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Life brought me so I came, 
 Death takes me so I go. 
I came not willfully, 
 Nor willfully I go. 
– Sheikh Muhammad Ibrahim Zauq (1789-1854) – Diwan-e-Zauq 
 
 
We remain of necessity strangers to ourselves, we do not understand ourselves, 
we must mistake ourselves, for us the maxim reads to all eternity: “each is 
furthest from himself” — with respect to ourselves we are not “knowers”… 
– Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 
 
 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
 And know the place for the first time. 
– T.S. Elliot (emphasis mine) 
 
 
In the wake of 911 we have witnessed a veritable explosion of discourses on 
Islam, and certainly we are already familiar with that phrase ‘an incitement to discourse’; 
the interplay between pleasure and power, between resistance and subjectivity, in 
Foucault’s seminal account of sexuality in The Will to Knowledge. The “machinery of 
power” that was deployed against deviant sexualities “did not aim to suppress it, but 
rather to give it an analytical, visible, and permanent reality.”2 If Foucault’s work was a 
concerted meditation on the modern deployments of criminality, madness and sexuality, 
                                                
2 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 1, History of 
Sexuality (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1990). 
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then surely the figure of the suicide terrorist — that exemplary juridical object of Western 
governmentality which folds all three Foucauldian elements (the mad, the criminal and 
the sexualized body/soul ) into a single figure — has become even more relevant in the 
era of biopolitical securitas. It appears that today, Islam has become an especially “dense 
transfer point for relations of power”3 — the jihadist must have also have his “interior 
androgyny.” Implicitly this work asks about the stakes in these games of truth, in this 
gigantomachia, this battle of the giants, in the death embrace of ‘secularism’ and 
‘religion’, in the dance between political Islam and the liberal West. 
 
Heidegger’s life long concern with the question and the meaning of being—with 
the place of being and the situatedness of “man”—has been the singular impetus and 
inspiration behind this attempt to think the place of the political and the ethical in the 
now troubled constellations of modernity and “Islam.” Therefore following one of 
Heidegger’s most obdurate truisms regarding the primacy of ontology over epistemology, 
‘the metacolonial’ in the title of this work, must properly be understood as an 
ontological4 rather than as a political or historical category. This neologism however is 
not an excuse to hide behind ‘theory/philosophy’ — as if thought and practice were ever 
distinct. The work aims therefore to be a material, embodied, history and politics of the 
‘ulama practices as a form of power; a genealogy of the violences and the silences of 
Islam.  
In the introduction to Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, Heidegger notes 
that his impetus for the destrucktion (de-construction, dismantling, or de-saturation) of 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
4 In this work as a whole however I do not develop the ontological resonances of this term. See Appendix A 
on critical ontology. 
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the tradition of metaphysics and everydayness, emerged out of the specific questions and 
crisis of the present in which he was thrown. Both World Wars had a profound effect on 
the nature, misdirection and ‘turn’ of his thinking. We are today in the grip of a series of 
crisis, which though stamped with the provenance of this particular moment, this 
particular place and time, unfold in the wake of prior events. Our present, our crisis, is 
not some apocalyptic culmination of a historical telos or spirit. But it is our time. 
Hence the task of undertaking a Foucaultian inflected (but ultimately 
Heideggerian) deconstruction of political Islam — a genealogy as critical/historical 
ontology —originates from our contemporary situatedness. It arises from the crisis of a 
situation which claims one in such a way that one is solicited, called to respond. But a 
response is not a reaction. Rather it is a practice of thought, a form-of-life perhaps. This 
‘thinking’ is not for its own sake, nor for a known telos, but one which may facilitate 
openings and possibilities for “thinking otherwise.” The problematization of political 
Islam undertaken here, points to this space or opening between fact and facticity; a space 
that is questionability itself, one that has disclosive possibilities in its destructuring 
movement. 
 
A Pre-face for Hauntology 
As such, this pre-face is the proper place to unveil or disclose something of an 
ethos, spirit, and mood of the work. The a priori dimensions of this project then, its pre-
face, is marked by a series of hauntings. The specter that haunts this work, also inhabits 
our very life-world. In a departure from Marxism, this specter is not Communism, nor for 
that matter is it Capitalism or even Islamism; these are merely its avatars.  
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The secret name of this metacolonial reading, one that remains a secret despite its 
telling, is hauntology. Critical/historical ontology seeks to disclose the specter, to witness 
it, as prelude to an embrace, an annihilation (fana), or perhaps even an exorcism. But 
whereas critical ontology is a practice of disclosure, hauntology is its more affective 
underbelly, its unmasking, its mood; the dreaded anticipation of an appearance or 
apparition of being. The fear of a nearness to being. The specter is in this way also the 
monstrous, both in the sense of a showing, an omen, and the simultaneous failure of 
signification, the unspeakable – it, the thing! The monstrous is a warning, a reminder. It 
is an admonishment that is also a summons, and a premonition that is also a 
demonstration.5 This work then is a merely a hint, an inkling, an echo or Anklang6 of the 
play of the specter. Therefore in the unmasking we must ask after what remains un-asked, 
namely the remains of being7. And yet what is unmasked in the question of being/power, 
is masking itself. 
 
A Pre-face for the Metacolonial 
As a critical interrogation of political Islam and its present, the metacolonial 
cannot be divorced from its broader moorings within Heidegger’s devastating critique of 
the metaphysics of presence. Furthermore, in what is perhaps the most philosophically 
significant chapter in Homo Sacer, Agamben persues this critique through a rethinking of 
the relation between potentiality and actuality: “Until a new and coherent ontology of 
                                                
5 All terms share the Latin root, the present active moneō, and the present infinitive monēre. My thanks to 
Joel Wainwright for this suggestive linkage between the daemon and demonstration. 
6 In Contributions Heidegger uses the word Anklang for echo. It denotes the initial moment in which a 
sound arises but has not yet fully unfolded. It carries over the tension between silence and expectation, 
between withdrawal and intimation. 




potentiality […] has replaced the ontology founded on the primacy of actuality and its 
relation to potentiality, a political theory freed from the aporias of sovereignty remains 
unthinkable.”8 Islam is today, by its own adherents most particularly, regarded as an 
essence, a way of life. Hence Islam, like biopolitics in Foucault, has an onto-theological 
structure. If as I am suggesting, Islam today is an avatar of machination or what 
Heidegger called technē, then we can no longer rely simply on representational and 
epistemological models to expose it. What is exposed however is not Islam as such, but 
homo Islamicus who now dwells in the Islamapolis. In the Islamapolis, Muslim 
experience in relation to the present is one which is increasingly understood in terms of 
identity, actuality and action. 
The metacolonial is also, like biopolitics and genealogy, the Trojan horse that 
inaugurates the interrogation of the political, and by extension political Islam, as an 
ontological rather than a merely political or violent epistemological category9. In my 
view this troubling of political Islam, this disclosure of Islam itself as a “regime of truth,” 
is a critical prelude towards the possibility of rethinking Islam’s ethical potentialities.10 
The metacolonial, unlike the postcolonial, does not operate within a conception of the 
West that privileges or essentializes the spatio-temporal moment of 
capitalism/colonialism as an originary and destructive force.11 I am suggesting then that 
political Islam today, its gathering (jama‘at), responds not to the call of prayer (adhan), 
                                                
8 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Meridian 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
9 See Appendix A on critical ontology. 
10 Lest anything written here be misconstrued, I do not believe that the farce of liberalism gives way to the 
promise of a liberal/progressive/traditionalist Islam; the two are caught up —as Benjamin’s Angelus Novus 
would protest — in the same catastrophe. It is then with the catastrophe, with the crisis of being, that the 
thoughts in this work turn. 
11 Rodolphe Gasché, Europe, or the Infinite Task: A Study of a Philosophical Concept, Meridian: Crossing 
Aesthetics (Stanford University Press, 2008). 
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but rather Gestell. This work seeks to illuminate the nature of this calling in the hopes of 
opening up a space for other voices, and, perhaps more importantly, other silences that 
we no longer have ears to hear. 
 
In his preface to Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben describes his commentary on 
the place of testimony as laying “signposts” which might allow “future cartographers of 
the new ethical territory to orient themselves.”12 In this work I am attempting to 
think/write a deconstructive genealogy of political Islam. It is my hope that a historical 
and political cartography of the “worlding” of the ‘ulama, will open a potential pathway 
into this new ethical space.  
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adab – Belles letters, literature; culture and culturally prescribed forms of comportment. 
adhan / azan – the Muslim call to prayer; from the root words ‘ear’ and ‘permit.’  
Ahl-i Hadith – “The people of hadith.” A Sunni doctrinal orientation that emerged in late 
nineteenth-century colonial India. They denied the authority of all Sunni schools 
of law and insisted instead on the exclusive and unmediated authority of the 
Qur’an and hadith as the sources of all guidance. Effectively opposed taqlid. 
Ahmadi – A doctrinal offshoot that emerged in late-nineteenth-century India and is 
defined most notably by the belief of its adherents (the Ahmadis) in the 
prophethood of the movement’s founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908). 
amir – Leader of a group or community 
Amir al-Momineen – Commander of the Faithfull.  
anjuman – Association or organization.  
Barelwi – The doctrinal orientation associated with Ahmad Rida Khan (d. 1921) of 
Bareilly, a small town in Uttar Pradesh in northern India. The Barelwis emphasize 
ritualized forms of devotion to the Prophet. Their ritual practices, which are often 
associated with Sufi shrines. 
bid‘at – innovation or novelty in religious matters. 
dar al-‘ulum – Institution of Islamic learning; see madrasa.  
Dars-i Nizami – Classical madrasa syllabus introduced in India in the 17th century, and 
adapted with slight modification by the Deoband schools. 
Deobandi – The doctrinal orientation associated with the madrasa of Deoband, in northern 
India; an adherent of this movement. The Deobandi movement, which emerged in 
late-nineteenth-century colonial India, lays stress on a renewed commitment to 
hadith and sacred law as the basis of a “reformed” and reinvigorated Islamic 
identity.  
din – Faith; religion; way of life. 
fatwa – A legal opinion issued by a jurisconsult (mufti).  
fiqh – Islamic law and jurisprudence.  
fitna – Disorder; chaos; the term is also used for the first civil wars in the history of Islam, 
which permanently divided the Muslim community into hostile factions and later 
into distinct sects.  
fuqaha’ (sing. faqih) – Scholars of law (fiqh).  
hadith – Traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad; regarded by Muslims as second 
to the Qur’an as a source of religious guidance and law.  
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Hanafi – A school of Sunni law named after Abu Hanifa (d. 767). Most Sunni Muslims in 
South Asia, including the Deobandis and the Barelwis, subscribe to this school of 
law. 
Hanbali – A school of Sunni law named after Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855); an adherent of 
this school. Hanbalism is the dominant school of law in Saudi Arabia. 
haram – Forbidden 
hudud (sing. hadd) – Punishments expressly sanctioned in the Qur’an and the sunna, and 
(unlike many other punishments) not subject to being mitigated by the ruler or the 
aggrieved party.  
huquq (sing. haqq) – Rights.  
huquq Allah – The rights of God, regarded as non-negotiable.  
hukm (pl. ahkam) – A legal ruling.  
Hukumat – Government. 
itihad – Systematic reflection on the foundational sources of the law to arrive at legal 
rulings on matters not already or explicitly determined by sacred law.  
ikhtilaf – Disagreement among jurists.  
‘ilm (pl. ‘ulum) – Knowledge; religious learning; science(s).  
imam – Leader or head of the community; In Shi‘i Islam the imams are the descendants of 
‘Ali who are regarded as infallible guides; the term is also used for the person 
leading the ritual prayers. 
isnad – Chain of transmission that forms an essential part of any report relating the words 
or deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith). 
Ithna ‘ashari – (“Twelver”) Shi‘a – A sub-division of the Shi‘a, whose members regard 
twelve successive descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter 
Fatima and her husband, ‘Ali, to be their infallible religious guides (imams).  
Ja‘fari – The school of law of the Ithna ‘ashari (“Twelver”) sect of the Shi‘a; named after 
the sixth Shi‘i imam, Ja‘far al-Sadiq (d. 765). 
jahiliyya – “The age of ignorance”; refers to the era before the advent of Islam; also used 
in the twentieth century by certain Islamist thinkers to assert that their 
coreligionists were living in a new age of unbelief or apostasy. 
jama‘at / jama‘a – Group; association; community. 
jihad – “struggle”. Two types of jihad are usually distinguished; an ‘internal’ struggle to 
forge character, self-formation, etc., and an external armed struggle or war against 
unbelievers or oppressors. Jihad as war can be invoked in self-defense or in the 
defense of Islam. 
khilafa – “Deputyship”; the caliphate.  
Khilafat al-Rashida – “The rightly guided caliphate”; designates the four caliphs (Abu 
Bakr, ‘Umar b. al-Khattab, ‘Usman b. ‘Affan, and ‘Ali b. Abi Talib) who 
immediately succeeded Muhammad as the leaders of the Muslim community (632-
61 C.E.). To the Sunnis, they are the most revered of all the Companions (sahaba) 




kafir – One who disbelieves or denies the faith of Islam. See also shirk. 
madhhab – School of law; in Urdu, sometimes used interchangeably with religion (din).  
madrasa (pl. madaris) – Islamic/religious school, seminary or institution of higher Islamic 
learning.  
Maliki – A school of Sunni law named after Malik b. Anas (d. 795). 
masjid – Mosque. Place of worship. 
maqtab – usually a small school attached to a mosque for elementary Islamic learning 
mawlawi / mawlana – Also spelt maulana. A term used to designate a religious scholar; 
see ‘ulama.  
millat / milla – A community defined by ties of faith (see ummah).  
mufti – A jurisconsult; one who issues legal opinions (fatwas)  
mujahidin – Those waging jihad.  
mujtahid – A practitioner of ijtihad.  
muqallid – A practitioner of taqlid.  
mullah – A religious scholar or master; see maulana, ‘ulama. 
pak – pure. As in Pakistan, the pure state, the nation of the pure 
pir – A Sufi master. Also often rulers or leaders in rural communities 
qawm – Nation as defined by ties of ethnicity, shared territory, and language.  
qadi – Muslim judge who rules according to the shari‘a 
qanun – Law as enunciated by the ruler, as distinguished from the discourses of the 
Muslim jurists (fiqh).  
sahaba – The Companions of the Prophet Muhammad. For the Sunnis, they are not only 
the source of all information about the teachings of Muhammad but also the 
paragons of religious authority that is second only to the Prophet. The Shi‘a 
recognize only some of the Companions as righteous.  
Shafi‘i – A school of Sunni law, named after Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafi‘i (d. 820); an 
adherent of that school.  
shari‘a – The totality of Islamic legal and ethical norms; the sacred law of Islam.  
shaykh / shaikh – (pl. mashayakh) A religious scholar; a Sufi master. Also spelt. 
shirk – The greatest sin in Islam; associating another being, entity or person with God 
Shi‘a (sing. Shi‘i) – Community of Muslims who, unlike the Sunnis, believe that after the 
death of the Prophet infallible religious guidance must continue in the person of 
the imams , who are divinely designated to lead the community in religious and 
political matters. There are several subdivisions within the Shi‘a, of which the 
historically most important are the Ithna ‘ashariyya and the Isma‘iliyya.  
Sufi – Muslim mystic. Sufi practice is also referred to as tasawwuf. 
sunna – The normative example of the Prophet, usually expressed in the form of reports 
relating his teachings and conduct (hadith).  
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Sunnis – Those professing adherence to the sunna of the Prophet and to the agreed upon 
norms and practices of the universal Muslim community. The Sunnis constitute the 
overwhelming majority of the Muslim people worldwide. 
tabligh – The preaching of Islam.  
Tabligh-i Jama‘at – A proselytizing movement that emerged in early-twentieth century 
India and now has operations worldwide. Those associated with the Tabligh-i 
Jama‘at often belong to or have some affinity with the Deobandi orientation.  
taqlid – “Investing with authority”; following the legal rulings of earlier scholars, or of the 
school of law to which one professes adherence. 
taqwa – piety; fear of God. 
‘ulama (sing. ‘alim) – Men of learning, those who possess knowledge (‘ilm). Usually 
applied to a class or group of religious scholars who have formal training in the 
Islamic religious sciences, especially but not exclusively in Islamic law and hadith.  
ummah – The global, pan-Islamic community of Muslims.  
usul al-fiqh – The sources of the law; the principles of the science of jurisprudence and the 
methodology of legal reasoning. 
Wahhabi – An adherent of the puritanical teachings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab 
(d. 1791); Wahhabism is the official ideology of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
waqf – (pl. awqaf) – Pious endowments  
wali – “Friend [of God]”; saint  
zakat – Islamic alms-tax paid annually on one’s accumulated wealth; one of the five 
“pillars” of the faith.  
 
(Glossary partly adapted from Qasim Zaman, The ‘Ulama in Contemporary Islam: 
Custodians of Change, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics. Princeton: Princeton 







The Metacolonial State is a genealogical project that is concerned with 
understanding the nature of political space in contemporary Pakistan. My contention is 
that political Islam, and specifically the Deoband and Taliban ‘ulama, have taken on an 
increasingly biopolitical character. As “a history of the present” I show how the crisis in 
Pakistan today is itself a manifestation of the biopoliticization of Islam. While the 
Deoband ‘ulama remain the primary thematic subject and focus of the work, they are 
largely signposts towards a broader attempt to disclose a cartography of power. Within 
the multiplicity of Islamist practices in Pakistan, the Deoband movement has emerged as 
one of the most highly organized and yet remarkably polycentric institutions that claim 
orthodox religious authority. Until September 11 2001, scholarship on political Islam in 
Pakistan had been focused on ‘modernist’ and ‘fundamentalist’ movements; traditional 
‘ulama were considered to be politically and culturally insignificant. The dramatic rise of 
the Taliban and its fateful alliance with Al-Qaeda have however resulted in a 
proliferation of new discourses about the ‘ulama, their traditions and educational 
institutions. Precisely because of the imperial gaze directed towards the control, reform 
and regulation of Islam, this study places our understanding of Islamist politics within a 
broader, complex, and overlapping set of governmentalities and competing sovereign 
powers. The work aims to be a material, embodied history and politics of the ‘ulama as a 
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form of power. I argue that while ‘ulama practices have undergone a series of dramatic 
transformations since 1947, these cannot be understood in isolation from the broader 
militarization of political space; hence the need for opening this investigation with an 
analysis of the mullah-military complex that emerged in the 1980’s. The ‘metacolonial’ is 
itself a neologism that articulates two influential critical paradigms: Foucault’s concern 
with biopolitics and governmentality and Agamben’s illuminating thesis on sovereign 
power, bare life and the state of exception. Pakistan is shown to be an exemplary space of 
biopolitical sovereignty where the state of exception takes on a near permanent 
localization and where distinctions between dictatorship and democracy, between 










If politics today seems to be going through a protracted eclipse and appears in a 
subaltern position with respect to religion, economics, and even the law, that is so 
because, to the extent to which it has been losing sight of its own ontological 
status, it has failed to confront the transformations that gradually have emptied 
out its categories and concepts. 
 — Agamben13 
 
[If] Islam dominated the world, terrorism would rise against Islam, for it is the 
very world, the globe itself, which resists globalization. 
 — Baudrillard14 
 
 
Cartographies of the Political: Toward the Metacolonial State/Space 
 
On October 21st 2009, at around 3:00 PM, the usually calm and contemplative 
atmosphere of Islamabad’s International Islamic University (IIUI), was shattered by a 
double suicide bombing that killed six people, including three young hijab clad girls. 
Dozens of other victims were severely injured in the blasts, one of which was detonated 
at the women's cafeteria and the other outside the office of the chairman of the 
department of Islamic Law (shari‘a). Baudrillard’s words, which I cite as an epigram to 
this chapter, echo resoundingly in these bombings, an event which is indeed paradigmatic 
                                                
13 ———, Means without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino, vol. 20, 
Theory out of Bounds (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. ix. 
14 Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism, trans. Chris Turner, New Revised ed. (Verso, 2003), p. 12. 
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of the war between Islamist forces and an Islamic state. Government agencies were quick 
to blame the Tahrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for the attack with Interior Minister 
Rehman Malik stating yet again that “all roads lead to South Waziristan.”15 According to 
figures released by the Pakistan ministry of interior, 2009 has been one of the bloodiest 
years since the beginning of what can only be described as the opening of yet another 
deadly front in the series of ongoing civil-wars of Pakistan. Over 80 bombing incidents in 
2009 alone have claimed over 1200 lives. Since 2006 various sources place the death toll 
at over 800016. 
In a series of recent research trips to Pakistan what I found to be most disquieting 
with regard to the ongoing crisis was a pervasive mood of radical uncertainty and doubt, 
often expressed by the inability of even informed local actors and analysts to make sense 
of the crisis. In the space of this uncertainty, a space marked continuously by the threat of 
violence and death, conspiracy theories are of course rampant. What each of these 
theories, both sane and insane have to offer, is the idea that structures of invisibility 
govern the visible. Ask anyone on the streets and you will find any number of variations 
of the hidden hand thesis; ‘the Taliban is not ‘really’ the Taliban’, ‘Muslims cannot be 
doing this to other Muslims’, ‘the CIA, Mossad, RAW wish to destabilize Pakistan’, 
‘secret elements within the shadowy ISI are seeking to subvert democracy’, ‘President 
Zardari is merely a tool for US policies’, and so on ad infinitum. That is to say the entire 
framework of political space is haunted by a cocktail of spooks and sovereign political 
wills. Nobody it seems abides17 by Pakistan. Even the protest by IIUI18 students that 
                                                
15 Dawn, Oct 21, 2009. 
16 These figures do not including body counts of the military or “insurgents.” 
17 I borrow the import of this term from Qadri Ismail, Abiding by Sri Lanka: On Peace, Place, and 
Postcoloniality, Public Worlds (University of Minnesota Press, 2005). 
 
 3 
followed in the wake of the University attacks simply invoked the generic “just say no to 
terrorism” while simultaneously holding the state accountable for its failure to protect its 
citizens. Everybody is suspicious of everybody, nothing seems real or genuine. It is as if 
the entire country is now held together by the thread of nihilism itself. Pakistan is clearly 
facing an existential crisis of epic proportions, one that perhaps far surpasses the crisis of 
the separation of “East Pakistan” in 1972.  
This “homeland” for the Muslims of British India, is increasingly producing both 
real and imagined states of homelessness for its beleaguered citizens19. While there is no 
doubt a direct link between the commencement of Army operations in the FATA region 
and the dramatic escalation of violence in Pakistan since 2006, this work will argue that a 
more rigorous conceptual and historical understanding of the structure of violence is 
needed if we are to begin to make sense of what has confounded local analysts and the 
public alike. The aim of this dissertation, in its most prosaic terms, is in part to provide 
visibility to the space of the political where the violent contests between local, national, 
international and trans-national sovereign forces are playing themselves out. It is in many 
ways a preliminary history, or gene-alogy of specters that haunt this now almost 
permanent ‘space of exception’. Even as I write, this space of exception threatens to take 
on a permanent localization in Pakistan, in a way that has already consumed Afghanistan. 
                                                
18 With financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the Islamic University was founded on 
November 11, 1980. The university’s website declares it’s mission: “The desire to produce scholars and 
practitioners, imbued with Islamic learning, character and personality, and capable to meet the economic, 
social, political and intellectual needs of modern times.” Located on the outer edges of Islamabad in Sector 
H-10, the University is a prominent icon of Islamabad’s architectural landscape, and currently enrolls 
17,000 students, including 6,000 women and 2,000 foreign students. The university also has a history of 
links with jihadist organizations during the 1980’s and 1990’s. The infamous Muslim scholar Abdullah 
A‘zam, Al-Qaeda leader and Osama Bin Laden’s mentor, was once a lecturer at the university before the 
mujahideen took up their CIA/ISI backed armed struggle against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979. As one student recalls, “university’s students, back in those days, openly backed the cause of jihadis 
and some of them would hang portraits of Osama bin Laden and his other comrades in their hostel rooms” 
(Newsline, Oct 2009). 
19 Already Pakistan has some of the highest figures for IDSP’s. 
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In Pakistan today security and terrorism have become a single deadly system in which 
they legitimate and justify each other's mode of being. In the desperate cycle of state 
terror and insurrectionary terrorism that has gripped Pakistan, and indeed the world, we 
need more than ever to understand the complexities of “power” and “violence”,20 in both 
their repressive, revolutionary, resistant and fetishistic forms. This self-consciously 
interdisciplinary project — part history, ethnography, geography, philosophy, always 
critical — is both solicited by and responds to this crisis. (political violence is of course 
not new to Pakistan, the decade of the 1990’s was also marred by forms of ethnic and 
state violence.  
 
Globalization is perhaps the ineluctable and simultaneously enigmatic condition 
of our time. It goes without saying then that the political space under examination here is 
immediately global, and its contours cannot simply be folded into the borders of 
something called “Pakistani” history. Globalization is not merely about the 
reconfiguration of national powers — the circulation of goods, commodities, images and 
capital across territorial boundaries — but also about flows and configurations of power 
which produce new bodies, affects, desires, associations and understandings; in short 
                                                
20 This work is thus also simultaneously a meditation on power, violence and the body. I draw almost 
exclusively for my understanding of power on Foucault and Agamben. Violence has also become a 
thematic of intense recent scholarly attention. I draw also on Zizek’s distinction between the “fascinating 
lure of … directly visible ‘subjective’ violence” and the more invisible forms of a systemic and symbolic 
“objective” violence; a violence that lurks like “dark matter” in the social “background”; Slavoj Zizek, 
Violence: Big Ideas/Small Books (Picador, 2008). On violence see also the essays collected in Aisha Karim 
Bruce Lawrence, On Violence: A Reader (Duke University Press, 2007). See also Hannah Arendt, On 
Violence, Harvest Book (Harvest Books, 1970), Jennifer L. Culbert Austin Sarat, States of Violence: War, 
Capital Punishment, and Letting Die (Cambridge University Press, 2009), Marco Abel, Violent Affect: 
Literature, Cinema, and Critique after Representation (University of Nebraska Press, 2008). Also 
influential for this study are Allen Feldman, Formations of Violence: The Nature of the Body and Political 
Terror in Northern Ireland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), and Gyanendra Pandey, Routine 
Violence: Nations, Fragments, Histories, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford University Press, 
2005). For a specifically Foucaultian critique see Beatrice Hanssen, Critique of Violence: Between 
Poststructuralism and Critical Theory, Warwick Studies in European Philosophy (Routledge, 2000). 
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globalization produces a new “sense of the world”.21 The crisis in Pakistan is understood 
immediately as both a local and trans-local phenomenon, where political space is both 
material and affective; it touches on the structure of feelings of everyday life.22 Especially 
in the wake of 911, within the broader global circulation of affect, Islam, with all of its 
multiple registers, is consumed at a more acute affective and bodily level. Juan Cole’s 
recent book Engaging the Muslim World,23 recognizes ‘anxiety’ as a central motif that 
defines the biopolitical interplay between America and the Muslim World. While Cole’s 
book seeks to deconstruct the singular affective registers of each term, it would be fair to 
say the problems of violence and war that confront us in the age of terror, must be 
situated on a level which exceeds politics and history. The term for this excess, which I 
will elaborate on shortly, is biopolitical sovereignty. Not only then as Cole argues do we 
have to confront generalized anxieties mutually reflected in the Islam-West relationship, 
we must also take into consideration more immanent planes of affect that pervade the 
landscape of and between Muslim communities and states (Iranian anxieties about Arabs 
etc, Jewish anxieties about the Arab, Indian anxieties about Pakistan, vice versa and so 
on). My concern here is thus with a series of overlapping and immanent biopolitical and 
                                                
21 Globalization is what Jean-Luc Nancy describes as an “enclosure in the undifferentiated sphere of a 
unitotality” (p. 28) a process that leads to an uninhabitable un-world or state of injustice, “an unprecedented 
geopolitical, economic, and ecological catastrophe” (p. 50), in contrast to the creative potential of 
mondialization (world-forming). See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2007), ———, The Sense of the World (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000). 
22 Ann Laura Stoler, "Affective States," in A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics, ed. Joan Vincent 
David Nugent (Malden: Blackwell, 2004). Scholars of the political are now increasingly paying attention to 
the role of affect and passion in political life. Patricia Ticineto Clough, ed., The Affective Turn: Theorizing 
the Social (Duke University Press, 2007), Jonathan Flatley, Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the 
Politics of Modernism (Harvard University Press, 2008), John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the 
Social and the Somatic, Posthumanities (Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2009), and also Cheryl Hall, The 
Trouble with Passion: Political Theory Beyond the Reign of Reason (Routledge, 2005), all represent a 
significant advance in theorizing political affect. 
23 Juan Cole, Engaging the Muslim World (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
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sovereign anxieties. The intensification and multiplication of this series of overlapping 
anxieties — especially in regions which are more concretely impacted by the decision of 
imperial policies and the destructive regimes of neoliberal globalization — tend to 
aggravate and intensify the “state of exception”24 and the attendant production of what 
Italian social and political ‘theorist’ Giorgio Agamben calls ‘bare life.’ Bare life is naked 
life, a life (zoē) without value, at once included and excluded from the law. The 
neologism ‘metacolonial’ that I deploy in this work, is not meant to displace the 
postcolonial, but instead seeks to capture a sense of the nihilistic condition which 
pervades our time.25 
The metacolonial then, articulates two fundamental theoretico-political 
trajectories from the work Michel Foucault (1926 –1984), and Giorgio Agamben (1942) 
into a single conceptual space: Foucault’s concern with biopolitics and governmentality 
and Agamben’s illuminating thesis on sovereign power, bare life and the state of 
exception. These two critical vectors are then gathered under the sign of the 
metacolonial, a term which is at the heart of the thesis. The metacolonial is thus a single 
term meant to capture the critical thrust of these paradigms which are now already widely 
deployed in the social and human sciences.26 The metacolonial is thus a sovereign 
biopolitical space where the state of exception takes on a near permanent localization. 
                                                
24 The term is Agamben’s. I elaborate on the significance of this term for my project in this and subsequent 
chapters. See Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005). 
25 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. The concept of bare life signifies a “new 
academic interest in nonrepresentational approaches to the question of being which conceive of time-space 
as having no determined actuality.” Quoted in Helen Thomas and Jamilah Ahmed, eds., Cultural Bodies: 
Ethnography and Theory (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2004). The metacolonial is thus also an 
attempt to think in nonrepresentational terms. See also Nigel Thrift, Non-Representational Theory: Space, 
Politics, Affect (London: Routledge, 2008). 
26 See Chapter 2. We might also begin to think about the metacolonial as a kind of ontological imperialism; 




Part of the innovation of this project, its conceit, is to bring these powerful disclosive 
paradigms to bear on an understanding of political Islam in Pakistan. Political Islam is 
not by any means monolithic even in Pakistan, let alone globally, and in this study I have 
chosen to concentrate on the Pakistani vectors of the Deoband school in large part 
because of their intimate, though contested link with the Taliban phenomenon. My 
primary task then will be to show that the political space of Pakistan, and by extension 
the political practices of the Deoband ‘ulama have taken on an increasingly biopolitical 
character. At its broadest then this work is conceived as a genealogical history — “a 
history of the present” — of the crisis of Pakistan. My primary thesis and task will be to 
show how this history is itself a manifestation of the biopoliticization of Islam. From 
within this biopoliticization of Islam we can talk about and make sense of ‘ulama 
governmentality and the state of violence. 
Stated differently, this work is animated principally by a concern to understand 
the forms of violence that have gathered around the horizons of political Islam. While the 
Deoband ‘ulama of Pakistan remain the primary thematic subject and focus of the work, 
they are largely signposts towards a broader attempt to disclose a cartography of the 
political. That is to say I am not principally concerned with a specific narrative history of 
political Islam in Pakistan, but rather am attempting to think this phenomenon in relation 
to what Foucault’s called the historico-political a priori.27 One of the more rudimentary 
contentions that I will make is that the phenomenon of ‘Islamic/Islamist’ violence and 
terrorism, is not a problem of politics or religion as such, but rather a problem of the 
                                                
27 See Beatrice Han, Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical, trans. 
Edward Pile, Atopia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). I will expand on the significance of 
Foucault’s historical a priori in Chapter 2. 
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political.28 The aim here is to problematize political Islam, to show it up as an apparatus 
(what Foucault called a dispositif).29 These problematizations do not constitute a new 
post-genealogical methodology or analytic, but instead are designed to induce a critical 
spirit that can at least witness, if not perhaps respond, to the state of exception in which 
we live. This study therefore revolves around one essential question; how to think the 
problematic of political Islam (and specifically the Deoband) genealogically and 
biopolitically. Through this term — the “metacolonial” — Islamic modernities30 are 
brought face to face with the ghosts of metaphysics haunting our global, technological, 
biopolitical present. To disclose political Islam as a metacolonial phenomenon is 
therefore the specific task of this work. It must also be stated upfront that I arrived at the 
question of ‘ulama biopolitics only after observing, documenting and thinking about 
Deoband political somatics — its body politics. The Deoband commitment to the 
enforcement of shari‘a, the deployment of blasphemy as a technology of sovereign 
power, the production of the Ahmadi as heretic and ‘bare life’, and its valorization of 
violent jihad, are some of the examples that I use in this dissertation to open up a space 
for a new problematization of political Islam and ‘ulama praxis. 
The provisional aim of this metacolonial analysis of political Islam will be to 
show how the space of the political — which unfolds today as a pure topology of 
                                                
28 Given the postfoundational distinction between politics and the political that I draw on, we can say 
therefore that the crisis is simultaneously an onto-political crisis. For an excellent account of Left-
Heideggerian appropriations of political ontology see Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political 
Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau, Taking on the Political (Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007). On another register this dissertation can be seen as an exploration the problematic 
of political Islam in terms of an historical and political ontology. In a work concluded in parallel to the 
dissertation I have began to formulate the outlines of a critical ontology which further illuminate the 
meaning of the metacolonial: as a colonization or enframing of the life-world by metaphysics (technē). 
29 This is perhaps what Foucault had in mind with the terms problematization and eventalization, which 
were meant to designate a way of thinking beyond genealogy. See Rudi Visker, Michel Foucault: 
Genealogy as Critique, trans. Chris Turner (London & New York: Verso, 1995). 
30 See Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, 2nd ed., Phronesis (London & New York: Verso, 1996). 
The metacolonial is thus linked to “ghost-modernity”, rather than postmodernity. 
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exception — proliferates and intensifies through the alignment (and disaggregation) of 
sovereign orbits and imperial spaces. This political space, or field of power, can be 
characterized as a series of nested and overlapping sovereignties within a wider 
biopolitical matrix. This space can be understood as a grid of intelligibility that provides 
the conditions of possibility of political practice. Since the metacolonial is characterized 
above all as a state/space of exception,31 it will be necessary to highlight the political and 
topological structure of the exception and enunciate it’s relationship to Foucault’s 
genealogy of power and the subject.32 The metacolonial state, is therefore a state of 
biopolitical exception, a state in which the capture of life finds a more or less permanent 
and stable spatial arrangement. 
It should be noted upfront that my attempt here is not to outline a new paradigm 
for critical thought, but rather to attempt to think the problem of political Islam 
genealogically and, by extension biopolitically.33 The metacolonial is a specific 
cartographic exercise whose topology relies extensively on Agamben’s innovative 
account of the structure of the sovereign ban. To put it differently, the metacolonial is 
both an affect and a zone — a state/space — marked by the intensification of sovereign 
and biopolitical forms of power. The metacolonial designates this colonization of life by 
the will to power.34 It is within this complex mapping of power that the practices and 
possibilities of the both the ‘ulama and the army (the mullah-military complex) are to be 
                                                
31 Agamben, State of Exception. 
32 It would be possible to state in a nutshell that what I find limiting in most of the studies of Muslims and 
political Islam in Pakistan, is a series of ‘untheorized’ and largely liberal models of power and the subject. 
In contrast Foucault’s rethinking of power and the subject, and post-structuralism more broadly, proceeds 
on the basis of a problematization of these two key elements. In large measure the conceptual work of 
chapter 1 responds to the rather impoverished uptake of a vast range of useful ways to think about time, 
space and the political. Agamben is exemplary in this regard. 
33 While biopolitics has become an important paradigm, like governmentality, in the social and human 
sciences, it has not yet been applied to the study of political Islam. 
34 Or metaphysics as technē. 
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situated. The metacolonial thesis offered here then, suggests that it is the modernist 
transformation and politicization of the ummah into a quasi-nationalist structure, that has 
enabled the ‘ulama to harness the destructive logic of sovereign power. This is the 
simplest dimension of what I mean by the phrase the biopoliticization of the Islamic life-
world. 
In the dominant forms of the Western and Islamist imaginary, some singular and 
unique theology, a civilizational ethos even, is supposed to ground the incommensurable 
difference between contemporary Islamic formations and the West. Neocons, Orientalists 
and Islamists alike assume that the “traditional”35 textual sources of the Muslim life 
world, the Qur’an and Hadith, form the deep antechamber for both militant and 
democratic Islamist politics. Variations of this proposition which pervade as virtual 
truisms in public discourses on political Islam, need to be rethought significantly.36 But 
even though Islamic political language trades in the discursive coinage of tradition, the 
market in which these terms have purchase is today an altogether transformed space. 
That is to say the Muslim world, its “traditional” market, has undergone a series of 
architectonic shifts, a disruption and transformation of its classical episteme to a modern 
one.37 The terms ‘biopolitical’ and the ‘exception’ signal this transformation of Islamic 
space. Another key element of this thesis then will be an attempt to interrogate the 
                                                
35 My use of the term of course unfolds in the wake of the significant rethinking of this category along with 
its usual binary opposite modern. For the classic account see Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., 
The Invention of Tradition, Canto (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), and 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism 
(London & New York: Verso, 1991). 
36 See Haj’s excellent new study which significantly problematizes the very applicability of categories like 
‘modern’, ‘secular’ and ‘tradition’ Samira Haj, Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality, and 
Modernity, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford University Press, 2008). Haj’s work reflects the 
influence of Talal Asad’s anthropology of the secular. My aim here is to complete Asad’s project on a more 
radical footing. 
37 Talal Asad’s term “discursive tradition” draws only partially from the genealogical resonacnes of the 
Foucauldian term “discursive regime.” Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of 
Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
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consequences of this epistemic shift, and I have used the term metacolonial to signal this 
concern with political Islam at the level of what Foucault called the épistème.38 Unlike 
the shifts from the classical to the renaissance to the modern épistème that Foucault has 
so admirably elaborated with respect to the West, the modernist shift in large parts of the 
Muslim world, and certainly South Asia, were accompanied by the colonial violence of a 
“distant sovereign”.39 It is this colonial difference then that can account, in part, for the 
troubling experience of modernity in large parts of the Muslim world;40 that is to say, on 
pain of a considerable generalization, that there is no clash between something called 
modernity and the west on the one hand and something called Islam on the other. Rather 
the violences and incoherence of political praxis in large parts of the Islamic world result 
from a disavowal, or misrecognition of its already modernist, biopolitical ground. As 
Agamben suggests, the “enigmas” of modern violence, can only be solved, “on the terrain 
– biopolitics – on which they were formed.”41 On Agamben’s diagnosis, the inevitable 
                                                
38 Given the significance of this move for the overall intelligibility of the thesis I have devoted chapter 2 to 
a clarification of Foucault’s anti-humanist genealogy. 
39 I borrow this term from Sudipta Sen, Distant Sovereignty: National Imperialism and the Origins of 
British India (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
40 Of course a similar disenchantment also pervades ‘the west’. 
41 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Obviously modern violence (Islamic 
exceptionalism) is not an exclusive feature of political Islam. On the contrary liberal polities have a much 
longer and violent record of political praxis. See for instance Michael Dillon, The Liberal Way of War: The 
Martial Face of Global Biopolitics, Global Horizons (Routledge, 2009), Julian Reid, The Biopolitics of the 
War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity and the Defence of Logistical Societies, Reappraising the 
Political (Manchester University Press, 2007), Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in 
Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), Fred Anderson 
and Andrew Cayton, The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500-2000 (Viking 
Adult, 2004). There is also an already vast literature on violences of ‘freedom’ and American 
exceptionalism (Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right, 
1st ed., Critical Issue Book (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995), Deborah L. Madsen, American 
Exceptionalism (University Press of Mississippi, 1998), Ashley Dawson and Malini Johar Schueller, eds., 
Exceptional State: Contemporary U.S. Culture and the New Imperialism, New Americanists (Duke 
University Press, 2007), Thomas R. Hietala, Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire, 
Cornell Paperbacks (Cornell University Press, 2003), Andrew Neal, Exceptionalism and the War on 
Terror: The Politics of Liberty and Security after 9/11, Routledge Critical Security Studies (Routledge, 
2008), William V. Spanos, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Spector of Vietnam 
(State University of New York Press, 2008), Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: Origins of 
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failure of biopolitics, leads to the proliferation of an increasingly sovereign mentality. 
The impossible task then is to give an account of the ruin of the modernist Muslim 
subject — homo Islamicus — and by extension the ruination of Islam. 
As is already evident then a plethora of terms — genealogy, governmentality, 
biopolitics, sovereignty, exception, episteme — are critical to this thesis. Given that these 
concepts are often deployed and articulated with a wide degree of differing latitude and 
even at times at cross purposes, a somewhat lengthy clarification of the way I understand 
and use these terms is essential for the intelligibility of the project as a whole. To be sure 
this is a history as genealogy, and it will be important to begin by clarifying the stakes of 
this articulation. Chapter 2 is therefore devoted to a clarification of these terms and 
highlights the conceptual and political work of disclosure they will perform in this thesis. 
The primary labor of this dissertation has been to forge a new reading of the crisis, rather 
than simply chronicle its historical unfolding. I will reserve a series of brief introductions 
to political Islam and Deoband ‘ulama in subsequent chapters, drawing out the ways in 
which my work is both situated within and departs from the extant literature. 
 
 
The Deoband ‘Ulama 
 
My concern in this dissertation is principally with understanding the religio-
political42 nature of the Pakistani Deoband movement. This movement traces its formal 
historical origins to the Deoband madrasa (seminary), founded by Maulana Muhammad 
                                                
American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Harvard University Press, 1986), David E. Stannard, American 
Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World (Oxford University Press, 1993). 
42 The term religo-political is used to suggest that religion like politics, is always saturated by relationships 
and effects of power. See Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political, Thinking the Political (London & New 
York: Routledge, 1995), and Chantal Mouffe, On the Political, Thinking in Action (Routledge, 2005). 
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Qasim Nanotawi (1832 – 80) and Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1828 –1905), in 
British India’s United Provinces (UP now Uttar Pradesh)43. A leading theological 
academy of modern India,44 the Dar al-‘Ulum of Deoband has since its inception in 1866, 
spawned one of the most influential global “traditionalist”45 (orthodox) institutions within 
the wider Muslim world. According to Barbara Metcalf, one of the western worlds 
foremost scholars of the Indian Deoband, the Deobandis were one of the several groups 
which sought to “reproduce Islamic culture in a colonial period characterized by 
considerable challenges to the preservation of traditional learning. … they became known 
not only as a school but as a school of thought.”46 This school of thought and movement 
was soon to take on “sectarian”47 dimension, as it transformed from a maslak, a style of 
                                                
43 For the only serious full length historical account of the early Deoband see Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic 
Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). Zia-ul-Hasan 
Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963), is 
also useful. A valuable primary source is the two volume history by the Indian Deoband scholar Sayyid 
Mahboob Rizvi, History of the Dar Al-‘Ulum Deoband, trans. Murtaz Husain F. Quraishi (Deoband, UP, 
India: Idara-e Ihtemam, Dar al-‘Ulum, 1980). However by far the best and most comprehensive book-
length treatment of the contemporary Deoband ‘ulama is Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The 'Ulama in 
Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). Metcalf’s first book Islamic Revival, while seminal in many respects nonetheless 
ends her narrative at the precise moment of the rapid politicization of the ‘ulama; namely the 1918 Khilafat 
movement. In her valuable attempts to play down a series of Orientalist essentialism that link Islam with 
fanaticism she underplays the political dimensions of the Deoband movement see her introduction to 
Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). Metcalf’s otherwise pioneering work has suffered from a largely untheorized 
model of politics and the political. I will examine the consequences of this lacunae in Chapter 3. Zaman’s 
work by contrast constitutes a necessary methodological advance in the study of the South Asian ‘ulama. 
Since my understanding of history, the subject and society is rooted in Foucault’s work on power, I draw, 
but significantly depart, from Metcalf’s overall interpretation of the Deoband. 
44 B. Metcalf, "The Madrasa at Deoband: A Model for Religious Education in Modern India," Modern 
Asian Studies 12, no. 1 (1978). 
45 In chapter 3 I problematize this characterization of the Deoband as ‘traditionalist’. 
46 Introduction in Metcalf, Islamic Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan, p. xx. 
47 In her most recent work, Metcalf uses this term but does not flesh out its implications (Barbara D. 
Metcalf, Husain Ahmad Madani: The Jihad for Islam and India's Freedom, Makers of the Muslim World 
(Oneworld Publications, 2008). See the chapter, “Refashioning Identities” in Zaman for an account of this 
violent sectarian dimension of the Deoband (Zaman, The 'Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of 
Change.) In later chapters I intend to show that the Deoband movement is essentially a biopolitical project 
rather than as Metcalf claims an apolitical inward pietistic movement of personal reform. For her recent 
attempts to grapple with the violent political nature of the Taliban Deobandis see Barbara D. Metcalf, 
"Traditionalist'  Islamic Activism Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs," in Understanding September 11, ed. 
Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer (New York: The New Press, 2004). 
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Islam, to a distinct form of Muslim identity. Today the Deoband’s Afghan and Pakistani 
based variants have attained global notoriety, principally because of the nexus between 
the Deoband and the Taliban.48.  
Within the multiplicity of Islamist practices in Pakistan, the Deoband has emerged 
as one of the most highly organized and yet remarkably polycentric institutions that claim 
orthodox religious authority. I am arguing in this work that the Deoband ‘ulama practices 
have undergone a series of dramatic transformations since 1947. I am characterizing 
these transformation primarily in terms of Foucault’s grammars of power — 
governmentality, sovereignty, discipline, and biopolitics.49 The 1979 Afghan-Soviet war 
marks a particularly significant threshold in this transformation; an event which led to the 
intensification of the conscription of ‘ulama power within a broader set of military and 
geopolitical spaces. Though this the new military-mullah complex was a significant 
turning point, I am arguing that crucial elements of this transformation have been 
underway since the inception of the Islamic State in 1947. This transformation as I shall 
discuss, has also played itself out in the dramatic shifts within the institutional space of 
                                                
48 While it may not have been inaccurate to describe the Taliban as Afghan Deobandi’s — or rather Afghan 
Students of Pakistani Deoband madrasas — in 1994 and 2001, today the Taliban is a more complex and 
multilayered phenomenon which has taken on distinct Pakhtun nationalist overtone. See Tariq Ali, The 
Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power (Scribner, 2008), for the nationalist element, and also 
Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007). The link between the Deoband and the Taliban is therefore 
complex, and it would be to over simplify the former to make an unequivocal connection with the later. 
While one must be wary then of essentialism’s and simplifications of the Deoband, it would also be 
inaccurate to say that the link is arbitrary or a mischaracterization. I take up this problematic in chapter 3. 
49 While there have now emerged a number of excellent works on the Deoband ‘ulama and their 
institutions, none of them take a biopolitical approach — see for instance Jamal Malik, ed., Madrasas in 
South Asia: Teaching Terror? (London: Routledge, 2008), Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Ashraf Ali Thanawi: 
Islam in Modern South Asia, Makers of the Muslim World (Oneworld Publications, 2007), Robert W. 
Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern 
Education, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press, 2007), Sana Haroon, Frontier 
of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, Columbia//Hurst (Columbia University Press, 2007), 
Zaman, The 'Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. I will further discuss some of these 
works in subsequent chapters. 
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‘ulama authority; the madrasa. Historically the madrasa within South Asia, has been an 
informal space for the dissemination of a variety of forms of Islamic learning (‘ilm).50 By 
the 19th century however, especially with the emergence of the Deoband, it had become a 
more formal disciplinary space for the production of “pious” bodies and ‘ulama authority. 
As the expanding network of Deobandi madaris (religious schools) entered or were co-
opted by other political arenas, these docile bodies have been increasingly deployed 
either for various state sponsored projects of “jihad”,51 or as militant cadres for the 
Deoband’s own increasingly autonomous yet fractured and internally feuding political 
movements; the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam (Society of Islamic ‘Ulama or JUI) and its 
various radical sectarian and jihadist offshoots like the Sipah-i Sahaba (SSP) and the 
Taliban. Thus, as “history of the present” the dissertation pays particular attention to the 
ruptures, displacements, and transformations of discourses on religion, identity and 
politics; transformations which I am suggesting should be understood principally in terms 
of subjectivation and biopoliticization.  
In addition to thinking about the history and politics this important, and yet 
remarkably understudied Islamic organization, what I am aiming for here is the 
development of a more nuanced and critically receptive framework for the analysis of 
                                                
50 See Saiyid Naqi Husain Jafri, "A Modernist View of Madrasa Education in Late Mughal India," in 
Islamic Education, Diversity and National Identity: Dini Madaris in India Post 9/11, ed. Jan-Peter Hartung 
and Helmut Reifeld (SAGE Publications, 2006), Saiyid Zaheer Husain Jafri, "Madrasa and Khanaqah, or 
Madrasa in Khanaqah? Education and Sufi Establishments in Northern India " in Islamic Education, 
Diversity and National Identity: Dini Madaris in India Post 9/11, ed. Jan-Peter Hartung and Helmut 
Reifeld (SAGE Publications, 2006), and other essays in Jan-Peter Hartung and Helmut Reifeld, eds., 
Islamic Education, Diversity and National Identity: Dini Madaris in India Post 9/11 (SAGE Publications, 
2006). For an account of the maktab and madrasa tradition in India see also Yoginder Sikand, Bastions of 
the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India (Penguin Global, 2006). 
51 Here I am of course referring to the mobilization of Jihad international by the US against the Soviets, 
and the use of these mujahideen forces by the Pakistan army after the Soviet withdrawal in both 
Afghanistan and India. For a good overview see Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with 
Militant Islam (Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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political space52 in Pakistan, a space that cannot neatly be divided between the secular 
and the religious. I am also convinced that a mere historical account, a histoire53of the 
‘ulama, will fail to take account of the complex simultaneously global and subterranean 
nature of the political field in which the subjectivities and praxis of the Deoband ‘ulama 
are forged. For instance, there is without doubt a strong class dimension to the problem of 
the Taliban today, but it would be too simple to reduce the phenomenon of Islamist 
violence to the developmentalist failure’s of the postcolonial elite. As any casual 
observation of the sociological makeup of the vast majority of talibs within the Deoband 
dini madaris network will reveal, they belong very clearly to a subaltern class. The 
majority of the ‘ulama are themselves indeed subaltern.54 The effective historical 
marginalization and subalternaity of the ‘ulama are undoubtedly key factors in 
understanding the violent turn of the ‘ulama. There is also little doubt that ways in which 
General Zia ul-Haq’s “Islamization” decade, couple with the imbrication of the Pakistan 
                                                
52 It is in fact a politico-theological space. For a sense of the critical importance of this syntagm see de Hent 
de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan, eds., Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World 
(Fordham University Press, 2006). 
53 A genealogy, or history of the present, proceeds with an implicit critique of historicism. In Chapter 2 I 
make this critique explicit, thereby setting the stage for the kind of theoretico-historical analysis of this 
work. 
54 On postcolonialism and subaltern historiography, see Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
eds., Selected Subaltern Studies, Essays from the 5 Volumes and a Glossary (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), and Vinayak Chaturvedi, ed., Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial (London: 
Verso, 2000). The fact that the originally Gramscian term subaltern derives from the name of a military 
rank is significant in our account of military space in Chapter 3. Both the postcolonial and subaltern are of 
course highly contested terms. But as Young notes, it is concerned with colonial history only to the extent 
that that history has determined the configurations and power structures of the present; Robert J. C. Young, 
Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford & Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 4. 
The subaltern classes are generally marked as marginalized groups. The excess and surplus children who 
populate the madaris landscape are undoubtedly both marginalized and excluded. It is in part this 
marginalization which accounts for the turn of the ‘ulama towards violence. Though he does not quite use 
the term, Jamal Malik has already shown how the ‘ulama are drawn largely from the ranks of the rural and 
urban poor (Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan 
(Lahore: Vanguard Press, 1996).) However because Malik does not make a distinction between authority 
and power, I depart significantly from his conclusion about the dissolution of tradition and authority. 
Instead it is a question of understanding the ways in which the Deoband reconstitute and shape the contours 
of an all ready ongoing and mutating “tradition” and how they forge new identities and create new spaces 
for authority and power. 
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Army and society in the Afghan war, have fundamentally altered the landscape of the 
political in Pakistan. However what I am suggesting here is that the phenomenon of 
political Islam must be seen as intimately bound up with the project of Pakistan itself — 
with its very metaphysics in fact. It is not a question of attempting to isolate some pure 
Islam and show how it has been corrupted by a series of political events. Nor is it a 
question of showing how modern political forms and vocabularies (the state the part, the 
nation etc) have been Islamized. What I am aiming for is something different. I seek to 
show how the very discursive regime of Islam is now fundamentally political, and how it 
is now always a discourse of power and subjectivization, even in cases where it declares 
itself as concerned solely with private, inward or moral self-improvement. As such the 
distinction between Islam as such, and the political as such, is untenable. Islam is today 
always already a bios. This indistinction between the political (public) and the spiritual 
(private) does not begin with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, nor even with the 
founding of Pakistan. While these events are thresholds of transformation, the historical 
shadow of biopolitics are longer, while simultaneously being both synchronic and 
diachronic. I will argue that it is in fact in the thought of ‘Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877 
– 1938), the spiritual founder of the South Asian Islamic State, that the poiēsis of Islam 
makes its paradigmatic and lethal confrontation with the polis, with the political. Iqbal’s 
work is an expression of this confrontation in which the political triumphs over the 
ethical (polis over ēthos). Iqbal does not initiate this confrontation but he gives it its most 
popularly received and powerful expression. If Pakistan is birthed in Iqbal’s imagination, 
Islam was laid to rest in his khayaal.55 It is in his poetry that Islam is most poignantly, 
                                                
55 Iqbal’s problematization of the West, and his desire for a certain liberation of Muslim minds and bodies 
from the long night of colonialism, left him vulnerable to the metaphysics that articulated both the state and 
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romantically and metaphysically linked to the absolute necessity of a modern state, albeit 
a state which rejects conventional ethno-racial and linguistic basis for national identity.56 
Pakistan’s history might hence be written as nothing but the effect of the impossible 
territorialization of Islam57 — the transference of divine sovereignty to the state and the 
subsequent sacralization of the collective Muslim body (ummah). 
Without a sense of this transformation, the nature of the crisis that envelops 
Pakistan, if not the globe, will remain hidden as we search in vain for a more descriptive 
and causal — or what Foucault called “genetic” — explanation.58 The transformation 
consists in part of a double and simultaneous process: the “statification” (étatisation) of 
Islam and Muslim society, and the ‘governmentalization’ of the Islamic state.59 Hence 
                                                
the biopolitical form. The united ummah is then deployed as a weapon in potentia, a mass of bodies, against 
the power of the west, and in fashioning and imagining this power Iqbal allowed the biopolitical underbelly 
of his new weapon to colonize the very structure he was fashioning against the west (i.e. umma) 
56 I will discuss Iqbal in the final chapter. See however his famous Reconstruction for an elaboration of his 
political thought; Allama Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: 
Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1989). For the classic formulation of nationalism’s raison d’être see Ernest 
Renan’s “What is a Nation?” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming National: A Reader 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, often deployed 
Renan’s racist/biopolitical logic in justifying his two nation theory. See the final chapter. 
57 And in this way also a history of its exception. Without getting ahead of ourselves, Agamben writes that 
the state of exception is the “principle of every juridical localization, since only the state of exception opens 
the space in which the determination of a certain juridical order and a particular territory first becomes 
possible.”Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, p. 19, italics mine   
58 For a critique of the genetic mode of historical analysis see Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History," in The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul 
Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New York: The New Press, 2003), and Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective 
Histories: Foucault's Methods and Historical Sociology (London & New York: Routledge, 1994). 
59 The term étatisation is from Foucault’s widely read governmentality lecture in Michel Foucault, Security, 
Territory, Population, Lectures at the College De France 1977 - 1978 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p 87 – 
114. For Foucault, “government” refers to relations between self and self, between communities and social 
institutions, as well as to the exercise of political sovereignty. Unlike Marxists he avoided “State Theory” 
which attempts to deduce the modern activities of government from essential properties of the state. 
Precisely because Foucault was interested in governmentality as an activity or “practice” that goes beyond 
the formal state object, we can similarly frame the exercise of political power by the ‘ulama as a form of 
governmentality. Foucault used the term ‘rationality of government’ interchangeably with the ‘art of 
government’. We are concerned here therefore with the arts (technē) of ‘ulama governmentality. Like 
Wahabism then which has influenced the more recent theological comportments of the Deoband, the 
Taliban is an expression of Islam as police. See the introduction in Colin Gordon, Graham Burchell, and 
Peter Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991). Given the limited ways in which the governmentality paradigm is often deployed, in particular its 
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‘ulama religio-political practices must be situated across a series of complex historical 
and political horizons. We must in short recognize how ‘ulama practice have been 
essentially imbricated within the historically variable relations of power and the 
contingencies of Pakistan’s fractured politics, rather than as an outgrowth or mutation of 
some static tradition. This approach can in part account for the ways in which Deoband 
“Islamic” discourses (on nationalism, the state, authority, gender, minorities, citizenship) 
have shifted over time.60 
It should also be mentioned at the outset that not all political formations under 
‘ulama tutelage can be framed within the rubric of ‘extremism’ ‘violence’ or ‘radical 
Islamism.’ Certainly a very large component of the Deoband phenomenon is manifested 
in the phenomenon of the Tabligh-i Jama‘at, which is a self-consciously “non-political” 
expression of Islam.61 However this understanding is in keeping with a very narrow and 
limited definition of politics and the political.62 However it is of course understandable 
that it is this militant and “uncivil” dimension of the traditionalist ‘ulama that has 
garnered most interest, in particular given the centrality of radical Islam in framing 
                                                
divorce from his concept of biopolitics, I will discuss the relationship between the two more extensively in 
Chapter 2. 
60 For instance with respect to gender, a number of religious parties backed Fatima Jinnah’s candidacy 
when she ran against General Ayub Khan, whilst some of the same groups were opposed in principle to 
female leadership in the case of Benazir Bhutto. See Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed, Women of 
Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back? (London & Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1987), and 
Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., Women, Islam and the State, Women in the Political Economy (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1991). 
61 This kind of problematic claim of being non-political or a-political is of course characteristic of the 
Tabligh-i Jama‘at. For the definitive account that echoes this characterization see Muhammad Khalid 
Masud, ed., Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama'at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for 
Faith Renewal, vol. 69, Social, Economic, and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia (Leiden & 
Boston: E.J. Brill, 2000). 
62 Certainly the Tabligh can be subject to an analysis in terms of power, for they most clearly exhibit a form 
of governmentality — “conduct of conduct” — their key role is the fashioning of a particular kind of 
Muslim subject. Recently in the wake of terrorist violence, the Annual gathering of the Tabligh-i Jama‘at in 
Raiwand included a number of demonstrations and protests against all forms of violence and terrorism (See 
the report “Taliban under fire from Pakistan’s faithful”, Dawn 15 Nov, 2009). 
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neoliberal and neoconservative constituent other. But here also an understanding of the 
radicalization of segments of the ‘ulama, their turn towards violent forms of political 
activism, and their increasingly militant policing of the boundaries of Islam, must also be 
set within further contextual parameters. The first is the imbrication of Islamist groups 
within the simultaneously repressive and enabling role of the State. Secondly, given that 
the Pakistani State, in conjunction with the United States and Saudi Arabia, has 
consistently attempted to infiltrate, control and harness orthodox Islamic institutions, due 
importance must be placed upon the larger structure of empire in making possible 
domestic economies of violence and power in which certain forms of “indigenous” 
jihadist violence are valorized and sustained.63 These larger geo-political attempts to 
deploy and manipulate “Islam” and Islamist forces for the legitimization of martial rule 
and for the waging of proxy wars (Afghanistan and Kashmir), resulted in the artificial 
political empowerment of groups like the Deoband. Under the catalyst of these state 
interventions, the otherwise politically marginal communities of Islamic orthodoxy, who, 
if Metcalf is correct, were traditionally focused on scholarship, piety and quiet social 
reform (daw‘a and tabligh), have nonetheless transformed themselves into agents of jihad 
and brokers of increased socio-political power.64 While the comportment towards state 
power, and more broadly, governmentality, among the ‘ulama cannot solely be read as an 
effect of Empire or the postcolonial state, Cold War cartography certainly fostered the 
conditions of possibility for the effective transformation of an ‘ulama republic fantasy 
into political possibility. A feature supposedly characteristic of fundamentalist or Islamist 
                                                
63 Timothy Mitchell, "Mcjihad: Islam in the U.S. Global Order," Social Text 20, no. 4 - 73 (2002). 
64 But neither the colonial or postcolonial state can be said to originary causes of ‘ulama governmentality. 
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groups,65 namely the desire for state power, can now equally be said to be true of 
‘traditionalist’ ‘ulama led Islamist groups. As such the standard typological distinctions 
of Muslim politics66 — Islamist/fundamentalist, modernist, traditionalist — have entered 
a zone of indistinction.67 Our analytic gaze must hence take into consideration the 
material and discursive effects of power of a new kind of colonial/imperial present,68 
exercised in the name of a variety of global and universalist legitimating discourses, 
(democracy, freedom, “Western civilization”, etc). Arguably this overlapping of Imperial 
desire and Islamist fantasy continues to provide a mutually reinforcing dialectic that is 
central to the technologies of American imperial ambitions both in Iraq and more 
globally. 
Broadly speaking I regard the terms “Deoband”, and by extension the “Taliban” 
as suggesting a fictional unity. The singular signifier of course gestures to multiple 
signifieds. These phenomenon then should be viewed instead as a complex series of 
intersecting and overlapping dispositifs, as assemblages or formations of power. The 
Taliban must be understood as a dense intersection point of a competing set of multiform 
powers, themselves exercising an unlimited sovereign right of death, an all-powerful 
monstrosity, reflective equally of the violent political space which gave it birth. 
 
                                                
65 This is the kind of typology that Roy deploys; Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol 
Volk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
66 Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
67 As such these distinctions, while of rough and ready usefulness, are no longer, if indeed they ever were, 
analytically tenable. Most scholarship on political Islam, including Zaman and Metcalf, continue to make 
these distinctions (Barbara D. Metcalf, "Traditionalist'  Islamic Activism Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs," 
in Islamic Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), and ———, "Islamic Arguments in Contemporary Pakistan," in Islam and the Political Economy of 
Meaning: Comparative Studies of Muslim Discourse, ed. William R. Roff, Comparative Studies on Muslim 
Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 
68 The term is used in Gregory’s excellent study; Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, 
Palestine, Iraq (Blackwell Publishers, 2004). 
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Historical Thresholds of Sovereignty 
 
Three catastrophes serve as the contextual historical matrix for my concern with 
the biopolitical space of Islam: 1947 (the emergence of postcolonial Pakistan), 1979 (the 
Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan) and 2001 (the point at which 
these two dates converge on the United States). If politics were astrology, and 
sovereignties were heavenly bodies, then these years were surely the moments of 
inaugural shifts and destinal realignments within the fabric of the global cosmopolis — 
disturbances whose fateful (eventful) reverberations still cast their pale and threatening 
shadow over our time. The metacolonial attempts a disclosure of the topology of this 
time, seeking to capture a few of the shadows cast by the haunting movement of this 
present/presence as it plays itself out, recklessly, on the landscape of religion and politics 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. I will briefly outline the ways in which these years mark 
significant biopolitical thresholds. 
1947 is of course the year of a violent cesarean birth, and the subsequent bloody 
separation of oddly conjoined triplets who had been gestating in colonialism’s womb 
since at least 1857. The post-partition surgery was inept, and incomplete, and the sad 
saga of this trauma continues to haunt the national destinies of India, Pakistan. 1971, the 
emergence of Bangladesh, was merely the completion of this originary biopolitical 
fracture — the ceaseless separation of bios and zoē. More critically, as a topological site 
for this study, 1947 marks the birth of the first Nation-State that comes into being under 
the sign of a mobilized Islam — a Muslim Republic, an Islamapolis, but not yet an 
Islamic State. Ironically as I shall seek to demonstrate, Pakistan — whose name derives 
as a bemused acronym of colonial provinces, and whose raison d’être was perhaps 
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acrimony (ressentiment) itself — exemplifies what Nietzsche called the spirit of revenge; 
the revenge of History not just against colonialism or the West, but against Islam itself.69 
As such Pakistan will be thought here as both a geographic, imaginative and 
metaphysical apparatus. 
Just under 33 years later, 1979 marks the birth and gestation of another pair of 
awkward Islamo-political entities, conceived yet again through the romantic 
misadventures of Imperial desire; the Iranian revolution and the birth of the Afghan 
Mujahideen and the Jihad International. If 1857 can be regarded as the first major 
counterstrike of new forms of local sovereignty against British colonialism, 1979 Iran 
marks the first exemplary counterstrike of Muslim sovereignty directed against the 
American empire. The long duree of American involvement in Afghanistan should thus 
be seen as directed not only towards its arch imperial rival the Soviet Union, but also 
against Iran, combining in one space a key and longstanding component American 
foreign policy; hostility towards revolutionary nationalism.70  
But more significantly, as a key contextual moment of the metacolonial, we can 
reconfigure the primary thrust of the Iranian revolution as directed against the deep 
historical trajectory and traditions of Shi‘i Islam itself; the Ayatollah, literally the ‘sign of 
                                                
69 In the extensive four volume Nietzsche lectures — lectures as I shall note which were decisive for 
Foucault — Heidegger suggests that Nietzsche’s primary thought of the will to power could not be 
interpreted in isolation from his other key doctrines of eternal recurrence, nihilism and the Übermench 
(super- or over- man). On Heidegger’s reading, Eternal Recurrence effectively signifies the desire of the 
human subject to stamp (and thus preclude) Being in its singularity and flux, with the mark of logos as 
presence and permanence (Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volumes One and Two (HarperOne, 1991), p 201.) 
Zarathustra’s most succinct formulation of the eternal recurrence — “the will’s revulsion against time and 
its ‘It was’ ” (———, What Is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 
Perennial Library, 1968), p 93.) — signals the spirit of revenge (ressentiment). In this way, metaphysically, 
Pakistan is that which fixes and invariably subordinates Islam to its provincial geography and its limited 
political sovereignty. Pakistan’s requirement was too ensure the predictability, codification and security of 
that which cannot be secured and predicted. It can be said then that Pakistan, which seeks to formally 
conflate purity (pak) with the polis, ensures the creation of a conflictual negative space, whose essential 
spirit is nihilism. Islam’s ethical possibilities are thus extinguished in an Islamic State, in the Islamapolis. 
70 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S Foreign Policy (Yale University Press, 1988). 
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God’, is now made to appear as the actual sovereign of a new political space, a space 
where what was once hidden, the ghaybah of the imam, becomes actualized. As 
Agamben notes “sovereign power can … maintain itself indefinitely, without ever 
passing over into actuality. (The troublemaker is precisely the one who tries to force 
sovereign power to translate itself into actuality.)”71 Thus the sovereign authority of God 
that was once in occultation, is now captured and subsumed within the new Islamapolis. 
In this way the Iranian Revolution, inaugurates not only the first “Islamic” State, it marks 
also the proper homecoming of political Islam. The radical doctrine of wilayat al-faqih — 
the direct rule, or sovereignty, of the jurist — that undergirded the rise to state power of 
the ayatollahs, is a decisive turning point in the historical relationship between Islam, the 
‘ulama and the political, in short between knowledge (‘ilm) and power. If it can be 
accurately said that in early Islamic societies, nomos and rule did not coincide, then the 
Iranian Revolution is indeed a truly modern revolution. The Islamic revolution as a 
specifically political revolution, marks the involution of Islam itself: Islam comes to 
replace Allah. This entry of Islam — and its concomitant form of Muslim subjectivity — 
into modern political power, marks the hollowing and decline of Islam which is now 
everywhere apparent. 1947 the birth of Pakistan and the 1979 Iranian revolution are thus 
key markers in this transition.  
But there were other nefarious convergences that suborn this year as the crucial 
biopolitical threshold for political Islam. 1979 in particular, saw not only the brutal 
conflagration of imperial powers in Afghanistan, it also witnessed a decisive event of 
power in Pakistan. On the 4th of April, behind the fortified walls of Rawalpindi’s 
                                                
71 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. The passage goes on to say: “Instead one must 
think the existence of potentiality without any relation to Being in the form of actuality.” 
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infamous Adiyala Jail (and just a few months before Soviet tanks rolled into Kabul) by 
order of Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia ul-Haq (1924–88), the Pakistan military 
hangs Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto, effectively decapitating the symbol (however flawed) 
of democracy in Pakistan. The sordid alliance that subsequently ensues between the ISI, 
the CIA and the House of Saudi, inaugurates what we may call the Great American 
Jihad; a paradoxical proxy crusade that may go down in history as the most costly, 
misguided, foul and shortsightedly successful ménage à troi, of the 20th century. The 
immediate offspring of this multi-lateral imperial dispositif, the Mujahideen, were hailed 
not only with massive injections of cash, heroin and arms, but also with ethico-political 
accolades; when a select few representatives of these warriors of Islam were greeted in 
Washington and knighted by Reagan as the “moral equivalents of our Founding 
Fathers”.72 There is undoubtedly a degree of truthful irony in this convergence; one 
exemplary practitioner of a puritanical project recognizing his own exceptionalist face in 
the nascent forces of jihadism.73 
The events set in motion in 1979 thus mark the beginning of the end of one 
Imperial foe, and the birth of another.74 And in what can only be a strange imprint of the 
call of enframing around which these assemblages have gathered and proliferated, we can 
hear the echo of technology and the structure of exception in the very names of these 
entities; al-Qaeda which derives its organizational name not only from the Arabic word 
qā’idah (foundation or base) but also is a reference to the very computer database of 
                                                
72 Eqbal Ahmad, David Barsamian, and Greg Ruggiero, Terrorism: Theirs and Ours (Open Media, 2001). 
73 As we have no learned from numerous accounts, Z. Brezinsky, Zia ul-Haq, and Prince Faisal Turki had 
been breeding these jihadist forces prior to the actual Soviet Invasion. That many of these children have 
multiplied and have returned to devour their fathers, in indeed a fitting tribute to Freud’s Totem and Taboo. 




names which was kept in Peshawar to keep track of the Arab-Afghan Greater Jihad 
conscripts. In the name al-Qaeda is thus embedded a simultaneous reference to the 
foundations of Islam and a military or computer database. And in the Taliban and the 
Deoband, we again hear the very structure of exception, the ban, which this work, 
following Agamben, seeks to disclose.75  
If 1979 was significant for the fortunes of political Islam, (from Palestine to 
Pakistan) it was also the crucial decade for the new visibility of other forms of religio-
biopolitics. Here we may mention, in addition to the emergence of the BJP in India, the 
rise of the Christian Coalition and its alliance with neoliberalism76 and neoconservatism 
in the US. The second Iraq war could in this sense be viewed as a direct product of this 
liaison. Political Christianity, or “Christianism” 77 arose in part out of the Christian 
Reconstructionist movement and the various forms of Dominionism in the U.S. This 
movement was influenced by the Calvinist theology of R. J. Rushdoony whose work was 
popularized by Francis Schaefer, and laid the groundwork for the rise to power of figures 
like Pat Robertson whose failed bid for direct political (sovereign) power in 1989 
eventually morphed into a more grass roots (governmentality) operation — birthing the 
Christian Coalition, an organization which remains a decisive constituent of the 
Republican Base, and which critics had suggested had virtually overtaken the functioning 
                                                
75 If this dissertation were permitted a Haiku form it could be rendered simply as Tali-ban. If this thesis has 
merit, then it could be said that the Taliban are an exemplary joke, a cosmic pun! 
76 More significantly, from the perspective of an emerging global governmentality, 1979 is also the year 
around which the explicit opening shots of neoliberalism were fired across the globe. See David Harvey, A 
Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2005). Thus it was the year not only for the 
creation and opening of new political spaces, but also the final collapse of the economic into the political, a 
process that has itself hastened the vast proliferation of multiple zones of indistinction. 
77 In lieu of the term ‘Christian fundamentalism’ I prefer the term Christianism because it highlights its 
multi-fold equivalence with Islamism. The various strands of political Christianity, have distinct parallels 
and similarities with political Islam in terms of the spectrum of positions viz-a-viz religious law and its 
relationship to the state. Rushdoony’s Institutes of Biblical Law is even more to the right of Mawdudi’s 




of the Republican party during the Regan and Bush I years. (see Theocracy Watch and 
Hedges). As will be apparent there is a distinct parallel between these forms of 
Christianism fundamentalism and that of the Deoband ‘ulama in that they both seek to 
create a space of sovereign operations (focused on the body and sexuality — gay rights, 
abortion) as a way to counteract the hegemony of liberal secularism. The latent 
sentiment, “Christianity/America in Danger”, so remarkably captured with the wild 
popularity of Mel Gibson’s The Passions of Christ, parallels the concern of Islamists for 
whom Islam (Muslim Society) “must be defended”.78 1979 thus clearly inaugurated a 
decade of a new assertion of a range of political theologies, no longer disguised in the 
familiar garments of secular sovereignty. It is thus not the case of an old medieval 
religious specter returning to haut the liberal pretensions of modernities otherwise 
progressive historical telos, but something quite the reverse; the becoming historical, or 
the Hegelianation of religion itself.  
In this way 1979 Afghanistan can be seen not only as the place where the grand 
dénouement of the Cold War unfolds, but also as the vital threshold for the biopolitical 
capture of Islam, and the transition point into the age of Terror and Security,79 which 
announced its conclusive arrival with the event of September 11, 2001. The subsequent 
convergence then between neoliberalism and neoconservatism, which advocates a far 
more moralistic and sovereigntist modality of power, constitutes the critical biopolitical 
                                                
78 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, Lectures at the College De France, 1975-1976 (Picador, 
2003), Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 




matrix in which the analysis of political Islam’s present must proceed. In short then, 
Afghanistan marks the crucial threshold of the biopolitical age of terror80 we now inhabit. 
The abysmal, spectral figure to emerge from the convergence of these three 
historical vectors is the Taliban — the Muselmann, not as witness of Auschwitz, but 
rather the shaheed of Afghanistan. As Agamben notes, Primo Levi described the most 
abject figures of the Nazi concentration camps as der Muselmann (the Muslim) – “a 
being from whom humiliation, horror, and fear had so taken away all consciousness and 
all personality as to make him absolutely apathetic.”81 Today the Taliban stand as the 
exemplary figure of Muslim life that does not deserve to live. The Taliban however are 
homo sacer with Kalashnikovs, and in this way exemplify the proximity between sacred 
life and sovereign power. A heretical reading, one that troubles liberal sensibilities, 
discloses the Taliban phenomenon as an exemplary and double instance of the sovereign 
paradox.82 
Emerging from the post-apocalyptic wreckage of US-Soviet imperial rivalry in 
Afghanistan, the Taliban were effectively spawned by yet another alliance between the 
secretive security apparatus of Pakistan’s ‘military intelligence’, and the Deoband 
‘ulama. This Mullah-Military complex, as I hope to demonstrate, is key to understanding 
the discourse and practice of the Deoband ‘ulama as biopolitical. Perhaps more 
troublingly, the Taliban combine two of Agamben’s key biopolitical paradigms, the camp 
and the refugee. During the first period of the Afghan catastrophe, between 1979 and 
                                                
80 Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity and the Defence of 
Logistical Societies, Dillon, The Liberal Way of War: The Martial Face of Global Biopolitics, and 
Elizabeth Dauphinee and Christina Masters, eds., The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, 
Dying, Surviving (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
81 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, p. 185. 
82 As Agamben reminds us “the paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact that the sovereign is, at the same 
time, outside and inside the juridical order.” Ibid., p. 25. 
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1988, thousands of camps were set up across the Afghan-Pakistan border to house the 
influx of some 4 – 5 million refugees.83 These camps were thus born out of a situation of 
crisis, martial law and war. The madaris that proliferated in conjunction with these 
camps, functioned as a disciplinary holding and training space for surplus children. The 
camp, as Agamben notes, is “the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space 
(insofar as it is founded solely on the state of exception)”. The camp thus appears as an 
event, the hidden paradigm that decisively signals the political space of modernity itself. 
Eminently torturable and bombable, the Taliban mirror the long history of global and 
local forms of sovereign violence through their own will to decapitation, and through a 
range of other less intense enactments of radical control over the body. The strict and 
obsessive reinforcement of gender boundaries between males (beards) and females (veils) 
is itself an instance of an emaciated sovereign logic, which substitutes control over 
territorial space for control over the body and social space. 
Despite the fact that the presence and continuity of Taliban ideology is viewed 
with embarrassment by Muslims worldwide, it simultaneously grounds the governmental 
logics for the “War on Terror.” Hence 1979 Afghanistan/Pakistan can be seen not only as 
the time-place where the grand dénouement of the Cold War unfolds, but also as the vital 
threshold for the biopolitical capture of Islam, and the transition point into the age of 
‘Terror and Security’, which announced its conclusive arrival with the event of 
September 11, 2001. A misrecognition of this space as a merely geopolitical (or Islamic) 
crisis — one of incompetent nation building, imperial mischief, or incompetent textual 
interpretation — rather than as an exemplary space of emergency, may obscure the way 
                                                
83 “The refugee must be considered for what he is: nothing less than a limit concept that radically calls into 
question the fundamental categories of the nation-state.” Ibid., p. 134. 
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in which the crisis in Afghanistan/Pakistan presages a severe ontological crisis yet to 
come; the darkest apotheosis of the emergency of being in whose nihilistic time and polis 
we already dwell. Perhaps this is the kind of dark space which ought to become the 
inducement for a way of thinking past the conventional limits of the disciplines. Failure 
to do so, Agamben warns with his haunting last three words of Homo Sacer runs the risk 
of an unprecedented biopolitical catastrophe. What follows here, is a labor of thinking 
under the weight of this immanent failure. 
 
Islamapolis 
Throughout the work, and especially in the final chapter on the ummah, I deploy 
the syntagm “Islamapolis”, a configuration with multiple but interrelated significations, 
which unfold along several interconnected registers. Islamapolis can be seen as a short 
hand that encapsulates the metacolonial ethos, and in this way the entire thesis. On the 
one hand it loosely translates “Islam-abad”, where abad, and abadi, refer to settlement 
and population. In this sense Islam-a-polis is simply the ‘city of Islam’, the nation of an 
Islamic population. Along another register, that of process, Islamapolis names Islam’s 
discursive articulation and material imbrication within systems of modern power; its 
encounter and folding within ‘the political’ — the space of the polis. What is critical 
however is the way in which, through this encounter, it becomes apolis — homeless, 
uncanny. Islamapolis also signifies the ways in which contemporary articulations of 
Islam are subsequently infected by the onto-logic of sovereign power. Islamapolis thus 
marks the biopoliticization of Islam: the mechanisms, technologies and strategies by 
which power over life manifests itself in Muslim discourses, practices and polities. The 
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Islamapolis is thus an exemplary metacolonial apparatus, a space which signals the 
simultaneous hollowing and hallowing of Islam. The attempt in this work is to offer a 










In this chapter I would like to suggest that thinking political Islam genealogically 
of necessity entails certain theoretico-historical commitments. The work of Talal Asad 
and his students represent most paradigmatically in my view, a direction which initiates a 
move towards genealogical thinking.84 Foucault’s genealogy is both a form of historical 
realism and also a radical critique of the dominant forms of historicist understanding. 
Foucault’s genealogical inquiries were designed in part to disrupt the progressivist 
assumptions embedded in western narratives about modernity and truth. I will argue that 
a genuinely interdisciplinary approach to history opens up potentially new horizons in our 
understanding of political Islam, horizons that are not constrained by the limits of 
chronology85 and the series of ideologies which have thus far dominated our analytic of 
contemporary Islamist violence; the largely humanist paradigms of liberal and Marxist 
scholarship. After a brief survey of the contemporary literature that takes political Islam 
as its primary thematic, I will outline the key paradigms of this genealogical study and 
                                                
84 My own approach is indebted to Asad’s innovations, but my interest here is in advancing this shift. 
85 As Hayden White has so elegantly demonstrated chronology provides a rubric for understanding, but it is 
not understanding itself. The only meaning that history can have is the kind that the narrative imagination 
gives to it. See in particular his chapter on Foucault “The Historiography of Anti-Humanism” in Hayden 
White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987). 
 
 33 
articulate the ways in which this work seeks to depart from most of the critical paradigms 
characteristic of the field.86  
 
 
Beyond Orientalism and the Politics of Representation 
 
The study of Islam and Muslim societies in the Western academy has historically 
been situated within and animated by concerns of war, conquest, domination and 
control.87 It was however with Foucault’s paradigm of knowledge/power — disseminated 
most eloquently by Edward Said in his classic 1978 work Orientalism88 — that the 
academic study of Muslim cultures and history was placed on an entirely new footing.89 
Said’s path breaking Orientalism presented the “West” with a very unflattering image of 
itself, uncovering the nefarious politics of the way the West represented its subject 
colonies and its own self-image in relation to them. His work undeniably opened up 
                                                
86 One does not have to offer critique in order to be against, but rather only in the hopes of thinking 
differently and otherwise. Needless to say I am indebted to the existing critical literature which serve as my 
point of departure. 
87 For an excellent historical overview see Norman Daniel, Islam and the West: The Making of an Image, 
Rev. ed. (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1993). After the demise of the communist threat in the 1990’s 
and still prior to 2001, there was a distinct sense in academic circles that the ‘green menace’ of Islam was 
replacing the ‘red’ threat of Soviet communism. The many voices seeking to counter this trend found 
themselves outdone in an instant by the genius stroke of Al-Qaeda. (See for instance Bruce B. Lawrence, 
Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg, eds., The Next Threat: Western Perceptions of 
Islam, Transnational Institute Series (London: Pluto Press, Transnational Institute, 1995). However despite 
their attempts to contextualize Islam, all these authors tend to assume the existence of some underlying 
essence of Islam that is the basis for Muslim belief and political praxis. 
88 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1979). At the end of the day 
however Said’s deployment of Foucault was both limited and superficial. Because Saids work was held up 
as a model for the deployment of knowledge/power, the net effect was the circulation of a distilled and de-
radicalized Foucault. For an important critique see William V. Spanos, The Legacy of Edward W. Said 
(University of Illinois Press, 2009). For an earlier critique see Brennan, Timothy “The Illusion of a Future: 
‘Orientalism’ as Traveling Theory,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Spring, 2000), pp. 558-583. 
89 Doubtless there have been influences other than Foucault, but I will claim that it is his rethinking of 




entire new ways of political analysis by showing how the presumedly autonomous field 
of culture was implicated in deplorable political realities. However, what was lacking in 
Said’s early account was an analysis of the responses from the ‘other’ side. Said had 
shown us what the imperial powers and their moral self-understanding looked like from 
the point of view of the disempowered other, but one got the sense that this other was 
silent and inactive while its territories and its identity were being distorted beyond 
recognition.90  
In parallel to Said’s work, the much heralded “Twilight of Subjectivity”91 
inaugurated by post-structuralism, has also become a dominant focus of concern among a 
cross-disciplinary spectrum of contemporary academics. For scholars interested in the 
cultural and political history of ‘marginal’ and ‘subordinate’ ,‘non-European’ peoples, the 
discrediting of a dominant characteristic of post-Enlightenment modernity— subject-
centered reason— has opened up a number of interesting (albeit problematic) horizons.92 
An awareness of the self-aggrandizing nature of the modern subject, has not only 
unmasked the will to power behind enlightenment claims of epistemic and moral 
sovereignty, it has also helped illuminate the ways in which these claims have been coded 
and enshrined in various historiographies and institutional practices. The discovery of the 
essential link between knowledge, culture and power, exposed the seemingly 
                                                
90 A major aim of Said’s Culture & Imperialism was to set aside this imbalance. Edward W. Said, Culture 
and Imperialism, Vintage (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). 
91 Fred R. Dallmayr, Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions to a Post-Individualist Theory of Politics 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981). 
92 Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy, Who Comes after the Subject ? (London & New 
York: Routledge, 1992). 
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disinterested claims of colonial and imperial scholarship, birthing entirely new disciplines 
which are now part of the academic landscape.93 
The identification and critique of “misrepresentations” have now become 
increasingly persistent themes in academic writings on Islam, with ever more 
sophisticated theoretical systems being deployed to describe the insidiousness, modus 
operandi and hegemony of such misrepresentations. It might be fair to say that an 
Orientalist epistemology has almost completely been eradicated within most respectable 
social science, humanities and area studies programs in the U.S.94 However the power 
and prevalence of simplifying representations in the western media and in Islamist 
discourse is such that they both continue to dominate the public sphere.95 The exorcised 
demon of the paradigmatic Orientalist, Bernard Lewis,96 continues thus to haunt the halls 
                                                
93 I have in mind here obviously both postcolonial studies and cultural studies. Particularly influential for 
my own intellectual formation was the interdisciplinary program of history and anthropology at the 
University of Michigan. The culture/power/history series is representative of this important trend. See 
Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner, eds., Culture/ Power/ History: A Reader in 
Contemporary Social Theory, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994).  
94 Which is why when it first appeared Al-Azmeh’s work was seen as an exciting intervention in the 
ongoing debate on philosophical and political representations of Islam; Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and 
Modernities, 1st ed., Phronesis (London & New York: Verso, 1993). The continued profusion of works 
indebted to the critique of orientalism and representations of Islam is of course testament to the transformed 
nature of the academy. See for instance Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The 
History and Politics of Orientalism, The Contemporary Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 
1945-2000, ed. Earl Lewis and George Lipsitz, vol. 6, American Crossroads (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004), Timothy Marr, The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). as some of the more recent examples. However despite obvious advances, many senior 
scholars of the “Orient” continue to offer reservations about the dominant epistemologies of scholarly 
critique. I will consider Asad’s work below, but see also Harry Harootunian, History's Disquiet: Modernity, 
Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life, The Wellek Library Lecture Series at the University 
of California, Irvine (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), and Rey Chow, The Age of the World 
Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work, Next Wave Provocations (Duke 
University Press, 2006). 
95 For a critique of this trend see Karim H. Karim, The Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence, Updated 
ed. (Montreal & New York: Black Rose Books, 2003). 
96 Lewis’s recent books continued to be best sellers for the post-911 American public who were naturally 
craving more ‘serious’ analysis Islam and politics Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash between 
Islam and Modernity in the Middle East, 1st Perennial ed. (New York: Perennial, 2003), ———, Islam and 
the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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of political science departments, the media, public opinion and of course public policy.97 
Former president G.W. Bush’s entire foreign policy apparatus, ideologically rooted in 
neoconservatism,98 took what little scholarly credentials it had from the Orientalist 
paradigm.  
 
Political Islam: From Fundamentalism to Islamism 
From the earlier sensationalist and essentialist depictions of a monolithic and 
militant Islam on the move,99 there now have emerged a number of significant studies of 
Muslim politics that have emphasized complexity and variety and have paid attention to 
the particular socio-political and economic conditions that would more accurately situate 
our understanding of this heterogeneous phenomenon.100 Most of these studies however 
remained mired in various forms of reification and objectification.101 
                                                
97 For a recent critique of the return of Orientalism, see Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells, The New 
Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy (Columbia University Press, 2003). 
98 For an excellent Foucaultian critique of neoconservatism see Majia Nadesan, Governmentality, 
Biopower, and Everyday Life (Routledge, 2008). For other important critiques of neoconservatism see 
Nicholas Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue: Unveiling Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy 
(Routledge, 2007), Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana 
(London: Routledge, 2004). For critiques of the Straussian underbelly of the Neocons see Anne Norton, 
Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (Yale University Press, 2004), and for an accessible 
general history James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (Viking Books, 
2004). 
99 Typical examples of such shoddy fear based scholarship would include Amir Taheri, Holy Terror 
(Bethesda, 1987), Robin Wright, In the Name of God (New York, 1989), Johannes Jansen, The Neglected 
Duty (New York, 1986). However unfortunately after 911, which transformed the threat of Islam into a 
viable affect of security, a raft of the most crass forms of essentialist and Orientalist works have flooded a 
market that now demands to know and destroy its enemy. In contrast to some of these new Islamaphobic 
works, Bernard Lewis looks quite sophisticated. See for instance David Frum and Richard Perle, An End to 
Evil: How to Win the War on Terror (Random House, 2003). or any book by the hack scholar Robert 
Spencer. For a much needed critique of this trend see Cole, Engaging the Muslim World..  
100 See Lawrence, Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence, and also Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim 
Politics, and John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). I depart significantly however from these accounts, which deploy a simplistic 
model of ‘tradition’ even when they claim it has historical variance. Lawrence treats Islamism as a form of 
anti-modernism, while in his widely read Islam and Politics, Esposito anchors his explanation of Islamist 
movements in a unitary understanding of Islam, a totality of shared practices and understandings. See John 
L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 3rd ed., Contemporary Issues in the Middle East (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
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There is no doubt that 911 and the years since has seen a major shift of interest 
towards South Asian Islam. Prior to 911 the historiography of Muslim South Asia had 
tended to concentrate on the colonial and pre-colonial periods, and to this effect a number 
of important and pioneering studies on pre-partition Muslim political and educational 
institutions have been written.102 Until recently however political Islam in Pakistan had 
remained a relatively neglected affair although the largest, most well organized and 
influential party, the Jama‘at-i Islami (JI), had received attention from Seyyed Vali Reza 
Nasr.103 Still however, with the exception of Zaman, and a number of short surveys,104 no 
                                                
University Press, 1991). His concept of an “Islamic imperative” is thus still naive and untenable. It is the 
facile distinction between modernity and tradition in these works, even if thy are themselves pluralized, that 
is particularly problematic. 
101 For a useful critique of the ‘revival’ master-narrative offered by Voll and Esposito — a critique that 
could easily be applied to Metcalf also — see Salwa Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State 
and Islamism (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003). In her persuasive analysis she shows how both 
scholars, though well intentioned in the struggle against overt Islamaphobia, invariably ascribe some kind 
of trans-historical agency to Islam, ignoring in the process how everyday life and sociality are themselves 
formative of the ways in which belief is formulated to begin with. As Al-Azmeh notes “generalizations 
about social groups in terms of religion in order to describe their specificities and to underpin factors that 
overdetermine their socio-economic and ideological positions have become habitual, although they are 
irresponsible, for the forces that make for social involution are not religious.” al-Azmeh, Islams and 
Modernities, p. 3. Needless to say in this study I reject the priority and even viability of the very category 
of religion and tradition as it is constituted in secularist and liberal discourse. 
102Juan R. I. Cole, Roots of North Indian Shi'ism in Iran and Iraq: Religion and State in Awadh, 1722-1859, 
vol. 6, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), David 
Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, vol. 7, Comparative Studies on Muslim 
Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), Sarah F. D. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: 
The Pirs of Sindh 1843-1947, vol. 50, Cambridge South Asian Studies (Cambridge & New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), Richard Maxwell Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 
1204-1760, vol. 17, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1994), Carl W. Ernst, Eternal Garden: Mysticism, History and Politics at a South Asian Sufi Center, Suny 
Series in Muslim Spirituality in South Asia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), David 
Lelyveld, Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India, Oxford India Paperbacks 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism 
and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16, Studies in Oriental Culture (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1982), John F. Richards, Mughal State and Society, vol. 1 #1, The New Cambridge History of India; 
the Mughals & Their Contemporaries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Francis Robinson, 
Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923, vol. 16, 
Cambridge South Asian Studies (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974). 
103 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan, vol. 
19, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), and ———
, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For an 
earlier account of the JI see Kalim Bahadur, Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan (Chetana Publications, 1977). 
104 See Nasr in Christopher Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India (New York: Columbia 
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major work on the JUI or the JUP105 has been published to date, and this despite the fact 
that the JUI has consistently won more national and provincial assembly seats than the 
JI.106 Prior to 911, the bulk of the analysis of Muslim politics had exclusively focused on 
Iran107 and the Arab World (particularly Egypt).108 This is not surprising given the events 
of the Iranian revolution (1979) and the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat 
(1981) by radical elements of the Muslim Brotherhood. By contrast the Islamist elements 
in Pakistan during this period were ‘on our side’. With few exceptions, then little by way 
                                                
University Press, 1996), Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan 
Connection, Ceri Series in Comparative Politics and International Studie (Columbia University Press, 
2006), and Zaman on militant and sectarian violence. Older accounts that only briefly consider ‘ulama 
politics include Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, 'Ulama in Politics: A Study Relating to the Political Activities of 
the 'Ulama in the South-Asian Subcontinent from 1556 to 1947 (Karachi: Ma'aref, 1972), Aziz Ahmad, 
Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan: 1857-1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), Leonard 
Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), and John L. 
Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
105 The exceptions to this is are works by Pakistani scholars Sayyid A. S. Pirzada, The Politics of the Jamiat 
Ulema-I Islam Pakistan, 1971-77 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), and Mujeeb Ahmad, Jam'iyyat 
'Ulama-I Pakistan: 1948-1979, vol. 12, Historical Studies (Pakistan Series; No. 84 (Islamabad: National 
Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1993). Pirzada’s account of the JUI has some useful 
information but is analytically and theoretically weak. Ahmed’s work on the JUP has a particularly narrow 
focus; both offer a rather simple narrative account which provides very little insight or analysis and does 
not situate the history of the JUP/JUI within any larger framework or debate over Muslim politics, not to 
mention their overwhelmingly partisan and deferent tone. 
106With the recent curtailment of Saudi funds flowing into the coffers of the JI, and the diversion of those 
funds to other Islamist parties, the JUI has emerged as significantly more powerful and influential party. 
107 See Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, Studies in Middle 
Eastern History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints, and 
Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978), ———, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran, Yale Fastback Series 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), and Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian 
Mojahedin, Society and Culture in the Modern Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989). 
108 Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State: Essays on Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle 
East, Revised ed. (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1993), Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim 
Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The 
Prophet and Pharaoh, trans. Jon Rothschild (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), and 
Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990).. More recently see the excellent work of Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic 
Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), and Gregory Starrett, 
Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt, vol. 25, Comparative 
Studies on Muslim Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).. Earlier works that remained 
cuaght in the fundamentalist paradigm areYoussef Choueri, Islamic Fundamentalism (Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2002), R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the 
Arab World, 2nd ed., Contemporary Issues in the Middle East (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1995). and ‘Ali Hillal Desouki, Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York, 1982). 
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of a more comprehensive analysis had existed for an understanding of Islamist politics in 
Pakistan.109 In the wake of 911 however a proliferation of discourses on Pakistan110 and 
Afghanistan111 has ensued, due in large part to the fact that this region has now come 
                                                
109 The exceptions to this as mentioned earlier are of course are of course Metcalf’s pioneering work on the 
Deoband (Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900.), and more recently Zaman, The 
'Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. However Metcalf has almost completely ignored 
the political activities of the Pakistani Deoband, preferring to focus on the “non-political” Tablighi Jamaat. 
Ayesha Jalal’s though her earlier and important work on Jinnah (Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: 
Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan, vol. 31, Cambridge South Asian Studies 
(Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).) and her recent ———, Democracy and 
Authoritarianism in South Asia, Contemporary South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995).), while offering insightful analysis of Pakistani politics, is weighed down by its Cambridge School 
emphasis on charismatic personas and elite politics, and does not focus on Islamic political parties per say. 
However her most recent work ———, Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia (Harvard University Press, 
2008).which I will discuss in the Chapter on Jihad, is more useful, though my approach here is a significant 
departure from her subjectivist account. Recent works by Lawrence Ziring and Ifthikar Malik also seem to 
treat these groups summarily. Among the few exceptions, see Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic 
State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan (London: Frances Pinter, 1987)., and more 
recently the excellent work of Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of 
Pakistan. For pre 911 accounts, see Mumtaz Ahmed, “Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia” in Martin E. 
Marty and Scott R. Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed: A Study Conducted by the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, The Fundamentalism Project (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991).and Mumtaz Ahmed, “Parliament , Parties, Polls and Islam: Issues in the Current Debate on Religion 
and Politics in Pakistan”, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 2, No. 1 (July 1985). Also see 
Hafeez Malik, “Islamic Political Parties and Mass Mobilization”, Islam and the Modern Age 3, 2 (May 
1972). Also studies of Islam and Politics in Pakistan after the Zia period have tended to focus on the issue 
of Islamization and its effects on public institutions and democracy, see especially William Richter, “The 
Political Meaning of Islamization in Pakistan” and Anita Weiss in Anita M. Weiss, ed., Islamic Reassertion 
in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State, Contemporary Issues in the Middle East 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986). 
110 This has led to some excellent new work. See Farzana Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan, 
Columbia/Hurst (Columbia University Press, 2009), Alyssa Ayres, Speaking Like a State: Language and 
Nationalism in Pakistan (Cambridge University Press, 2009), Robert Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism Unbound: 
Politics and Piety in Twenty-First Century Pakistan (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Yasmin Khan, The Great 
Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (Yale University Press, 2007), David Pinault, Notes from the 
Fortune-Telling Parrot: Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Pakistan, Comparative Islamic 
Studies (Equinox Publishing, 2008), and Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the 
Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (Columbia University Press, 2007). are 
representative of a new crop of scholarship on postcolonial Pakistan. I will consider the renewed interest in 
the Pakistan military in the next chapter. 
111 Between 1994 and 2001 Ahmed Rashid’s book stood out as the most authoritative account (Ahmed 
Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the Great Game in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2000).). 
Since then books on Afghanistan have exploded. Most of the work on Afghanistan however remains 
permeated by an interest in the Taliban. See for example Amin Tarzi Robert D. Crews, The Taliban and the 
Crisis of Afghanistan (Harvard University Press, 2009), William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, Twentieth 
Century Wars (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), Mark Sedra Geoffrey Hayes, Afghanistan: Transition under 
Threat, Studies in International Governance (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), David B. Edwards, 
Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), Larry P. 
Goodson, Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban (Seattle: 
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under the disciplinary gaze of an imperial regime. This renewed interest has led to some 
important new works on Islam and Pakistan. Traditional forms of Islamic education 
(madrasa) in particular have come under increased academic and state scrutiny112. Our 
present is thus defined by a proliferation of discourse about individuals and about the 
truth of these individuals because these discourses are linked to the functioning of 
disciplinary power, normalization, and biopolitics. 
 
Political Islam as a Disciplinary Object of Knowledge 
A complete analysis of all these works is of course beyond the scope of this 
chapter. We can however identify a few primary trends which highlight the state of 
critical scholarship on political Islam today. In the early phase of the study of political 
Islam, the term “fundamentalism” was usually employed as a marker for the return of 
religion to the public sphere in the Muslim world, and it was contrasted with something 
called ‘modernity’113. The emergence of fundamentalism was initially seen as evidence of 
the failure of Islamic societies to properly modernize. Explanations for this ‘failure’ 
diverged widely, but the problematic was almost always framed between static binaries 
of Islam and the West as a reflection of the distinction between modernity and tradition. 
Since then the term fundamentalism, and its host of associated qualifiers — “Islamic 
revival”, “Islamic resurgence” — have been problematized to the degree that few serious 
                                                
University of Washington Press, 2001), Peter Marsden, The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in 
Afghanistan, Politics in Contemporaray Asia Series (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
112 See for instance Hefner and Zaman, eds., Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern 
Education, Malik, ed., Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror, Ali Riaz, Faithful Education: 
Madrassahs in South Asia (Rutgers University Press, 2008), and the more policy oriented C. Christine Fair, 
The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan, Perspectives (United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2008). 
113 Michael Youssef, Revolt against Modernity: Muslim Zealots and the West, vol. 39, Social, Economic, 
and Political Studies of the Middle East (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic 
Fundamentalism and Modernity (London & New York: Routledge, 1988). 
 
 41 
scholars use it as a precise analytical term.114 The 1990’s were marked by a gradual 
disappearance of the term, which was replaced by a more nuanced approach to the 
various shades of “Muslim” politics. In its place the term “Islamist” and “political Islam” 
appeared.115 This new scholarship articulated the fundamentally modern nature of the 
new Islamist movements, and began situating these movements within the context of the 
material and political failures of postcolonial nation state. But even if the resort to a 
reified category of “Islam” as an explanatory category was fast becoming de passé, 
sociological explanations tended to render Islamism as a response to ‘conditions of 
modernity’ and frustrated expectations.  
As studies began to show the new Islamist actors were often products of modern, 
secular, educational institutions who were drawn to an Islamic idiom and worldview in 
part as a result of the manifest failures of postcolonial nation states to either bring 
adequate levels of development or extricate themselves from ongoing neocolonial 
relationships. Two broad categories of Muslim politics began to be distinguished; 
Islamists, who were more clearly identified with political Islam and Muslim modernists. 
Hence in Pakistan the Muslim League, the movement of Muslim nationalism that led to 
the creation of Pakistan was generally not categorized as a form of political Islam, in 
contrast to the movement spearheaded by Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi (1903–1979). Hence as 
                                                
114 The imprecise nature of this term is highlighted by the failed attempt to give the term any series of 
consistent meanings. See Marty and Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed: A Study Conducted by the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In Bobby Sayyid’s critical reading of the discourses of Western 
modernity on Islam, he shows how the very term is compromised by its unexamined eurocentrism. The 
need for the category of fundamentalism reflects an anxiety about the identity of western modernity itself 
and the need for a constitutive other. See Bobby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the 
Emergence of Islamism, Postcolonial Encounters Series (London: Zed Books, 1997). For Sayyid, 
Islamism’s anti-modernity is a rejection of the hegemony of western epistemology and the political 
hierarchies that are premised on it. 
115 Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., Political Islam: Essays from 
Middle East Report, Merip Reader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
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historian of religion Bruce Lawrence argued, “fundamentalists” could not have appeared 
in any but the modern age.116 Political theorist Roxanne Euben makes a similar 
observation; because “fundamentalism is in large measure determined by a modem 
context, it makes little sense to understand it as “premodern” in either a chronological or 
a substantive sense”117 Instead Euben suggests that we view fundamentalism as itself a 
foundationalist variation of the postmodern critique of modernity.118 
Islamism/fundamentalism had to be seen therefore as a modern phenomenon shot through 
with modernist attitudes and assumptions about the world. In principle the Islamist is not 
opposed to aspects of modernity (the modern state, political parties, industry, technology, 
etc), but instead the Islamist seeks to put her own cultural/identity stamp on the form of 
the modern. A naïve distinction thus emerges between content and form, between science 
and culture, religion and politics. In the world view of the Islamist, Western culture 
                                                
116 Lawrence, Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence. Political theorist Roxanne Euben makes a 
similar observation when she writes that because “fundamentalism is in large measure determined by a 
modem context, it makes little sense to understand it as “premodern” in either a chronological or a 
substantive sense”:Roxanne L. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of 
Modern Rationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). See also John Gray, Al Qaeda and 
What It Means to Be Modern (New York & London: The New Press, 2003). Instead Euben suggests that 
we view fundamentalism as itself a variation of the postmodern critique of modernity. This brings her 
position close to Akbar Ahmed who writes that “fundamentalism is the attempt to resolve how to live in a 
world of radical doubt.” Akbar S. Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise (New 
York & London: Routledge, 1992), p.13. 
117 Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, p. 163. 
See also Gray, Al Qaeda and What It Means to Be Modern. Zaman also writes that “modernism and 
Islamism—have both been largely rooted in modern, Westernized institutions of education.” (p. 7). 
However when he goes on to distinguish traditionalist ‘ulama from this group, he seems to be committing 
the same fallacy that sharply divides the religious from the political sphere. 
118 This at first blush seems to bring her position close to that of Akbar S. Ahmed’s who writes that 
“fundamentalism is the attempt to resolve how to live in a world of radical doubt.” Ahmed, Postmodernism 
and Islam: Predicament and Promise, p.13. However unlike Ahmed’s rather naïve take on postmodernity, 
Euben recognizes that a core element of postmodernism is the philosophical rejection of foundations. 
Postmodernism is anti-foundationalist, Islamism by contrast is not. As Bassam Tibi rightly argues, “The 
fundamentalist yearning for the absolute introduces a concept of absolutism in human knowledge, 
definitely not a postmodern idea” Bassam Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics (New York: Palgrave, 
2001). Tibi, like Lawrence, embraces a variation of the “incommensurability” thesis. Euben’s strategy, the 
correct one in my view, is to problematize the very singular conception of modernity and the West. 
Furthermore she argues “like postmodernism, fundamentalists’ paradoxical relationship to modernity 
represents an attempt to move beyond modernity in a way that is simultaneously parasitic upon it.” (p. 166) 
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(content) can be separated from its technological form.119 In short Islamist were shown to 
be modern because their intellectual positions were often formulated in terms heavily 
indebted to the discourses of the modern age. Islamists therefore were not expressions of 
a return of Islamic medievalism, but something new, something alternatively modern.  
However while Said’ idea of resistance is certainly not ethnocentric or 
xenophobic, one unfortunate aspect of anti-imperialist sentiment in post-colonial cultures 
is the tendency to blame everything on a monological ‘West’. A typical ‘nativist’ 
response has been to resort to reactionary endorsements of native ‘tradition’ tout court, 
now matter how anachronistic or objectionable these may be. Said’s Orientalism may 
itself have been part of this problem. Because Orientalism showed how the ‘Orient’ was 
constructed and thus systematically misrepresented in a variety of academic disciplines, it 
was often quoted and used as a bulwark in the cultural dimension of anti-colonial 
sentiment. However the book completely ignored the various forms of oppression that 
actually exist in the formerly colonized world, and did not equally problematize the 
hermeneutic and power dimensions of the ‘Orients’ self-representation of itself. As with 
any stage of cultural formation, the dominant discursive mode that successfully stifles its 
rival claims, has its own political and often arbitrary and contingent conditions of 
emergence. Despite the fact that it would be an unjustifiable extrapolation, one could get 
the impression, reading Orientalism, that any kind of oppression and despotism attributed 
to ‘oriental’ cultures was an illusion, maliciously concocted by the West in its imperial 
interests.120 
                                                
119 In Islam awr Jiddat Passandi (Islam and Modernism) the Deobandi cleric Taqi ‘Usmani holds a similar 
dichotomous view of the modern. 
120 Thus in Culture and Imperialism Said seems to be sharply aware of this earlier lacunae and thus makes 
his contempt for reactionary and xenophobic nationalisms quite clear. But the grounds of this contempt 
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However while all of these new studies formed significant advances over the 
essentialist caricatures of an earlier Orientalist generation, they were still hampered by a 
one sided consideration of the power/knowledge nexus; locked within the paradigm of 
‘representation.’ That is to say most post-Orientalist scholars became fixated on the 
politics of knowledge and representation in the West. If knowledge about Islam was 
inked to the west’s own discursive and imperial hegemony, what about Muslim 
knowledge about Islam? How do power relations between Muslim subjects effect the 
production of Muslim subjectivity within Muslim societies? This means that the question 
of Islam had to incorporate and go beyond the series of largely straw man arguments that 
the critique of Orientalism nonetheless had to demolish. But because it is no longer 
sufficient to show how “Islams” are multiple, diverse, heterogeneous, modern, capable of 
adaptation and change, etc. one must go beyond Orientalism and postcolonialism more 
generally.121 If Islam is an empty signifier then the analysis of Muslim life must be 
situated within a broader set of economic, political and power relations on the one hand, 
and the specificity of embodied life on the other.122 It follows that notions of culture 
                                                
only more clearly expose his deep commitment to liberal humanism. Liberal ideology has succeed precisely 
in masking its own operations as ‘common sense’; i.e. it does not conceive of itself as an ideology. 
121 Such calls for “regime change” within postcolonial studies have come to be sounded with more 
regularity. See for instance Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a 
History of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), and Revathi Krishnaswamy 
and John C. Hawley, eds., The Postcolonial and the Global (University of Minnesota Press, 2007). In a 
similar vien historian Geoff Eley critiques the totalizing assumptions of certain trajectories of 
postcolonialism. In their attempts at ‘provincializing Europe’, writes Eley, “post-Saidian historians 
sometimes imply an over abstracted and homogenized conception of the West and its internal histories.” 
Geoff Eley, A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society (University of Michigan 
Press, 2005), p. 194. Eley goes on to conclude that “the division between “social” and “cultural” was 
always a false categorical separation. … That’s why we need new “histories of society.” … the relevance of 
historical studies for the future will certainly require renewing an insurgent spirit again” (Eley, p. 203). I 
see the metacolonial as an attempt to answer the call of an insurgent spirit. 
122 Euben and Sami Zubaida’s work are good example of this new breed of nuanced critical historical 
political analysis. Rejecting culturalist approaches and the general unqualified use of “Islam” as an 
analytical category, Zubaida problematizes therefore the idea of Islam as a coherent sociological and 
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(piety, adab) and religious symbols should not be treated as sociological or political 
constants. Contemporary Islamist movements then, including ‘traditionalist’ ones, like 
other political developments, are not necessarily the expression of continuity or persistent 
themes of Islamic history. Political discourse, Islamic or otherwise, is thus shaped 
political forces and the socio-economic and political contexts in which they are 
articulated. Additionally critical perspectives should take into account the possibility of 
serious epistemic ruptures123 of ‘tradition’. 
In many ways Euben’s argument is also indicative of the critical discourse trend. 
For instance she seems on the one hand to object to the use of an anti-foundationalist 
methodology (broadly speaking post-structural and hermeneutic) to frame a sympathetic 
account of political institutions which not only presume a thickly metaphysical 
conception of ethics and community, but in fact claim that notions of the good are 
grounded in specific historical texts (Qur’an, hadith). At the same time she recognizes 
that these claims are themselves pressed into the service of both ethical and political 
objectives. And so while my own work clearly reaffirms the now commonly accepted 
view that there is no essential or monolithic Islam, it leaves room for the understanding of 
how particular subjectivities come into concreteness, and how scholarship must attempt 
to understand the truth value of alternative political cultures rather than dismiss them as 
merely epiphenomenal. It is by keeping such tensions open, rather than attempting a 
definitive closure, that ones description and understanding of political Islam can be 
enriched.  
                                                
political entity. See Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State: Essays on Political Ideas and Movements in 
the Middle East. 
123 I elaborate on this below in the sections on genealogy. 
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With some measure of generalization then we can say that scholarship on political 
Islam has gone through several broad yet continuingly overlapping critical phases; the 
critique of Orientalism and Western representations (Said) — the critique of static 
homogenous essentialisms, and the recognition of multiplicity and the historicity of 
Muslim politics — the linguistic turn which offered a critique/refinement of the static, 
allegedly Eurocentric124 categories that are deployed to study social and political 
formations more broadly (religion125, secularism/modernity126, tradition, ethnicity127 etc) 
— and then finally the most recent phase which deploys a more sophisticated framework 
for understanding the relationships between language, history, subjectivity and power 
(discourse)128. In some ways then, with varying degrees of sophistication, all these 
critiques are premised on an understanding of the relationship between power, language 
and subjectivity. Clearly then for this study the problematic of political Islam is to be 
placed within the broad framework of a critique of discourse rather than ideology; 
Foucault rather than Marx. 
 
Discourse and Power: Tradition and Genealogy 
                                                
124 Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media, Sightlines 
(Routledge, 1994), Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference, ed. Geoff Eley and Sherry Ortner Nicholas Dirks, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
125 See the excellent work of Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European 
Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (University Of Chicago Press, 2005). And of 
course the seminal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam. In this influential text Asad relentlessly troubles the idea that “religion” is a transparent category of 
universal history. 
126 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Cultural Memory in the Present 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
127 Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India (Delhi & New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990). 
128 Exemplary in this regard would be Mitchell, who draws on Derrida and Foucault to account for the 
‘enframing practices of colonial knowledge. See Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, Cambridge Middle 
East Library (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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This brings us finally to a brief consideration of a thinker/scholar who self-
consciously situates his ‘anthropology of the modern’129 within the framework of 
Foucault’s paradigm of genealogy; Talal Asad. Extending Foucault’s critique of the 
disciplines, Asad interrogates the conceptual frameworks that govern Western knowledge 
practices; especially those within the anthropology of religion. In particular he 
problematizes a series of unthought assumptions that undergird the normative framework 
of anthropological and scholarly inquiry into the reasons of non-European traditions, 
principally Islam. Like Foucault, his inquiries are intended to be read as “effective 
histories”130 or histories of the present, rather than social and cultural histories. That is to 
say he is not interested in deploying a colonial gaze which seeks to objectively track the 
development of an ethnos and a chronos of the other. And like Foucault he is not 
concerned with the search for “origins” that often characteristic of traditional social 
history.131 Additionally Asad offers a genealogical critique of the category of “agency.” 
Various conceptions of an autonomous sovereign self — the agents who ‘make its own 
history’ — lie at the core of the discourse of secular humanism.  
However as is well known Asad also borrows the concept of ‘tradition’ from the 
work of the Catholic philosopher Alasdair McIntyre.132 Talal Asad subsequently coins the 
term “discursive tradition” — which effectively represents a tensional combination 
                                                
129 For a series of critical engagements with Asad’s work see Charles Hirschkind and David Scott, eds., 
Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors, 1 ed., Cultural Memory in the Present 
(Stanford University Press, 2006). 
130 “Effective” history differs from the history of historians in being without constants. Nothing in man—
not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other 
men.” Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." 
131 See in particular David Scott, "The Tragic Sensibility of Talal Asad," in Powers of the Secular Modern: 
Talal Asad and His Interlocutors, ed. Charles Hirschkind and David Scott, Cultural Memory in the Present 
(Stanford University Press, 2006). 
132 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1984). 
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between Foucault’s concept of the “discursive regime” and McIntyre’s ‘tradition’. Asad 
suggest that Islam be viewed as a discursive tradition, and without doubt this trajectory 
has been generating some of the most exciting scholarship on Muslim politics and society 
in recent years.133 I will suggest however that this Asadian framework remains caught 
between two levels of Foucaultian critique; between epistemology-power (connaissance) 
and a more radical understanding of Foucault’s wok at the level of ontology-power 
(savoir). What this means is that with Asad, Foucault’s critique of power/knowledge 
remains at the level of epistemology (connaissance). Foucault’s distinction between two 
types of knowledge, connaissance/savoir, is as I shall elaborate below, key to a complete 
understanding of genealogy. Foucault’s History of Sexuality was subtitled la volonté de 
savoir (the will to knowledge) as an obvious homage to Nietzsche’s “Will to Power.” 
In Towards an Anthropology of Islam, Asad writes: 
A tradition consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct 
practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice 
that, precisely because it is established, has a history. These discourses 
relate conceptually to a past … An Islamic discursive tradition is simply a 
tradition of Muslim discourse that addresses itself to conceptions of the 
Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular Islamic practice in 
the present. 
 
Discursive tradition’s therefore are constituted and reconstituted not only by 
history, but also by the relations of power that saturate the spaces of the past and present. 
Muslim discourses, like western discourses, and the actors who articulate them are thus 
                                                
133 Haj, Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality, and Modernity, Charles Hirschkind, The 
Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics, Cultures of History (Columbia 
University Press, 2006), Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject.. See 
also Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing, Wellek Library Lectures (Columbia University Press, 2007).. To 
some degree both Zaman and Ismail are also influenced by Asad (See Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: 
Culture, the State and Islamism, Zaman, The 'Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change.) 
Zaman deploys this term in his analysis of the Deoband ‘ulama, but the weight of tradition displaces the 
analytic potential of power. 
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situated both historically and in a field of power relationships. As Zaman correctly notes 
this view of Islam, as discursively produced in the currents of history/power, “avoid 
essentialist constructions that strive to judge all facets of Islamic thought, ideals, and 
practice in terms of how they relate to (or, more often than not, fail to relate to) Islam’s 
foundational texts.” Unlike how they appear in many otherwise methodologically 
sensitive writings, “traditions” are not pure a priori isolable elements that interact with a 
given historical context, but are rather produced from within the field of power 
relationships. Thus orthodoxy is itself, however far removed from the formal arena of the 
political — the state — is itself an assertion of a series of power claims. Thus ‘ulama 
authority, and the practices that seek to constitute that authority within a populace, is 
simultaneously a relationships of power. In short culture/religion cannot not be treated 
either as a sociological given, nor cannot it be seen outside of the sphere of the political. 
This is in part what Asad means by the fundamental historicity of Islam. Naturally such a 
claim would be an anathema to the ‘ulama who base their authority and power on the 
basis of possessing originary and authentic knowledge (‘ilm). And this is precisely why 
Roy’s thesis on the failure of political Islam,134 is itself a monumental failure.135 
Effectively then and in ways complementary to Agamben as we shall see, Asad 
seeks to demystifying contemporary secular political institutions, by showing how myth 
and violence lurk behind their claims of worldly reason and tolerance. Once its rational-
legal mask is removed, the modern state will reveal itself to be far from rational or 
                                                
134 Roy, The Failure of Political Islam. 
135 This is also why Eickelman and Piscatori’s use of the term “Muslim politics” to characterize actors that 
deploy “signs and symbols derived from Islamic traditions” in the political sphere, is also deeply flawed. 
Without a more robust conception of the political ,and without fully recognizing the historicity, rather than 
the mere variance of tradition, such characterizations remain as arbitrary as the term fundamentalism that 
they seek to displace. See Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics. 
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secular.136 But would Asad say the same about institutions which operate in the name of 
Islam? On the surface it seems as if his final recourse to the category of tradition s 
designed to salvage the possibility of an ethical tradition in opposition to the purely 
political traditions of the West. 
But more importantly we are no longer concerned with the question “what is 
Islam”, “how is it represented and constructed”, but rather how are discourses of Islam 
deployed in the socio-political arena by multiple actors, both “Muslim” and “non-
Muslim”. The discursive deployment and construction of Islam as a disciplinary political 
(knowledge) object of western inquiry — an object to be known, controlled, reformed 
and harnessed — is not then the exclusive preserve of a colonial or imperial imaginary, 
but rather a feature of a more dense and overlapping series of governmentalities. If Asad 
is concerned primarily with how modern western knowledge practices, in particular 
anthropology, forge Islam/religion as a disciplinary object, then here in this work I seek 
to extend this question to the ways in which Muslim subjects are both forged by and 
simultaneously deploy their own forms of knowledge/power 
 
It has thus become important to head the methodologically sensitive calls for 
thinking about Islam and Muslim society in full view of its own historicity. In addition to 
thinking about the specificity and diversity of Islamic societies, my analysis will 
consciously divest itself from the usage of the over determining factor of “religion/Islam” 
or “ethnicity” as a central category for explanation.137 The limits of deploying “Islam” as 
                                                
136 Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, p. 23. 
137 See the introduction by Juan R. I. Cole, in Juan R. I. Cole, ed., Comparing Muslim Society: Knowledge 
and the State in a World Civilization, Comparitive Studies in Society & History (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1992). 
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a central category for understanding Pakistani politics come into particularly sharp focus 
when we consider the recent sudden shift in student politics in Karachi. Prior to the rise 
of the MQM (Muhajir National Movement) both the JUI and the JI found a strong base of 
support within the Muhajir community. But this identification with “Islamic” politics, 
underwent an overnight shift as the MQM rose to political dominance by the mid 1980’s. 
Such sudden shifts point to the strong need to analyze Pakistani politics in terms that do 
not distinctly privilege primordial categories such as “Islam” or even “ethnicity.” The 
over determination of “ethnicity” or “Islam” as causative elements in the political arena, 
tends to mask several factors which are more significant; namely the repressive role of 
the state; its legitimization of the use of violence as the means for political participation 
and negotiation; and in particular, the role of the military, which from the very outset of 
the nations history, has attempted to control the political process and gear the state 
towards maintaining a political economy of defense.138 
More generally I might add, I would like to ask questions related to the uses and 
deployment of postmodern strategies for thinking and writing the Other (Muslims). For 
instance has deconstruction allowed Islam, long victimized, silenced and excluded by the 
prevailing hierarchies embedded in the text called ‘the history of the West’, to assert 
itself more forcefully on the worlds stage? Is terrorism a species of this assertion? Can 
deconstructive readings, which developed out of and in reaction to a set of historically 
specific (Western) discursive practices, in which subjectivity and the egological model of 
an autonomous rational consciousness take primacy, be applied unproblematically to a 
genre which emerged out of a different set of ideological and historical precedents. 
                                                
138 See Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence, 
vol. 46, Cambridge South Asian Studies (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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Furthermore doesn’t employing deconstruction as a set of universal techniques and 
extending it unproblematically into a non-Western context, run the risk of making these 
practices yet another metanarrative with the ‘West’ as its originating point. While such 
queries are critical, I do think that with the requisite sensitivities to the historical 
specificities of Islamic societies, genealogical/deconstructive critiques may indeed be 
usefully applied to other knowledge disciplines — kalam and shari‘a (Islamic theology 
and jurisprudence) — which have taken on many of the original onto-theological errors 
that Heidegger reserves for ‘Western’ thought.139 Furthermore the very civilizational 
disjuncture between the West (Hellenism, Judaism, Christianity) and Islam, has itself 
been exposed as an Orientalist binarism.140 Similarly a Foucauldian critique aimed at 
revealing reasons ‘will to truth’ as inextricable from desire and power (i.e. Orientalism), 
may equally be used to uncover the ways in which appeals to revelation serve as the 
vehicle of suppression in the hands of those who control, dominate and disseminate 





The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our 
identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation. … It is no longer a question of 
judging the past in the name of a truth that only we can possess in the present, but 
of risking the destruction of the subject who seeks knowledge [connaissance] in 
the endless deployment of the will to knowledge [savoir].141 
 
                                                
139 This seemingly Eurocentric assertion must however be viewed in light of Heidegger’s non-geographical 
understanding of Europe. For an excellent reading see Rodolphe Gasché, Europe, or the Infinite Task : A 
Study of a Philosophical Concept, Meridian, Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2009). 
140 Richard W. Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (Columbia University Press, 2004). 
Although the question of who produces and who consumes a cruise missile is not so ambiguous. 
141 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," p. 367. 
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I have tried to get out from the philosophy of the subject through a genealogy of 
this subject, by studying the constitution of the subject across history which has 
led us up to the modern concept of the self. This has not always been an easy 
task, since most historians prefer a history of social processes (where society 
plays the role of the subject) and most philosophers prefer a subject without 
history142. 
 
Foucault remains one of the most widely cited figures in the human and social 
sciences, and this despite his rigorous critique of the sciences of man and their 
disciplinary regimes of truth. This past decade however has been marked by a significant 
revival and rethinking of Foucault’s legacy143. Part of this has been stimulated by the 
recent spate of publications in English of Foucault’s year long seminars at the Collège de 
France.144 In addition the huge reception within the wider humanities and social sciences 
of Agamben’s work on sovereign power and the exception — so painfully relevant in a 
post 911 world — has also rekindled an interest in Foucaultian biopolitics; which had for 
the most part during the 1990’s been subsumed under a more limited concern with the 
governmentality of advanced neoliberal regimes.145 Foucault’s seminars, especially The 
Birth of Biopolitics, within which the famous governmentality lectures were situated, has 
led to a revaluation of the relationship between Foucault’s complex grammars of 
power.146 The continued and increasing relevance of Foucault’s work can be seen, in part, 
                                                
142 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. Paul Rabinow, vol. Vol. II, Essential Works 
of Foucault, 1954-1984 (New Press, 1999). 
143 C. G. Prado, ed., Foucault's Legacy, Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy (Continuum, 2009), 
and Jorge Capetillo Sam Binkley, ed., A Foucault for the 21st Century: Governmentality, Biopolitics and 
Discipline in the New Millennium (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009 ), are two recent examples from a 
plethora of new work. 
144 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, ———, Security, Territory, Population, Michel Foucault, The 
Birth of Biopolitics, Michel Foucault: Lectures at the College De France (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), ——
—, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1973--1974, Lectures at the Collège De France 
(Picador, 2008), having produced the most excitement. 
145 Gordon, Burchell, and Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. 
146 Thomas Lemke, "Biopolitics and Beyond. On the Reception of a Vital Foucauldian Notion,"  (2005), —
——, "'the Birth of Bio-Politics': Michel Foucault's Lecture at the Collège De France on Neo-Liberal 
Governmentality," Economy and Society 30, no. 2 (2001). 
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by the vitality of the journal Foucault Studies which was founded in 2004, and the 
formation in 2008 of the new Journal of Power, largely inspired by Foucault’s work147 In 
addition to this many interdisciplinary journals continue to issue special editions devoted 
to an analysis of Foucault’s paradigmatic work.148 As Sam Binkley and Jorge Capetillo 
note in their recent re-evaluation of Foucault:  
… to imagine that the question of the contemporary relevance of Foucault 
is exhausted by changing empirical conditions alone is to reduce Foucault 
to precisely the kind of historicism he rejected, and to ignore the animating 
principle driving his work… Foucault can never be passé, if for no other 
reason than his assertions were never meant to project distinct teleologies 
or designate historical periodizations. While at times he may have 
gestured toward “great ages” (the classical age, the modern age, the age of 
sovereignty or discipline), what was central to his analysis was not the 
unfolding sequence of distinct world-historical stages, but the overlapping 
constellations of forms and technologies through which societies 
constitute themselves through the production of distinct subjects. 
Foucault’s oft cited assertion of the triangulation of the power formations 
associated with sovereignty, discipline and biopower affirms the distance 
he placed between his own approach and that of those who traffic in tidy, 
sequenced “ages.”149 
 
Hence it should be clear that that something called “the age of sovereignty” did 
not simply gave way to the age of discipline which would later gave way to the age of 
biopower and governmentality. This point is critical because it allows us to consider and 
formulate more complex assemblages (dispositifs) of power which are often a mixture of 
power’s various modalities. It is in this way that my work begins to make sense of the 
exercise of ‘ulama power in terms of both sovereignty, biopolitics, discipline and 
                                                
147 See Haugaard, Mark and Malesevic, Sinisa (2008) 'The ubiquity of power', Journal of Power, 1: 1, 1-3 
148 See Theory, Culture & Society 2009, Couze Venn and Tiziana Terranova, "Introduction: Thinking after 
Michel Foucault," Theory, Culture & Society  (2009), D. Wood, "Editorial: Foucault and Panopticism 
Revisited," Surveillance and Society 1, no. 3 (2003). Also Kiersey, Nicholas J. and Weidner, Jason R. 
(2009) 'Editorial Introduction', Global Society, 23: 4, 353 — 361, and Journal of the Philosophy of History, 
Pli 13, 2006. 
149 Sam Binkley, ed., A Foucault for the 21st Century: Governmentality, Biopolitics and Discipline in the 
New Millennium, p. 4, emphasis mine. 
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governmentality.150 In Nealon’s recent work, the only telos that one can derive from 
Foucault’s work is the idea of the intensification of power relationships over time151 In 
light of Foucault power oeuvre then our task as critical historians/anthropologists is to 
problematize the interpenetration of power, knowledge, and subjectivity 
 
History of the Present 
If the historian ‘throws’ himself directly into the ‘world-view’ of an era, he has 
not thus proved as yet that he understands his object in an authentically historical 
way, and not just ‘aesthetically.’152 
 
Foucault’s radical approach to thinking and writing history is generally subsumed 
under the title of genealogy. Historian’s influenced by Foucault, generally refer to their 
work as histories of the present. However the contours and meanings of Foucault’s 
radical historicism are not often elaborated upon by those who invoke the terms.153 
Foucault’s histories on the one hand appear to present us with a linear narrative about 
what happened; a narrative leading from the past up to the present. According to this 
reading Foucault’s work aims at “objective historical truth”. But, as McGushin suggests, 
it is also necessary to understand Foucault’s historicism as a creative endeavor, as an 
“etho-poetic work.” An etho-poetic approach does not simply aim to “achieve objective 
                                                
150 Dean suggests that such mixtures of power can result in particularly demonic formations. See Dr 
Mitchell M Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (Sage Publications Ltd, 2009). 
151 See Jeffrey T. Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and Its Intensifications since 1984 (Stanford 
University Press, 2007).. For another critique of the “epochalist” reading of Foucault see also Mariana 
Valverde, "Genealogies of European States: Foucauldian Reflections," Economy and Society 36, no. 1 
(2007). 
152 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York: HarperCollins, 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1962). p. 488. 
153 This is the point of departure of two superb studies of Foucault. See Han, Foucault's Critical Project: 
Between the Transcendental and the Historical, and Edward F. McGushin, Foucault's Askesis: An 




historical truth and thereby produce knowledge. The ultimate purpose is to transform the 
subject engaged in historical or philosophical thinking.”154 Thus part of Foucault’s final 
project was to problematize our very conception of philosophical and historical truth. 
Thus before I attempt to clarify the relationships between the various resonance of 
Foucault’s grammars of power, it will be important to establish the sense of Foucault’s 
histories, since this work follows in the wake of his critique of historicism. How do we 
reconcile Foucault as a historian — one of the most influential thinkers of the social 
science and one who has had a particularly profound impact on the discipline of history 
— when he also simultaneously and consciously thought of his work as ficto-histories? 
As Agamben also states Foucault’s “historical investigations were only the shadow of his 
theoretical questioning of the present.”155 These remarks are not simply his recognition of 
the interpretive or narrative structure of all historical work,156 but instead signal a more 
complex relationship between his understanding of history and temporality. While 
Foucault’s own historiographical shifts — from archaeology to genealogy to 
problematization — are complex and interwoven157 from a preliminary perspective it is 
important to distinguish between two senses of history, Geschichte and the more 
conventional Historie. Most historians are historians of the latter. Foucault’s genius, 
influenced in large part by Heidegger’s understanding of historicality158 was to combine 
                                                
154 McGushin, Foucault's Askesis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life. 
155 See Agamben, lecture Power and Glory, 2008. 
156 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), and Keith Jenkins, Re-Thinking History, Routledge Classics 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2003). 
157 C. Koopman, "Revising Foucault: The History and Critique of Modernity." 
158 In Heidegger’s famous elaboration on history in section §8 of Being and Time, “Historicality” refers to 
that existential awareness, or experience through which one understands Being in history, and as such it is 
the ultimate ground and cause of historical awareness and historical research. For Heidegger, the existential 
view of having a fate or a destiny, along with the power of a story to reveal meaning, is what makes human 
history possible. Hence the time of the event, kairòs, should be distinguished from the domain of ordinary 
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his inquiries into both forms of history, a fact that has lead to no considerable profusion 
of incoherencies, since his two categories of knowledge, savoir and connaissance, can 
also be linked to this distinction.159 Thus instead of the conventional understanding of 
history as the account of what has happened (Historie), Geschichte is thinking in 
response to the historical itself, the dynamic unfolding (event) through which ‘history’ 
itself happens. We are accustomed to thinking of history (Geschichte) as what happens or 
takes place in time (Historie), and this taking place we understand in terms of the 
unfolding of events that are historically (historic) observable. Thus a distinction between 
history and what we call historicity is key to understanding genealogy. In Foucault’s 
“history of the present”, we must hear the echoes of this evental history as it crosses over 
and shapes the present. Geschichte then should always be interpreted not merely as 
history in the narrow sense, the always selective and limited chronicle of past events, the 
kind we usually find in “history” textbooks, but rather as referring both to historicity and 
the reigning mentality through events in time are fictioned (fashioned) into a story. Thus 
as Paul Bove notes, “Foucault is interested in history as Geschichte”160 History does not 
fashion itself, nor do raw events as such exist outside a framework of already available 
interpretations. Simultaneously historicity is not itself something historical161 
Chronology, and the Historie that articulates it, is thus only the visible (present-to-hand) 
element of a more primordial historicity that, whilst always operative, nonetheless 
                                                
history (chronos) which is the successive, demonstrative time of facts, for which Heidegger reserves the 
word Historie. See also Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995).  
159 Another way of framing this is to think of the difference between chronological time and kairòlogical 
time. 
160 See Bove for Foucauldian critique of historicism and new historicism: Paul A. Bove, In the Wake of 
Theory (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press ; University Press of New England, 1992), p.21. 
161 Note the resemblances of this distinction with Heidegger’s definition of technology (technē) as 
something that is not itself technological. 
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remains in excess of its actualization. Thus, the event is never fully realized or exhausted 
in the worldly events that unfold in the present tense. Thus there is a distinction in 
Foucault between historicity of the event versus history constructed as a story or a 
narrative. As Ziareck notes this all to easily ignored distinction between Geschichte and 
Historie, “holds the key to the problem of otherness and difference, and its inscriptions in 
the space of history.”162 
Foucault wasn’t simply offering a method, a way to do history, but also a way to 
think the meaning of the historical, the past and the present. Foucault offers us a radical 
redirection of our gaze, from the narrative element (the always selective and 
interpretively bound reconfiguration of the archive) towards what he called the historical 
a priori. A failure to confront what Foucault means by these terms is a refusal to think 
Foucault’s radical insights into history as a play of power rather than as the narrative 
expression and reframing of a series of interpretive choices. Foucault’s historicism is thus 
of a radical kind, which rejects appeals to static transcendental truths and principles of 
unity, origin and progress in history though its embrace of nominalism, contingency163 In 
simpler terms therefore there is no prior object called ‘history’. Thus today while only 
innocent freshman would aspire to write history ‘as it really was’, most historians will 
readily concede that history writing is influenced by the historical circumstances of its 
production, and will acknowledge that because history is written, it is shaped by the 
resources of a linguistic community and the narrative conventions characterizing it.164 
Despite this there remains a belief that somehow the present can be fully accounted for 
                                                
162 Krzysztof Ziarek, The Historicity of Experience: Modernity, the Avant-Garde, and the Event, Avant-
Garde and Modernism Studies (Northwestern University Press, 2001). 
163 Mark Bevir, "What Is Genealogy?," Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2008). 
164 R. Radhakrishnan, History, the Human, and the World Between (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 
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by something called “history” which, albeit in a qualified sense, must ‘exist’, thereby 
enabling a distinction between history and myth, history and fiction.165  
Hence for Foucault, to the extent that historiography merely encodes the narrative 
of humanism and anthropology, a universal metaphysics of subjectivity,166 it must be 
rejected. Historiography is itself the cite of an ongoing battle. Foucault’s postmodernity, 
if one could even call it that167, would be found instead in the restive ‘problematization’ 
of what is historically given. Indeed Foucault sought to examine and understand the 
modernist link between history writing, the state and subject formation. Therefore to be 
clear, to say that I am interested in writing a history of the present, what Dean calls an 
effective or critical history,168 means to pay attention to what Foucault initially called the 
historical a priori. To follow Foucault’s “annexation of the present from the teleology of 
historical process and time, it is necessary to break with the teleological conception of the 
present itself as a unity of discrete but interdependent elements which are manifest in the 
historical moment.”169 Thus when Foucault asks “what difference does today introduce 
with respect to yesterday?” he is effectively asking about the effects of the present on our 
comportment towards the past, reversing the assumed priority of the past of historicist 
thinking. If Foucault was led to argue that Discipline and Punish formed a “history of the 
                                                
165 See Fasolt for a lucid critique of conventional historical ideologies and practice; Constantin Fasolt, The 
Limits of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). The idea that history is simply there for the 
rational methodological taking, that it pertains to common sense, is as Gramsci noted the surest sign of a 
hidden ideological sensibility. 
166 History as the story of collective Man. As Reinhart Koselleck notes prior to the Enlightenment ‘there 
was no history for which humanity might have been the subject’ The emergence of historiography thus 
corresponds to the emergence of a ‘collective singular’ “Man” as the object of history. Reinhart Koselleck, 
Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, ed. Thomas McCarthy, trans. Keith Tribe, Studies in 
Contemporary German Social Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 
167 Beverley Southgate, Postmodernism in Hisory: Fear of Freedom? (London: Routledge, 2003). 
168 Dean calls them effective and critical histories; Dean, Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault's 
Methods and Historical Sociology. 
169 Ibid., p. 52. 
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present” it was because the present was conceived as one traversed by revolts against the 
prison as a material instrument of power. As Foucault notes, “that punishment in general 
and the prison in particular belong to a political technology of the body is a lesson that I 
have learnt not so much from history as from the present”.170 This present, then, is a 
struggle over the very mode of subjection and self-constitution. Genealogies therefore 
resist the enframing of history by historicism which regards history (histoire) as the only 
true of reality. 
The immediate objection to thinking in terms of the historical a priori, would be 
that it somehow does not compute with common sense, or that it is “too theoretical”. I am 
in part convinced that the multiple crisis we now face are linked directly to the pragmatist 
demand to think in immediately “practical” terms. I reject therefore the kind of anti-
theoretical, neo-pragmatist, neo-conservative, approaches to contemporary political 
history which are always in a rush to lay the funeral pyre of “theory.” Like Foucault 
therefore I strongly reject this very dichotomy between “theory and practice”, which is 
itself an extension of the Western humanist preference for identity over difference, for 
presence over absence, dichotomies rooted in the subject/object division that prefigures 
representational thinking in the age of world picture.171 Genealogy must be seen therefore 
as a problematizations of a range of “self-evidences.” There is not on the one hand, a real 
Pakistan, and then on the other hand the various discourses on it. There is no Islam that 
                                                
170 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan, Vintage (New 
York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1977), p 30-1. 
171 See Heidegger, ‘Age of World Picture’ in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings: From Being and Time 
(1927) to the Task of Thinking (1964), 1964 (New York: HarperCollins, HarperSanFrancisco, 1977). For an 
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stands outside of historicity. As such the “way” in which we think and the “about” which 
we bring our reflections to bear on, are intimately intertwined. Everything as Heidegger 
would say is already in-the-world. I therefore regard the very distinction between theory 
and practice, interpretation and fact, as facile and unproductive; there is not therefore first 
the object as a given (Pakistan, Islam, Deoband history) and then only a series of 
thoughts about them. Nor am I of course privileging theory as somehow detached from 
the lived life world. Foucault was of course resolutely opposed to privileging either, and 
his genealogies unfold in the wake of a critique on the one hand of pragmatism and 
idealism and detached theoretical privilege on the other.  
The debate as to whether Foucault was a historian or a philosopher therefore has a 
long provenance, and has once again been ignited by the interesting exchange between 
Han and Gutting.172 For me however Foucault’s project is both; a rigorous attempt to 
combine historical and philosophical thinking — a mode of interrogation which 
“problematizes man’s relation to the present”. Therefore in this study of political Islam I 
seek to problematize our relation to history rather than merely account for or explain its 
chronological sequence and emergence. In order to do so it must be clear that Foucault’s 
archeological investigations were aimed at interrogating this historical a priori, a method 
that is later complimented by genealogy which is an interrogation of relationships of 
power. There is thus an important homology between power and the a priori that requires 
a measure of clarification. Additionally it is important to note that Foucault was not 
writing an a priori history, on the contrary, he tries to write a history of the a priori.173 
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Background: The Space of the Political 
In his essay Subjectivity and Truth, Foucault describes his work as “a genealogy 
of the modern subject”,174 or the historical process of subjectification. He writes, “I have 
tried to get out from the philosophy of the subject through a genealogy of this subject, by 
studying the constitution of the subject across history which has led us up to the modern 
concept of the self … the question of the historicity of the subject.”175 He specifies that 
his method for constructing a genealogy of the subject is an “archaeology of knowledge 
[savoir]”, whereas the domain of the analysis are the various “technologies” or 
“hermeneutics of the self”; the various intersections between certain types of practices 
and techniques of the subject (confession, asceticism, etc.), with scientific discourses 
about the subject (criminology, psychiatry, etc.). Foucault, as he would himself go on to 
declare, was never interested in a theory of power as such, but rather was concerned with 
an embodied subjectivity always already situated within a field of power relationships. It 
is critical therefore to say something about this savoir ‘field’.  
Foucault’s thought links up with the phenomenological tradition176 in at least two 
senses: (1) it is a critical inquiry into the conditions of possibility of knowledge and the 
historicity of reason; and (2) as a philosophical study of the subject, it is an effort to 
rethink critically the phenomenological subject.177 Foucault’s approach might be 
compared with the phenomenological approach to subjectivity that Charles Taylor takes 
                                                
174 Michel Foucault, The Politics of Truth, Foreign Agents (Semiotext(e), 2007), p. 149. 
175 Ibid., p. 150 emphasis mine.  
176 While Foucault certain wrote against both hermeneutics and phenomenology, it was the phenomenology 
in the tradition of Husserl, the concern for intentionality, and not Heidegger, the concern for being, the 
Foucault rejected. See Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). 




in his Sources of the Self. Taylor, building upon Rorty and Heidegger develops a 
phenomenology of the subject that seeks to counter the predominance of Cartesian logics 
in modern epistemology and social theory. In its early neo-Kantian career, modern liberal 
social theory, Taylor argues, had taken an erroneous turn (into the metaphysics of 
subjectivity and presence) insofar as it conceived the self to be sovereign, atomistic, and 
only contingently bound to its cultural or historical surroundings.178 What many of these 
theories miss is an understanding of the silent contextual background that determines the 
condition of possibility of knowledge and meaning. In his latest formidable work, A 
Secular Age, Taylor, echoing Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, writes that all beliefs “are 
held within a context or framework of the taken-for-granted, which usually remains tacit, 
and may even be as yet unacknowledged by the agent, because never formulated.”179 This 
notion of a framework of tacit belief is similar to what Heidegger and phenomenologists 
more generally articulate as the “background” of human understanding. Foucault himself 
is also concerned with this background as he adopts the Heideggerian concept of umwelt 
and reformulates it in terms of milieu. It is this shared background180 that provides the 
condition of possibility for the intelligibility of our very sense of ourselves as particular 
kinds of subjects. That is to say we dwell in a space of unarticulated and shared context 
of significances. Critically then for Foucault and phenomenology is the notion that most 
of these evaluations are never explicitly thematized, or even formulated as beliefs; they 
are the unthought of any culture. As Heidegger would say they simply show up in the 
                                                
178 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
179 ———, A Secular Age (Belknap Press, 2007), p 13. 
180 Or pre-ontological understanding, elaborated in Heidegger’s famous characterization of equipmentality 
in Being and Time, namely the distinction between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. See Hubert L. 




way we do things, in our practices. It is this holistic network of shared significances and 
practices that precedes and first makes possible both our consciousness of and our 
engagement with the world. Foucault is thus interested in this background, this milieu, 
this space or field of power relationships which always already shows up as a particular 
“order of things”. 
The concept of a background, or historical a priori, can thus illuminate what 
Foucault had in mind with terms like archive the statement and the episteme. The brief 
definition of the a priori that Foucault offers in The Order of Things, suggests that the a 
priori is that which ‘in a given period, carves out in experience a field of possible 
knowledge [savoir], [and] defines the mode of being of the objects which appear in that 
field.”181 Like the phenomenologists, namely Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, whose 
conceptual apparatus he modified, Foucault was concerned with showing that this 
background field of human understanding is not embedded in formal ideas and concepts 
(as ideology) but rather consists in the various modes of embodied sociality and concrete 
socio-political practice. Hence for Foucault, the liberal-atomist picture of the sovereign 
human subject, a subject that is isolable from her culture or history, presupposes an 
impossible dissociation from its very conditions of possibility. In short the liberal subject 
does not and cannot make sense. Taylor makes a similar claim: “We are in fact all acting, 
thinking, and feeling out of backgrounds and frameworks which we do not fully 
understand. To ascribe total personal responsibility to us for these is to want to leap out 
of the human condition.”182 For Foucault this background is not a transcendental 
                                                
181 We can surmise that the name that Foucault gives to this filed in general is biopower, a biopower that 
operates increasingly as the logic of neoliberalism, a space where things (entities, people, the earth) show 
up as resources and commodities 
182 Taylor, p 387. 
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structure, but is rather given to us historically, and yet it is not itself historical, precisely 
because it does not simply correlate with a sequence of texts or sayings. That is to say the 
form of the historical a priori is not formal or logical, and this is clear from Foucault’s 
rejection of structuralism. Instead the background in defining the limits of what can be 
said, itself constitutes an episteme. It is the episteme then which, within its spatial and 
temporal limits, can determine what shows up as significant, admissible, acceptable, or 
possible for any given culture and epoch. Foucault’s task then was to isolate the series of 
historical events which lead to a rupture or shift in the background of discursive and 
social practices. Crucially the analysis of discourse is not aimed at isolating some distinct 
transcendental realm of rules and conditions, i.e. an über-structure, but rather it aims at 
disclosing ‘the conditions of existence’ of statements as opposed to the conditions of 
possibility. 
Foucault thus takes this phenomenological idea of a background, and subjects it to 
a series of transformations and reformulations throughout his prolific career. Taylor goes 
on to call this background the “social imaginary” which he defines as “that common 
understanding which makes possible common practices, and a widely shared sense of 
legitimacy.”183 For Foucault this social imaginary is a field or network where a 
multiplicity of force relations intersect. This social imaginary, this milieu, space, field, 
site or background, has in Foucault a number of corresponding avatars — episteme, the 
historical a priori, the statement, the archive, the assemblege — and it is precisely his 
“methods” of arch-genealogy (and later problematizations) that he fashions to interrogate 
and think this structuring, historical unthought and silent background. However because 
                                                
183 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, ed. Jane Kramer eds. Dilip Goanker, Benjamin Lee, 
Michael Warner, Public Planet Books (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
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this background is not held or specified in formal “theoretical” terms, it cannot be 
understood from a straightforward reading of the historical record, such as the spoken 
contents of a khutba or the texts on the syllabi of a madaris. I would like to make the 
claim that very few scholars working on political Islam have in mind, at least explicitly, 
this notion of the background.184 In some of his early work Foucault would go so far as to 
assert that it is the historical a priori that “provides a foundation for, and makes possible, 
all the empirical sciences of order”,185 that “in any given culture and at any given 
moment, there is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all 
knowledge [savoir], whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice”.186 
While Foucault may have nuanced such singular, totalizing and quasi-structuralist 
designations of the background, we can certainly see how in finally offering the concept 
of biopolitics, that he was signaling to the way in which governmentality names an 
ordering or enframing of biopolitical space, an ordering which is increasingly neoliberal 
and technological in its modality.187 
If we are correct then in assuming that the nature of the social imaginary or the 
background (the field, the historical a priori), is increasingly being shaped by a 
biopolitical and neoliberal imperative, then turning our gaze towards the “biopolitical 
horizon” will gain added significance. As Agamben suggests, the “enigmas” of modern 
violence, can only be solved, “on the terrain – biopolitics – on which they were 
                                                
184 As a genealogist himself, the work of Talal Asad would of course be one obvious exception. See Asad, 
Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam. 
185 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Vintage (New York: 
Vintage Books, Random House, 1973), p. 71.  
186 Ibid. 




formed.”188 On Agamben’s diagnosis, the inevitable failure of biopolitics, leads to the 
proliferation of an increasingly sovereign mentality. The consequences of this shift for an 
analysis of political Islam may be of huge practical significance, if indeed as I am 
suggesting, the very background of modernity is obscured. That is to say when we place 
the phenomenon of Islamist violence, and the conflict between (radical) Islam and the 
West, against this background horizon of biopolitics, a new series of potential insight 
may begin to develop. These insights would treat the nature of political space holistically; 
as an arena of the contestations of powers (sovereign and biopolitical) rather than as a 
struggle between liberal subjects189 and the medieval ideologies of religious 
fundamentalism. Also a realistic solution that does not privilege intentionality and 
subjectivity as the driving forces behind violence, will allow us to shift our attention from 
the preoccupation to reform the ‘ulama and the madaris, towards “fixing” the broader 
political space in which the madaris is situated. It is in this sense that one of the essential 
                                                
188 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
189 Because both traditional idealist and realist conceptions fail to do justice to the complexities of the self-
world relationship, both its present and absent dimension, Heidegger regularly deploys the term Dasein 
which was no doubt influential on the way in which Foucault thought about the human subject.. Heidegger 
chose this word in part to avoid invoking the accretion of a series of historical errors, and conceptual 
limitations associated with more familiar terms like the self, human being, person, individual, agent, etc. 
Dasein is literally the human being that is there (Da), and questions its topos, its place, as an existing being. 
As Heidegger remarks Dasein is “the being for whom the question of being is a question”. Dasein is also 
being-in-the-world. The significance of these elementary gestures is not neologism for the sake of 
obscurity, but deflection: away from deeply ingrained traditional (idealist) metaphysical conceptions of the 
relationship between subject/object, human/world. The significance then of Dasein lies in its lack of 
transparency, and gestures to the deep and constitutive historical web of relations with other beings, other 
events, other things. Dasein’s “facticity” hence exceeds any list of properties we may conjure up for it, 
ascribe to it, or describe from the surface. Heidegger deploys the term factical life to signal the irreducible 
richness of existence, and the shortcomings of any theoretical description of life. Dasein is thus always 
immersed in a specific situation responding and contributing to its dynamic environment. Heidegger’s turn 
then to both anthropology and history lies in this attempt to capture the complex, sedimented and murky 
nature of Dasein’s everyday performance of being in the world. See Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A 
Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Div I, Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas, eds., Heidegger, 
Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus, vol. Vol. 2 (The MIT Press, 2000), 
and Miguel De Beistegui, Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology, Studies in Continental 
Thought (Indiana University Press, 2004). 
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components of the space of exception, the military, is crucial for understanding the 
sovereign transformation of the Deoband. 
 
Knowledge (Savoir/Connaissance) 
It must be clear then from the outset that what we are interested in, that towards 
which our analytical gaze is directed, is a comportment from the thought towards the 
unthought; toward the savoir, from the given empirical grounds of knowledge as 
connaissance. At its most elementary any genealogy must be cognizant of this 
distinction, and my contention here in part, and the novelty to some degree of this 
analysis, lies in its disclosure of this cite. I have characterized this cite as a metacolonial 
space, that is to say a political space; a quasi-matrix which forms the grounds of 
intelligibility of knowledge and practices. The primary characterization, or coloration, of 
this horizon is biopolitical. This horizon is also at once and simultaneously a space of 
exception. In this space the play between sovereign power and bare life has reached a 
maximum and deadly intensity. Given the importance of this unthought, it will be 
necessary to offer some guiding and preliminary clarifications. 
In Mapping the Present, Stuart Elden’s pioneering project of spatial history, he 
makes a simultaneous call to both historians and geographers, to “spatialize history and 
historicize space.”190 In Elden’s work, given the central motif of space, Foucault’s history 
of the present is re-framed as a “mapping of the present.” Such a mapping of the present 
is a spatial history, rather than a history of space. Given that for Foucault, space is 
                                                
190 Stuart Elden, Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History 
(Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002), p. 6. Elden was perhaps one of the first authors to 
explicitly suggests thinking of Foucault’s genealogy as a historical ontology, that is to say as way of 
writing and thinking the history of being. In Elden’s formulation genealogy is “recast as historical 
ontology, which is framed as a critique of the present.” 
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fundamental to the exercise of power — power puts things in place, it orders and 
disposes, it relations — the genealogical project (and by extension my project of the 
metacolonial) is fundamentally concerned with the spatiality of the political, that is to say 
it is a historical/genealogical interrogation of political space. Space, Elden reminds us “is 
inherently political” and “politics is inherently spatial.”191 Elden’s path-breaking work on 
Foucault and Heidegger has needless to say been essential to my project.  
Within this work Elden highlights the critical significance of a distinction that 
Foucault makes in The Archaeology of Knowledge — which examines the historical a 
priori at the level of the archive — between connaissance and savoir. The singular 
translation of both terms in English as knowledge, blurs what is perhaps the most 
significant aspect of Foucault’s entire œuvre.192 The savoir is what Foucault calls “the 
space of knowledge”,193 and his archaeology, as a style of critical historical investigation, 
addresses itself “to the general space of knowledge [savoir], to its configurations, and to 
the mode of being of the things that appear in it.”194 The concepts of the ‘historical a 
priori’, episteme, the statement and the archive developed in The Order of Things and 
The Archaeology of Knowledge, are all rather incomprehensible without attention to the 
connaissance/savoir distinction.195 Additionally the later range of Foucault’s entire 
conceptual vocabulary — dispositif, technologies, the history of the present, space, 
knowledge and bio-power — all become much clearer when we understand the historical, 
epistemological and ontological level at which Foucault directs his critical gaze. Keeping 
                                                
191 Ibid. 
192 As Elden perceptively notes, this distinction corresponds to Heidegger’s ontic/ontological difference. 
193 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, p. xxii. 
194 Ibid. Archaeology defines the mode of being of the savoir systems as a “positivity”. I will turn to 
Agamben’s crucial discussion of Foucault’s deployment of term positivity below. 
195 I will return to this below, in light of Agamben’s discussion of the Foucaultian ‘statement’ in Remnants 
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in mind the connaissance/savoir distinction “allows us to see both the continuity between 
archaeology and genealogy”.196 Needless to say this difference is crucial to my 
biopolitical analysis, especially as it plays itself out across the ‘ilm (knowledge) of the 
‘ulama. Most scholarship on Islam can thus be characterized as a concern almost 
exclusively with connaissance. For this project an illumination of the savoir, a savoir 
which is sutured by knowledge-power, will be decisive in our metacolonial reading of the 
‘ulama’s crossing of a biopolitical threshold. This distinction of the type of analysis can 
further be seen as a difference between understanding and explanation.197 Again most 
histories are explanations. In this sense it is important to note that what I am aiming for in 
this study is an understanding of political Islam, and less the generation of knowledge, 
historical or otherwise, about political Islam. Thus we can formulate another distinction 
between knowledge (connaissance) and understanding (savoir) in order to locate our 
primary conceptual horizon within the later. Of course the relationship between the 
savoir and the connaissance is symbiotic, and neither constitutes a pure isolated space. 
The problem, perhaps as Foucault saw it, is that the type of histories he opposed were 
merely absorbed in the production of knowledge as connaissance, and failed to 
interrogate the savoir. This is indeed the basic strategy that Foucault sets out in the 
Archeology of Knowledge with its analysis of discourse which aims to isolate ‘the 
                                                
196 Elden, Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History, p. 152. A similar 
ontological distinction between the political and politics, is critical to post-foundational political theory, 
and thinkers such as Jean-Luc Nancy and Ernesto Laclau. See Marchart, Post-Foundational Political 
Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau. 
197 See Karl-Otto Apel, Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective, ed. 
Thomas McCarthy, trans. Georgia Warnke, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1984).. But what I have in mind here is Heidegger’s own crucial distinction between 
understanding, the tool of hermeneutic/ontological inquiry, and knowledge, the tool of analytical/ontic 
inquiry. Foucault’s was thus investigating what Heidegger called the “worlding of the world.” Thus 
Foucault’s general strategic direction with respect the critique of knowledge can be said to be in line with 
Heidegger’s privileging of the ontological over the epistemological, that is to say Foucault is concerned 
with (Heideggerian) conditions of existence and not merely (Kantian) conditions of possibility. 
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conditions of existence’198 of statements as opposed to the conditions of possibility or 
content of discourse.199 Thus in a very rough way we can say that Foucault’s critical 
histories were aimed at an analysis, or rather disclosure, of langue rather than parole. 
What limits most studies of political Islam, and general histories of Pakistan, is their 
exclusive concern with the analysis of propositions rather than what Foucault called 
(somewhat regretfully) statements. The analysis of a discursive regime thus takes place at 
a level which is not equivalent to the set of texts or speeches that an institution formally 
articulates.  
 
The Historical a priori 
Foucault borrows the term a priori from Kant’s transcendental philosophy, for 
whom space and time are a priori. This is because in Kant’s view we do not discover 
time and space through experience; rather, experience itself would not be possible 
without space and time in the first place. Thus the a priori is a condition of possibility for 
experience. Kant’s primary question was of course, following Descartes, a question about 
the limits and possibility of knowledge; whether true knowledge of the world is possible. 
For Kant this question was intrinsically connected to the introduction of the distinction 
between the empirical and the transcendental (a priori). Kant however invariably re-
grounds transcendental knowledge within the experience of the subject, thus 
anthropomorphizing all knowledge, and setting up the representations of Man as the 
                                                
198 “The analysis of the discursive field is orientated [in order to] grasp the statement in the exact specificity 
of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with 
other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it excludes. … a 
statement is always an event that neither the language (langue) nor the meaning can quite exhaust.” Michel 
Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge & the Discourse of Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 
p. 28, Emphasis mine. 
199 More on Foucault’s episteme and statement below. 
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ultimate guarantor of truth. In his commentary on Kant’s Anthropology,200 Foucault, 
showed how this re-centering of the transcendental a priori, within the empirical 
experience of the human subject, sets up the subject as paradoxically providing the 
conditions of possibility for its own knowledge. Kant therefore seeks “within human 
finitude the elements of a transcendental determination henceforth made impossible in 
principle by the anthropological confusion between the empirical and the a priori.”201 
Neo-Kantian’s regard the a priori as a term pertaining to the limits of human knowledge. 
That is to say, many philosophers think that the a priori refers a certain kind human 
knowledge that exists before an experience occurs, even if they only know it tacitly in 
some sort of background manner. Thus in The Order of Things Foucault introduces his 
famous critique of man and his “empiric-transcendental doublet” which is imprisoned by 
the Kantian ‘analytic of finitude’, an analytic which is itself a result of the 
monopolization of the field of possible knowledge by “man.” It is imperative therefore to 
see the way in which Foucault’s genealogy is an extension of his critique of humanism 
and the constitutional primacy of the subject.202 Most histories of political Islam I would 
argue, are caught implicitly in the winds of this humanism. 
The significance of the a historical a priori for understanding Foucault’s 
genealogical and archeological method cannot be overstated, and has been highlighted by 
Han in her recent study of Foucault’s critical project.203 She shows how for Foucault, the 
                                                
200 Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant's Anthropology, trans. Roberto Nigro, (Semiotext(E) / Foreign 
Agents) (Semiotext(e), 2008). 
201 Han, Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical. 
202 See Cronin, Foucault’s Anti-humanist Historiography. Foucault was of course also influenced by 
Heidegger, phenomenological reversal of the a priori. The a priori is not what humans know first, but what 
is first. Thus the a priori, pertains to being, rather than knowing 
203 Han, Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical.. By translating 
Foucault’s commentary on Kant’s Anthropology, Han performed a significant service for Foucauldians, 
much as Ann Laura Stoler did with her précis of Society Must Be Defended in Race and the Education of 
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Kantian a priori, becomes the historical a priori, the historical conditions for the 
possibility of knowledge [savoir]. This historical a priori is neither the Kantian a priori, a 
necessary precondition for experience, nor some a historical logical structure, a Platonic 
form. Rather it points to something like the condition of the possibility for the very 
intelligibility of the real. However Foucault’s development of the historical a priori, 
which undergoes successive reformulations through his career, is eventually unable to 
escape a certain contradiction. To overcome this impasse Foucault discovers “power”. 
The use of the term power, allows Foucault to move from archaeology to genealogy, 
which is represented by a shift of concern from knowledge as such to knowledge bound 
up with the discursivity of practices and power. This allows Foucault to understand the 
historical a priori in explicitly political terms, through his development of the concept of 
‘power‐knowledge’, where power and knowledge are seen as inseparably intertwined. 
Thus power can be thought of as a certain condition of possibility; that which places and 
relations, but does not exist as it were outside of the field in which it is composed and 
which it composes. The space of investigation of the metacolonial is therefore an a priori 
space. 
Foucault’s history is therefore taking place at a different level than everyday 
history. As he notes at the close of his preface to The Birth of Clinic: 
The research that I am undertaking here therefore involves a project that is 
deliberately both historical and critical, in that it is concerned … with 
determining the conditions of possibility of medical experience in modern 
                                                
Desire, which brought to the fore Foucault’s concern with the biopolitics of race; Ann Laura Stoler, Race 
and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1995). 
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times … it is a structural study that sets out to disentangle the conditions 
of its history from within the density of its discourse …204 
 
This is thus an early formulation of the historical a priori, the investigation of 
which required archeology. Archaeology was thus an investigation of the a priori, 
understood as an episteme or that which “makes knowledge [savoir] possible.”205. During 
the archaeological period Foucault’s guiding concern was precisely this: the question of 
the conditions of the possibility of knowledge (savoir). In later years this was then 
followed by genealogy which concerned itself with power and “regimes of truth”. In each 
case the historical investigations were concerned with “the relations between the subject, 
truth and the constitution of experience”.206  
 
Episteme 
Foucault who introduces the term episteme in the Archaeology, effectively aims 
to get a handle on this historical a priori structure of intelligibility. The episteme in 
Foucault’s early archeological phase thus designates a horizon of intelligibility. 
Knowledge is thus stamped, a priori, with an episteme, which allows entities to show up 
in a particular way. By analyzing statements in light of their enunciative function, 
Foucault seeks to understand the intelligibility of discursive acts ‘not with reference to 
                                                
204 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, Vintage (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1994), p. xix, my italics. Of course as his career progressed Foucault, distanced himself 
from the structuralist connotations of this early work. 
205 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, p. 31. 
206 Michel Foucault, Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture (New York & London: Routledge, 
1988), p. 48. 
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the interiority of an intention, a thought, or a subject, but in accordance with the 
dispersion of an exteriority.’207 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault refines the notion of episteme, 
developed in Order of Things, and introduces the concept of the archive, which he 
defines as ‘the general system of the formation and transformation of statements.’ The 
notion of the episteme was itself a way for disclosing, or at least gesturing towards, the 
historical a priori of an epoch, that is to say the historical conditions of possibility of 
knowledge in a particular period. Foucault’s archaeology can thus also be seen as a 
political rival of Derridian deconstruction.208 The episteme is thus recast as “total set of 
relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to 
epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems.”209 In Foucault’s later 
genealogies the episteme is designated as an element of the broader concept of the 
apparatus (dispositif): ‘the episteme is a specifically discursive apparatus, whereas the 
apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive, its elements being 
much more heterogeneous’210 The episteme is simply decoupled from any assumption 
about the autonomy of language and discourse and linked more substantially with the 
enframing operations of power and the various socio-political apparatus that extend 
                                                
207 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge & the Discourse of Language, p. 125.  
208 Both in turn trace their concepts to Heidegger’s Destruktion; the historical deconstruction of the 
metaphysical tradition. For Heidegger, as Ian Thompson clarifies, “the metaphysical tradition establishes 
both the fundamental and the ultimate conceptual parameter’s of intelligibility by ontologically grounding 
and theologically legitimating our changing historical sense of what is. Heidegger’s notorious antipathy to 
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constellations of historical intelligibility, temporarily securing the intelligible order by grasping it from 
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theologically (from the outside in).” Iain Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the 
Politics of Education (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
209 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge & the Discourse of Language, p. 191. 
210 ———, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, p. 197. 
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discourse its effectivity. Hence the concept of the episteme becomes a ‘regime of 
discourses’; the effects of power that arise from a play of statements that have hardened 
into an apparatus or dispositif. Discursive regimes are thus the sway of discourses of 
knowledge that have congealed into specific arrangements and dispositifs (apparatus).  
Foucault’s Order, which designates the reigning episteme, is linked to both Man 
and History with a capital ‘H’. “In any given culture and at any given moment”, Foucault 
writes, “there is only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all 
knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice’.211 Foucault’s 
target then is the very episteme of man. “Man” will later become the subject of his 
archaeology of knowledge, a subject which comprises the ‘historical a priori’ of modern 
thought. The episteme “establishes for every man, from the very first, the empirical 
orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home.”212 The 
historical a priori designates an attempt to map the epistemic ordering of things,213 a 
study of the placement effect of the newly emerging forms of scientific discourses. The 
historical a priori is thus a structuring code embedded in cultural practice and scientific 
discourse, a code whose function is to fashion, or order, the place of things within a space 
of knowledge. In this way the notion of the historical a priori designates a spatial effect, 
an early attempt to think the polis as a space of knowledge/power. Foucault’s interest in 
archae-genealogical analysis then 
… does not belong to the history of ideas or of science: it is rather an 
inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory 
became possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted; 
                                                
211 ———, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, p. 168. 
212 Ibid., p. xx. Foucault’s analysis of three epistemes (renaissance, classical and modern) can be loosely 
correlated with Heidegger’s five major epochs, or different ways of understanding what beings are; the pre-
Socratic, ancient, medieval, modern and late modern period of technological enframing (Gestell). 
213 The dominant metaphysics of the age. 
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on the basis of what historical a priori and in the element of what 
positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be 
reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only.214 
 
Discourse and Statement 
As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent 
date. And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as 
they appeared … then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a 
face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.215 
 
Foucault closes the pages of his dense Archaeology with the enigmatic 
Nietszchean remark; “ ‘Discourse is not life: its time is not your time; in it, you will not 
be reconciled to death; you may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have 
said; but don’t imagine that, with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will 
live longer than he.’ ”216 What is this remark if not simply a frontal assault on the modes 
of everyday intelligibility, of representational thought even in its most deepest state of 
questioning? As we know in the evolution of Foucault’s terminology, discourse—which 
now combines and further develops the earlier notion of the archive and the statement 
(énoncés) from the Archaeology, and the episteme from The Order of Things—brings 
together more overtly the problematizations of knowledge-power within language. I 
therefore disagree with those numerous interpretations of Foucault which suggest on the 
one hand that he abandons the project of archaeology and the statements in favor of 
genealogy (discourse and power) and on the other, that his late ethical turn represents a 
belated return to the subject and an absolution of an ultimately pessimistic and totalizing 
                                                
214 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, p. xxii, emphasis mine. 
215 Ibid., p. 387. Earlier in the preface he calls man “a kind of rift in the order of things… a configuration 
whose outlines are determined by the new position he has so recently taken up in the field of knowledge” 
(ibid, p. xxiii). 
216 ———, The Archeology of Knowledge & the Discourse of Language, p. 211. 
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conception of power which prohibits the possibility of ethical agency and effective 
political resistance. Such interpretations effectively suggest that Foucault’s work is a 
series of conceptual abandonments; genealogy and power rejecting archaeology, ethics 
and the care of the self rejecting power. Needless to say I regard both these 
interpretations as premised on the very erasure of the connaissance/savoir indistinction 
that Foucault is trying to overcome. I am therefore in agreement with Jeffery Nealon’s 
recent thesis,217 which confirms essential continuities between Foucault’s entire œuvre, 
and formulates it as the history of the intensifications of power. By placing Foucault’s 
work within the paradigm of historical intensifications and dispersions of power, we can 
see that his triangulation of knowledge, power and the subject does not disappear in his 
ethical phase, in favor of rescuing some notion of a free and ultimately heroic agent. 
Foucault’s anti-humanism remains consistent with his later work on askēsis.218 Rather, if 
we understand the subject as intrinsically entangled with power and knowledge, the task 
of genealogy is first and foremost a disclosure of the power/knowledge networks and 
governmentalities which constitutes and structure the subjects grid of intelligibility and 
possibility. 
From the view points of a more conventional Foucaultian uptake of the concept, 
discourse simply refers to the use of language as it is embedded in social and institutional 
practices. Discourses are institutionalized, regulated or normative way of talking about, 
making statements about, or representing/signifying (through speech and text) the socio-
political world. They consists of utterances and statements that can be grouped and 
regulated to form a coherent, bounded and identifiable system of thought, e.g. medical, 
                                                
217 Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and Its Intensifications since 1984. 
218 McGushin, Foucault's Askesis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life. 
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psychiatric, patriotic, or theological discourses. In this way discourses define the terms of 
debate and acceptable limits of “speech” and understanding, through processes of 
exclusion. It is within such bounded rule governed systems, enacted in specific social 
contexts by designated experts, that discourses have force and meaning. These expert and 
authoritative discourses affect the way we see and understand reality, governing our 
sense of the possibilities of self and identity.219 Discourse in this sense was central to 
Said’s critique of Orientalism. By emphasizing the social, political and functional aspects 
of language, traditional discourse analysis thus seeks to examine the unspecified rules 
governing language use: the way in which language is deployed within wider social 
structures of regulation for the control and production of meanings and subjectivity. 
Discourses are thus part of the entire socio-political edifice, producing social structure 
and practices as well as being produced by it. At its most general then Foucault’s 
deployment of discourse alerts us to the general relationship between language and 
power; “it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together.” A discourse is 
thus both a knowledge regime, a normalized practice and a site/space of power. However 
without a sense of the distinction between knowledge (savoir) and knowledge 
(connaissance), the way in which Said uses discourse, and the way Foucault intended it, 
are almost incompatible. Similarly Said’s worldliness is radically different from the 
worldliness of Foucault. For Foucault, who is doubtless indebted to the Heidegger 
concept of facticity, life is our existence as openness to “world.”220 World then is the 
                                                
219 Of course in complex societies subjects (identities) are constituted through multiple, competing, often 
contradictory discourses. 
220 As we know from Heidegger, “world” is not the sum total of entities surrounding us, it is not simply the 
contents of the infinite expanse of Cartesian space. Rather being-in-the-world is disclosedness. We do not 
stand as subjects over and against some entity called world. Rather world is the totality, not of signs, but 
the web of significance from out of which entities show themselves or are encountered. 
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totality of signification.221 Without a doubt Foucault attempts to illuminate this world, 
this space of power, with his concept of biopolitics. 
 
It is well know that Foucault’s turn towards genealogy was not because he 
disavowed archaeology as a method, but rather because archeology was primarily an 
attempt to understand language in its phenomenological specificity, as that which shows, 
as language in its materiality (that which makes matter, that which makes significance), 
and not merely as an epiphenomenon of some essential subjects standing behind and 
merely using language. Archaeological analysis “directs us from the interiority of the 
speech act to the exteriority of the statement as discursive formation. By thinking to 
encounter the historical exteriority of statements, and by mapping this dispersion in a 
work of critique, the archaeologist produces a work that works to turn thought in the 
direction of the outside.”222 A discursive formation is thus not comprised of its specific 
thematic content, or elements, but rather by the rules or system that govern the formation 
of knowledge objects. The basic characteristic of a discursive formation or regime is that 
it is a rule-governed system, or better, the System, or Order of governing rules; the order 
of governmentality.223 It is in the notion of the discursive regime that the seeds of 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality are sown; governmentality as effectively an 
                                                
221 Oksala has also noted the similarities between Foucault’s notion of episteme in The Order of Things and 
Heidegger’s overall strategy in the essay “The Age of the World Picture.” The disclosure of an “ontological 
order upon which the sciences as well as the everyday practices characteristic of an age are grounded. … 
The world picture, like Foucault’s concept of episteme, thus refers to the overall schema, the implicit order 
of things, on the basis of which reality is comprehended.” Oksala, Foucault on Freedom. 
222 Timothy Rayner, Foucault's Heidegger: Philosophy and Transformative Experience, Continuum Studies 
in Continental Philosophy (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007). Biopower is the name for a 
system which precludes the thought of the outside. 
223 Which as Agamben suggests in his lecture Power and Glory, has taken on the primary form of 
oikonomia. Foucault sees neoliberalism as an expression of the dispositif, a novel mode of the art of 
governing; a new mode of social power. 
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‘ordering attitude and behaviour’.224 The aim of an archaeology of any discourse, 
scientific or Islamic, is thus not to analyze the content of the discourse, but rather to 
identify these governing rules (the governmentality), the historical a priori, in their 
historical manifestation. Foucaultian discourse then has the function of world-disclosure. 
Put another way the concept of discourse was fashioned as a way for Foucault to 
provide his histories of the present within phenomenological depth. And it was only with 
the introduction of the seemingly more tangible concept of power, inserted more 
concretely through his notion of genealogy and discourse, that allowed him to probe the 
pressing political and material questions of the day. As such discourses in Foucault are 
simply a new more concrete way to talk about statements (énoncés) whose 
phenomenological and quasi-structuralist resonance were largely ignored by his historical 
and social science oriented audience. As Agamben notes, the “incomparable novelty of 
The Archaeology of Knowledge consists in having explicitly taken as its object neither 
sentences nor propositions but precisely “statements,” that is, not the text of discourse but 
its taking place.”225 Agamben notes that Foucault wrote  
with lucid awareness of his [archaeological] method’s ontological 
implications: “the statement is not therefore a structure … it is a function 
of existence” (Foucault 1972: 86). In other words: enunciation is not a 
thing determined by real, definite properties; it is, rather, pure existence, 
the fact that a certain being – language – takes place. 
 
Hence as Agamben clarifies, the statement (énoncés) does not refer to a text but to 
“a pure event of language” whose “territory cannot coincide with a definite level of 
linguistic analysis (the sentence, the proposition, illocutive acts, etc.),” but rather with “a 
                                                
224 An attitude or mood that characterizes the ontological mode of technology see Martin Heidegger, The 
Question Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, Harper TorchBooks, 
1977), p. 21-2. 
225 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz : The Witness and the Archive. 
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function vertically present in all sciences and in all acts of speech.” To appreciate this 
evental nature of statements, we must attend to “the dimension that gives it; ignore its 
power to designate, to name, to show, to reveal, to be the place of meaning and truth, and, 
instead, turn [our] attention to the moment … that determines its unique and limited 
existence.”226 The enunciative or spacing function of the statement is obscured to the 
extent that we attend to the propositional or ontic truth of the statement (its 
correspondences).227 
Discourse, is not therefore to be equated with the particular expressions or 
propositions of language, but rather with the very articulation of intelligibility. And what 
is articulated, what is gathered together and given jointure in discourse, is ‘world’. It is 
this world of political Islam that the genealogist must interrogate. The metacolonial is 
thus interested in locating those formations of savoir (discursive formations) which are 
complicit in the production of knowledge as connaissance. What are the various 
constellation and gathering of truth-events, the various apparatus (dispositifs) that have 
made these savoir historically possible? Foucault once described his archae-genealogy as 
a practice which would demonstrate 
… precisely how, in the course of our history, of our civilization, and in an 
increasingly accelerated way since the Renaissance, truth-knowledge 
assumed its present, familiar and observable dimensions; to show how it 
colonized and took over the truth-event and ended up exercising a 
relationship of power over this truth. … We could call this the genealogy 
of knowledge, the indispensable historical other side to The Archaeology 
of Knowledge.228 
 
                                                
226 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge & the Discourse of Language, p. 111. 
227Rayner its seems would concur with Agamben’s analysis: “Foucault intended his conception of the 
enunciative function to be understood in relation to the Heideggerian concept of Ereignis.” Rayner, 
Foucault's Heidegger: Philosophy and Transformative Experience. 
228 Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1973--1974, emphasis mine.  
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This “indispensable historical other side” in many ways summarizes both the 
task of the metacolonial and the nature of the transcendental obstacles it will encounter. 
Foucault middle genealogical phase, his most widely referenced phase, can thus be seen 
as attempting to historicize the transcendental, without reference to any extraneous 
metaphysical principles. Nor does his savoir look down on empirical history from a 
supposedly higher philosophical perspective, that of the “eye of the concept”. In some 
ways as he began to realize in his ethical phase, he cannot have is background and eat it 
to! Though he would firmly reject the construal of his genealogical histories as 
metaphysical by pointing to the fact that he grounds his approach in specific analyses of 
various material traces of discursive practices, he did not shy away from using the term 
ontology.229 Yet as Han notes his “interest in empirical discourses is constantly guided by 
his concern to uncover their underlying quasi-transcendental conditions of possibility”, so 
as to uncover “that from which knowledge [connaissance] and theories have been 
possible; the space of order on the background of which knowledge [savoir] was 
constituted”230 It is precisely this which distinguishes Foucault’s genealogy from 
historicism. 
What eventually emerges from Foucault’s work is that History is itself a kind of 
power or order, an order which makes it possible for us to have the kind of hierarchies we 
have in the first place. This hierarchy or order, precedes the acquisition of any specific 
knowledge content (connaissance). If Foucault gives a name to this order in his later 
works, it is biopolitics. The current global violences of the war on terror can be seen as 
both a reflection of and reaction to this Order of Gestell or neoliberalism enframing, an 
                                                
229 As we know Heidegger’s ontology, his critique of the tradition of western metaphysics, was not a 
rejection of metaphysics qua metaphysics. 
230 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, p. xxi–xxii. 
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inevitability that also often masquerades under the guise of “development”. Foucault’s 
work therefore opens up a space for thought, that of ‘savoir’, on the background of which 
all entities can be understood as orderable. For Foucault the History of historicism has 
become the very framework (the historical a priori) under which entities are today 
constituted as they are. Foucault argues that “we are governed by History”231 or in my 
terms, governed by the political, and we will remain so until a new épistème arises. This 
then leads us back to clarifying the limits of historicism, which is itself a difficult term to 
define given the various uses of the term.232 Initially it can be seen as providing a useful 
correction/critique of the human sciences by showing that the validity of their knowledge 
is constantly undermined by their inscription within the flow of history. Historicism 
argues that “none of the contents analysed by the human sciences can remain stable in 
itself and escape the movement of history’.233 That is to say truth is historical, which in 
historicism becomes “history is truth”. The initial move of historicism is therefore 
appealing to a postmodern sensibility, since it problematizes the human sciences’ desire 
for a detached and objective standpoint, by offering the paralyzing insight that this very 
detachment belongs to the very history they are trying to describe. However, this critical 
dimension operates at the purely empirical level of what we have identified as 
connaissance (histoire). Historicism for Foucault is established ‘solely at the level of 
positivities: the positive knowledge of man is limited by the historical positivity of the 
knowing subject, so that the moment of finitude is dissolved in the play of a relativity 
which we cannot escape and which itself has value as an absolute.”234 This in historicism 
                                                
231 Han-Pile, "Is Early Foucault a Historian?." 
232 Paul Hamilton, Historicism, New Critical Idiom (London & New York: Routledge, 1996). 
233 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, p. 370. 
234 Ibid., p. 372. 
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there is no escaping history, just as much in Nietzsche there is no escaping the will to 
power.  
I take it that the great subaltern Indian historiographer and postcolonial cultural 
critic, Ranajit Guha, was raising a similar disillusionment within his own discipline of 
history at the apex of his career235 Guha, who obviously takes something of a Heidegger 
turn at the apex of his career (substitute Tagore for Hölderlin), is concerned by the ways 
in which a deeper, spontaneous and affective relationship of the everyday is betrayed by 
the forms of “historical” analysis, a neglect of existential temporality by official 
historiography. Guha is in search of a certain ethical transcendence from the official 
narratives of history, and turns instead to poetic ways of dwelling to counter the 
disciplinary apparatus of a colonizing historical narrative. The work here follows then in 
the wake of this disillusionment with formal history and historiography, without at the 
same time abandoning historicity. The naïve link between understanding the past as the 
patient collation of selected fragments of the “historical record”, however de-orientalized 
in its form and intent, remains part of the very colonial gaze over the life world that Said 
battled and ultimately himself fell victim to by virtue of his unrepentant humanism. 




                                                
235 Ranajit Guha, History at the Limit of World-History, Italian Academy Lectures (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002). 
236 The Greek concept of poiēsis suggests productive work, deliberate fabrication, in which the subject 
employs technē, “craft” or “art,” in order to achieve a work. The self, in the context of care of the self, is 
not the object of knowledge, but rather is itself a work of art; it is poetic. 
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Sovereign Power and Biopolitics: Foucault and Agamben 
 
Sovereignty  
The question of sovereignty has remained one of the most vexing problems of 
modern political theory. A widespread academic concern with this term has led to a 
profusion of critical commentaries and investigations, none more remarkable than 
Agamben’s influential work Homo Sacer, where he offers the single most powerful 
theoretical discussion for the problems of modern power. Surprisingly his work has not 
been taken up by historians, whereas there is now an explosion of interest in his work in 
fields of law, criminology, international relations, geography, political theory, literary 
and cultural studies.237 Building on both Schmitt’s theories of sovereign exception and 
Foucault’s analysis of biopower, Agamben argues that “the inclusion of bare life in the 
political realm constitutes the original-if concealed-nucleus of sovereign power”. I will 
consider Agamben’s work in more detail in the following chapters. Suffice it to say that 
his concept of bare life, sovereign power and the exception has inspired numerous 
                                                
237 In this way this dissertation can claim to address a theoretical lacunae in historical studies. Agamben has 
already entered the pantheon of legendry critical thinkers. The forthcoming book in the Routledge critical 
thinkers series, places him in the pantheon of such luminaries as Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, De Mann, 
Spivak, De Mann, etc.; see Alex Murray, Giorgio Agamben, Routledge Critical Thinkers (Routledge, 
2008). Two significant monographs on Agamben have already been published Leland De la Durantaye, 
Giorgio Agamben : A Critical Introduction (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), and 
Catherine Mills, The Philosophy of Agamben, Continental European Philosophy (Acumen Publishing Ltd, 
2008). A number of edited volumes devoted to the exploration of his work, Matthew Calarco and Steven 
DeCaroli, eds., Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life (Stanford University Press, 2007), and Justin 
Clemens and Nicholas HeronAlex Murray, eds., The Work of Giorgio Agamben (Edinburgh University 
Press, 2008). Several journals have issued special editions analysing the impact of his work in their 
respective fields. See Law and Critique, 2009 and Alison Ross, "Introduction," South Atlantic Quarterly 
107, no. 1 (2008). The journal Foucault Studies will be releasing a special issue on Agamben’s contribution 
to Foucault studies. Regretfully the journal History and Theory bears few traces of Agamben’s influence 
and a search of the American Historical Review brings up a handful of citations almost devoted entirely to 
book reviews. Oddly enough the outgoing speeches by the President’s of the American Historical 
Association, both mention the significance of Agamben’s thematics. See Gabrielle M. Spiegel The Task of 
the Historian, 2009. There are of course a few exceptions see Dominick LaCapra, History and Its Limits : 
Human, Animal, Violence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
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works,238 including this one. Agamben’s insights into politico-theological structures of 
modern politics and economics, have become especially relevant with respect to 
understanding elements of the war on terror with its attendant multiplication of spaces of 
exception, most paradigmatically Guantanamo Bay.239 
Political theorists, cultural critics, international relations scholars, lawyers, 
anthropologists, philosophers, and literary critics, all approach the dilemmas of sovereign 
power with a mixture of urgency and frustration. Social theorist William Rasch in his 
book Sovereignty and Its Discontents,240 and anthropologist Aihwa Ong241 each discuss 
the modern mutations of sovereignty, whereas political scientist Stephen D. Krasner 
decries sovereignty as a form of “organized hypocrisy.”242 Krasner suggests that nobody 
really seems to know what they mean by the term. According to Krasner, the so-called 
Westphalian model of sovereignty — according to which sovereign European states were 
originally mandated to tolerate and recognize each other internationally — is of dubious 
analytical use: “The most important empirical conclusion of the present study,” he writes, 
                                                
238 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004), Neal, 
Exceptionalism and the War on Terror: The Politics of Liberty and Security after 9/11, and Dawson and 
Schueller, eds., Exceptional State: Contemporary U.S. Culture and the New Imperialism. Most recently see 
Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2009). 
239 Bulent Diken, The Culture of Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp, International Library of Sociology 
(Routledge, 2005), A W Neal, "Foucault in Guantanamo: Towards an Archaeology of the Exception," 
Security Dialogue 37, no. 1 (2006), Joshua Comaroff, "Terror and Territory: Guantanamo and the Space of 
Contradiction," Public Culture 19, no. 2 (2007), and N. Hussain, "Beyond Norm and Exception: 
Guantánamo," Critical Inquiry 33, no. 4 (2007). Agamben’s paradigm of the camp has also been used to 
examine modes of exclusion: Sherene H. Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law 
and Politics, Lorenzo Da Ponte Italian Libra (University of Toronto Press, 2008). Also Michaelsen and 
Shershow’s 2004 essay “The Guantánamo ‘Black Hole’: The Law of War and the Sovereign Exception.” 
There are a dozen more variations which makes it clear that Agamben’s exposure of the political structure 
of the exception has resonated profoundly in attempts to theorize this exceptional space of suspended law 
that claims it is still lawful. See also Steven C. Caton, "Coetzee, Agamben, and the Passion of Abu Ghraib," 
American Anthropologist 108, no. 1 (2006). 
240 William Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents (Other, 2004). 
241 Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Duke University 
Press, 2006). 
242 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocricy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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“is that the principles associated with both Westphalian and international legal 
sovereignty have always been violated.”243 In other words, sovereignty names a fiction of 
state integrity that has never coincided with practice. Hardt and Negri in their influential 
work, Empire, also talk about the transformation of sovereignty under globalization, a 
situation in which national borders and boundaries are becoming redundant.  
Historian James J. Sheehan, dedicating his 2005 Presidential Address to the 
American Historical Association to “The Problem of Sovereignty in European History,” 
also points to the mystifications surrounding the concept of the state: “The state was and 
is not history’s natural telos. The emergence of states was neither inevitable nor uniform 
nor irreversible.”244 He urges therefore that we “move beyond the handful of Western 
European states whose quite exceptional experience provides both our political 
vocabulary and our historiographical models.” Many of those readings however, 
including those that draw on Foucault, are too quick to pronounce the death or 
irrelevance of sovereign. What is critical however in all of these new explorations is that 
the principle of sovereignty is simply delinked from the imaginary of the state. This is not 
to suggest that state sovereign has disappeared — even Hardt and Negri do not make this 
claim — only that it is undergoing substantial reformation. Foucault’s attempt to extricate 
us from the fascination with state sovereignty was meant only to redirect our attention to 
the cunning new modalities through which power in modern societies operates. But even 
as he developed his analyses of biopower and governmentality as efforts to historicize 
and denaturalize the “cold monster” of state sovereignty, Foucault acknowledged that 
“sovereignty is far from being eliminated by the emergence of a new art of government; 
                                                
243 ———, Problematic Sovereignty (Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 24. 
244 Cited in Jonathan Elmer, On Lingering and Being Last: Race and Sovereignty in the New World 
(Fordham University Press, 2008). 
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on the contrary, the problem of sovereignty is made more acute than ever.” Precisely 
because our very “political vocabulary” and “historiographical models” are bound up 
with this conceptually vague notion, it is impossible to evade it altogether.  
Following the attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001 however, 
attacks aimed at what Al-Qaeda saw as the heart of America’s global empire, it seemed 
as if the essential nature of sovereign power, showed itself with remarkable clarity: as the 
ability and the will to employ overwhelming violence and to decide on life and death. As 
Hansen and Stepputat note, “The “war on terror” and the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq 
demonstrated that underneath the complex structures of power in modern, liberal 
societies, territorial sovereignty, and the foundational violence that gave birth to it, still 
remains the hard kernel of modem states—an intrinsically violent “truth” of the modem 
nation-state that remains its raison d'être in periods of crisis.”245  
However what distinguishes Agamben and Foucault, from many of the recent 
concerns with sovereign, is that they both work to sever the link between state power, 
sovereignty, and territory, but also to show it up as an ontological problem. In another 
volume explicitly inspired by the impetus of Foucault and Agamben, a similar distinction 
between sovereign power and sovereignty is made: “We want to break away from a 
notion of “sovereignty” as synonymous with “sovereign statehood” that often appears at 
the center of analysis. Instead we want to insist upon an engagement with the term 
“sovereign power.” ”246 
                                                
245 Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, eds., Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World (Princeton University Press, 2005). 




This is not to say that states no longer exercise sovereign powers, but rather to 
suggest that the question of sovereign power goes well beyond the framing of sovereignty 
as a formal, de jure property whose efficacy to a large extent is derived from being 
externally recognized by other states as both sovereign and legitimate. The recent articles 
collected in the Hansen and Stepputat’s edited volume, Sovereign States, also seek to 
“questions the obviousness of the state-territory-sovereignty link”, and in this way 
proceed with their interrogations and deployments of the sovereign problematic in the 
wake of Agamben’s insightful analysis. Conceptualizing the territorial state and 
sovereignty as social constructions, the volume shifts the focus for understanding 
sovereignty from issues of territory and external recognition by states, toward issues of 
the internal constitution of sovereign power within state and society; specifically through 
the exercise of violence over bodies and populations. Sovereign power and violence that 
always mark it, should therefore be studied as practices dispersed throughout, and across 
societies.247 “Sovereign power, whether exercised by a state, in the name of the nation, or 
by a local despotic power or community court, is always a tentative and unstable project 
whose efficacy and legitimacy depend on repeated performances of violence and a ‘will 
to rule.’ ” In this way we can see how this category is critically useful in our interrogation 
of ‘ulama practices whose sovereign performances, like those of states, are often 
spectacular and public. As Hansen insightfully notes: “Although the meanings and forms 
of such performances of sovereignty always are historically specific, they are, however, 
                                                
247 For a similar analysis of sovereign power as a series of nested fields see Caroline Humphry’s entry on 
Sovereignty in Companion to the Anthropology of Politics. See also Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of 
Sovereignty, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2001). and 
Cynthia Weber’s incisive study of sovereignty as produced through acts of international intervention; 
Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange, Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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always constructing their public authority through a capacity for visiting violence on 
human bodies.” The spectacular violence visited on Afghanistan and Iraq, and the rise of 
practices of torture and bodily humiliation of the enemy, can the seen as a particular 
reflection of the assertion of sovereign power. 
 
Biopower 
As we can see then, biopolitics, sovereignty and governmentality hence form a 
complex interrelated matrix. In preliminary terms Foucault’s account of the emergence of 
“modern biopower” can be characterized historically as the passage from the “territorial 
state” to the “state of population”. In its traditional form, which is that of territorial 
sovereignty, power defines itself essentially as the right over life and death. It concerns 
life only indirectly and negatively. Foucault characterizes sovereignty through the 
formula “to make die and to let live.” Foucault defines the difference between modern 
biopower and the sovereign power of the old territorial State through the crossing and 
transition of two symmetrical formulae. 1) To make die and to let live summarizes the 
procedure of old sovereign power, which exerts itself above all as the right to kill. 2) To 
make live and to let die is, by contrast, the insignia and modality of biopower, which has 
as its primary objective to make the care of life and the biological as such into the 
primary concern of State power. Biopolitics on the contrary, seeks to indicate the order of 
a politics generally determined by life and devoted to its maintenance and control. What 
is meant by biopolitics, in principle, is not “a politics about life or living” but, rather “the 
sphere of politics coextensive with the sphere of life.”  
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During the seventeenth century with the birth of the modern state, and the 
emergence of “population”, care for the life and death of subjects begins to occupy an 
increasing place in the mechanisms and calculations of states. Sovereign power is thus 
progressively transformed into what Foucault calls “biopower.” The ancient right to kill 
and to let live gives way to an inverse model, modern biopolitics, which can be expressed 
by the formula “to make live and to let die”. In contrast then to modern biopower “in the 
right of sovereignty, death was the point in which the sovereign’s absolute power shone 
most clearly” (Foucault). Sovereignty then was for Foucault that historically specific 
form of power associated with monarchial power, that involved the right to kill or let live. 
The individual or institution that exercises the ultimate and legitimate right to kill can 
claim sovereign power. Sovereign power includes the right to punish (spectacular forms 
of torture), discipline (confinement, prison) and extract (tax) and expel (ban). It is a 
deductive power. However for Foucault’s sovereign power did not simply disappear but 
was transformed. Modern states now exercise both sovereign and biopolitical forms of 
power. When Foucault famously declared that what we need “is a political philosophy 
that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty. …We need to cut off the King's 
head: in political theory that has still to be done”, what he was referring to was the way in 
which a top down model of power, residing in a monarch or the state (the juridico-
political model) continues to inform modern conceptions of power. The actual modality 
of sovereign power, in particular its right to kill, is subsumed as the dark underside of 
modern biopower, what Foucault referred to as thanatopolitical element of biopower  
Therefore one needs to distinguish in Foucault between several elements of 
sovereignty; one represented by the historical institution of the monarch, one represented 
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by the juridico-political model of power (as a model of top down power), and the other as 
the bodily modality of any sovereign power (whether monarchical or biopolitical) which 
retains a certain power over life, as in Weber’s famous definition of the state as 
possessing the monopoly on violence. Foucault’s biopower by contrast is collective 
power of a bios, the sovereign power of the people in contrast to the sovereign power of 
the individual monarch. Sovereign power is thus diffused within the body politic, and 
concentrated in specific legal forms within the institution of the modern state. Biopower 
is modern, biopolitics is originary. The former requires population, biopower is a 
biopolitics of the population. Foucault claimed that state sovereignty in the modern 
period retains the power of death but has been subject to reformulation so that “the 
ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to 
the point of death.” 
Thus even though the formal elements of sovereign power have been replaced by 
biopower, the darker thanato-political elements of sovereign power remain potentially 
buried within the underbelly of biopolitics. In Hitler’s National Socialist regime the 
exercise of biopower and sovereign power overlapped to create an absolutely murderous 
and absolutely racist state. In fact Foucault would go on to argue that race was the 
element which allowed biopower to exercise its dark sovereign side. 
At its most elementary then biopolitics refers to a power over species life and the 
body. In its shortest and most general formulation we can say that biopolitics is a 
politicization of life and simultaneously a politics of the body, a calculated politics of life, 
that targets the individual and collective species body. The manner in which power 
operates upon both individual bodies and populations in modern Western societies has 
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therefore undergone a dramatic shift. Modern powers function in a manner that go far 
beyond traditional models of sovereignty or of state power, and hence demand a concrete 
and historically specific analysis of their operations. Biopower and biopolitics thus 
designate the specifically modern mechanisms of power over life in relation to both the 
individual and the population. Biopolitics refers to the growing inclusion of man’s natural 
life in the mechanisms and calculations of power. This term allows us to consider the way 
in which power confronts life. It invites us to consider the fundamental relationship 
between life and power, between life and the political.  
Foucault most explicitly describes biopower in the section on “Right of Death and 
Power over Life” in The History of Sexuality: Will to Knowledge, and is worth quoting in 
full 
“this power over life [biopower] evolved in two basic forms; these forms 
were not antithetical, however; they constituted rather two poles of 
development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. 
One of these poles — the first to be formed, it seems — centered on the 
body as a machine; its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the 
extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its 
docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all 
this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the 
disciplines: an anatomo- politics of the human body. The second, formed 
somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the 
mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: 
propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their 
supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and 
regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population. The disciplines of the 
body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles 
around which the organization of power over life was deployed.”248 
 
Foucault thus identified two related dimensions of modern power — a 
disciplinary power: exercised upon the bodies of individuals through techniques of 
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training, surveillance, spatial distribution, examination, and normalization (prisons, 
schools, factories, clinics, hospitals etc.), and biopower: a regulatory mechanism 
exercised upon the biological existence of a population grasped as an object of 
management, administration, and control. Impelled by the exigencies of governing 
modern life, biopower refers to knowledge and strategies of power that aim at governing 
a population’s life forces. Governmentality and biopower are therefore intimately 
connected. Further on Foucault states that the “disciplines of the body and the regulation 
of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power was 
deployed” seeking to “invest life through and through.”249 
Rather than suppress, constrain, or destroy, power now operates to “incite, 
reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it.” (Foucault) 
Biopower takes as its object the population rather than just the individual body. That is to 
say biopower is concerned with the human being as a biological species subject to 
conditions such as births and mortality, health, illness, and disease, life expectancy and 
longevity, risk and security, management and control. Biopower, is in short, a power of 
regularization designed to optimize the socio- biological capacities of a living 
multiplicity of human beings. Under biopower regimes everything including human 
beings, but especially the natural environment, are viewed as entities lacking intrinsic 
meaning other than as resources for relentless optimization, efficiency and calculation. 
Biopolitical governmentality can therefore refer to institutions beyond the state 
(media experts, hospitals, clergy, etc) and it can encompass a strategic rationality for the 
management of population, understood as a vital resource, any rationality that takes life 




as its target of operations. Through the deployment of various normalizing technologies 
of power, biopolitical government seeks to organize population so as to maximize its 
value as resource. This is in fact the key ingredient of neoliberalism, which Foucault 
examines in his lectures on biopolitics. What is critical here is that Foucault argues that 
modernity is dominated by a (technological, techno-biopolitical) power that works to 
objectify the real and reduce human life to the level of resource Heidegger calls this 
power machination (Machenschaft) or enframing (Gestell). This power works to order the 
forces of life, placing them into productive systems, and this is what Foucault calls 
biopower.250 Rayner notes that Foucault, like Heidegger, associates modernity with “a 
power that objectifies and orders the forces of human life for the sake of power.” The 
task of thinking today, is to overcome sovereign and biopolitical ways of thinking, to 
escape the disciplinary power-knowledge nexus. 
Foucault also showed that modern political rationality is biopolitical. Rather than 
operating according to the rationality of sovereignty in which power is represented in the 
image of the sword-the power to form a law and to enforce it, the right to kill those who 
transgress—biopower is represented in the image of a healthy population. Politics aims at 
the management of a population—it is the power to foster life. Biopolitics sustains the 
development of institutions which structure our lives and the world according to the ends 
of biological life—that is, toward economy in the Greek sense of the word oikonomia, the 
management of necessary, organic functions, needs, and pleasures. Life is defined in 
economic and biological terms rather than in ethical and political terms. All other projects 
are submitted to the ultimate goal of continuing and perfecting life in the biopolitical 
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sense of the term, and the means of doing this become more and more technologically 
sophisticated. In the pursuit of a secure, healthy, and productive population, biopolitics 
deploys disciplinary, normalizing institutions. Biopolitical survival and normalization 
come to be mutually reinforcing 
While Foucault has probably done the most to bring the concept of biopolitics 
into contemporary social theory, it is Agamben who has further analyzed its most 
disturbing material inscriptions. For Foucault, biopolitics arises when life itself becomes 
the object of structures of power. In his analysis, this change occurs with the rise of 
modernity in eighteenth-century Western Europe, and he exemplifies it through 
contrasting on the one hand, the public execution of regicides before the beginning of the 
era, and the panopticon prison model on the other, whose spatial arrangements allow for 
the control of prisoners through permanent surveillance. Importantly, this surveillance is 
only made possible by the emergence of a new discourse concerning the relationship 
between life and power. Foucault’s analysis implies the view that the subjection of life to 
power is itself a central element of modernity. Giorgio Agamben’s analysis of 
modernity’s dark underbelly would seem to suggest otherwise.251 Agamben traces the 
roots of the modem state and its forms of biopolitics back to the beginnings of the 
Western tradition that shaped the modern world order. States from the time of the Greeks 
down to the early twenty-first century are by definition sovereign states, and the essence 
of sovereignty, Agamben argues, lies in the power to decide who is and is not a member 
of the political community; a power whose paradigmatic institutional expression is the 
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state. Those that are simultaneously internal to the community, and yet excluded from it, 
are reduced to the status of “bare life.”  
For Agamben the state of exception, which at once excludes bare life and in doing 
so simultaneously captures it within its political order, is the “hidden foundation” on 
which the structure of the modern relation between politics and life rests, a structure in 
which life presents itself as what is included by means of an exclusion. In a similar 
fashion the metacolonial thesis seeks to unveil the way in which Islamist politics also 
constitutes itself in relation to the production bare life. The structure of the exception, the 
inclusive exclusion of zoē in the polis, will be shown to also be coincident with Islamist 
politics. Crucially then it is across this link between bare life and politics, “a link that 
secretly governs the modern ideologies seemingly most distant from one another”, that 
the indistinction between Islam and the West can be found. Our metacolonial thesis 
pertaining to the violences of Islamism, and Pakistani political space more generally, 
relies similarly on the notion that Islamic actors are embedded in a wider space and 
history of metaphysics, of which they remains entirely unaware. Furthermore I will claim 
that it is the engine of biopolitical sovereignty that is secretly operating behind all forms 






Foucault’s Grammars of Power 
 
One could correctly argue with both Enns and Oksala,252 that Foucault was 
ultimately a philosopher of freedom, although not in the liberal sense of the word. 
Foucault’s entire trajectory I believe was concerned with exposing the capture of life 
(freedom) by power. He sought to provide tools by which the governed can understand 
the rationality that informs the way they are governed and thereby better resist intolerable 
forms of governance. The most important term in his work, biopower, designates this 
sense of power over life. His critique of liberalism,253 would effectively show how certain 
ideas that disavow their own investments in a certain form of life, and a certain implicit 
order, are effectively concealing the relationships of power upon which they stand. Hence 
the remarkable aporias of liberal regimes and their propensity for global violence.254 
Reid’s recent book The Biopolitics of the War on Terrorism is important for this study. 
He seeks to examine the question of the pervasiveness of war in liberal societies. Like 
Browns work on tolerance, he shows how liberalism should be understood as a specific 
regime of truth which disallows certain forms of life in favor of what he calls logistical 
life (effectively the life of homo economicus). The function of ideology is of course to 
give a kind of symbolic consistency to power, to legitimize and naturalize it, and to 
conceal its structural incoherence and disparity. Definitive of liberalism has been its 
belief in the ability to establish peaceful societies through the removal of the condition of 
war. Democratic Liberal regimes claim that they have devised the best political means 
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that allow human beings to flourish peacefully. From their inception in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries liberal regimes have sought to govern life with a view to the 
elimination of the problem of war from within and between societies. However if liberal 
modernity has been shaped most powerfully by the ideal of peace, it has nevertheless also 
been defined not only by the recurrence of war, but by a gradual increase in military 
capacities among liberal societies for the violent destruction of human life. Why, Reid 
asks, has the liberal political project based concretely on the ideal of peace in the service 
of humanity, continually served to reinvent and bolster its nemesis, war ? Why is it that a 
political project dedicated to solving the problem of war and the creation of peace has 
now culminated in the declaration of a war bereft of temporal or spatial parameters? Why 
is it that a political project which seeks to sever the relation of society to war now 
requires a social state of permanent mobilization for war? By committing to a war 
without end, temporally, spatially, or politically, the form that the “War on Terror” is 
taking is unprecedented in its breadth and intensity, and a war no longer simply confined 
by the dialectics of Washington. While Reid shows us much about the biopolitical 
modality of the war on terror, what is often left out in this and the other spate of recent 
works which deploy the biopolitical framework, is a sense of the Muslim subject as yet 
again a mute recipient of a series of Western logics. By contrast in this work I wish to 
show how the logic of power traverses Muslim subjectivity itself. 
Foucault’s account of power of course famously rejects the problematic of 
ideology, in particular its true/false binary.255 For Foucault the Marxist approach 
presupposes an essentialist concept of the subject whose ‘real interests’ are supposedly 
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distorted by the operations of ideology. However, the problem with this ‘metanarrative’ 
of ideology, according to Foucault, is that the subject who is to be liberated from power, 
“the man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of 
a subjection much more profound than himself.”256 The critique of ideology then, though 
useful is limited in its conception of how power operates. 
Foucault’s neologisms can be seen then as a great proliferation of grammars of 
power designed to expose the operations and modalities of power in both micrological 
(subjective) and macrological (institutional) settings. It was a question for Foucault, of 
articulating these grammars into new and mobile configurations, configurations whose 
task was not to denote but to disclose the open, the worlding of the world. His grammars 
were directed therefore not so much towards the truth about a specific object or historical 
phenomenon (though of course he offers a critique of the production of object domains) 
but at thought itself; the very activity of thinking and the process of the production of 
knowledge, whether of the philosopher, the diplomat, the clinician or the scholar. 
Therefore his power concepts — discipline, sovereignty, governmentality and 
biopolitics — were not designed to denote rigid methodological borders, but were rather 
site/space specific, but otherwise loose grammars for the disclosure of the subject 
entangled in power relations, in dispositifs of power. For instance, while Foucault’s 
discussion of sovereign power was a site/space specific description of a juridico-
discursive form of power, the notion of biopolitics did not simply replace sovereign 
power, but rather the general modality of sovereign power (the “right to take life or let 




live”257) combined with other emerging dispositifs—discipline, police and population—
and folded together to form a new configuration of biopower (the “power to foster life or 
disallow it”). Genealogy is thus a practice of the arts of disclosure, a disclosure of the 
space of power. Foucault’s complex and shifting grammars of power, can then be taken 
as modes of disclosure, designed to elicit a transformation of self/understanding. 
Ultimately Foucault’s genealogy with its armory of power-grammar’s is an attempt to 
reach the thought of the ‘outside,’ it suggests a path of transformation, a movement to 
think otherwise. 
The precise relationship between Foucault’s grammars is often a subject of much 
controversy and disputation with the broad social science uptake of his work, which 
divides itself roughly between three camps; those who would prefer to emphasize 
Foucault’s critique of neoliberalism (governmentality scholars),258 those concerned with 
the various modalities of discipline inherent in modern social practices (scholars of the 
disciplines and subjectivity),259 and those who have developed his notion of 
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biopolitics,260 which has taken on a new albeit perhaps conflicting trajectory in works of 
Hardt and Negri261 and those concerned with biopolitics. The early distinction between 
these three arenas is however gradually disappearing, and in Agamben, who favors the 
language of the biopolitical, the two forms collapse. It is really only with Agamben’s 
reading of Foucault’s project as a political ontology, that the critical resonances between 
each of these grammars can be saved from deteriorating into a quibble over Foucaultian 
philology.262 
With the question of power more broadly Foucault seems to be moving in two 
different albeit inter-related directions; on the one hand opening up a more general space 
for understanding power in its intensification and dis-positioning of the subject, while 
also at the same time offering more specific vocabularies for describing new formations 
and grids of power relationships (dispositifs). Without this framework of political 
ontology (what I have examined above in terms of the background), some of Foucault’s 
moves seem whimsical and one is tempted to suggest as Colin Gordon, Paul Patton, 
Thomas Lemke and numerous other commentators do, that Foucault simply abandons 
biopower in favor of a more specific conception of governmentality,263 or worse still with 
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Louis McNay, Nancy Fraser, Charles Taylor, Eric Paras and Alain Badiou, that Foucault 
embraces a modified conception of liberal subjectivity in his ethical turn.  
Foucault’s shifting vocabularies thus should be thought in terms of a hermeneutic 
circle, a movement of thought that edges towards its unsayable goal of an experience of 
the thought of the outside. Hence the moves from archaeology to genealogy, from 
genealogy to problematizations, and from problematizations to eventalization, do not so 
much mark a change of target or a tacit repudiation of earlier styles and the limits of a 
particular method. Instead they mark a certain restlessness, a shifting and refinement of 
language whose continuous aim is the discovery of a more proximate form for expressing 
the relationship between history and historicity. Nor is it simply a matter of producing 
verifiable or logical propositions regarding power. Instead for Foucault, philosophical 
activity is “the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, 
if not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think 
differently, instead of legitimating what is already known?” He adopts as his form for this 
critical activity the essay; “The “essay” —which should be understood as the assay or test 
by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the simplistic 
appropriation of others for the purpose of communication —is the living substance of 
philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still what it was in times past, i.e., an 
“askesis,” askesis, an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought.”264 
What then, pace Agamben, does one make of Foucault’s famous call for 
“liberation from the theoretical privilege of sovereignty”. It is important to note here that 
Foucault’s call is opposed to a model or representation of power, and not the essential 
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modality of sovereign power. It is only “the representation of power [that] has remained 
under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the 
head of the king.”265 Foucault’s exhortation here is thus to see the more stealthy and 
intimate operations of power which have arisen with greater intensity since the advent of 
modern biopower, and not simply see power as residing in the state or the dominant class. 
When viewed in light of a metaphysical struggle for the soul, the history of being/power, 
power takes on an entirely new garb. If anything sovereign power is itself a certain 
apparatus, an older avatar of power if you will. Sovereign power however does not 
simply disappear, only its institutional form does. When Foucault critiques the juridical 
model of power, what he is suggesting is not that sovereign power vanishes rather that it 
mutates and is displaced, while at the same time the monarchical conception of power 
retains its hold on the imagination. As such the new form of power can pervade the 
system without being exposed as such. Liberalism primary weakness lies precisely in its 
inability to see power as situated in the interstices of the social body.266 On Foucault’s 
account then, in the European sphere, sovereign power’s inefficient modus operandi is 
gradually supplanted by a more efficient modus operandi, i.e. biopower “the 
administration of bodies and the calculated management of life.” European forms of 
sovereign power however continue to operate in the margins of Europe and more overtly 
in the colonial territories. At the same time modality or element of sovereign power 
understood as the “power of life and death” —the exceptional element of sovereign 
power— was of course conscripted and folded within the framework of biopower, 
principally in the guise of racism, thus forming the dark thanatopolitical underbelly of 
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biopolitics that Foucault details in his 1975-1976 lectures “Society Must be Defended.” It 
is always a question in Foucault of tracing the mutations and disseminations of power, 
establishing the specific cartographies of power in the places and times under analysis, 
while simultaneously seeing these configurations as a general expression of the 
intensification of power over life, the historical movement of Gestell. Thus for example 
in the colonies—a space of Western power which Foucault famously ignores267—the 
various forms of local and indigenous sovereignties, co-mingled with the new forms of 
colonial sovereign power, to be challenged and themselves transplanted by the newly 
emerging forms of counter racial biopolitical nationalisms. The task of a metacolonial 
historian would be to map these new always overlapping and intersecting spaces of 
power, and to expose even the various historico-political discourses of resistance (i.e. 
Marxism, postcolonialism) that claim to oppose structures of domination, as a continued 
function of the ruse of power. 
 
 
Thinking Political Islam Genealogically 
 
In a preliminary way then we can see that if socio-political phenomenon like 
political Islam are approached only in terms of a connaissance knowledge (ontic/present), 
then the existential savoir dimension of knowledge (ontological/absent) dimensions will 
be obfuscated. Foucault’s theory of the enunciative function of statements (énoncés), 
inserts itself precisely at this point, as a concern not with the specifics of what is said, but 
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with the structuring of intelligibility and signification itself ;268 “not with reference to the 
interiority of an intention, a thought, or a subject, but in accordance with the dispersion of 
an exteriority.”269 This exteriority is none other than the background. Hence we can see 
that an exclusive concern with ‘ulama knowledge (‘ilm) as connaissance would yield a 
study that is markedly different from one which seeks to discover the exteriority or 
savoir. Another way of saying this then is that it is not “Islam” in the configuration 
“political Islam” that is key, but rather the political. Any attempt to reclaim an originary 
ethical space of Islam, must today pass through the very political medium in which all 
discourse on Islam are discursively articulated. My claim will be that the major studies of 
the ‘ulama thus far do not fully engage the political, in large part because they take the 
form of the political for granted. That is to say they do not theorize the matrix of power 
within which both ‘ulama and scholarly writings on Islam are situated. 
It should be clear that this is not simply a study of the ‘ulama caught up in 
networks of power (as if the ‘ulama were somehow originally outside of power) but 
rather a study of the very ways in which the ‘ulama are both constituted by and 
themselves constitute a form of power. ‘Ulama practice and discourse cannot thus be 
studied in isolation from the immanent ways in which political space is constitutive of 
subjectivities. Thus by shedding light on the complex nature of political space we are 
simultaneously shedding light on ‘ulama discourse and practice. The later cannot be 
understood in isolation from this space. It is in this sense a archae-genealogy of political 
Islam. My use of Foucault’s genealogy conforms to my understanding of his endeavor as 
a history of the present, which departs from the often superficial deployments of 
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genealogy as a mere history of (empirical) discontinuities. Rather Foucault sought to use 
discontinuities as breakdown moments that consequently shone greater light on the shifts 
in the episteme, a series of ruptures that would in fact reveal the dissemination and 
intensification of power though history. 
Despite important differences between Foucault and Agamben — these critical 
figures converge at the intersection of biopolitical sovereignty. Foucault’s genealogical 
grammars of power (biopolitics and governmentality/security) and Agamben’s 
sovereigntology270 (the state/space of exception), all share a broad characteristic which 
can be subsumed under the general trajectory of ‘power over the singularity of life’. For 
instance, Foucault’s genealogy of subject formation outlined the ways in which life is 
conscripted and captured within the calculus of ‘normalizing’ governmental rationalities. 
Key to the normalizing operations of modernities biopolitical apparatus was the 
development of security mechanisms “installed around the random element inherent in a 
population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life.”271 Foucault’s 
governmentality is thus essentially a security apparatus (dispositif de sécurité) which 
triangulates the political somatics of disciplinary power and older modalities of 
sovereignty with the new biopolitical technologies that target and secure populations. In 
the expanding order of this biopolitical space (the modern polis272) — a space which is at 
                                                
270 Antonio Negri, one of Agamben’s foremost critical interlocutors, in his review of State of Exception, 
suggests that Agamben’s foremost contribution to the analysis of sovereignty has been to moor it within the 
terrain of political ontology. See also A. Negri, "Philosophy of Law against Sovereignty: New Excesses, 
Old Fragmentations," Law and Critique 19, no. 3 (2008). 
271 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 248. 
272 “Polis is usually translated as city or city-state. This does not capture the full meaning. Polis means, 
rather, the place, the there, wherein and as which historical being-there is. The polis is the historical place, 
the there in which, out of which, and for which history happens” Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, trans. Ralp Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 152. The polis does not 
designate geometrical or Cartesian space, but primarily names the place or the site in which Dasein (human 
being) comes to dwell in a historical-ontological manner. In this paper I will generally use polis (and bio-
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once homogenizing, normalizing and technological — the production of new martial 
subjectivities closes off and obscures the possibilities of life understood as a singularity. 
Agamben’s formulation of bare life, the camp and the state of exception, radically 
ontologizes Foucauldian biopolitics, a point which is encapsulated in Agamben’s primary 
thesis in Homo Sacer: “The entry of zoē into the sphere of the polis – the politicization of 
bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of modernity.” For Agamben, this event, 
this capture and inclusion of bare life in the political, “constitutes the original – if 
concealed – nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a 
biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.”273 For Agamben, politics 
today has been entirely transformed into biopolitics. As such the task of the metacolonial 
analysis as it is deployed in this work, is to think the problematic of political Islam 
genealogically and, by extension, biopolitically.274 
With Agamben the term biopolitical sovereign simply captures Foucault 
understanding of the way in which sovereign power folds into the biopolitical. The 
sovereign is no longer the king but it is society itself.275 That is to say sovereignty is now 
folded within the biopolitical, and the people (species race) are the new kings. In 
resistance to forms of colonial sovereignty which after 1857 increasingly took on the tone 
of a British biopolitical form of sovereignty, the process of biopoliticization was 
amplified. Hence biopoliticization is a certain ‘politicization of life’, a term which for 
both Agamben and Foucault, signals the capture of life (its singularity, its mystery, its 
                                                
polis) to signal the space of the modern political, the polis of police and policy, the polis of Islamapolis, as 
the name for the space where the question of being is no longer a question. I elaborate on this use in 
Chapter 2. 
273 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
274 I would regard the biopolitical as one of the disclosive vectors of critical ontology.  
275 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended. 
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finitude, its aleatory nature) by a certain kind of power, a power that pervades the modern 
polis. This power should not be understood as either a material or discursive structure, 
nor even an ideological configuration, but rather as an ontological vector. It is around this 
phrase, the politicization of life, that the points of convergence between Agamben and 
Foucault and Heidegger’s political ontology need to be highlighted, especially since the 
provisional aim of the metacolonial is to disclose the biopoliticization of Islam. And 
certainly political Islam, as we shall see exemplified in Deoband political practice, has 
failed to recognize the nature of this “foundational event”, this ‘radical’ (i.e. ontological) 
transformation, having already equated modernity with the surface of Western culture as 
such. Political Islam’s ontic dissonance with the West thus belies a deep underbelly of 
ontological equivalences and resonances.276. 
                                                
276 On Heidegger’s account, “modern techno-power is founded in an unconditional drive toward the 
enhancement of power. This drive toward enhancement calls for the objectification and ordering of beings; 
conversely, the objectification and ordering of beings facilitates the drive towards enhancement.” (Rayner) 
In this way if we regard Foucault’s ‘history of power’ as in part a narrative of the intensification of power, 
we can see how it is indebted to the process that Heidegger calls technological enframing. Governmentality 
then can be thought of as the way technological subjects seek to accomplish security, certainty and stability 
‘through a complete ordering of all beings, in the sense of a systematic securing of stockpiles, by means of 
which [their] establishment in the stability of certainty is to be completed” (Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volumes 
One and Two, p. 234. quoted in Rayner). The individualizing and totalizing poles of biopower in Foucault, 
coincide in the ‘total mobilization’ of beings as resource, the systematic securing of stockpiles for the sake 
of power. The result is that nature, now distinct from human ‘culture’, comes to appear as a vast field of 
usability and disposability or ‘standing reserve’ (Bestand) (———, The Question Concerning Technology, 
p. 17.) It is in this sense that ‘culture’ is itself a form of colonization. In his Parmenides lectures, Heidegger 
emphasises the links between the etymological roots of culture, with colonization. of the originary life-
world possibilities of human being. Human life itself becomes a resource, or domain for maximization and 
securitization. This transformation of man, and subsequently the domain of culture itself, into production 
and stockpile, is the unfolding of what Heidegger calls the will-to-power. Effectively then power for 
Heidegger names “that kind of willing that wills itself as will to power.” Agamben’s critique of life under 
biopower is precisely a critique of this double affirmation of the subjects exalted and sovereign existence. 
‘The basic form of appearance in which the will-to-will arranges and calculates itself in the unhistorical 
element of the world of completed metaphysics can be stringently called ‘technology’. Humanism, the 
target of Heidegger’s critique in the Letter, is thus a diminution of human potentiality, which under 
technology becomes the purest expression of the will-to-will and its sacralization of life. Technē operates 
by facilitating the increasingly total predominance of the actual over the possible, beings over being, the 
totality over the singularity. Techno-power can be seen as a certain kind of relationing (or conditioning) in 
which subjectivity asserts itself as will-to-will.  This will-to-will is what Agamben will identify as the arché 
of sovereign power (potere) in opposition to potentiality (potenza). Thus humanism, which is at the heart of 
the “anthropological machine”, with its attendant political doctrines of liberalism and democracy and its 
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Thus to be clear then, biopolitics or ‘power over life’, does not simply mean the 
conscription of an originally free subject within an external structure of domination and 
subordination. It is not simply that the subject is enmeshed within institutional 
arrangements of disciplinary power, nor that its subjection to forms of overt sovereign 
power or repression wholly define it. Though one element of power (which Foucault 
designates as power with a capital “P”) certainly does involve domination and overt 
violence277, the form that Foucault is primarily interested in is the productive subject-
forming power. Power is thus not external to the subject but immanent with it. We may 
say that the modern subject is itself the expression of a constellation of historical and 
ongoing forces; the subject is a form of power through and through. And it is the 
normalized and disciplined subject of a biopolitical identity that is most powerful 
expression of subjectivity today, a form that I would argue pervades the dominant 
conceptions of Muslim identity. In fact Foucault would claim that the discursive regime 
of historico-political discourses are the most powerful and effective forms of subject 
formation/bondage. For it is precisely when the subject sees itself in a war of liberation 
against repressive forces, that this very struggle binds it more concretely to the 
identity/subject/people it wishes to liberate. We might call this the biopolitical trap of the 
wretched. Thus historico-political discourses and movements of resistance against overt 
power can end up producing a more effective double capture of subjectivity. For instance 
in The Order of Things, Foucault shows how what seem to be opposing and 
discontinuous positions, really belonged to a same archaeological or epistemic ground. 
Something of a similar strategy is deployed by Agamben when he talks about the 
                                                
juridical armature of a rights bearing subject, are complicit in technologies occlusion of its own 
impoverished metaphysical episteme.  
277 See Appendix on Power 
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limitations of democracy, human rights, Marxism and liberalism which all remain 
oblivious of their metaphysical soil. Our metacolonial thesis pertaining to the violences 
of Islamism, and Pakistani political space more generally, relies similarly on the notion 
that Islamic actors are embedded in a wider space and history of metaphysics, of which 
they remains entirely unaware. The “enigmas” of modern violence, be it the Nazi or the 
American war machine, al-Qaeda, Taliban or the IRA, can only be solved, then, 
 
on the terrain – biopolitics – on which they were formed. Only within a 
biopolitical horizon will it be possible to decide whether the categories 
whose opposition founded modern politics (right/left, private/public, 
absolutism/democracy, etc.) – and which have been steadily dissolving, to 
the point of entering today into a real zone of indistinction – will have to 
be abandoned .... And only a reflection that, taking up Foucault’s and 
Benjamin’s suggestion, thematically interrogates the link between bare life 
and politics, a link that secretly governs the modern ideologies seemingly 
most distant from one another, will be able to bring the political out of its 
concealment and, at the same time, return thought to its practical 
calling.278 
 
The aim of an archaeology of any discourse, scientific or Islamic, is thus not to 
analyze discourse as propositions, but rather to identify these governing rules (rules of 
governmentality) within a field of power relationships; the historical a priori, in their 
historical manifestation. The metacolonial is thus a cartography — a topology of power 
— and here I seek to work out a regional Deoband diagram; the complex topology of 
power in which the practices and possibilities of the Pakistani ‘ulama are situated. What 
necessarily complicates this analysis is that we are considering the Deoband who both 
articulate a certain governmentality and are simultaneously situated within multiple and 
overlapping spaces and senses of power. Forswearing what Said called ‘imaginative 
geographies’, is merely the point of departure for the metacolonial. It is this space of 
                                                
278 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
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intelligibility that I am calling the metacolonial, and I will subsequently interpret political 
Islam as itself a subject of the metacolonial; that is to say its specific violence’s can be 
understood by, and be seen as productive of, the metacolonial. The remaining chapters 
shall themselves disclose instances of the play of this metacolonial state/space. To be sure 
this is not the unfolding of some abstract philosophical zone, nor is this an exercise in 
first philosophy, but rather this work aims at the disclosure of a concrete, somatic, and 
violent space — the unfolding of the will to power and nihilism at the heart of all 
political appropriations of Islam; modernist, liberal, traditional and orthodox alike. In our 
designation, the phenomenon of the Taliban—the politics, ideologies, religions and 
violences that gather in and around its name—is not an exception to mainstream political 
Islam, but an exemplary instance of the modern-metacolonial.  
Shari‘a law for instance, manifests itself precisely as a power over life and the 
body and can in this sense be read effectively as a biopolitical technology of (sovereign) 
power. The provisional aim of this work, will be to show the way in which ‘ulama 
practices disclose, or reveal, a political space that is best characterized as metacolonial. I 
will argue that Political Islam has from its very inception been a metacolonial rather than 
a strictly postcolonial phenomenon. The task of the dissertation is thus two fold, to lay 
the groundwork for thinking the metacolonial, and showing how political Islam in 
general and the political practice of the Deoband ulama in particular, exemplify this 
claim. What follows then is an attempt to undertake a historical and political cartography 
of the Deoband anthropos.279 This endeavor neither privileges nor displaces what might 
                                                
279 In a summary fashion, it could be said that the radical failure of the Deoband lies in its endeavor to 
preserve an ethnos rather than an ethos. 
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have been a more standard chronological, historiographical or ethnographical 
transcription of original research data.  
Also, to be clear, lest the earlier invocation of Nietzschean ‘Will’ mislead us from 
the start, this account of the Deoband is not a subjectivist one. Nor is not concerned 
principally with the humanist question of agency and freedom (although I do not mean to 
disregard this either), but with the conscription, production and entanglement of 
subjectivities within the modern. So it is not so much that we can think of Deoband 
politics, whether in Pakistan or Afghanistan, as actively pursuing a conscious strategy of 
sovereignty, nursing secret ambitions of acquiring State power through a duplicitous 
recourse and mobilization of some tailor made interpretation, or authentic revival of 
Islam as such. Rather it is a question of disclosing the ways in which modern political 
space, the polis itself — in which the Deoband respond and participate — produces 
‘ulama politics. It is this political space of power that I am calling the metacolonial, and it 
is in this space that the ‘ulama, indeed all political agents, dwell. What I seek to 
demonstrate then is not the way in which the ‘ulama may be said to be in pursuit of 
power or sovereignty, but rather the way in which the Deoband is itself haunted, 






The Space of Emergency: Political Theology & The Military 
 
 
 [The] tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of exception’ in which 
we live is the rule. We must attain to a concept of history that accords with this 
fact. Then we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about the real state of 
exception, and this will improve our position in the struggle against fascism. 
(Walter Benjamin) 
 
Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide 
deployment. The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and 
contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that—while ignoring 
international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception 






In Discipline and Punish Foucault suggests that a fundamental transformation in 
the epistemic regime of penal justice was in part caused by the infiltration of an apparatus 
of power that had emerged in military camps. The origins of modern ‘disciplinary’ power 
thus lie not in the prison but the space of military camps and the battlefield. The 
disciplinary dressage of early modern military camps, the culture of perpetual observation 
and examination, the emergence of spaces of confinement, and the recourse to repetitive 
training exercises, were all corporeal forces that were designed to construct a more 
efficient fighting human machine. Such techniques eventually spread, mutated and 
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penetrated other institution like the hospital, school (madrasa) and factory. The 
disciplinary manipulation of bodies does not produce subjects per se, but is only one part 
of a complex network of power/knowledge, or ‘apparatus’, which forms the constitutive 
conditions of subjectivity. Modernity, Foucault suggests, inaugurates the disciplining of 
the soul through the corrections of the body. The new madrasa at Deoband, which 
according to Metcalf is the “leading theological academy of modern India”, is described 
as at once traditional and modern. Metcalf is uncomfortable, and rightly so, with the 
common understandings of the madrasa as ‘traditional.’ This was a school that “clearly 
broke with earlier patterns of education”280 and which “from its inception was unlike 
earlier madrasas. The founders emulated the British bureaucratic style for educational 
institutions instead of the informal familial pattern of schools then prevalent in India. … 
Financially, the school was wholly dependent on public contributions, mostly in the form 
of annual pledges, not on fixed holdings of auqaf, pious endowments contributed by 
noble patrons.”281 In her concern to critique modernization theories282 Metcalf misses 
here an opportunity to see this transformation of the madrasa as inaugurating the 
emergence of a modern disciplinary space of power within the very heart of orthodoxy. 
1857 clearly marks the formal end, or decapitation of Muslim sovereignty in British 
India, and thus sets the stage for the turn towards biopolitical forms of power. The 
emergence of the modern madrasa therefore, replete with new forms of enclosure, 
                                                
280 Introduction in Metcalf, Islamic Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan. 
281 ———, "The Madrasa at Deoband: A Model for Religious Education in Modern India." 
282 Modernization theories have, in part due to the early efforts of scholars like Metcalf, fallen into 
disrepute. Such theories were examples of egregious eurocentrism that aimed to continue the civilizing 
mission by other means. Modernization theorists argue that the proper script for modernity and progress 
has already been written in the West and so all that traditional societies have to do is emulate this script. 
However modernization theory continues today in the guise of development. For an excellent critique see 




regulation and surveillance of bodies, represents the penetration of modern forms of 
power, both disciplinary and biopolitical, into the heart of a movement which ostensibly 
trumpets its anti-Western anti-colonial credentials. Metcalf’s assertion then that “the 
school’s concerns were totally apolitical”283 is untenable not only because it ignores the 
overt political nature of the Deoband since 1918, but because it relies on a flawed and 
weak conception of politics/power that is rooted precisely in the kind of juridico-political 
and state model that Foucault has so severely critiqued. The material reliance therefore of 
the madrasa on ‘popular’ rather than ‘sovereign’ power most clearly signals this shift into 
the modern. We must view the Deoband then, its institutions and its practices, within the 
framework of a more robust and conceptually rich conception of power, a model of 
power which at minimum has cut of the kings head. 
It is thus fitting that we begin our account of the metacolonial space of Pakistan 
by a consideration of the fundamental role that ‘discipline’ has played in facilitating the 
now innumerable and proliferating spaces of violence in Pakistan. That the military has 
played a dominant role in shaping the political destiny of Pakistan is commonly 
acknowledged. But little or no attention has been placed on interrogating the nature of 
and form of military power, or the state form itself. The military has to be sure been 
endlessly described284 but it remains remarkably under theorized. Overall I will be 
highlighting the necessity of recognizing an indistinction between military space and 
‘ulama space. Both inaugurate and proliferate disciplinary and biopolitical spaces. It is 
their recent overlap and merger that has resulted in the crossing of a certain threshold, 
leading to the emergence of new and unexpected dispositifs and assemblege of power. 
                                                
283 Metcalf, "The Madrasa at Deoband: A Model for Religious Education in Modern India." 
284 See below for a consideration of the relevant literature. 
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Today’s civil war is not only a contest between jihadism and its erstwhile parent the 
military, nor is it only a contest between various sectarian traditions. It is also an 
increasingly violent civil war within the Deoband establishment itself. Pakistan’s guiding 
principles — enunciated by the Father of the Nation M.A. Jinnah in an early radio 
address to the new nation — “Faith, Unity, Discipline”,285 must thus bee seen in a whole 
new and disturbing light.  
Pakistan’s history has long remained under the shadow of dictatorship. But as 
Agamben clarifies, dictatorship and the state of exception are not the same thing. The 
former is only a species of the latter. Thus while plenty of attention has been paid to the 
explaining the causes for Pakistan’s seemingly endless cycle of dictatorship,286 no one 
has yet paid attention the relationship between the sovereign exception and dictatorship. 
The proclamations of emergency that are considered in this chapter can then be applied to 
our understanding of the fatwa as a force of law. The military as a force of war thus can 
be said to merge with the ‘ulama’s space of law (Allah awr Army). A threshold is reached 
when the distinction between law and war collapses. It is thus necessary to trace the ways 
in which the Pakistan military has contributed to the state of exception through its 
repeated interventions in and domination of political space. 
The metacolonial designates the space of power we inhabit today. I have 
characterized metacolonial space as a biopolitical sovereign space of exception. This 
chapter will seek to understand and expose the contours of this space. In the chapters thus 
far I have suggested that in order to understand political Islam in Pakistan we need to take 
                                                
285 These words are famously inscribed on the Teen Talwar (Three Swords) monument located at a 
prominent intersection/roundabout in Clifton, Karachi. It seems as if the disciplinary sword has triumphed 
over the other two; unity and faith. Both Islam (faith) and Pakistan (unity) lie in obvious ruin. 
286 See for instance Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia. 
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into account the nature of political space. The political and politics are of course terms of 
classical provenance, linked to the Greek term polis, which though conventionally 
translated as city-state,287 designates a space of power. The political as such, is also 
associated more concretely with the emergence of popular movements and 
populations.288 There is thus something already biopolitical in our everyday usage of the 
term “political.” 
Thus to reiterate, in this dissertation I am concerned with understanding the 
emergence of the political itself, rather than the emergence of political Islam as such. 
This space of the political is signaled by the broader transformations that Foucault 
identifies as the transition from sovereign (monarchical) power to forms of modern 
biopolitics and governmentality. As should be evident then from any cursory 
understanding of Foucault’s use of the term, power is not a thing or substance, it is not 
owned or possessed, but rather circulates. It is a term that designates relationships of 
power which take place at the level of populations and the individual and not just at the 
level of the state.289 Political Islam, can be said to be political in so far as it embodies a 
mentality of power — a governmentality — that seeks to shape, conduct, control, 
discipline, protect and or liberate (Islamize) society. It does not have to refer to activities 
that aim at the control of the formal state apparatus, or that take place at the level of 
                                                
287 “Polis is usually translated as city or city-state. This does not capture the full meaning. Polis means, 
rather, the place, the there, wherein and as which historical being-there is. The polis is the historical place, 
the there in which, out of which, and for which history happens” Heidegger, An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, 152. The polis does not designate geometrical or Cartesian space, but primarily names the 
place, site or abode, in which Dasein (human being) comes to dwell. I will generally use polis (and bio-
polis) to signal the bio-political space of the modern: the polis of police and policy, the polis of Islamapolis. 
288 It is perhaps for this reason that we do not generally identify say the Abbasid revolution as a 
manifestation of political Islam, and the term seems to be almost wholly absent from studies of Islamic 
Empires, and “premodern” Muslim societies. Political Islam, and Islamism, acquire their full place in the 
hierarchy of Western political epistemology only after the Iranian revolution, with modest gestures to the 
Muslim brotherhood, and perhaps Jamal al-din al-Afghani, as the progenitors of Islamism as such.  




formal political parties that contest national elections. Similarly as I have discussed, 
Agamben’s conception of sovereign power does not refer exclusively to the orbit of state 
power.290  
In Chapter 2 I outlined the inadequacies of approaches to political Islam that 
privilege ‘religion’ as either a universal category or as an independent agent of historical 
formation. Consequently my research seeks to highlights the “secular”291 processes and 
forces (state actors, global political economy, etc.) that bear on the formation of Islamist 
politics and subjectivities.292 Therefore before we begin to discuss ‘ulama technologies of 
power, it will be vital to consider the broader nature of Pakistan’s disciplinary and martial 
space. If as I claim Pakistani political space is being increasingly defined by the state of 
exception, then ‘ulama biopolitics, must itself be situated within a broader understanding 
of the state/space of sovereignty. In Pakistan this space has been dominated by and 
produced as a military space. In short we must first turn to the way in which the Pakistan 
Army has infected the broader political space by its own martial disciplinary logics, 
logics which have served to intensify and multiply the space of exception. 
It is not simply the case however that the army or the military are somehow the 
originators or cause of the state of exception. Like colonialism, the army has simply 
sustained and intensified the logic of exception. This means that it is the structure of the 
                                                
290 It is precisely for this reason that Nasser Hussain’s use of the term “emergency” to characterize colonial 
juridical apparatus, is flawed. Nasser Hussain, The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule 
of Law, Law, Meaning, and Violence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003). Not only does he 
fail to take into account the politico-theological (ontological) nature of sovereign power, he is concerned 
largely with the way in which colonial legal structures hampered the development of national sovereignty. 
Thus while his study sheds excellent new light on the structure of colonial formations, his uptake of 
Agamben is of limited use in our study. Like Agamben I view sovereignty as the source of the political 
problem and not a goal to be achieved.  
291 For Carl Schmidt these ‘secular’ processes are already politico-theological processes. 
292 In this way my project merely attempts to instantiate lines of inquiry that have been sustained elsewhere 
more eloquently and forcefully. See Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam, ———, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. 
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sovereign exception, the ban, and not simply the material logics and history of the 
military that need to be exposed.293 At the same time I am not suggesting that some 
hidden metaphysics or deep a-historical structures are solely to account for the crisis in 
Pakistan. On the contrary it is first and foremost the militarization of the polis by that 
institution of colonial governmentality par excellence, the Army, that lies at the heart of 
the political crisis facing Pakistan. Thus the state of exception is not unique or particular 
to either the military or the ‘ulama. Additionally both military and ‘ulama 
governmentality thrive in a broader space of power which is itself further sustained by the 
routine (normal) exercise of sovereign power by imperial and colonial forces. The ruling 
trinity of Pakistan, Allah, Army awr Amrika (the AAA)294 is thus first and foremost an 
expression of a sovereign anxiety. Any attempt to solve the predicament of violence and 
instability in Pakistan must therefore seek to think the problem on the horizon of the 
incoherence’s of sovereignty. What hampers most studies that seek to account for the 
crisis of Pakistan is the repeated failure to problematize the political, sovereignty, 
religion, identity and the very biopolitical logic of the nation-state.295 In short it is power 
and not Pakistan as such which requires thinking. Pakistan is merely the effect of 
power.296 Hence we must begin our analysis by making clear that the productive link 
                                                
293 We can get a sense of the importance of this structure by noting how, despite the passage from military 
dictatorship and martial law to democracy, Pakistan remains in an exceptional state. As if often disturbingly 
apparent to the citizenry of Pakistan, the distinction between regimes of martial law and regimes of 
democracy are increasingly entering a zone of indistinction. 
294 To the commonly asked question, who rules Pakistan, a popular adage often invokes the AAA; the 
trinity of God, Army and America, that are allegedly responsible for the fate of the country. The terms 
suggest that the power of the Army and America are not unlike the power of God; mysterious and wholly 
unaccountable to the people. 
295 That is to say an Asadian or broadly Foucaultian understanding of the political has not been applied to 
the study of Pakistan. 
296 In her attempt to “make sense” of Pakistan, noted scholar of history and International affairs, Farzana 
Shaikh, similarly fails to take into account the very structural incoherence of the very terms she deploys in 
her explanation. There is a mention of, but no serious problematization of power. However the book does 
break ground by pointing to the incoherence of Pakistani identity itself as lying at the heart of the crisis: 
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between Islamist violence and the army is not merely a question of uncovering a dark 
history of alliance and short sighted deployments, but is rather a question of 
understanding the intensification, and permanent localization of the state of emergency.  
 
 
Pakistan and Her Army 
 
There is by now a long and faithful tradition of critique within Pakistani 
scholarship, that highlights the particularly nefarious role played by the Army in the 
creation of Pakistan’s seemingly endless series of social, economic and political crisis. 
Veteran activist and journalist Tariq Ali has been predicting the immanent collapse of 
Pakistan since 1969. His highly influential Can Pakistan Survive? was so good it was 
banned by General Zia-ul Haq.297 His latest book, The Duel, characterizes the dialectic of 
Pakistan’s tragedy as the “ongoing duel between a U.S.-backed politico-military elite and 
the citizens of the country.”298 The last three decades, Ali writes, “have witnessed a 
shallow and fading state gradually being reduced to the level of a stagnant and 
treacherous swamp.”299 Ali was however self-exile in 1963, and was thus spared the 
wrath of the military establishment. More sustained and less polemical analysis of the 
                                                
“the vexed relationship between Islam and nationalism”. For instance she insists that “Pakistan” rejected 
theocracy at its foundations. But one is left with the distinct feeling from her narrative, that some agent 
called “Pakistan” has simply failed to juggle its pluralist balls adeptly. By contrast we view both balls 
(identity) and the activity of juggling (nationhood) as problematic to begin with. For an otherwise useful 
and comprehensive account of Pakistan’s ‘ideological’ morass see Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan. 
297 As a young teenager, while in High School in Pakistan, I was able to obtain a bootleg copy. It was 
perhaps one of the first political texts that influenced my desire to study history and politics. It should be 
republished however under the new title “Canned, Pakistan Survives!”. 
298 Ali, The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power. 
299 Ibid., p. 1. 
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praetorian state began to emerge in the 1980’s,300 including a sound volume edited by a 
former commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Air Force (1957 – 1965) Air Marshal Asghar 
Khan.301 In a series of more recent works greater flesh has been put on the ways in which 
the army has not only co-opted the political process and but also simultaneously extended 
its power within the fabric of culture and economy.302 In each of these works the deadly 
network of alliances between the ‘ulama, the military and the United-States is explored. 
Each essay outlines the way in which alliance between these three forces was 
contributing to the retardation of democratic potential. Each essay predicted the 
potentially catastrophic results that would ensure from these alliances. It seems as if no 
one in the Pakistani establishment had time to read. In each of these essays the ‘ulama are 
written of as anti-modern and illiterate forces that have been opposed to the integrity of 
Pakistan from the very beginning. Since then a certain dominant, and by no means 
incorrect, thematic has come to characterize almost all explanations of Pakistan’s 
problems; the nefarious role played by the United State in consistently supporting both 
military rule and jihadist forces in the 1980’s.303 This structural alliance is then set on top 
                                                
300 Hassan Nawaz Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, Pakistan, the Roots of Dictatorship : The Political Economy 
of a Praetorian State (London: Zed Press, 1983). 
301 Mohammad Asgar Khan, ed., Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience, Third World 
Books (London: Zed Books, 1985). One of the contributors, journalist Zafaryab Ahmed was arrested by the 
Zia regime and tortured. 
302 For the classic account of the military capture of the economy see Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The 
Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence. More recently in an excellent study Ayesha Siddiqa 
shows how the army has penetrated both economy and society in a more sustained and intense manner such 
that their extraction from power will be difficult even when the façade of democracy returns. See Ayesha 
Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy (Pluto Press, 2007). Siddiqa’s analysis runs 
parallel with but more deeply than Mazhar Aziz who also seeks to outline a greater explanatory role for the 
military in understanding the political failure of the state. Both studies extend the metaphor of failure or 
frustrated process of nation-building. Once again I seek to examine the assumption that “development” an 
“nation building” are desirable to begin with. Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel 
State, Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies (Routledge, 2009). 
303 This is effectively the primary tenor of the argument in two recent works. See Ahmed Rashid, Descent 
into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central 
Asia (Viking Adult, 2008), Ali, The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power, Hussain, 
Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam.  
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of an already existing network of postcolonial woes that have beset the nation from its 
violent and bloody inception; a feudal hierarchy, poverty and political corruption. All in 
all, so the argument goes, these forces, the AAA, have compromised if not destroyed the 
‘secular’ potential and originary vision of ‘true’ Pakistan and ‘true’ Islam. Each of these 
recent works, Shaikh, ‘Ali and Rashid in particular, offer us a compelling narrative and 
endless description of a series of cynical alliances and ideological hypocrisies. In many 
ways I share the analysis of these leftist and liberal authors. But what emerges is a 
detailed historical and political description of the movement of actor-puppets with little 
attempt to understand the nature of ‘movement’ and the principle of motion itself. Each 
are limited either by the explanatory framework which even in the liberal narrative 
(Rashid) invariably draws from a Marxist paradigm (the contradictions of capital, 
imperial greed, corruption and mismanagement by the ruling elite, ‘false consciousness.’) 
And consistently the ‘ulama are viewed simply as anti-modern forces whose resurrection 
has been facilitated by the cynical “weaponization” of Islam by the Army and America 
alike. The chickens are now coming home to roost, lets fire the farm managers for letting 
them get out of the pen! Again while I share the underlying tenor of these arguments, 
something is missing. It is this something, this unthought that I seek to get at in the 
remaining chapters. 
In this work then I am arguing that Islamist violence is made possible and 
sustained by a more autonomous will to power among the ‘ulama class, and is not merely 
a corollary of the inscription of the ‘ulama within military spaces. At the same time 
however the violence of the ‘ulama cannot be understood in isolation from its 
conscription within and proximity to geopolitical violence of the army and America. 
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Additionally we might add that the martial spaces extended by the military, which are 
determinative of the ethos of the political space in which all other political actors 
participate, cannot in any meaningful sense be decoupled from the ongoing “martial face” 
of a variety of neoliberal and neoconservative global governmentalities.304 This is the 
secondary neo-colonial sense of the meta-colonial where meta implies being in the midst 
of, rather than post. This ongoing meta-colonial space is markedly different for India than 
it is for Pakistan. This is not to say that the former is devoid of such meta-colonial forces, 
only that they differ in intensity. In India in contrast to Pakistan, a sovereign anxiety and 
dislocation is not for the most part in a state of perpetual crisis. Pakistan’s destiny 
therefore lies in its complex entanglement within a series of both interconnected but also 
conflicting historical and political dispositifs; from its postcolonial legacy, the dominance 
of the military, the place of Pakistan within the imperial orbit of the United States, to the 
very violent biopolitical caesura which carved out this “moth eaten” nation. What I am 
referring to here is of course the very eidos of Pakistan and the capture of Islam within its 
political schema. Pakistan emerges under the biopolitical imperative of “society must be 
defended.”305 In a similar way American foreign policy, rightly regarded as deterring 
democracy, is the outcome of its own will to security. We do not then have merely 
cynical players who are promoting a political vision for direct material gain, but rather a 
series of actors that are each concerned with defending and securing their populations, 
their ummah.  
As the premier colonial institution the Army has always conflated its own raison 
d’être, the defense of the territorial nation-state (Pakistan) with the defense of Islam. 
                                                
304 Dillon, The Liberal Way of War: The Martial Face of Global Biopolitics. 
305 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended. 
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Similarly the Deoband ‘ulama have always regarded their political activity, from the 
founding of the originary school in 1857, to their support for the Taliban today, as the 
safeguarding and preservation of Islam. During the tenure of Zia-ul Haq, this 
indistinction reached its maximum intensity as Pakistanis were increasingly disciplined 
by a new form of Martial Islam. Certainly in the minds of such figures like Hamid Gul, 
the former head of Inter-Services Intelligence (1987-89), who Ahmed Rashid rightly 
called “the most fervent Islamic ideologue in the army after Zia”306 the defense of Islam 
took priority over Pakistan. It would not be unfair to suggest that today Pakistan is being 
haunted by Hamid’s ghouls. 
Today there is no shortage of works that make the decisive connection between 
the rise of violent religious extremism in South Asia and troubling role of the Army in the 
proliferation of jihadism. It is critical to note therefore that the transformational threshold 
in the rise of ‘ulama governmentality was inaugurated by a series of overlapping 
geopolitical and nationalist, not Islamist, forces. This alliance is on the one hand a 
confirmation of Mitchell’s McJihad thesis, which highlights the indistinction between 
McWorld and Jihad.307 Mitchell seeks in part to erase the lines of absolute difference 
characterizing “our history” and “theirs”, by not only expanding the scope of “the they” 
but also showing how “us and them” are historically interpolated, and how a common 
space of power is forged by the political economy of oil. Mitchell is effectively 
                                                
306 Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the Great Game in Central Asia, p. 129. As Rashid notes Gul played a 
lead role in both the establishment of the Taliban after the Soviet-Afghan War, and for redirecting the 
Afghan jihad towards the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir against India. During his tenure General Gul 
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Democratic! Alliance) against the left-leaning liberal Pakistan Peoples Party (Hassan Abbass, Pakistan's 
Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p 
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307 Mitchel’s essay is in part a response to these ostensible opposites in Benjamin Barber’s quasi-Orientalist 
tirade Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad Vs Mcworld, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books, 1995).which effectively 
regurgitates the essentialist Islam/West binary under the cover of pop sociology 
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suggesting that the question of political Islam be analytically framed within a field of 
power relationship, which are increasingly transnational and neoliberal. That is to say 
rather than culture being understood merely as an autonomous and essential feature of 
society,308 it needs to be placed more concretely within the context not only of local 
power struggles, but also trans-national power grids of neoliberal Empire.309 Mitchell 
goes on to remark: 
As a rule, the most secular regimes in the Middle East have been those 
most independent of the United States. The more closely a government is 
allied with Washington, the more Islamic its politics…When other 
governments moved closer to the United States—Egypt under Anwar 
Sadat in the 1970s, Pakistan under Zia ul-Haq in the 1980’s—their 
political rhetoric and modes of legitimation became avowedly more 
Islamic. … This pattern, once it has been noticed, lends itself to a 
straightforward, but unsatisfactory, explanation. The United States 
depends on the support of conservative political regimes, it is often 
pointed out, and these have tended to rely on religion to justify their 
power. … This explanation is unsatisfactory because the conservative 
political morality offered by certain forms of Islam is not some enduring 
feature of the religion that rulers adopt at their own convenience. Its 
usefulness reflects the fact that religious conservatism expresses the views 
of powerful social and political movements. Political regimes enter into 
uneasy alliances with these movements, depending on a force they do not 
directly control.310 
 
                                                
308 For a critique of the “culturalist” assumptions about Muslim society see Mamdani Mahmood, Good 
Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004). 
309 Whereas colonialism refers to “foreign presence in, possession of, and domination over bounded, local 
places” (Said), imperialism refers to foreign domination, without the necessity of presence or possession, 
over expansive, transnational spaces. Colonialism formally refers to the occupation of territory by foreign 
settlers, soldiers, or administrators. Imperialism, by contrast, is the projection of political power across 
large spaces, over other target states. No assumption of property need ground the imperial relationship. 
What makes for an imperial relationship, one that characterizes the US/Pak relationship, is the influence 
and the potentiality to project power, rather than manifest as an actual presence. Imperialism is thus a kind 
of global hegemony without formal annexations and colonies. Thus the frame for understanding the 
relationships of power between the US and many Muslim nations, is imperial: what geographer Derek 
Gregory call a “colonial present.” In Hardt and Negri however, Empire constitutes a new formation which 
exceeds the imperial sovereignty of the United States. For Pakistan however the two forms of power, 
Empire and Imperialism, cannot be neatly disaggregated. See the essays in Craig Calhoun and Frederick 
Cooper, eds., Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power (New Press, 2006). 
310 Mitchell, "Mcjihad: Islam in the U.S. Global Order." 
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While certainly correct, Mitchell does not elaborate on the nature of this force? Is 
he suggesting that conservative Islam is a distinct force from global capital? If so he 
would be undermining his own McJihad thesis. By highlighting a series of interlinked 
dependencies between the maintenance of power and the authority of states like Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia, Islamist forces and U.S. strategic and economic interests, Mitchell 
states that because religious movements have played this pivotal part in the global 
political economy “it would seem to follow that political Islam plays an unacknowledged 
role in the making of global capitalism.” Hence his formulation of our age as McJihad: 
an age in which the mechanisms of capitalism appear to operate, in certain 
critical instances, only by adopting the social force and moral authority of 
conservative Islamic movements. … the crisis in Afghanistan reflects the 
weaknesses of a form of empire, and of powers of capital, that can exist 
only by drawing on social forces that embody other energies, methods, 
and goals.311 
 
McJihad then describes a deficiency of capitalism, a deficiency that produces a 
history of incoherence’s. Towards the end of the essay he makes clear that McJihad 
“does not refer to a contradiction between the logic of capitalism and the other forces and 
ideas it encounters” but rather, “to the absence of such a logic”. However by suggesting 
that the political violence in the region is the “persistent symptom of this lack” it would 
seem as if, Mitchell unwittingly confirms the deep distinction between the forces of 
global capitalism (modernity) and “other forces and energies” (jihad). By contrast in this 
work I would like to suggest a more fundamental indistinction between capitalist violence 
(Empire) and Islamist violence (Jihad). The plane of this indistinction is biopolitical, and 
it reaches a more fundamental union in the ISI-jihad alliance, represented by figures like 
                                                
311 Ibid, emphasis mine 
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Gul. Therefore the distinction between state-military violence and Islamist violence is 
already severely blurred in Pakistan.312 
By now of course the thesis that the United States helped forge the conditions of 
possibility for the rise of jihadist extremism is well know even to an American 
audience.313 Cole leaves no room for doubt about this long and sordid history of liaisons 
and while as I maintain the 1979 war does constitute a threshold in the transformation of 
political Islam, the essential link between the military and political violence has a longer 
provenance. Without taking into account the long history of the Pakistan Armies will to 
sovereignty the nature of this violence will be reduced to a series of ‘tactical” mistakes 
and shortsighted policies. At minimum a focus on radical Islam or even ethnicity as the 
root cause of the crisis simply masks the more fundamentally repressive role of the state 
— its legitimization of the use of violence as the means for political participation and 
negotiation; and in particular, the role of the military, which from the very outset of 
Pakistan's history, has attempted to control the political process and gear the state 
towards maintaining what Ayesha Jalal aptly calls a “political economy of defense.”314 
But even this formulation does not go far enough and as I shall argue in this and 
preceding chapters, the turn towards radicalism by the ‘ulama is not causally linked to 
state practices, but rather emerges from the incoherence and nihilism of a biopolitical 
                                                
312 For a useful descriptive account of the role of the Pakistani state in the emergence of militancy in 
Pakistan and in Afghanistan see Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in 
Afghanistan (Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), and Zahab and Roy, Islamist 
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313 See John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, New ed. 
(London: Pluto Press, 2000). For a popular account see Robert Dreyfuss, Devil's Game: How the United 
States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam, American Empire Project (New York: Metropolitan Books, 
2005), Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Its Soul for Saudi Crude (Crown 
Publishers, 2003), and Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, 
from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).  
314 Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence. 
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process of which both the state and Islam are mutual interlocutors. It is when these forces 
meet that particularly violent thresholds are crossed. The event of Pakistan itself 
constituting the first merger. 
One may also note that while the violence of this decade, in particular the 
emergence of suicide bombing as a weapon of insurgency, has taken on a new affective 
intensity, decades previous have been witness to similar levels of military-civilian 
violence. There is already a long history of the brutalization of Baluchistan that has yet to 
be fully documented. The 1990’s conflict between the MQM and the State, was also 
written in terms of mutilated bodies in gunny bags. Interestingly enough, today’s 
operations against the Pakistani Taliban reflect on a large scale a pattern of civil military 
relationships that has characterized the repeated deployment of paramilitary groups for 
domestic and foreign agendas of the Pakistan Army. As is well known, the MQM was 
also nurtured by Zia as a force to counter the democratic forces of the PPP,315 a decade 
which also claimed hundreds of lives in sectarian and ethnic violence.  
The conflict between the MQM and the Pakistani state dates back to 1992's 
“Operation Clean-up”, a government initiated military operation, ostensibly aimed at 
cracking down on all “terrorist” and “criminal” elements in Sind, but which effectively 
became a witch hunt against the MQM. The MQM's charismatic albeit autocratic leader, 
Altaf Hussain, was forced into exile, and the party which had dominated Karachi politics 
since its founding in 1984 was forced underground. May and June of 1994 were marked 
not only by the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, but also a period of violent resistance 
by a militant wing of the MQM. As one monster was veering out of control, another was 
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being manufactured. In May 1995 the conflict took its most bloody turn with MQM 
militants systematically ambushing police patrols. Using rocket launchers, they attacked a 
number of government offices and police stations, and during the months that followed 
Karachi came to a virtual halt as the MQM and paramilitary forces battled it out on the 
city's streets; a glimpse of what was to come in Swat and Waziristan a decade later. 
While sporadic ethnic and sectarian violence had been a permanent feature of the Karachi 
landscape since 1992, the intensity and organized nature of the 1995 round of conflict 
was entirely different. Analysts began to compare the situation in Karachi to the 
insurrection in Kashmir as the death toll during the months of June and July peaked at 
over 600 people, marking only the beginning of months of carnage that were to follow. A 
new set of sensationalistic evening dailies cropped up in Karachi — front pages adorned 
with pictures of bloodied, bullet-ridden, or severely tortured bodies. The state's swift and 
brutal retaliation ensuring these tabloids ample material for their daily commodification 
of death. 
Thus while it is important to document the links between various Islamist groups 
and the military, a more fundamental account of political space is lacking. Most analysis 
thus far therefore take the state or the military as their point of departure. Each of these 
works fundamentally conforms to a model of juridico-political power that Foucault 
rejected, an understanding that continues to hamper even those scholars who draw on 
Agamben’s theory of sovereign power, yet insist on sovereignty as an exclusive feature 
of the state. I obviously do not wish deny the role of the state (or colonialism for that 
matter) but the question of power and sovereignty as posed by Foucault and Agamben 
transcends the originary logic of state power. Thus it will be necessary to consider the 
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state of exception. As I will show, even in the absence of formal martial law, the 
exception prevails316 The indistinction of political space between the departure of 
Musharraf and the return of democracy highlights this fact. This perhaps was one of the 
most tragic outcomes of what was otherwise a proud moment in the struggle between the 
people and the martial state.317 
 
 
Producing Emergency: The Frequencies of Violence 
 
What we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the 
problem of sovereignty. …We need to cut off the King's head: in political theory 
that has still to be done. (Foucault, “Truth and Power”, 1977) 
 
The question of the place of political Islam in Pakistan, and the Deoband and the 
Taliban in particular, cannot be fully understood without taking into account the link 
between martial spaces, the political, and of course the postcolonial context of the 
Pakistan Army. The army emerges historically as the key institution of colonial policing, 
securing colonial sovereignty over British India, and as such its originary conscription, its 
raison d’être, lies firmly within colonial governmentality. Subsequently since 1947, or 
more accurately 1956, it has been ‘martialed’ as the effective local proxy for American 
foreign policy, and would simply collapse without the periodic infusions of money, aid 
and technology from the United States.318 An understanding of the military and in 
particular its spatial metaphysics, is thus indispensable to this account of political Islam, 
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since Pakistan is first and foremost a series of overlapping (and conflicting) military and 
security spaces, and now even more so, a vast permanent space of exception. It is the 
complex of this (metacolonial) space that is the constitutive matrix of political Islam. It is 
also in this place that the dynamic of Pakistan’s centrifugal319 problem emerges. This 
enigmatic condition is a case of profuse sovereign anxiety and confusion, the resulting 
anomie of which affirms the state of exception in a vicious circularity. An element of this 
sovereign anxiety is commonly expressed in the popular configuration Allah, Amrika awr 
Army (the AAA); the trinity that is allegedly responsible for the fate of the country. It 
may even be suggested that the very emergence of Pakistan was the means to redress an 
anxiety of citizenship and power as it was first articulated by the nascent All India 
Muslim League (AIML), a movement which effectively conflated the economic 
insecurities of the Muslim feudal elite, with the idea of a majority Hindu India as 
constituting a threat to Islam, and its “way of life”. Transformed under two centuries of 
colonial ordering, and now already constituted as a bios, Islam, so the AIML argued, 
“must be defended”. The official slogan of the AIML in the years leading up to the 
partition was “Islam is in Danger”. The military have thus come to regard themselves not 
merely as protectors of the state, but by extension, defenders of Islam, albeit a 
provincialized Islam. It is therefore by way of an indistinction between Islam and the 
nation-state, that the military justify their extra juridical juris-diction which extends 
above and over any law including the shari‘a itself. In Pakistan, as any causal observer 
would attest, the law and the military are indistinct. The ‘ulama simply wish to attain to 
this level of sovereignty. 
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And what gives the Pakistan Army its rights of proclamation — its capacity to 
pro-claim law? It is not because it houses the foremost intellectuals of the nation, the 
foremost juridical experts (Islamic or secular). It is because, and only because the Army 
is that institution which has the greatest capacity to wield organized violence, and which 
by the repeated take over of the states political and economic machinery, has effectively 
maintained a monopoly on death dealing. Hence with the explicit support and backing of 
a greater sovereign force — a force which merely amplifies its assertive capacity— the 
military effectively wield a deadly cocktail of powers; combining older form of sovereign 
power, with technologies of policing while simultaneously conscripting the biopolitical 
weight of nation-Islam-ummah complex. The subsequent attempt —in particular during 
the Afghan wars and then extended into Kashmiri policy— to directly harness and co-opt 
the very institutional and political cites that claim Islamic authority, from the JUI and 
JUP to the JI, merely produced a mutual infection enhancing and amplifying the 
sovereign will of each group. The recent bomb that yet again decapitated a deeply flawed 
yet nonetheless symbolically vital Bhutto, may itself have been a product of this 
indistinction between the military and the political forces of Islam. The fact that “no 
body” claimed responsibility or took political credit or pride in the attack, and that 
popular opinion regarding the identity of the attackers will probably remain split evenly 
between the PPP itself (Zardari), the Military (ISI) and Jihadists (or some combination of 
the three), is perhaps the greatest testament to this space of emergency and indistinction 
that this work seeks to highlight. 
To begin then, with the question of the military, and the specific analysis of the 
proclamation, is not an idle diversion from the question of the nature of political Islam in 
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Pakistan. The two are inextricably linked as we shall see, for the martial technologies 
which have their root and ethos in colonial policing, constitute the critical element in the 
analysis of the political space of the ‘ulama. It is this martial space, underwritten by war, 
that is the constitutive matrix of political Islam, and all subsequent articulations of the 
ummah.  
 
The Violence of Law and the Law of Violence 
 
The state in which we live now, in the ‘war on terror’, is one of the endlessly 
suspended terrorist threat: the Catastrophe (the new terrorist attack) is taken for 
granted, yet endlessly postponed. … And it is crucial here that we accomplish the 
‘transcendental’ turn: the true catastrophe is already this, life under the shadow of 
the permanent threat of a catastrophe. 320  
 
Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide 
deployment. The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and 
contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that — while ignoring 
international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception 
internally — nevertheless still claims to be applying the law. 321 
 
For Agamben, “in the state of exception it is impossible to distinguish between 
observance and transgression of the law”.322 As a paradigmatic example of this, Agamben 
considers, the Decree for the Protection of the People and of the State, established in 
Germany on February 29, 1933. Similarly we may consider November 3rd, 2007. In 
Pakistan’s sixth decade of paralytic existence, the answer to the otherwise vexed question 
of national sovereignty and identity would disclose itself in yet another Martial Law 
Proclamation. The text of the “emergency proclamation” reads: 
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Whereas there is visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists and 
incidents of terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, IED explosions, 
rocket firing … some militant groups have taken such activities to an 
unprecedented level of violent intensity posing a grave threat to the life 
and property of the citizens of Pakistan. … Whereas some members of the 
judiciary are working at cross purposes with the executive and legislature 
in the fight against terrorism and extremism, thereby weakening the 
government and the nation’s resolve …Whereas some judges by 
overstepping the limits of judicial authority have taken over the executive 
and legislative functions … Whereas the Government is committed to the 
independence of the judiciary and the rule of law and holds the superior 
judiciary in high esteem, … [In] Accordance with the constitution and as 
the constitution provides no solution for this situation, there is no way out 
except through emergency and extraordinary measures… I, General 
Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff, proclaim emergency 
throughout Pakistan. I hereby order and proclaim that the constitution of 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall remain in abeyance. This 
Proclamation shall come into force at once.323 
 
This was without doubt Pakistan’s quintessential postmodern moment; the 
execution of a coup within a coup — a state of emergency within a state of emergency. 
Could it be that the state of emergency, which has already for so long become the rule in 
Pakistan, now has to be declared within itself to sustain its sovereign efficacy? To be sure 
however, from its political orientation and timing right down to its language it was a 
provincial state of emergency within the orbit of a more global one. Thus Musharraf’s 
proclamation, despite the U.S. State Department rhetorical and mild public disapproval, 
was tailor made to coincide with the broader requirements of the biopolitical logic of the 
‘war on terror’. But this is not just a case of the order of U.S. power extending itself more 
viscerally into an already militarized neocolonial space of a client regime. If the 
traditional 20th century mode and space of operation of US imperial power was Janus 
faced —democracy by day, imperialism by night—this Pakistani coup could be seen as 
an intensified reflection of the way in which US governmentality was asserting itself on 
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its own home front! If Hardt and Negri’s Empire signals at minimum the erasure of 
nationalist economic borders and its subordination to global capital, then the sovereigntist 
logic of the war on terror would seem to inaugurate the erasure of the protective 
biopolitical lines between members of American polis and the global (Muslim) targets of 
its security operations. 
But this emergency proclamation is remarkable not only for its paradigmatic 
exemplification of the paradox of sovereignty, it is also reveals with clarity the discursive 
contradictions that emerge when a law of force seeks to legitimize itself as a force of law. 
The proclamation, as we read, is magically “in accordance with the constitution” even 
though the constitution does not authorize such declarations; that is to say the silence of 
the law, its spaces of darkness, overshadows the law itself. This silence is martialed as the 
necessary violence by/of the sovereign, who wields this power in the name of a silent 
partner who speaks directly to the dictator; the one who speaks. As Agamben insightfully 
notes the “space devoid of law seems, for some reason, to be so essential to the juridical 
order that it must seek in every way to assure itself a relation with it, as if in order to 
ground itself the juridical order necessarily had to maintain itself in relation with an 
anomie.” We see here then what the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt had in mind by when he 
talked of a theologico-political form of sovereignty. Schmitt sees the modern political 
form of sovereignty as effectively a secularized version of a theological concept. As 
British legal scholar Douzinas notes, this is the sovereign feared or celebrated in modern 
political theory; the sovereign who decides the exception, goes to war, annihilates his 
enemies, who meets out spectacular punishments to those that violate his body or writ.324 
                                                
324 Costas Douzinas, “Speaking Law: On Bare Theological and Cosmopolitan Sovereignty” in Ann Orford, 
ed., International Law and Its Others (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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However as Agamben shows, the secularization of sovereignty in modern democracies 
does nothing to render this figure any less violent or insatiable. Schmitt was merely 
concerned with finding the proper locus for the exercise of sovereign decisionism, and 
not like Benjamin, on whom Agamben extensively draws, with undermining it. This is 
why it is essential to see “modern secular politics” in terms of political theology.325 The 
topological proximity then between an ostensibly secular army and the Islamists becomes 
more apparent when both are considered as variations of a political theology. 
Additionally on Schmitt’s understanding, the lacunae within the law — those 
situations that are not covered by or fall outside the scope of the law — is precisely that 
empty space that demands and authorizes the invocation of necessity. The exercise of the 
sovereign exception is thus predicated on necessity and the gaps/silences within the 
structure of the law. Necessity is hence the hole/whole that the law has not covered, that 
must in some sense remain uncovered, such that the sovereign may take its place. I would 
argue that a similar structure of lacunae within the shari‘a is precisely the non-space from 
which the ‘ulama seek to secure a sovereign place. This will to place (‘amr) is 
exacerbated precisely when the ‘ulama are dislocated and suffer a decline in their regard. 
 
Pervasive (but no longer persuasive) Musharraf 
In Rouges, Derrida writes that “the right of the stronger has always been the best 
right”. This is itself “cynical confession of sovereign power to speak in the name of the 
                                                
325 Of course as Derrida notes “we did not have to wait for Schmitt to know that this politico-juridical 
concept [of sovereignty] secularizes a theological heritage.” He thus cautions against a facile abandonment 
of sovereignty recognizing like Agamben, that its paradoxical, ontological status which has to be attended 
to. Neither cosmopolitanism (for Derrida) nor the Multitude or universal citizenship will resolve the 
sovereign aporia. Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, Meridian (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005). 
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law, and to simultaneously violate it.” Musharraf’s proclamation asserts that it is 
respectful of the judiciary precisely through its suspension of the constitution and the 
sacking of the Supreme Court Justice. But is this not the suspension of respect itself? It is 
also perhaps the first such declaration which blurs the lines between violent religious 
‘extremists’ terrorists, and the Supreme Court and its ‘Lashkar’ of secularized Bar 
Association members. As the Pakistani State/Military was busy signing MOU’s with 
FATA militants like Baitullah Masood, its internal security forces and police were 
bludgeoning lawyers and student protestors armed with dangerous placards. For the 
‘protection of the people’, human rights activists had to be jailed or placed under house 
arrest. In this way the war against terrorism manifests effectively as a war against civil 
society and law itself. The task of the state is thus to co-opt law and terrorism where 
possible and smash them when they contravene the will of the sovereign. And so before 
the question, who and what is sovereign in Pakistan, and by what right/power is it 
exercised, here I shall ask; how is sovereignty in Pakistan? How is it played? 
Appearing on State controlled PTV, while ‘illegally’ holding both titles of civilian 
President and Chief of Army Staff, (ostensibly declaring emergency to forestall any legal 
challenge to the continuation of his Presidency), Musharraf addressed a stunned nation. 
Beginning in Urdu he declares: 
… our country is at a dangerous juncture, facing a national crisis. 
Throughout history, nations have often had to make difficult decisions. 
That time has come now for Pakistan — we have to make important and 
painful decisions. If these decisions are not made then Pakistan's future is 
at stake. … the decision I have made is, first of all, for the sake of 
Pakistan. Pakistan is above all personal interests. …”326 
 
                                                




Failing to note the deep historical and ongoing complicity between the military 
and the forces of violent jihadism, nurtured to perverse perfection on the Kashmiri and 
Afghan fronts, he continues: 
“… Terrorism and Extremism are rampant. Suicide bombings are 
widespread. … fanaticism is now common. Fundamentalist extremists are 
everywhere. … Extremism has spread [into] the heart of Pakistan. … They 
want to impose their outdated religious views upon the people. In my eyes, 
this is a direct challenge to Pakistan's future as a moderate nation. … 
Pakistan is on the verge of destabilization… inaction at this moment is 
suicide for Pakistan and I cannot allow this country to commit suicide. 
Therefore, I had to take this action in order to preserve the democratic 
transition which I initiated eight years back…. To the critics and idealists 
against this action, I would like to say, please do not expect or demand 
your level of democracy, which you learned over a number of centuries. 
We’re also trying to learn and we’re doing well. Please give us time. 
Please also do not demand your level of civil rights, human rights, civil 
liberties which you’ve learned over centuries…. Please give us time.”  
 
This speech affords us a series of critical remarks that will set the stage for this 
investigation/instigation. We can begin by noting the mundane within the already bizarre. 
When asked how long the emergency will last, spokesmen for Musharraf suggested a 
matter of months! What took the West ostensibly centuries to learn — civil rights, 
democracy etc. — could now be crammed with determination in the space of a few 
months. Since the emergency was actually lifted on December 15th 2007, a full one day 
earlier than he had finally proposed, we can assume that this crisis was averted and 
historical destiny was attained! Doubtless the relentless pressure and popular resistance 
by segments of an empowered civil society who opposed the military maneuver, media 
coverage against State brutality meted out to well (western) dressed and suited secular 
lawyers.327 Thus a degree of international pressure and public embarrassment for the 
                                                
327 Clips of the bloody police baton charge and tear gassing of the lawyers guild made its way even to John 
Stewart’s The Daily Show. 
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Bush administration may have resulted in pressure on Musharraf to ‘lift’ the ban. But 
only of course after it had accomplished a series of its ostensibly original goals; retain the 
Presidency and thus the military button on the power to dissolve assemblies at will; tame 
those segments of civil society that had learned the lessons of western democracy too 
fast, i.e. the media, lawyers and human rights advocates; scramble any possibility of 
reinstating the Chief Justice and instill a general level of dis-localized fear that will 
warrant the affective need for continued military preeminence; shift all of these 
operations under the façade of democracy as quickly as possible! 
Secondly the somatic, colonial and biopolitical registers of this language are 
astounding. The nation is a (terrorist) suicidal body and he, the Führer/doctor/priest, will 
not allow the nation to end its miserable life! Thus Musharraf in this speech, in addition 
to an un-nuanced display of internalized colonial mimicry, evokes the Spirit of Hegel, by 
declaring that Pakistan, unlike the West, (or India), has not yet matured in the dialectical 
fire of history— “we need time” not democracy.! By effectively declaring Pakistan a 
backwards society, not yet deserving of popular (self)-rule, he was not only echoing two 
centuries of colonial discourse, and undermining the very ethos of swaraj, which 
animated both the Congress and the (All India) Muslim League, he was also effectively 
legitimating the exercise of old style monarchical forms of power and violence in order to 
control, discipline and pacify his unruly subjects — all in the name of the preservation of 
the life of the nation. Could we have asked for a more decisive formulation of biopolitical 
sovereignty? If at this juncture he had donned his Jodhpurs, would the performance have 
been less comic or more tragic? In assuming the language of a subordinate vassal, the 
President/General reveals the extent to which his own hold on power is dependent on 
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placating the sensibilities of a more distant Emperor (the West, America)— the repeated 
use of ‘please’, indicative perhaps of the ultimately whimsical line between homo sacer 
and the sovereign. And yet such an indictment of the army, as a subordinate local 
sovereign power, speaks only to the secondary dimension of the meta-colonial, the 
various apparatus of ongoing forms of colonialism. To probe the primary, metaphysical 
modality of colonization we must turn to the persistence of certain ghosts.  
What then gives the Pakistan Army its rights of proclamation — its capacity to pro-claim 
law? It is not because it houses the foremost intellectuals of the nation, or the foremost 
juridical experts (Islamic or secular). It is because, and only because the Army is that 
institution which has the greatest capacity to wield organized violence, and which by the 
repeated take over of the states political and economic machinery, has effectively 
maintained a monopoly on death dealing. Hence with the explicit support and backing of 
a greater sovereign force — a force which merely amplifies its assertive capacity— the 
military effectively wield a deadly cocktail of powers; combining older form of sovereign 
power, with technologies of policing while simultaneously conscripting the biopolitical 
weight of nation-Islam-ummah complex. The subsequent attempt —in particular during 
the Afghan wars and then extended into Kashmiri proxy war policy— to directly harness 
and co-opt the very institutional and political cites that claim Islamic authority, from the 
JUI and JUP to the JI, merely produced a mutual infection enhancing and amplifying the 
sovereign will of each group. The recent bomb that yet again decapitated a deeply flawed 
yet nonetheless symbolically vital Bhutto, may itself have been a product of this 
indistinction between the military and the political forces of Islam. The fact that “no 
body” claimed responsibility or took political credit or pride in the attack, and that 
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popular opinion regarding the identity of the attackers will probably remain split evenly 
between the PPP itself (Zardari), the Military (ISI) and Jihadists (or some combination of 
the three), is perhaps the greatest testament to this space of emergency and indistinction 





In another nationally broadcast speech, but his time to the Reichstag on July 13, 
1934, then Chancellor of Weimar Germany, Adolf Hitler, in the wake of Ernst Röhm 
putsch (better know as the “Night of The Long Knives”) proclaimed: 
In this hour I was responsible for the fate of the German people, and 
thereby I became the supreme judge of the German people. … I further 
gave the order to cauterize down to the raw flesh the ulcers of this 
poisoning of the wells in our domestic life. Let the nation know that its 
existence—which depends on its internal order and security—cannot be 
threatened with impunity by anyone! And let it be known for all time to 
come that if anyone raises his hand to strike the State, then certain death is 
his lot.328 
 
Substitute Pakistan for Germany here and we have virtually the same biopolitical 
logos (spirit) of sovereignty expressed by Musharraf (or General Zia-ul Haq preceding 
him in 1977) replete with its somatic registers. To be sure as with Hitler this is not merely 
the old form of monarchical sovereignty, not simply the exercise of a ruthless dictatorial 
will, but the collapse of the figure of the leader with the national body itself. Hitler 
charismatically embodied the German nation and was constituted as the Führer, not 
merely a Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader). And similarly with Musharraf who is merely the 
temporal instance of an otherwise pervasive military sovereignty, there is a similar 
                                                
328 Fest, Joachim Hitler (New York: Harcourt, 1974), p. 469. 
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collapsing and merger; of the national body with the institution of the army itself. 
Additionally Musharraf is upheld as a model citizen/general, who in displaying genuine 
affection and care for the nation, stands up against the endemic corruption of elected 
politicians and lawyers. What is further relevant again for our diachronic and synchronic 
comparison is the concern that Hitler showed for ‘legally’ sanctioning the extra-judicial 
massacre of his former Sturmabteilung (SA) paramilitary loyalists, which was 
accomplished through the introduction of the “Law Regarding Measures of State Self-
Defense.” Carl Schmitt, then Germany’s leading legal theorist, subsequently wrote an 
article “The Führer Upholds the Law” defending Hitler’s actions. In the words of 
Schmitt—now made even more infamous and relevant by the work of Italian philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben—“Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception.” That is to 
say sovereignty is exercised and simultaneously accrues to the person (or institution) that, 
when declaring a state of emergency or martial law, may ‘legitimately’ suspend the 
validity of law. “The exception” wrote Schmidt “is more interesting than the rule. The 
rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the rule but 
also its existence, which derives only from the exception”.329 Schmitt understood the 
tautological nature of sovereignty, and considered liberal theory weak precisely for its 
failure to grasp the nature of decision (and hence its inability to deal with crisis). The 
assumption of the universality and rational self-evidence of law in the legal positivism of 
liberal jurisprudence was according to Schmidt, groundless; liberalism had to, but could 
not, accept the inevitability of authority and the priority of executive power. I shall return 
to this problem of constituted and constituting power in subsequent sections, but in 
                                                
329 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, ed. Thomas McCarthy, 




essence the law for Schmidt could not, a priori, be grounded in the will of the people or a 
constitution without a vicious circularity. Law requires juris-diction, an authority or 
constituting force necessary to carve out a normative homogenous space of operation, a 
sovereign space which is the condition of possibility for the nomos—the ‘normative’ 
operation of judicial and legislative power. In Society Must Be Defended, Foucault 
elaborates on the theory of sovereignty as itself the diction (saying, proclamation) of the 
law of law. The theory of sovereignty, first elaborated by Jean Bodin, “attempts to show, 
how a power can be constituted, not exactly in accordance with the law, but in 
accordance with a certain basic legitimacy that is more basic than any law and that allows 
laws to function as such.”330  
For Schmitt, who does not actually solve, but merely exacerbates the problem, 
sovereignty functions as a kind of linguistic “quilting point”; the stable signifier that 
(temporarily) holds back (epoch) signification from being engulfed in an endless regress 
of abyssal circularity. That is to say the sovereign is the guarantor against insecurity, 
chaos and madness. And so it is not some a priori reason, ‘self-evident truth’ or ‘natural’ 
law that grounds popular assent to sovereign power, but rather an affect or sentiment 
whose primary modality is the uncanny, a primal anxiety—fear of the unknown. This 
anxiety is best exploited by concretizing it within the dynamic of the friend/enemy 
distinction. And thus the thrust of his 1934 essay was to appeal to the necessity of 
sovereign right which is the only force capable and quick enough to respond to and 
forestall “grave danger” facing the state/people. Doubtless we hear the resounding echoes 
of this tactic of law in the Bush administration, as we heard it in the formative cries of 
Pakistan.  
                                                
330 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 44. 
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In his 1976 lectures Security, Territory, Population, Foucault describes Nazi 
political society as one where the general logic of biopower was absolutized together 
with the sovereign right to kill. In this “absolutely racist State, an absolutely murderous 
State, and an absolutely suicidal State”,331 we see the ‘demonic’ convergence and 
intensification of both sovereignty and governmentality. Foucault used the term 
thanatopolitical to name dark underside of the biopolitical politics of preserving and 
enhancing the life of the populous.332 What I intend to demonstrate here is how the 
convergences of this logic within the military space that is constitutive of the Pakistani 
polis, has extended itself to political Islam. 
In the wake then of securitas,333 liberalism is effete if not complicitous with the 
logic of biopolitical sovereignty. The rise of neoconservatism and the era of fabricated 
preemption and torture is certainly evidence of that. How then might this paradox be 
resolved? How might the ghost that inhabits the paradox of sovereign and haunts the 
political be exorcised? It is precisely to figure this quandary that we might turn to the 
work of Agamben, whose ‘sovereigntology’ may offer us a way to think the 
problematization of power over life with greater clarity. As Agamben reminds us “the 
paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact that the sovereign is, at the same time, outside 
and inside the juridical order.”334 Agamben’s approach to sovereignty must be understood 
across the ontological difference, for it seems to me as if his task is to disclose the onto-
theological structure of sovereign power, which brings us close to the orbit of 
                                                
331 ———, Security, Territory, Population. 
332 Mbembe uses this aspect to describe necropolitics Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," Public Culture 15, 
no. 1 (2003). 
333 In Roman mythology, Securitas was the goddess of security, especially the security of the Roman 
Empire. 
334 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, p. 25. 
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Heidegger’s conception of enframing (Gestell). Thus for Agamben any resort to 
constitutive power, even politics perhaps, will invariably be haunted by the structure of 
the ban, regardless of whether power is exercised by the multitude, altruistic capitalists, 
benign dictators or even an elected demos.335 The notion that the paradox of sovereignty 
is the common structure of all modern political life is the point where Agamben, 
Benjamin and Schmitt all converge. The primary struggle is not along the 
democratic/totalitarian (and in our case democratic/Islamist) axis, but rather is rooted in a 
question of the metaphysics that undergirds sovereignty, power and the political. The task 
is how to think beyond the metaphysics of sovereignty towards “a post-metaphysical 
ontology of the political yet to be realized”,336 a political space divested of the onto-
theological paradox of sovereignty and the structure of the ban. 
 
 
The Polemos of the Political 
 
[In] conformity with a continuing tendency in all of the Western democracies, the 
declaration of the state of exception has gradually been replaced by an 
unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as the normal 
technique of government.337 
 
As a figure of necessity, the state of exception therefore appears … as an 
“illegal” but perfectly “juridical and constitutional” measure that is realized in 
the production of new norms (or of a new juridical order).338 
 
                                                
335 The political for Agamben, is thus devoid of an ethos. It would seem that he seeks to articulate a way to 
conceive of action and work in ways that resemble Heidegger’s conception of Gelassenheit . See the 
opening chapter on critical ontology. 
336 See the superb essay William Rasch, "From the Sovereign Ban to Banning Sovereignty," in Giorgio 
Agamben: Sovereignty and Life, ed. Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2007). 




As William Rasch notes, “the figure of the sovereign makes those democratically 
inclined nervous, because democracy seeks to avoid asymmetry at all cost … replacing 
sovereignty with the rule of law, as if the rule of law had no need for the personified 
sovereign.” When personified as an individual, an institution, or a general will, 
sovereignty appears as if it precedes the law, giving the law its force. The sovereign is 
thus a kind of shadow of the law. But the law itself is not subject to the law. The law lays 
down the law and demands obedience in exchange for protection under the law. 
A common conceit of modern liberalism, which sees itself as supplanting the 
arbitrary rule of monarchy, is that a domestic “rule of law” replaces the reliance on the 
potentially erratic figure of the sovereign, or even the depredation of a populist mob 
majority (as under Nazism). The rule of law, is thus cast in opposition to the rule of men. 
But for Agamben this distinction which derives law from something called ‘natural 
rights’ is still problematic because it does not eliminate the problem of decision. Under 
Islamic legal reasoning, the inevitable question of the jurists decision is evaded in the 
same way by assuming a minimum set of transparent divine commands that simply are. It 
is here that Schmitt’s characterization “Sovereign is he who decides the exception” 
comes into play. Schmitt’s deployment of sovereignty was introduced principally as a 
mechanism to ground and legalize Hitler’s use of executive power. Schmitt’s challenge to 
liberal theory lies not so much in a kind of direct opposition to liberal thought, but as 
Rasch notes in his exposing of the liberal order ; showing that it is not natural or 
transparently rational but is itself ideological. Its power derives from its blindness to its 
own ideological ground, its own assumptions about power and what it means to be. That 
is to say liberalism is political order and not merely the outcome of rational logical 
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thought on the nature of justice, equality or ethics. Like any other political order it rests 
on a decision and not a pre-given universal norm. In this way Schmitt shows that modern 
liberalism is itself a variation of political theology. For Agamben to expose this theology 
is to expose its metaphysical ground, a ground which is paradoxical and thus 
meaningless. Law in this way is effectively seen as an expression of power rather what it 
should be an expression of justice. 
On September 16th 2001, in an interview with the late Tim Russert for NBC’s 
Meet The Press, (Vice) President “Dick” Cheney, declared: 
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We've got 
to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs 
to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using 
sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if 
we're going to be successful. That's the world these folks operate in, and 
so it's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, 
to achieve our objective. 
 
The “Dark Side” as we have come to know has effectively meant the suspension 
of habeas corpus, the Geneva Convention and the general disregard for other 
international laws regulating needless preemptive war, and the degrading disciplining and 
punishment of “prisoners of war”, including their immunity form dehumanizing 
treatment like torture and indefinite detention. It should be clear that in essence what was 
at stake in the conflict between Musharraf and the March 2007 suspension of the 
Supreme Court Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, was not only the constitutionality 
of Musharraf’s Presidency, but also the issue of the disappearance of dozens of “terror” 
suspects, and their right to habeas corpus. In invoking the “Dark Side” then Cheney gives 
us what is perhaps the most opaque glimpse of the biopolitical sovereign underbelly of 
neoliberal governmentality. And fearful “liberal” citizens have by and large willfully 
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tolerated not only the torture and humiliation of the other, but have also permitted a scale 
of surveillance and constraining of basic rights in order to secure the homeland and 
victory in the war against deterritorialized, dangerous and evil Muslims everywhere. But 
what is distinctive here is not the deployment of a sovereign modality of power abroad, or 
the use of torture per say, for surely this has been a routine fixture of overt and secret US 
foreign policing. What is perhaps most disturbing is the attempt to normalize this dark 
side, to re-produce it in actuality, and fold it within the procedure of the law, thereby 
collapsing the distinction between sovereign violence and the law once and for all. The 
Bush administrations relentless will to torture and its drive to exert the power of death 
(legitimate killing) over its targets, is the decisive signals of this folding of sovereign 
power within normalizing modalities of neoliberal governmentality. The ideological 
name and manifestation of this tendency, driven by a metaphysics of Islam hating, is 
neoconservatism.  
Bülent Diken’s “Comedy of T(errors)” sums up the logic of securitas animating 
the decisionism of Musharraf and neoconservatism alike: 
In the twenty first century state terror is called politics of security, which 
justifies itself with reference to and thus mirrors terror. Thus it can curb 
citizenship rights to save democracy, kill people to protect them from 
despots, and legalize torture to preserve human dignity. 
 
He then quotes from the guru of the sovereign paradox: “The thought of security 
bears within it an essential risk. A state which has security as its sole task and source of 
legitimacy, is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to become itself 
terroristic.”339 But then, echoing Zizek and Baudrillard,340 Diken suggests that it is the 
                                                
339 Agamben quoted in Diken, Bulent “Comedy of T(errors)” 
340 Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism, p. 81. 
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obsession with security, living in permanent fear, that is the real victory of terrorism. On 
this reading the catastrophe then is the trans-political era that terrorism has inaugurated; 
the disappearance of politics, its becoming ob-scene; the idea that power takes place off 
stage. What I will be arguing for is perhaps not so much against this position, but a 
parallel divergence, a different emphasis and a possible reversal. It is not so much a 
question then of obsession, which would place the locus of diagnosis within an aberration 
of the subject (his interpretive or rational framework). Nor is it a question of “terrorist 
objectives”. It is not then a question of our —the ailing liberal subject—obsession with 
security, but rather its inverse; the obsession and grip of security on the subject. It is 
security itself that has a hold on the liberal and the terrorist alike. Both the civilized 
(West) and the barbarian (Muslim) are captured on the stage of the political, forced to 
march lockstep to the tune of security. The war on terror is in this sense a performance of 
security. The abyssal dance of death that we are witnessing in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
that we may yet witness in Iran and Pakistan, is not the disappearance of politics, its 
obscene nature, but the final shadowy maneuvers of the political coming out to perform 
and dominate every scene/seen/screen. This is to say that we do not need more 
constituent power in the hands of the multitude ala Negri, but rather something altogether 
different if not impossible. 
It is in light of the “Dark Side” then that we can situate Musharraf’s closing 
remarks within what I am striving to call the metacolonial; the matrixial space that will 
be vital for understanding the ‘ulama and political Islam itself. And so as his language 
tellingly shifts from Urdu to English—in a section that must have been drafted by anyone 
of the now numerous modern American incarnations of Tomás de Torquemada — John 
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Woo, David Addington, Alan Dershowitz — Musharraf directly invokes the tropes of 
“law-fare” discourse in the United States. He quotes directly from Abraham Lincoln’s 
speech that justified the first sovereign suspension of the ancient biopolitical right of 
habeas corpus341 during the civil war. Only now the echoes of the genuine lament and 
apology that we may have heard in Lincoln are gone, replaced instead by a series of false 
“twice shy” tears. And so in this obscene yet illuminating substitution, the voice of a 
modern day Pakistani military “usurper” and the voice of an elected 19th century Civil 
War American President, come to equivalence in the state of exception that has now 
indeed become the rule everywhere. Buttressed then with the juridico-historical 
justifications for an exemplary practice of exceptionalism, Musharraf effectively blurs the 
distinction between himself (the military) and Pakistan, between his voice and the voice 
of law, between the violence of law and the law of violence. It is thus not only at radio 
frequencies that the Voice of America and the Voice of Pakistan converge, but also on a 
series of other broad-band metaphysical wavelengths. It is my contention that we need to 
destructure more carefully such biopolitical wavelengths. And the prime frequency at 
which both “Terror” and the “War on Terror” broadcast globally is the frequency of 
violence. It is in the resonance of these indistinctions that we can hear more clearly in the 
sound of the metacolonial. 
To be fair, of course it was not always, nor originarily the military that have 
contributed to the normalization of the rule of exception. Readers of Pakistan’s leading 
English Language Daily, Dawn, are by now familiar with frequent accounts of the 
savaging of the constitution, in its relation to the saga of the 8th amendment. What 
                                                
341 “The first recording of bare life as the new political subject is already implicit in the document that is 
generally placed at the foundation of modern democracy: the 1679 writ of habeas corpus” (Agamben, 
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.) 
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characterizes the real tragedy and danger however is the now vastly apparent indistinction 
between this state of emergency— rule by military dictat—and the subsequent 
democratic transitions. This is perhaps what Agamben had in mind when he writes of the 
“inner solidarity between democracy and totalitarianism.” Many well off liberals and the 
mainstay of the bourgeoisie elite, a tiny percentage of the populace to be sure, seemed to 
welcome the postmodern coup. The old colonial refrain, that Indians do not deserve or 
are not capable of assuming democracy, echoed from virtually every corner of 
established privilege in Pakistan (and was echoed in conversation after conversation with 
many members of the Pakistani diaspora in the US as well). Under the newly elected 
regime/dynasty of Feb 18th 2008, the Chief Justice remains suspended and the Media, 
whose few years of unprecedented openness under and in spite (not because) of 
Musharraf, ironically, remain muted. The corrupt and ineffective interludes of democracy 
that routinely punctuate the otherwise formal constant of military rule, now seem to be 
indistinct not only with the polis but also the economy, as the military apparatus 
penetrates ever mode deeply into the economic fabric of the nation.342 Breaking free of 
this cycle of indistinction between democracy and martial law, requires at minimum a 
somber reflection on the place and function, if not refusal, of sovereignty itself. 
 
The Space of War 
In a most general sense the term ‘Islam’ is of course as general (or perhaps 
vacuous) as the term ‘humanity’ or the ‘west’, and functions more like a political 
metanarrative or polemical quilting point. But it is important to keep in mind that the 
invocation of the idea of Islam the ummah, is almost always a way to designate a mass, a 
                                                
342 See Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy. 
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population, and hence an object of knowledge regulation, and policing. In this sense 
ummah discourses are doubly biopolitical, in that they are not merely a feature of a range 
of Muslim political imaginaries, but rather constitute a modality that is useful to the logic 
of security that drives the proliferating indistinctions of the wars of/on terror. 
Transnational discourse on the ummah are perhaps, in this sense, more vital to the 
political economy of liberal regimes, whose pervasive logic of security and martial 
capacities for war thrive on the affective deployment of Islam as a vital threat. The 
American project for the imposition of liberal peace across the “Muslim World” is 
defunct without expert discourses on (political/radical) Islam as the engine of a counter-
modernity, a unified homogenous plot, whose profuse resentments threaten “Western 
civilization” and its “way of life”. The idea of a unified ummah is thus central to the 
metaphysics of both Islam hating (e.g. neoconservatives) and Islam loving (jihadists). In 
our rapidly globalizing era then, the third biopolitical triad between ‘Security’, and 
‘Population’ is ‘Terror’ rather than ‘Territory’. The ummah, as Islamapolis, may then be 
seen as an extension of the carceral polis, replete with an imaginary geopolitics, that 
seeks to exercise yet again the power of normalization (Islamization). What presides over 
these sovereign mechanisms “is not the unitary functioning of an apparatus or an 
institution, but the necessity of combat and the rules of strategy. … In this central and 
centralized humanity [ummah], the effect and instrument of complex power relations, 
bodies and forces subjected by multiple mechanisms of ‘incarceration’, objects for 
discourses that are in themselves elements for this strategy, we must hear the distant roar 
of battle.”343  
                                                
343 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, p. 308. 
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For Foucault war was the central problem of modernity. “What I would like to 
study would be the problem of war and the institution of war in what one could call the 
military dimension of [modern] society. … How, when and why was it noticed or 
imagined that what is going on beneath and in power relations is a war? … Until now, or 
for roughly the last five years, it has been disciplines; for the next five years, it will be 
war, struggle, the army.’344In parallel, our concern here is with War (War on Terror, 
jihad), Struggle (jihad, ethos), and the Army (Pakistani Military). Foucault’s idea of war 
can certainly be related to Schmidt’s friend/enemy distinction and agonistic theories of 
the political (ala Chantal Mouffe). Its more significant origins lie however in my opinion 
in Heidegger’s conception of polemos.345 As Julian Ried notes with regard to the 
emergence of the disciplines, “Foucault insisted that the tactical models of military 
organization were of utmost importance to understand how war invests the order of 
power.”346 In Discipline and Punish war and the military sciences, and not the prison, are 
designated as the originary impetus behind the disciplining of individual bodies and the 
eventual transitions to carceral societies. As he extended his analysis of power from 
disciplinary to biopolitical regimes and modern governmentality, the problematic of war 
and power only intensified. The History of Sexuality elaborates further on the 
fundamental imbrication of liberal regimes, predicated on the production of ‘peace’, with 
war and biopower. In conjunction with Agamben then we can say that under modernity 
                                                
344 ———, Society Must Be Defended. 
345 Julian Reid, "Life Struggles: War, Discipline, and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault," 
Social Text 24, no. 1_86 (2006). Auseinandersetzung, meaning war, confrontation, logos or Kampf, 
struggle. In later Heidegger polemos emerges as an ontological concept that describes the chiasmatic 
relationality of Being and Dasein, the crossing of the ontological difference. 
346 Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity and the Defence of 
Logistical Societies, p. 31. 
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the camp and the polis merge. The Taliban are in an essential way a merger — a 
daemonic combination to use Foucault’s terms —of the camp and the polis. 
Its more significant origins lie however in my opinion in Heidegger’s conception 
of polemos (Auseinandersetzung, meaning war, confrontation, logos or Kampf, struggle. 
In later Heidegger polemos emerges as an ontological concept that describes the 
chiasmatic relationality of Being and Dasein). Effectively then we may say that the 
Army, the ‘ulama and America are engaged in a war against the demos, the people, who 
in constituting a multitude could potentially take up the sovereign task — of resolving 
sovereignty. The possibility of assuming the responsibility of sovereignty and holding 
power to accountability and response-ability is thus kept at bay by the AAA. It is not only 
in political theory then, as Foucault suggests, that it remains to cut off the Kings head.  
In State of Exception, his sequel to Homo Sacer, Agamben extends the analysis of 
the conscription of life in the a-polis to include the domain of law, so as to disclose the 
indistinction between the political and the juridical, between law and the living being.347 
With devastating insight into the juridical excess of the neoconservative “war on terror”, 
for whom the actual and always threatened suspension of law had become a measure of 
global dominance (a consequence itself perhaps of decaying economic sovereignty under 
conditions of Empire), Agamben argues that the state of exception, which was meant to 
be a provisional measure adopted by states under conditions of emergency, has in the 
course of the twentieth century, become “the dominant paradigm of government in 
contemporary politics.”348 Certainly Pakistan’s perpetual state of martial law and the 
                                                
347 Effectively, State of Exception which theorizes the state of exception in its historico-political and 
juridico philosophical context, can be read as a historical ontology of the exception. 
348 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 11. 
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ongoing violence of military/jihadism, can be usefully comprehended through his meta-
analysis. 
The space of the modern polis is in this way understood by Agamben as 
coincident with the topology of the camp, whose “dislocating localization is the hidden 
matrix of the politics in which we are still living.” The camp can therefore be understood 
as a radicalization of Foucaultian biopolitics, in that it signals a disjuncture between the 
relationship of birth (bare life) and the order of the nation-state. This means that the camp 
is almost post-biopolitical, in that it marks the emergence of an instability in the structure 
of the old nomos; in the mechanism of the regulation of the relationship between 
territory, birth, order. Foucault of course hinted at the possibility of this daemonic and 
lethal mix between biopower and sovereignty, whereby the state becomes an “absolutely 
murderous state.” Something of this lethal machinery has now embedded itself within 







The Space of Law: ‘Ulama, Shari‘a and Enforcement 
 
 
All societies and all cultures today (it does not matter whether they are 
democratic or totalitarian, conservative or progressive) have entered into a 
legitimation crisis in which law (we mean by this term the entire text of tradition 
in its regulative form, whether the Jewish Torah or the Islamic Shari‘a, Christian 
dogma or the profane nomos) is in force as the pure “Nothing of Revelation.” But 
this is precisely the structure of the sovereign relation, and the nihilism in which 
we are living is, from this perspective, nothing other than the coming to light of 
this relation as such.349 
 
 
Enframing Islam in Pakistan 
 
Deoband Legend 
Legend has it, and it is disputed legend I might add, that, the town of Deoband got 
its name from the intrepid accomplishments of a local Maulana who had been called into 
action as pre-modern ghost buster. A family of devilish djinns, or (deo), had been 
plaguing the town, and the story has it that our ‘alim ghost buster after a protracted 
exorcism was able to bung up (bund) these devilish genies into bottles. Hence the name 
Deo-band. It is even unclear if the arrival of the deo coincided with the arrival of the 
Faranghi.350 It is of course unlikely that this gene-ology would stand the test of historical 
verification. However the legend contains a hauntological irony. For what we do know is 
                                                
349 ———, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, p. 16. 
350 That is to say the arrival of white man and his burden of disenchanted modernity 
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that it was a jinn of a very different sort—a maulana of English Constitutional Law, 
Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, known to posterity as the Quaid-e-Azam, the Father351 of the 
Pakistani nation—who unwittingly perhaps paved the way for the unleashing of those 
ghouls that had remained bunged up for well over a century. Today these ghouls are 
eminently recognizable in the form of the Taliban; the power of the post-colonial 
Deoband having reached its apogee with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Taliban’s 
subsequently fateful alliance with al-Qaeda. Thus, from its very inception political Islam 
has been bound up with the politics of secularism in an inseparable and macabre tango 
with the biopolitical. Repeated efforts to pry the two apart have led not only to endless 
debates regarding the ‘true’ weltanschauung of Pakistan, its raison d’être (debates which 
are now ritually played out in the pages of every newspaper on August 14th) but also 
deadly conflicts.  
This genealogical study has sought to locate our understanding of political Islam 
in terms of the metacolonial, a device which at minimum seeks to evade the false binary 
between culture/religion and the political.352 If Pakistan today suffers from a personality 
disorder — a biopolitical sovereign anxiety that threatens to tear it further apart — then 
we must seek to understand the spirit of the malaise rather than describe the symptoms in 
all of its depressing detail. One aspect of this trajectory involves understanding how the 
complex processes of modernity and globalization have transformed the very episteme of 
‘ilm that the ‘ulama draw upon. For Foucault, the episteme as we have discussed, is 
linked to an art or technē, which in turn signals a field of knowledge/power. By paying 
                                                
351 See note on the “Father of the nation” and the Duce in Chapter VI. 
352 Talal Asad’s work on the anthropology of secularism has been influential here. See Asad, Genealogies 
of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, ———, Formations of the 
Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. 
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attention then to the way in which the filed of power, the discursive regime, has 
transformed we can gain a better insight into the meaning of ‘ulama praxis. This praxis 
does not simply reflect or for that matter distort something called tradition or Islam, but 
rather it reflects the dominant apparatus or dispositif in which discourse and practice are 
situated. Therefore at minimum a genealogical account begins by undermining the 
autonomous and privileged category of an unproblematized and monolithic “Islam” from 
the center stage of analysis, enabling us to think about Islam and Muslim society in full 
view of its own historicity;353 in view of its complex entanglements with the space of the 
modern in which they are always already situated. 
 
Before we continue to probe the nature of the Deoband ‘ulama and the space of 
the political in Pakistan it is important to make a few preliminary clarifications. The term 
‘ulama refers in its most general sense to a man of learning, or to one who possesses ‘ilm 
(knowledge354). As such a more important question would be to enquire about the ways 
in which what contemporary Muslims understand by ‘ilm may have already undergone a 
transformation, and if so in what way. Secondly while the singular of ‘ulama, ‘alim can 
                                                
353 For an overview of the impact of the JI on the organization and structure of other traditional parties see 
Vali Reza Nasr, “Organization and Islamic Political Parties” in Charles H. Kennedy, ed., Pakistan: 1995-
96, American Institute of Pakistan Studies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). 
354 In Arabic ‘ilm has connotations of light and illumination and suggests an experience rather than 
‘information’. While the Sufi/Mullah, zahir/batin dichotomy is a historical oversimplification, in a general 
way we could argue that a Sufi sensibility leaves open the possibility for an understanding of ‘ilm as an 
experience of language (absence), whereas the ‘ulama tend to be concerned with the literal and visible 
aspects (presence) of knowledge. See William C. Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn 
Al-'Arabi's Cosmology, Suny Series in Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), and 
Julian Baldick, Mystical Islam, vol. 8, Nyu Studies in near Eastern Culture (New York: New York 
University Press, 1989).The English word knowledge is flat and homogenous, and is embedded with the 
dominant assumptions about what constitutes truth in the Western tradition. Thus any genuinely serious 
inquiry into the ‘ulama and ‘ilm would require itself to take up the question of the will to truth in its 
relationship to the will to power. After Heidegger, no better guide for this critical investigation is to be 
found than Michel Foucault. I believe it is the single most dominant cause for the impoverishment of social 
science investigations that in the wake of postmodernism, they have given up being concerned with the 
question of truth leaving it to the domain of philosophers. 
 
 161 
refer to any kid of learned man or scholar, the word ‘ulama today refers to a class of 
religious scholars. Thus a great Pakistani historian or physicist could be introduced as an 
‘alim, but she would not be counted among the ‘ulama. Nor would a group of professors 
at a modern Muslim university be referred to as ‘ulama. The emergence of the ‘ulama as 
designating a class, or group, of religious scholars, is distinct in modern period355. By 
contrast an organized group of Sufi authorities are usually referred to mashaikh rather 
than ‘ulama.356 In addition to this there are different kinds of ‘ulama, each reflecting the 
orientation or style of the various sectarian groups that have emerged in 19th century 
India. That the primary fault line between the Sunni ulama do not overlap necessarily 
with the originary distinction between the four legal schools (madhhab) of Islam, but 
rather with sectarian identity, is itself in part a reflection of a biopolitical transformation 
of the Muslim life-world. 
In this dissertation then I am concerned with examining the “Deobandi” sectarian 
and doctrinal orientation. The Deoband’s see themselves as a self-consciously reformist 
ideology, defining themselves in opposition to more “popular” syncretic styles of Muslim 
belief and practice on the one hand and to “modernists” on the other. The key point 
however is that neither ‘popular’ nor ‘modern’ scholastic authority is recognized as 
legitimate by the Deoband because it does not emerge from within their particular 
disciplinary/institutional setting. Within contemporary South Asian Islamic formations 
then the “Deobandis” distinguish themselves not only from the Shi‘a but also from other 
                                                
355 Metcalf, "Traditionalist'  Islamic Activism Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs.". This fact itself may reveal 
something about the very modernity of the ‘ulama, their constitution as religious within a modern episteme 
which makes a distinction between religion and the secular. The ‘alim ‘ulama disjunction reflects the 
coding of the modern at a very fundamental level.. 
356 The word Maulana (master), which today has come to take on derisive connotations, used to refer to 
both master in the Sufi world, and to a learned scholar of the orthodoxy. 
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Sunni rivals such as the “Barelwis”357 and the Ahl-i Hadith,358 both of which also 
emerged in India in the second half of the nineteenth century.359 Needless to say each of 
these groups contest the other groups sources and performances of religious authority and 
power. With the exception of a general reverence for the Qur’an and the Prophet, each of 
these groups rarely see eye to eye on matters of religion, culture and politics, except 
when it comes to their loathing and contempt for the Ahmadi, another 19th century Indian 
phenomenon. Ahmadi’s are Muslims who regard Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908) as a 
“prophet” after Muhammad. I will consider this case of the exception at great length in 
this and subsequent chapters, since it reveals the nature of Deobandi sovereign power in 
the most paradigmatic of ways. The Ahmadi as I will show have become the bare 
excluded life through which ‘ulama power and authority manifests itself. IN this way the 
Ahmadi are the cipher for understanding ulama sovereignty. Overall however, the 
distinctions then between traditionalist (Deoband), modernist (Aligarh, Iqbal, Pervez), 
popular (Barelwi) and Islamist (Mawdudi) forms of Islamic practice are imprecise and 
analytically unviable, and if I invoke them here it is only in a general kind of way. If my 
contention, in its most elementary expression, is that power rather than ideology accounts 
                                                
357 The Barelwis revere the authority not just of the Prophet but also of Sufi saints, whom they regard as 
sources of spiritual guidance. For a comprehensive account of the Barelwi movement see Usha Sanyal, 
Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmed Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920 
(Delhi & New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Deobandi groups generally oppose Barelwi forms of 
intercessionsist and shrine based religious devotion. Though Deobandi’s do not oppose all forms of Sufism, 
their commitment to Sufi traditions has given ay over time to more puritan and Wahabbi influences. 
358 The Ahl-i Hadith (“people of the hadith”) are broadly speaking more literalist and simultaneously 
antinomian. They insist on the exclusive legitimacy of the Qur’an and hadith, and assume that they can 
have pure unmediated access to these texts. Effectively this means a rejection of the authority of the 
classical schools of law and hadith commentary. 
359 For a brief survey of the rival Sunni groups, including the Nadwat al-‘ulama which has significant 
overlaps and similarities with the Deoband, see Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-
1900, Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan: 1857-1964, and Usha Sanyal, Ahmad Riza Khan, 
Makers of the Muslim World (Oneworld Publications, 2005), p. 28 - 49. 
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for the political practices of the ‘ulama, then doctrinal differences are only the symbolic 
shadows through which actual contestations play themselves out.  
It follows then that any attempt to locate authentic, traditional or modernist 
“Islam” in Pakistan is deeply problematic. I extend here then the calls by a number of 
contemporary critics for the dissolution of Islam as a category in the understanding of 
politics, history and society, suggesting instead that we speak of “Islams” rather than any 
singular essentialized phenomenon.360 
 
Multiplicities of the Deoband 
Viewing the Deoband as a sub-set within a sub-set of Islamic multiplicities, I had 
hoped that my project would help undermine, yet again, the privileged category of an 
unproblematized and monolithic “Islam” from the center stage of analysis. But the 
substitution of the more simpler, temporally and archeologically bounded Deoband for 
Islam was proving to be equally problematic.361 In part, this is because the originary 
mantle of the Deoband is itself contested, with the various institutions of the ‘ulama 
having fractured and split numerous times around fundamental political principles. 
During the course of my interviews with contemporary ‘ulama, I also detected a 
heightened awareness of the multiple structural forms which the Deoband must create in 
order to survive in the modern age. The current editor of Al-Farooq, a Deoband madrasa 
affiliated journal, exemplified this with an aptly consumerist ice-cream metaphor: “We 
offer Islam in a variety of flavors, some people like the chiko, others vanilla, while some 
just hate mango.” These Deoband “flavors”, are to be found in its three primary 
                                                
360 al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities. 
361 This is also why a combined ethnographic and historical approach is essential since while historians may 
concentrate on texts, individual subjects don’t stand in a unilateral or determined relationship to those texts. 
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modalities: Educational (dini madaris: games of truth in the production of knowledge); 
Political (JUI, sectarian and jihadist outfits: technologies of government in the use and 
exercise of power); and Missionary/Spiritual (daw‘a, tabligh: techniques of the 
government of self and others). Each of these modalities are intertwined and cannot be 
neatly distinguished from the other. Needless to say a range of political and social 
sensibilities pervade the ‘ulama. Though here I am concerned with the more violent 
affects of the Deoband, affects which are invariably linked to the violence of the political 
itself, there are many Deobandi orientations that explicitly reject forms of violent 
coercion (this of course does not imply that they are apolitical). In short not every 
Deobandi ‘alim or Talib is a militant jihadi. 
As I will examine below, the Deoband’s political activity is not limited to the 
activities of its formal political party the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam (Society of Islamic 
‘Ulama’ or JUI). The official political wings of the Deoband have themselves fractured 
numerous times around disagreements on fundamental political philosophy. The primary 
split occurring of course just prior to the 1947 partition, between Husain Ahmad Madani 
and Shabbir Ahmed ‘Usmani, over the question of Muslim nationalism. Since 1947 the 
JUI has continued to divide into factional and militant sectarian offshoots. With regard to 
the dini madaris, there are an estimated 4000 Deoband schools, but only half are actually 
registered and under the curriculum control of the central Wafaq al-Madaris in Multan. 
Thus even as an educational project the Deoband is subject to potentially multiple 
mutations. Also the Deoband’s daw‘a wing is fused with the activities of the larger global 
and ostensibly non-political Tabligh-i Jama‘at movement. And to complicate matters 
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further, many ‘ulama have deep links with the main Sufi silsilas within Pakistan.362 
Furthermore people connected with the Deoband do not often refer to themselves as 
Deobandi, having only resigned to this label as a means of differentiating their maslak, or 
style of Islam, from other Sunni groups like the Barelwi, Ahl-i Hadith, Parvezis, 
Jama‘atis (Islamists) etc.  
Thus many of the ‘ulama themselves problematized my endeavor of studying “the 
Deoband”. “The Deoband” I was politely reminded, was simply the name of the town in 
U.P. India where a seminary was originally instituted to “preserve and protect Islam.” 
More emphatically they refer to themselves not as Deobandi, but Muslims and followers 
of the Hanafi fiqh, thereby suggesting their conscious link with a historically authentic 
originary community and ideal. Complications in the task of delineating the boundaries 
of the Deoband are further compounded by the fact that Deoband is not a tightly 
centralized or homogenous institution, with the link between these three modalities 
remaining dynamic and fluid. Moreover as the dissertation will endeavor to demonstrate, 
the ‘ulama have remained remarkably adaptive and responsive to historically shifting 
forms of power and the broader social transformations that have accompanied modernity. 
By viewing Deoband political practice as rooted within historically variable relations of 
power and the contingencies of Pakistan’s fractured politics, rather than in any 
theologically grounded transcendent principles, we may account for such divergences in 
actual praxis.  
Given this multiplicity then, one of the questions that I had been particularly 
interested in was understanding the ways in which the Deoband has given birth and 
                                                
362 For instance, Maulana Musharraf ‘Ali Thanawi, the current mohtamim (rector) of Lahore’s Jami‘a-
Islamiyyah, has taken bait (oath) with a Naqshbandi, Chisti and Qadri shaikh, three of the most prominent 
Sufi orders in South Asia. 
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simultaneous patronage to “non-political,” non-violent groups, like the Tablighi Jama‘at 
on the one hand, and more militant groups like the Taliban363 and the virulently anti-Shi‘a 
Sipah-i Sahaba (SSP) on the other. How can a history of the present account for a 
multitude of new militant sectarian formations like the SSP, or the Lashkar-i Tayeba, 
both offshoots of the JUI, whose propensity to use violence to achieve their political ends 
is matched only by the Pakistani state itself. The enthusiastic support (both logistical and 
theological) for the 1994 jihad in Afghanistan, a precursor perhaps of the jihad to come in 
Pakistan, could, on the one hand, be viewed as a departure from the historically tacit 
willingness of the Deoband to work for “Islamization” and Islamic reform from within a 
democratic dispensation. On the other, it could be seen as a return to the original project 
that began not with the foundation of the Dar-ul ‘Ulum in 1866, but 10 years earlier at 
Shamli during the anti-colonial uprisings of 1857.  
Initially part of my labor was to understand the ways in which “sources” within a 
long established Islamic tradition can be interpreted to justify the political program of 
Taliban style Islamic authoritarianism, and simultaneously the “pacifist” (or passive 
aggressive) agenda of daw‘a movements like the Tabligh. The political manifesto of the 
JUI, does not call for the direct capture of state power by the ‘ulama. However their 
recent backing for an extension of Allah’s (read Taliban) sovereignty to Pakistan would 
suggest, at the very least, a monumental shift! I discovered however that the interpretive 
comportment364 towards foundational texts (the Qur’an, Hadith, etc.) and the resultant 
                                                
363 In March 2000, on the eve of their “150 years of Deoband” celebrations, the JUI, published a special 
issue in several Urdu dailies. In this issue, was a special message from Mulla Muhammad Omar under the 
title, “Amir al-Momineen,” suggesting the acceptance of his spiritual-political authority. See Chapter VI for 
an analysis of the Deoband Conference. 
364 The term comportment is deliberately being employed in the Bourdeuian sense, since the Deoband 
maslak requires a regimen of bodily gestures, rituals of bodily purification, tonal specificity, markers of 
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vectors of political and social action embodied in the articulation of the shari‘a, are a 
function not of the truth of the texts, but of the complex ways through which 
subjectivities are themselves constituted; i.e. politically, historically and economically. 
That is to say political practice does not resort first to a rethinking of texts, but rather is 
animated by the field of biopolitical affect and sovereign power relationships that pervade 
the political space in which the ‘ulama operate. 
 
The Theology of the Political  
Pakistan —“homeland” for a select few of the Muslims of British India — has 
from its very inception, stood in an inseparable and yet paradoxical relationship with 
Islam, and this master signifier still remains the cite of intense and often violent 
contestations which continue to forge the parameters of state legitimacy and the 
nationalist imagination.365 And whereas issues around the nature of an Islamic state are 
hotly contested within a variety of local oppositional Islamic discourses, even within 
Deobandi discourse366 there has been significant divergence over key issues. In fact the 
glaring extent to which political praxis is often entirely unfettered to the ideological, not 
only contributes to the deconstruction of Islamist discourse itself, but goes a long way 
towards debunking the kind of essentialist stereotyping which fan such Orientalist 
fantasies as the ‘clash of civilizations’. Thus a case can be made that a political economy 
and a political theology in the Schmittian sense, rather than a political ideology, govern 
                                                
adab, etc before approaching these sacred texts. One cannot for instance recite/read the Qur’an while 
walking, or without prior niyyat or wadu. 
365 See Shaikh for an excellent account of the way in which this inability to resolve the relationship between 
Islam and nationalism is in part the source for the countries woes. Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan. 
366 It should be noted further that neither the particular style of the Deoband nor its current curriculum and 
approach to Islam, exhaust the actual and potential possibilities of Islamic knowledges and practices. 
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Deoband political praxis at any given moment. This stands in marked contrast to 
Metcalf’s analysis in her recent attempt to account for the embarrassing discovery of 
violent politics in the largely “apolitical” and inward pietistic and scholarly tradition of 
the Deoband movement.367 Echoing the analysis of her earlier work, Metcalf continues to 
regard the Deoband as predominantly expressing a certain “interiorization” of Islam. The 
Deoband ‘ulama she writes “fostered a kind of turning away from issues of the 
organization of state and society, toward a concern with the moral qualities of individual 
Muslims.”368 If earlier scholars like Metcalf have suggested that the ‘ulama turned away 
from issues of state and society during the colonial period and shifted their focus to 
personal moral qualities, Zaman’s The Ulama in Contemporary Islam by contrast, shows 
how such interpretation “have deflected attention away from the growth of radical 
sectarianism that has characterized Pakistani religious life in the last three decades.”369 
Such argument Zaman claims “do not provide an adequate frame of reference in which to 
understand the public and political dimension of the activities of Deobandi ‘ulama in the 
twentieth century.”370 To account for such Deobandi phenomenon as the Taliban, Metcalf 
makes the surprising claim that because the Deoband is essentially a private movement of 
interiorization and moral reflection, the Deoband must be politically hollow, and can thus 
take the shape of whatever political container it is embedded in.371 If anything the Taliban 
                                                
367 Metcalf, "Traditionalist'  Islamic Activism Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs." 
368 Barbara D. Metcalf, ed., Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place of Adab in South Asian Islam 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 
369 Zaman, The 'Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. 
370 Ibid., p. 
371 Typical of such assertions: “What is perhaps most striking about the Deoband-type movements is the 
extent to which politics is an empty ‘box’, filled expediently and pragmatically depending on what seems to 
work best in any given situation.” And also “None of the Deobandi movements has a theoretical stance in 
relation to political life. They either expediently embrace the political culture of their time and place, or 
withdraw from politics completely”.Metcalf, "Traditionalist'  Islamic Activism Deoband, Tablighis, and 
Talibs." On the one hand the “expediency” and “empty box” theory does not account for the often resolute 
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phenomenon and its dramatic evolution and resurgence since 2006 reveal anything but a 
hollow political resolve.372 The focus on the Deoband as an essentially private apolitical 
movement of moral reform “hardly prepares one for the radical sectarianism in Pakistan 
in the last quarter of the twentieth century—a development in which the Deobandi 
‘Ulama have been central players.”373 A similar critique is offered by Saba Mahmood, 
who expressly makes the Foucaultian connection between piety and politics; an extension 
of the feminist slogan the personal is political, and the entire culture/power series of 
scholarship. In her political ethnography of the Egyptian piety movement, Mahmood 
notes for instance how the activities of such groups seldom engage those institutions and 
practices that are commonly associated with the realm of politics, and the state (elections, 
judiciary, etc). As a result it is easy to ignore the political character of these movement 
whose activities tend to fall off the “political radar” of the analyst. Referring to both 
Metcalf and Olivier Roy, Mahmood writes that “it is quite common for scholars to 
consider movements of this kind—movements that focus on issues of moral reform— 
apolitical in character. This characterization is a gross political and analytical mistake, 
however, because the transformative power of movements such as these is immense and, 
in many cases, exceeds that of conventional political groups.”374  
In substantial agreement with Mahmood and Zaman then I would argue that the 
analytical and conceptual labor of contemporary scholars needs to better grasp the 
                                                
until death stance of the Taliban and other Deobandi clerics, and on the other it again betrays a simple 
public/private, ethics/politics, social/political binarism. 
372 However embedded in this insight is perhaps some conception of the role of political space in the 
formation of subjects. However Metcalf does not interrogate the political. 
373 Zaman, The 'Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. 
374 Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. 
 
 170 
relationship between the ethical and the political.375 Metcalf was of course writing for a 
generation whose problematic was still rooted in the much needed critique Orientalism. 
However even when she considers politics in contemporary Pakistan in the wake of the 
rise of the Taliban, she continues to miss the opportunity to see how fundamentally 
political Deoband praxis is. For instance in her two essays on Pakistan, Metcalf talks 
about the role of the Jama‘at-i Islami in their attempts to Islamize the constitution, but 
fails to mention the lead role played by the Pakistani Deoband establishment. Nor does 
she consider the extensive role that the Deoband ulama has played in the persecution of 
Ahmadi’s in Pakistan. “Although concerned with the inculcation of individual moral 
virtues, members of the Jama‘at, in contrast to many of the ‘ulama, also insist on the 
transformation of the social order by political means.”  
 
Crisis of Authority: ‘Ulama as Subalterns 
Any serious account of ‘ulama violence today must situate the ‘ulama within the 
context not only of an emerging biopolitics but also within the crisis of ‘ulama authority 
and influence. Through their educational projects (madaris), and several vast publishing 
arms affiliated with the major Deoband schools, and of course through a mass army of 
affiliated daw‘a warriors (Tabligh-i Jama‘at), the Deoband had remained by and large, 
committed to democratic modes of intervention and influence in the public sphere. But by 
1980 what was still lacking was a form of “authority” that could translate into real 
“political power,” without which the goal of disciplining mass society would remain 
                                                
375 Not to do so would mean to insist on understanding Christian evangelical campaigns against abortion 
and gay rights, as non-political, or as expressions of an inward pietistic moral sensibility. For Foucault of 




elusive. For large segments of Pakistani society and the elite class in particular, the ‘ulama 
were still considered to be backwards and irrelevant. Written out of the nationalist 
narrative due to the opposition to Pakistan by the dominant Madani faction of the JUH, 
public derision and ridicule of the ‘ulama was not uncommon, a fact that is not lost upon 
the ‘ulama themselves.376 In conversations with Maulana Ibn Naqshibandi377 he recounted 
dozens of popular derisive adages, the most endearing of which was “koch logun ke liya 
to hum abhi tak gaun ke kuthey se bhe bhuttur hain”378 Tales, and rumors, regarding the 
predatory homosexual exploits of the mullah, and the young boys under his care are 
commonplace. Liberal intellectuals in Pakistan predisposed to loath the ‘ulama, routinely 
dismiss them as jahil (ignorant). 
The ‘ulama then are burdened with this double sense of irony; that within the very 
boundaries of a nation state that was created ostensibly in the name of Islam, those 
entrusted with its "preservation," those trained to speak in its name, and those conversant 
in the language of the sacred revelation, remain a mere subaltern, economically 
disempowered and at times despised class. In no small measure must this stark irony have 
contributed to a degree of social schizophrenia. The rise of a new form of sovereign and 
biopolitical governmentality among the ‘ulama, then is a development which itself must 
be understood within the context of the historical decline of the role and uses of the 
‘ulama under colonial and postcolonial modernity. Understanding the ‘ulama’s 
paradoxical relationship to the modern post-colonial nation state, is hence key to showing 
up a variety of political tactics, like the deployment of blasphemy as a political weapon, 
                                                
376 The biographies of Ludhianawi and Mufti Mahmood, for instance, a replete with incidents of social 
disregard and lamentations of declining public authority. 
377 At Jami‘a Faruqiyya, November 2000. 
378 For some people we are still worse than the stray village dogs. 
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as something other than an antediluvian eruption of medieval Islamic religiosity into the 
well ordered teleological space of the modern. Rather than seeing Deoband political 
practice as a form of politics outside of time, as counter modern, I argue that religio-
political groups like the Deoband cannot be understood outside the concrete 
manifestations of modern governmentality. By a mixture of both design and contingency, 
the ‘ulama have effectively negotiated the various spaces and networks of power to 
invigorate and empower their movements and institutions, thereby marking out a form of 
political, cultural and economic influence for a subaltern constituency whose cultural and 
political valency were otherwise dissolving under the weight of a modernizing 
postcolonial state. But it is not merely on the register of an economy of power that I seek 
to advance my claims. What I am suggesting, perhaps more significantly, is that the 
Deoband, in their becoming political, do not in fact contest the rudimentary cartography 
of political modernity (i.e. the idea of sovereignty, nation, state, government, population, 
society, citizen, technology, etc). It is perhaps only at the second order level of political 
culture and the politics of identity (which again are not divorced from the question of 
power), that discursive posturings play out as markers of difference and distinction.379 
The survival of the Deoband as an institution and a political force is thus a marker of its 
ineluctable entanglement with the modern. 
An understanding of the Deoband’s gravitation towards forms of violent and 
coercive political activism, is represented most clearly by their support for and creation of 
sectarian and jihadist groups. This turn, however must be situated through an 
understanding of the ways in which the State, especially since the 1980’s, has attempted 
                                                
379 However this second order of the political, or flavoring, should not occlude the fact that what is still 
being served up is supper. 
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to infiltrate, control and harness orthodox Islamic institutions. These state attempts to 
deploy and manipulate “Islam” and Islamist forces for the legitimization of martial rule 
and for the waging of proxy wars (Afghanistan and Kashmir), resulted in the artificial 
political empowerment of groups like the Deoband. Under the catalyst of this state 
intervention, the otherwise politically marginal communities of Islamic orthodoxy, have 
transformed themselves into agents of jihad and brokers of increased socio-political 
power. Given the ways in which the Pakistani martial state has, historically, legitimized 
the use of violence, intimidation and coercion as the means for political participation and 
negotiation, we can begin to see how newly empowered Islamist political groups have 
themselves deployed the symbolic weight of Islam, and the blasphemy laws in particular, 
in order to advance their claims of political leadership. More importantly we can trace the 
ways in which the ‘ulama themselves exercise forms of policing power over and above 
both civil society and the sovereign authority of the state.  
One of the crucial elements of the state of exception is described by Agamben as 
the merger and indistinction between auctoritas and potestas (authority and power). The 
real crisis arises, argues Agamben, when the two elements of auctoritas and potestas 
combine in one person or institution and the state of exception becomes the rule.380 The 
crisis of the ‘ulama in Pakistan can thus also be seen as the merger between the desire of 
authority and the conscription of the ‘ulama within geopolitical spaces of power. 
Traditional ‘ulama authority, already in decline in Pakistan381 merges with a desire for 
potestas. What happens when the background series of assumptions that convey 
traditional authority with power are transformed by colonialism on the one hand and the 
                                                
380 Agamben, State of Exception. 
381 Malik also makes the claim that under postcolonial state, the traditional space of ‘ulama authority has 
been in decline. See Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan. 
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emergence of populations on the other? We could then characterize the postcolonial 
transformation of the Deoband as the shift from taqlid to jihad: the desire for the 
maintenance of authority through the promotion of taqlid to the desire for power through 
the promotion of jihad. The conjunction between auctoritas and potestas seems to be well 
illustrated in the phenomenon of Talibanization. I would argue that the precursors for this 
transformation are not simply the events of 1979 which led to the deployment of the 
mujahideen. Rather it is the statification and biopoliticization of Islam, signaled first by 
the creation of Pakistan, and subsequently by the Iranian revolution.  
 
 
Towards a Conception of ‘Ulama Governmentality 
 
Our thesis at its most elemental, simply asserts that the transformations of 
political Islam are best understood in terms of biopoliticization. How does this 
biopoliticization play out, and what does it mean to say that the space of Pakistan 
coincides with the metacolonial as opposed to the postcolonial? Further we may ask in 
what way has Islam today, in its coincidence with life, been emptied of its ethical 
possibilities? How much of the hollow rattling that goes on in Islam’s name (liberal, 
traditional or fundamentalist) is merely the raucous anxiety of a nihilism that refuses its 
own recognition? The task of reading the space of exception therefore lies in a 
recognition of an entirely different sort.382 
Though Walter Benjamin did not use the term, if he were to outline the basic 
thrust of a biopolitics it would mean to think history as the normalization, the becoming 
                                                
382 Contra, that is to say to Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens, The 
Seeley Lectures (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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rule, of the state of emergency.383 For Agamben, the task of critical thought is to offer a 
testimony384 of the way in which life, in its state of exception, has now become the norm 
under modern biopolitical regimes.385 What is the nature then of the biopolitical regime 
of the ‘ulama? As I have discussed in Chapter 2, biopolitics in its broadest sense, is a 
politics of life, where life is understood in an exclusively biological386 and technological 
fashion387 (bio-tech). The inclusion of this bare, biological, life in the political order 
“constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said 
that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.”388 
The remaining task of this chapter will be to situate ‘ulama political practices in terms of 
sovereign power. If we can show that the structure of the exception is consubstantial with 
Islamist politics, then our claim regarding the indistinction between Islam and the West 
will take on added plausibility, thus running counter the dominant barrage of imperial and 
governmental discourses on Islam which assert a fundamental if not incommensurate 
difference.389 By placing life at the center of their own political strategies, the practices of 
the modern ‘ulama, like the modern State, disclose this secret of power, otherwise 
concealed under the banner of fidelity to Islam and the shari‘a. Thus the form of power 
                                                
383 “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the 
exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight”. 
384 For Agamben, testimony refutes the “isolation of survival from life”, the separation of a sphere of naked 
life (bare life, zoē) from the context of the forms of life (bios). “The witness attests to the fact that there can 
be testimony because there is an inseparable division and noncoincidence between the inhuman and the 
human, the living being and the speaking being, the Muselmann and the survivor … Testimony thus 
guarantees not the factual truth of the statement safeguarded in the archive, but rather its unarchivability, its 
exteriority with respect to the archive.” Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz : The Witness and the Archive. 
385 ———, Means without End: Notes on Politics. 
386 In the essay Form-of-Life, Agamben understands biological life as “the secularized form of naked life.” 
Ibid. 
387 That is to say with Heidegger, that life is understood as fact rather than facticity. 
388 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. And later more famously, “the entry of zoē 
into the sphere of the polis – the politicization of bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of 
modernity.” 
389 Jihadist discourses of course also share this structure of essential difference. 
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exercised by the ‘ulama today is linked to that “most immemorial of the arcane 
imperii”390 that Agamben discusses in Homo Sacer. And it is precisely this link, the link 
between bare life and politics, which “secretly governs the modern ideologies seemingly 
most distant from one another.”391 In what way then is Islam, like Marxism and 
Liberalism, “embedded in a wider history of metaphysics, of which it remains 
unaware.”392  
A historical genealogy thus seeks to disclose the way in which the being of life is 
understood, and to expose the way in which this understanding manifests in practices, 
and operates, unnoticed, in the background of the modern episteme of biopolitics 
(technē). For Foucault the history of being,393 its shifts from one episteme to another, is 
generally marked by the transformations and mutations of power in the modern age; 
governmentality as pastoral power merging with police power, biopower as the 
transformation of sovereign power and disciplinary power in the context of the 
emergence of sexuality, and so on. Foucault’s grammars of power should be seen in this 
light, as ways of illuminating the various modes of subject production as a prelude to 
accounting for what we have become today, and as inducement for thinking otherwise. 
His terms were therefore not designed to stand as permanent theories of the political, or 
as a methods for the analysis of political structures, but rather they are anti-concepts, 
inceptual motifs that help shed light on the multiple ways in which modern life and 
                                                
390 The arcane imperii is literally the secret of power. But what is this secret Agamben does not quite say. 
We surmise that this secret of power is the sovereign secret, which is to say an ontological secret, namely 
the covering over of the withdrawal of being. And it is an immemorial secret, not because it is timeless or 
very old but rather because it is no longer in memory, forgotten. 
391 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
392 Michael Lewis, Heidegger Beyond Deconstruction: On Nature, Continuum Studies in Continental 
Philosophy (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008). 
393 This history of being, as we have seen in Part 1, is not confined to some wholly other transcendental 
sphere, but instead participates, through its crossing, in the economy of power and the polis. Being is 
always therefore also a question of power. 
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subjectivity is constituted and constrained (even through the powers of freedom). 
Biopower is hence the assumption of the political and the subsumption of life within its 
space (space of the polis).  
If the potentiality of Islam was once constituted as a “way”, a way toward 
being/Allah, if the shari‘a394 itself designated the wisdom of this ‘path’ and ‘way’, if the 
‘ulama and fuqaha were regarded as men of understanding and illumination, then today 
we can speak of Islam as having transformed into a way of life, the shari‘a into a force of 
law, and the ‘ulama as hollow men possessed by power. A proper archaeology and 
genealogy of this transition remains to be thought and written.395 But this is to say that 
today Islam, like the West, is firmly in the ‘grip of technology’,396 a grip which we can 
best see in terms of biopoliticization.397 What does ‘ulama politics reveal about the nature 
of the polis, the political space in which the ‘ulama dwell. This space, as we shall see is 
revealed to be hollow, ethically (and ontologically) hollow, and is thus only a space of 
power. The ‘ulama dwell in this space; their city/camp is the Islamapolis. Thus a 
genealogy will not principally be concerned with the biographical narration of the lives of 
                                                
394 It is not arbitrary then, in a formulation that continues with the Deoband, that handbooks of Shari’a, 
begin with and are predominantly concerned with the forms of ritual and worship (‘ibadat) and only 
secondarily with what would fall under the domain of modern law (mu‘amalat). 
395 That is to say a proper history of the Shari’a as apparatus (apparatus of capture and closure, of being, the 
Shari’a as the induction of a certain positivity and history) has yet to be written. This historical 
investigation is beyond the scope of our talents, but it should be evident that this transformation and 
ossification far predates the colonial modern, and can be traced to the emergence of canon law and Shari’a 
in the 9th and 10th centuries of Islam, when the works of Aristotle, Plato and Plotinus were permeating 
discussion of Arabic philosophy, kalam (scholastic theology) and jurisprudence. In such a history we would 
note that colonialism plays the role of a certain amplification and conduction, and not originator of these 
apparatus. Colonialism thus serves as the amplification of a threshold which is itself metacolonial. As noted 
Chapter 4, “meta” is itself a polysemic spatial signifier, meaning both beyond and after and also above and 
alongside. 
396 Beistegui’s phrase. 
397 Islamic history thus folds within the epoch of technology, an epoch which itself unfolds as Gestell. 
Within this epoch, being is unveiled as beings, as energy and standing reserve. The challenge of a 
genealogy (a critical historical ontology) of Islam lies in adequately problematizing the historical situation 
(epoch) of Islam with respect to being. 
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the ‘ulama, or plot out the chronological details of its political machinations. Our concern 
is instead with the political being of the ‘ulama,398 their biopoliticization and supplication 
towards sovereign power. 
My interest in shifting from a primarily postcolonial modality to a metacolonial 
one, lay in the increasing obviousness that the problems of Islamic violence could not 
simply be written under the banner of an archeology of the imperial399 gaze, for there is 
something decisively imperial in the gaze of the ‘ulama themselves. This shift to the 
meta- does not by any means dispense with the importance of the effects, historical and 
ongoing, of classical imperial formations, but instead seeks to broaden the temporal and 
spatial terrain of our understanding of sovereignties nefarious modalities, each of which 
fold upon and multiply the other, producing new and ever more complex formations. The 
deltas and tributaries of sovereign power merge with, mesh and disperse other forms of 
disciplinary, governmental, and biopowers. Rather than understand ‘ulama political 
technologies as the unfolding of some kind of original Islamological imperative, or even 
as the corrupt expression of some unadulterated Islamic truth, I am trying to understand 
‘ulama politics in terms of sovereignty and the performances of power, performances 
whose affective resonances both maintain the space of power as well as produce new 
spatial effects. 
To speak of the biopoliticization of the Deoband ‘ulama, thus means attempting to 
understanding the transformation of ‘ulama practices (‘ilm awr amal) as a corollary of 
their conscription within the space of the modern polis (the apolis). Thus while it is 
tempting to view the corruption and violence of the Pakistani Deoband primarily in terms 
                                                
398 In Heideggerian terms this means illuminating the worlding, or facticity of the ‘ulama, their being-in-
the-world. This world is not a universal world, but a spatio-temporal world. 
399 Assuming “imperial” designates both historical and neo-colonial power. 
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of its alliance with the state and the military, from the perspective of a history of power, 
the story is somewhat more complex. Characteristically, and against the mainstream left, 
both Foucault and Agamben viewed power in terms that did not privilege the state 
apparatus as the source of violence. Rather the state was itself the threshold effect of a 
political a priori, an a priori which we have identified under the general umbrella of 
Gestell, but more specifically as the apparatus in Foucault, and sovereignty in Agamben. 
With his grammars of power Foucault is effectively expanding the geography of 
violence, making visible new spaces where power operates, spaces that are often hidden 
or do not usually manifest as political. 
The problem for a critical reading of political Islam then is to arrive at some 
understanding of this shift in the Islamic episteme and its historical/political a priori. As 
Foucault wrote famously in his governmentality essay: 
We all know the fascination which the love, or horror of the state exercises 
today, attention is paid to its history its advance, its power its abuses. The 
excessive value placed on the state is expressed in two ways: one form is 
the immediate, affective and tragic, is the lyricism of the monstre froid we 
see confronting us. But there is a second way of overvaluing the problem 
of the state, one which is paradoxical because it is reductionist … But the 
state, no more today than at any other time in history, does not have this 
unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor to speak frankly 
this importance. The state is no more than a composite and a mythicized 
abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. 
Maybe what is really important for our modernity – our present – is not so 
much the étatisation of society, as the ‘governmentalization’ of the 
state.400  
 
Similarly for Agamben, while the state deploys a brutal form of mythic violence, 
the sovereign effect is prior to the constitution of the state. Agamben as we have seen, 
analyzed the way in which figures like Schmidt and Hobbes deployed the concept of 
                                                
400 Gordon, Burchell, and Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. 
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sovereignty as a mechanism to legitimize the state and its deployment of what Benjamin 
called ‘mythic violence.’ Opposed to mythic violence in Benjamin’s critique of the 
political, was divine violence.401 Mythical violence, either in the form of state or 
revolutionary violence (“law-preserving” or “law-positing” or constituted and 
constituting power) comprised the space of the modern political against which Benjamin, 
and following him Agamben, sought to think. Consequently, the depredations of the 
‘ulama in the modern period, should be understood not in terms of the adoption of 
medieval formulations of Islamic jurisprudence and their blind, literal and disconcerting 
application within modern polities, but rather, in terms of our thesis, of the 
biopoliticization of Islam; that is to say in terms, roughly, of two movements, 
governmentalization and juridification. For Agamben, juridification represents the 
coincidence of life and law, its biopolitical becoming, which is reflected in the popular 
characterization of Islam, among liberals and conservative alike, as a “way of life.”  
If anything characterizes modern democracy as opposed to classical 
democracy, then, it is that modern democracy presents itself from the 
beginning as a vindication and liberation of zoē, and that it is constantly 
trying to transform its own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to 
speak, the bios of zoē.402  
 
Agamben’s characterization here of the link between bare life and way of life 
finds its continual echo in the near universal characterization of Islam as “a way of life”, 
and the ummah as a political “society which must be defended.” 
                                                
401 Benjamin, Critique of Violence. On my reading, this distinction between mythic and divine roughly 
corresponds to the distinction between potere (political power) and potenza (ethical power). 
402 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
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Yet another popular fundamentalist mantra —Islam is a “complete code of 
life,403—also betrays its underlying technological understanding. The juridification or 
codification of Islam, its reduction to an ideology of nizam (system) thus further signifies 
its collapse and indistinction with the shari‘a. So we are speaking not of the Islamization 
of modernity, but the modernization of Islam, and its final coincidence with the history of 
the West. At the technological apogee of this history the shari‘a is deployed as strategic 
and tactical instrument, as war by other means.  
As Masud, Messick and Powers note, in the historical formation of Islamic law an 
important division within juristic labor marks the relation of the shari‘a to the concrete 
world of human affairs. While marking off the juridical from the worldly may itself be 
problematic to begin with, they nonetheless draw our attention to an important point. 
Across time and space, two distinct categories of legal interpreters have 
stood at the meeting points of law and fact. The domain of legal procedure, 
including adversarial cases, rules of evidence, binding judgments, and state 
enforcement, belongs to the judge (qadi); the issuance of nonbinding advisory 
opinions (fatawa, or fatwas) to an individual questioner (mustafti), whether in 
connection with litigation or not, is the separate domain of the jurisconsult (mufti). 
In their different venues, both qadi and muftis have specialized in handling the 
everyday traffic in conflicts and questions falling within the purview of the 
shari‘a.404 
 
My argument here suggests that one way of characterizing the transformations 
undergone by the modern Pakistani Deoband, is the gradual indistinction between the 
role of mufti and the role of qadi. In the modern period the Deoband ‘ulama have largely 
been seen as mufti’s, and the madrasa was largely a cite for the production of muftis who 
                                                
403 This phrase was popularized in Pakistan by Ghulam Ahmad Parvez. See Gulam Ahmed Parvez, Islam: A 
Challenge to Religion (Lahore: Idara-e-Tulu-e-Islam 1968). Only in the antinomian strands of Sufism, is 
this link between law and life openly problematized. See for instance Eric Winkel, Islam and the Living 
Law: The Ibn Al-'Arabi Approach (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
404 Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers, eds., Islamic Legal Interpretation: 
Muftis and Their Fatwas, Harvard Studies in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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could offer non-binding legal opinion. All the major madaris have ifta departments, 
which collect legal assessment or rule (hukm). However under the regime of the Taliban, 
the distinction between the mufti and the qadi, hukm and state law have collapsed, as 
Islam is fully subsumed by the imperatives of state authority. 
 
 
Legislative Exorcism and the Deoband Anti-Ahmadiyya Movement 
 
[Governmentality] is a question of not imposing law on men but of disposing 
things: that is, employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws 
themselves as tactics.405 
 
Central to Agamben’s analysis of modern forms of biopolitical sovereignty is the 
description of the capture of bare life by the state and the legal order, in order to produce 
the figure of homo sacer. The characteristic modality of the ‘ulama in Pakistan today lies 
in precisely this deployment of sovereign power, and the production of the heretic as 
homo sacer. Through the success of the “Objectives Resolution”, the order of the shari‘a 
continues to haunt the body of state law and the constitution, lying at once inside and 
outside the law. The juridical tools that have been complicit with the ‘ulama and the 
state’s production of homo sacer are of course the notorious blasphemy laws that were 
formally established by the state during General Zia ul-Haq’s dictatorial tenure. 
Agamben’s reference to the jurist in the following remark, is aptly characteristic of the 
way in which the ‘ulama have crossed a biopolitical threshold. 
If there is a line in every modern state marking the point at which the 
decision on life becomes a decision on death, and biopolitics can turn into 
thanatopolitics, this line no longer appears today as a stable border 
dividing two clearly distinct zones. This line is now in motion and 




gradually moving into areas other than that of political life, areas in which 
the sovereign is entering into an ever more intimate symbiosis not only 
with the jurist but also with the doctor, the scientist, the expert, and the 
priest.406 
 
The problem of blasphemy that has now migrated from the domain of the qadi 
and the fatwa to the domain of the state, is an exemplary phenomenon which betrays 
‘ulama complicity with the will to sovereign power.407 According to Maulana Waheed 
Khan at Jami‘a Faruqiyya, the legislative exorcism of the Ahmadiyya was one of the 
major achievements of the Deoband in the “defense of Islam.”408 Deoband sovereignty is 
thus expressed through the inclusive exclusion of the Ahmadi409 within the scope of 
shari‘a law, a law whose juridification is marked by its taking on the aporetic dialectical 
structure, or topology, of the ban. The ban on the Ahmadi brings the body of the Ahmadi, 
now rendered homo sacer, within the legal orbit and scope of their mythic violence, and 
                                                
406 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. My emphasis on jurist and priest (i.e. ‘ulama) 
407 I am by no means asserting that only today has blasphemy become an issue. Clearly the matter has a 
long historical provenance; from the Kharijite’ assassination of Muhammad’s cousin ‘Ali , to the revolt of 
the famed student of Hasan al- Basra, Wasil ibn Ata (d.749), who founded the Mu’tazilites School (from 
Arabic verb i’tizal “to part or separate from.” What I am asserting however is the ubiquity and intensity of 
the phenomenon today, the way in which the core tool of exceptionalism, is yielded by an increasingly 
large and diverse array of individuals and institutions, including but also beyond the state apparatus.  
408 Ironically he cited Deoband’s ‘military’ opposition to the British during the colonial period, as their 
greatest legacy! 
409 The Ahmadi are a Muslim community that emerged as a distinct doctrinal movement in late nineteenth 
century India. The Ahmadiyya derive their name from their spiritual leader Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–
1908) who claimed to be the Mujaddid (divinely inspired reformer). It is however precisely what he 
claimed and did not that is the subject of severe contestation. His severest critics charge that he claimed for 
himself the status of a nabi (prophet) thus contravening the idea that Muhammad was the last prophet of 
God. This is the basis upon which many Sunni’s derive their animus, going as far as accusing the 
movement of being a colonial and Zionist conspiracy. Most of his followers however regard him to be the 
promised Messiah or Mahdi. Ghulam Ahmad who initiated the first members the Ahmadiyya community in 
1889 was born on Friday February 13, 1835 in the town of Qadian, in Punjab, India. His followers are thus 
also called Qadiani’s. There are two principal splits within the Ahmadiyya Jama‘at, between the Lahori 
Ahmadi, and the Qadiani. The split, which rarely manifests in violence, is based on a dispute over 
succession and the precise meaning of Ghulam Ahmad’s status as a Mahdi. The Ahmadi’s today are a 
world wide community, though the largest population remains in the Pakistani town of Rabwah. For further 
details see Antonio Gualtieri, The Ahmadis: Community, Gender, and Politics in a Muslim Society 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004). More recently Simon Ross Valentine, Islam and the 
Ahmadiyya Jama'at: History, Belief, Practice, Columbia/Hurst (Columbia University Press, 2008).. 
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it is this assumption of sovereign power, I would argue, that constitutes a real heresy 
(shirk). This is a strategic form of what Agamben calls “the ordering of space”, a practice 
that is constitutive of the sovereign nomos. As we saw with the military, what is at issue 
in the sovereign exception, the ban, “is not so much the control or neutralization of an 
excess as the creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-political 
order can have validity.”410 The state of exception—which is effectively a “complex 
topological” relation between outside and inside, between “the normal situation and 
chaos”—is the device that makes the validity of the juridical/shari‘a order, and by 
extension ‘ulama sovereignty, possible. The law of punishment for the apostate, 
fundamentally reconfigures the relationship of the ‘ulama with law and death. Properly 
speaking the thanatopolitical, that is to say sovereign, expression of modern biopower, is 
enshrined in the decision of life and death and the right to kill. The relocation of this 
declaration within the sphere of the shari‘a, effectively redirects sovereign power towards 
the ‘ulama, with their capacity and authority to declare apostasy (takfir).411 The 
declaration of the heretic is therefore a move, a juridical weapon, which exposes “the 
secret tie uniting power and bare life.”412 Sovereign power needs a subject that can be 
abandoned to its “law beyond the law”.413 This right of declaration of the exception, and 
the sanctioning of death, constitutes a form of sovereign authority. As Agamben argues, 
this state of exception is more fundamental to sovereignty than the law itself. It 
constitutes the very condition of possibility for juridical order. The shari‘a is therefore 
deployed as sovereign currency in the wider biopolitical networks of the metacolonial 
                                                
410 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
411 The right to declare a Muslim a kafir, thus taking the individual out the bonds of Muslim community 
and hence protection. 
412 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
413 Ibid., p. 59. This subject is of course the homo sacer. 
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state. In simpler terms the shari‘a, is a means to an end of political power. It is no longer 
a path or a way, but a law that must be obeyed. In the polis the shari‘a is war by other 
means, a decisive weapon in the clash of local sovereignties. 
 
The Logic of the Caesura: The Proliferation of Islams 
The Deoband began under a single pomegranate tree in the town of Deoband in 
1867 and forged a single political organization the Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind 
(Organization of Indian Islamic Scholars) in 1919. In 1945 the party split along 
nationalist differences, with Maulana Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani taking leadership of the 
JUI-Pakistan faction. Since 1947 the endless logic of the caesura that is Pakistan, has 
played itself out within this organization. After its first split between its pro-Pakistan 
(‘Usmani) and pro-India (Madani) factions, the JUI began its inevitable mutation into a 
dozen smaller and often competing groups. Up until the 1979, however these divisions 
between the sub-groups were largely confined to a non-violent political, though often 
vitriolic, arena. Internal skirmishes were largely political, but rarely violent. The second 
sovereign event however, 1979, has resulted in the intensification and far more dangerous 
mutation of these group which now has over 40 different sub-political organizations, 
some allied others at violent loggerheads.  
During my research period in 2001, I regularly posed a series of question 
regarding the differences between the Deoband and the Barelwi, to virtually everyone I 
met, from taxi drivers and pan shop vendors, to businessmen, lawyers and members of 
the military. Outside of the madaris, I never once, in well over a hundred encounters, was 
able to get anyone to explain to me the principle theological differences between the 
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major South Asian splits within the Sunni Hanafi traditions; Deoband, Barelwi and Ahl-i 
Hadith. The majority questioned were not even aware of these splits within mainstream 
Sunni Islam and had only a vague sense of what branch their own Sunni identity 
corresponded too (either in terms of madhhab or maslak). Even when the Taliban hit 
headlines in 1994, few people could connect the name Deoband to the Taliban. It comes 
as no surprise then that the principle theological differences within the Deoband, between 
the Hayati and the Mamati,414 are even more baffling obscure, and are themselves rarely 
the cause for divisions.415 Divisions are almost always political or communal, beginning 
with the original differences over nationalism between Hussain Ahmad Madani and 
Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani; that is to say the more enduring splits within the Deoband are 
not theological but are rather biopolitical.416  
While the JUI is the largest religio-political organization in Pakistan, it has never 
been able to obtain even the meager Parliamentary seats it has without forming political 
alliances. On average, and even including the recent 2002 elections, the JUI has rarely 
been able to garner more than 2 – 3% of the popular vote.417 Very often the two major 
factions of the JUI, the JUI (Sami-ul Haq) and JUI (Fazlur Rahman) would form different 
coalitions. The high point of the JUI’s cooperation with other regional and nationalist 
parties occurred during the 1977 General election, with the formation of the Qaumi Itihad 
                                                
414The split between the Hayati and the Mamati, like the split between the Deoband and the Barelwi, 
revolves around the question of the ‘living’ (from Hayat, life) status of the Prophet. The Hayáti position is 
closer to that of the Barelwi, in claiming that the Prophet has an invisible yet living presence among the 
ummah. The Mamati, like the Ahl-i Hadith, believe that the Prophet is only living in a special abode within 
Heaven. 
415 Pirzada’s book on the JUH does not even mention this difference, testifying to the secondary role of the 
theological versus the political within these Islamist organizations. See Pirzada, The Politics of the Jamiat 
Ulema-I Islam Pakistan, 1971-77. 
416 That is to say over which society is to be defended! 




(National Unity) group led by Fazlur Rahman’s father, Mufti Mahmud (1919-1980). 
Qaumi Itihad then became the Nizam-i Mustapha group which led a concerted campaign 
against Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s PPP.  
While the JUI, throughout its political career, have always battled to introduce a 
Shari‘a Nizam (system) within Pakistan, the efforts have largely been confined to the 
sphere of constitutional amendments and changes through assembly and committee work 
(the Objectives Resolution). The Nizam-i Mustapha movement (Movement to Establish 
the System of the Prophet) took this essential thrust of the JUI to a larger and more pro-
active political level. Ironically it was the 5th July 1977 declaration of martial law by the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Zia ul-Haq, that effectively took the wind out from the sails 
of the Nizam movement. Subsequent division in the JUI revolved around the question of 
support for Zia’s “Islamist” putsch. Whereas Mufti Mahmud and following his death on 
14th of October 1980, Fazlur Rahman, worked with the PPP through the anti-Zia coalition 
the MRD (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy), the JUI (S) gave tacit support to 
Zia and were closely allied with the Mujahideen effort against the Soviets. However 
despite the political opposition to Martial Law, both factions cooperated with Zia and 
were drawn into the power struggle of the Great Game. It was through the prestige, 
money and power that accrued to the new jihadist outfits that a revival in the political 
fortunes of the JUI was accomplished. The exponential growth of madaris during this 
period is simply one indicator of this transformation. 
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The various Deoband arms, wings and offshoots, can be seen to roughly 
correspond with sectarian (national) and jihadist (trans-national) thrusts.418 The sectarian 
divisions form three tactical fronts; against the Ahmadi, against the Shi‘a, and against the 
Barelwi. The organization dedicated to armed opposition against the Shi‘a include, the 
notorious Sipah-i Sahaba (SSP, Soldiers of the Prophets Companions),419 and the SSP 
breakaway group the Lashkar-i Jhangawi (LeJ, Army of Jhang420) formed by Akram 
Lahori and Riaz Basra. The SSP was founded by the rabidly anti-Shi‘a cleric Maulana 
Haq Nawaz Jhangawi and Maulana Azam Tariq (1962—2003) in 1985. The Lashkar-i 
Jhangawi’s militant leader Riaz Basra routinely made headlines in the 80’s and 90’s and 
was one of the most wanted men in Pakistan prior to Mullah Omar. A former member of 
the SSP, and the Salar-e-A’ala (Chief, or Excellent, Commander) of the Jhangawi group, 
Basra was killed in a “police encounter” on May 14, 2002.421 Lesser know groups include 
                                                
418 It might also be mentioned that in addition to these sectarian and jihadist groups which are often at 
loggerheads with one another, the Deoband has also associated itself with sectarian unity groups the Milli 
Yakjehti Council. However given the prominence and support provided to the sectarian groups by the 
scholarly leadership of the Deoband, it seems as if the unification projects are merely a front to deflate 
criticism that the Deoband fans sectarian hatred. The Deoband always considers itself to be a movement for 
the protection of the honor of the Prophet and the Sahaba. It follows that sectarianism is a logical corollary 
of the protection of Islam in a biopolitical age. Communalism and sectarianism are both species of the 
biopolitical caesura. 
419 Formerly known as Anjuman-e-Sipah-i Sahaba, it is now a defunct group, having been declared a 
terrorist organization by President Pervez Musharraf in 2002. Azam Tariq was assassinated on October 4, 
2003 near Islamabad, in an attack widely blamed on Shi‘a militants. Azam Tariq was a key figure in the in 
Pakistan’s bloody history of sectarianism, which peaked during the years of operation of the SSP. Over 
2000 sectarian murders have occurred since 1989. For a detailed account of the assassination see Newsline 
October 2003. 
420 The group was named in honor of Haq Nawaz Jhangawi who was assassinated in a bomb attack on 23 
February, 1990. Sectarian violence reached its peak during the years following Jhangawi’s murder, which 
the SSP blamed on Shi‘a landlords and the Iranian Government. Prominent Shi‘a scholars were targeted in 
the wake of Jhangawi’s murder, as well as Sadiq Ganji.  
421 According to a Newsline report of the time, this criminal who was wanted in over 250 cases, including 
the 1988 murder of Iranian Council General to Pakistan, Sadiq Ganji, was actually arrested a few months 
prior to May, and the encounter was staged for fear that the ISI would engineer his escape. Extra-judicial 
murders as many police encounters became known, became a common way for the governmental to deal 
with ‘terrorists elements’ and ‘social misfits’, and should also be seen as the expression of sovereign power 
of the state and police. Also according to establishment insider, Hassan Abbass, a low level ISI operative 
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the Tahrik-i Difa Sahaba (Movement for the defense of the Sahaba, Companion of the 
Prophet) and the Tahrik-i Khuddam Ahl-i Sunnat. 
Organizations working against the Barelwi are less prominent and include the 
Jami‘at Asha’at-o-Tauhid-o-Sunnah, founded by Maulana Ziaullah Shah Bukhari in 
1949, and the Jami‘at Ahl-i Sunnat. Organizations that campaign against the Ahmadi 
(Qadianis) however were among the first to form, all in 1949. These include the Aalmi 
Majlis-i Khatm-i Nubuwwat founded by Maulana Khan Muhammad, the Tahrik-i Tahafuz 
Khatm-i Nubuwwat founded by Sayyid Maheen Bukhari and the Pasban-e-Khatm-i 
Nubuwwat founded by Allama Mumtaz Awan. While these names are not well known, 
the various Khatm-i Nubuwwat groups were the first to be founded and received strong 
support from all of the main Sunni groups, from Mawdudi’s Jama‘at-i Islami, to the 
Barelwi. It is the one cause around which even progressives like Allama Iqbal have 
gravitated. The Ahmadi are thus the exclusive cipher of bare life for all Sunni Islamist 
parties. 
In addition to these sectarian sub-groups which began to further multiply and 
proliferate in the 1980’s, the Deoband has also spawned over a dozen jihadist outfits that 
work in Kashmir and Afghanistan,422 and functioned as the more or less explicit tools of 
the ISI’s ‘foreign policy’, until 2001. Today the Pakistan Army itself essentially one 
                                                
from the Pakistan Air Force named Athar was the accomplice in murder of Ganji. See Abbass, Pakistan's 
Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. 
422 Each of the Sunni Islamists groups and not only the Deoband, have jihadists offshoots. One of the most 
effective jihadist outfits is the Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HM, the Mujahideen Party), the militant wing of the 
Jama‘at-i Islami (JI). HM was formed at the behest of the ISI in September 1989. Given Mawdudi’s long 
history of opposition to the claim of jihad in Kashmir by the Pakistan Army, the formation of this wing can 
be seen as contrary to its organizations founders spirit. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Mawdudi’s successor 
however was drawn into the sovereign game like everyone else, and the JI also benefited from the slush 
funds and street prestige that the Afghan and Kashmir jihads procured. As the parent of all major jihadists 




faction within the larger jihadist apparatus. In addition to the Taliban, these Deoband 
groups include; the Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI, Movement of Islamic Jihad, or 
Islamic Struggle Movement) which was the first to be formed at the onset of the Afghan 
war in 1980; its offshoot the Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM, Movement of the Islamic 
Mujahideen423) founded in 1983 and led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil424; the Jaish-i 
Muhammad (JeM, The Army of Muhammad425) founded by former General Secretary of 
the HuM Maulana Masood Azhar in 2000; and the Lashkar-i Tayeba426 (Let, Army of the 
Righteous, or Army of the Pure) just to name a few. Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami was 
founded by three Deoband seminary students, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, Maulana Irshad 
Ahmad and Maulana Abdus Samad Sial.427 Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, who was a 
regular Friday khutba speaker at Jami‘a Faruqiyya where I conducted the bulk of my 
research, was a close advisor of Masood Azhar, and extended his scholarly patronage to 
the activities of the JeM. The formation of the JeM was opposed by many members of the 
Harkat-ul Mujahideen, who wanted to preserve a united Kashmir jihad front. The 
monthly mouthpiece of the Harkat-ul Mujahideen, Sada-e-Mujahid, routinely featured 
articles critical of Azhar’s breakaway faction, and critiqued scholars like Ludhianawi and 
                                                
423 Formerly known as Harkat-ul Ansar, and not to be confused with Hizb-ul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul Ansar 
was declared a terrorist organization in 1997 by the US due to its association with Saudi terrorist Osama 
bin Laden. To avoid the repercussions of the US ban, the group relabeled itself the Harkat-ul Mujahideen in 
1998. 
424 Khalil was also one of the founders of the HuJI, but broke off to found the Harkatat-ul Ansar. 
425 The Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) was launched by Masood Azhar from Karachi on January 31, 2000, 
following his released from an Indian jail. The ‘release’ occurred after the ISI negotiated a “hostage” swap 
following the December 31, 1999, hijacking of an Indian Airliner. 
426 Currently under the leadership of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, and now known as Jama’at-ud-Da’wah, LeT 
is widely regarded to be behind the recent November 2008 Mumbai carnage. Saeed was a one time 
appointee to the Council on Islamic Ideology during the regime of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Taiba 
from Tayyab (pure) is also commonly transliterated as Tayyaba, Tayyiba, Taiba or Toiba. 
427 According to one source the group began under the name of Jami‘at Ansarul Afghaneen (JAA, the Party 
of the Friends of the Afghan People), and was later rechristened the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, to designate 
its broader inclusion of the Kashmir front. For further details on all these jihadist groups see The South 
Asian Terrorism Portal (http://www.satp.org). 
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Nizamuddin Shamzai for double talk and supporting of the new JeM. The fact that both 
these scholars were assassinated seems to point towards internal factionalism as the 
cause.428 The logic of the jihad is not confined to Islam as Baudrillard suggests. Instead 
what we are dealing with is a proliferation of the jihadists apparatus that came into being 
under the sovereign alignment of 1979. As the Pakistan Army today battles the very 
jihadist elements it has carefully nurtured since 1980, what we see in Pakistan is the 
generalization of a dispositif429 in which security and terrorism form a ‘single deadly 
system, in which they justify and legitimate each other’s actions’.430 As Agamben’s brief 
essay on security insightfully suggests ‘terrorism’ is simply the reverse side of the 
security dispositif, an inverse and more concentrated reflection of the sovereign power 
deployed by the state.431 Terrorism is therefore merely the excrement of civilization and 
modern governmentality. 
Returning now to the Khatm-i Nubuwwat groups, the Tahrik-i Tahafuz-e-Khatm-i 
Nubuwwat, was effectively the tabligh arm of the banned Majlis-e-Ahrar-i Islam,432 
whose famous slogan “Long live the rule of God, Death to Democracy” (hukumat-i 
illahiyya) and their opposition to the Pakistan movement, led to over a decade of 
                                                
428 The recent split between the major Deoband madaris, Faruqiyya and Dar-ul ‘Ulum, discussed in Chap. 
6, can also be seen as a reflection of the division between scholars who support and are willing to work 
with the governmental in their efforts against the multi faceted Tehreek-e-Taliban, and those groups like 
the HeM and the LeT that oppose the Pakistan government.  
429 It is important for us to keep in mind that Foucault’s use of the term dispositif, apparatus, continues the 
spatial thematic already embedded in Heidegger’s conception of Gestell (enframing, enframe, meaning a 
certain structural encapsulation). 
430 See Oliver Marchart, "The Other Side of Order: Towards a Political Theory of Terror and Dislocation," 
Parallax 9 (2003). 
431 Agamben, Giorgio, On Security and Terror “…discipline wants to produce order, security wants to 
regulate disorder. … Nothing is more important than a revision of the concept of security as basic principle 
of state politics. European and American politicians finally have to consider the catastrophic consequences 
of uncritical general use of this figure of thought. It is not that democracies should cease to defend 
themselves: but maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, not 
merely towards their control. On the contrary, we can say that politics secretly works towards the 
production of emergencies.” 
432 Rafi Usmani, Akeedah-I-Khatm-E-Nabuwat (Lahore: Bait-ul-Uloom, 1996). 
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suspension in the early years of Pakistan. In many ways it was their underground 
philosophy that had a decisive influence on the sovereign aims and objectives of the 
Pakistani Deoband more broadly. If the legal political parties worked within the ambit of 
Parliamentary democracy, their dark side, the Ahrar nurtured contempt for it. One might 
even say that the Taliban and the various radical jihadist outfits today are the re-emergent 
face of the Ahrar. According to G. H. Khan, the Ahrar was set up in Lahore in 1929433 at 
the suggestion of Maulana ‘Abul Kalam Azad, as a mechanism to weaken the unity of the 
Pakistan movement. The “Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam-i Hind” was led by the anti-Ahmadi 
Deoband ‘alim Maulana Syed Attaullah Shah Bukhari who was elected as the Ahrar’s 
first President.434 As The Munir report states; “One of the main activities of the Ahrar 
was their opposition, in one form or another, of the Ahmadis. It may indeed be said that 
the Ahrar took their birth in the hatred of the Ahmadis.”435 It was the Ahrar’s post-
Khilafat movement (1919-1924) campaign of the 30’s that seriously transformed 
relations between the broader Ahmadiyya community and orthodox Sunnis. From the 
beginning then as the opposition to the Ahmadi (both the Lahori and Qadiani groups) 
migrated from the realm of kalam to the political, the strategy of the ‘ulama has been one 
of sovereign power. As Jalal notes, Janbaz Mirza, the prolific historian of the Ahrar sect 
gives special place to the Ahrar campaign against the Ahmadi’s.436 Initial Ahrar policies 
broadly reflected the early Deoband ‘ulama’s opposition, under the leadership of Madani, 
to Jinnah and the Muslim League. The Ahrar leadership called Pakistan “Palidistan”. 
                                                
433 The Munir Report states that the Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam, a party of nationalist Muslims, was formed in a 
meeting held in Lahore on 4th May 1931. 
434 G. H. Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, 1931-1940, 1st ed. (New Delhi: Light & Life Publishers, 
1980), p. 205. 
435 Munir Report, p. 12. 
436 Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850 (New 
York: Routledge, 2000), p. 295. 
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However as the possibilities of power under an exclusively Islamic/Muslim State began 
to take shape, factions within the Ahrar, along with figures like Shabbir ‘Usmani and 
Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, promised to declare support for Pakistan if Jinnah would guarantee 
that “Qur’anic laws would be enforced.”437 Given the Ahrar’s influence Jinnah is alleged 
to have made numerous statements to leading clerics like Thanawi and ‘Usmani that 
Pakistan’s laws would be in conformity with the spirit of Islam. As late as 1945 the 
Punjab Muslim League declared that when Pakistan would be achieved “the 
administration would be carried out according to the Qur’an”438 The Ahrar manifesto 
reads as follows: 
God is the only source of strength. The oneness of God, the acceptance of 
Muhammad (PBUH) as the last and final prophet and following the 
example of the Sunnah and the Companions of the Prophet is our creed. 
The establishment of Khilafat,439 Shura440 and Ijma’a-e-Ummat,441 is our 
politics. Our system of finance is Zakat, Ushr and Jazia-o-ikhraj. The 
word of God above all, the spread of Islam through Jihad is our destiny. 
Our goal is to please God and the Last Prophet.442 
 
While the “manifesto” is ambiguous, this forms the ideological template for all Deoband 
groups, a hukumat-i illahiyya (Government of God). And though it leaves room for a 
series of differential tactics as to how this “political system” will be established, the 
driving force of the various movements cannot so simply be placed at the feet of such an 
ideological mandate. The Jama‘at (gathering), I would suggest, is itself a response to the 
gathering call of Gestell. 
                                                
437 Secret Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, quoted in Ibid., p. 448. See also the section in Chapter 6 
Fatwa-e Pakistan. 
438 Secret Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, quoted in Ibid., p. 449. 
439 Institutionalized form of temporal and spiritual authority over the entire umma. 
440 A Islamic consultation assembly, or Council of Islamic Elders, that advise the khalifa. 
441 Assembly of Community of the Prophet. 
442 Usmani, Akeedah-I-Khatm-E-Nabuwat. 
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Biopolitical caesuras are essentially mobile, and in each case they isolate a 
further zone in the biological continuum, a zone which corresponds to a 
process of increasing Entwürdigung and degradation. Thus the non-Aryan 
passes into the Jew, the Jew into the deportee, the deportee into the 
prisoner (Haftling), until biopolitical caesuras reach their final limit in the 
camp. This limit is the Muselmann.443 
 
Pakistan it could be said is the unfolding of this degradation; the homeland of the 
Muselmann. 
 
The Sovereign Strategy: Apostasy & Khatm-i Nubuwwat 
The problem of heresy has played out in post-colonial Pakistan as a historico-
political dialectic of defining, producing, defending and defiling Muslims, a dialectic 
which as I mentioned above, originates not with the ‘ulama but with the Pakistan 
movement itself. Heresy must therefore be understood not only in terms of its juridical 
registers, but more importantly in its biopolitical functionality. One of the Deoband’s 
self-proclaimed major socio-political achievements was the legislative and religious 
exorcism of the Ahmadiyya from the broader Muslim community in Pakistan. The 
attempts by this contradictory class of religio-political scholars to politicize, and 
eventually dominate the process of defining the boundaries of ‘Muslimness’, must be 
understood through a consideration of several key contextualizations, both meta-colonial 
and metacolonial. With these contextualizations in place, one can talk about ways in 
which modernist Islamic politics draw upon and deploy the symbolic weight of what is 
popularly marked as traditional, authentic discourse, to create new forms of political 
space and to exercise new forms of disciplinary and sovereign power. The politicization 
                                                
443 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz : The Witness and the Archive. 
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of the definition of Muslimhood444 during the 1953 ‘anti-Ahmadi disturbances’ in 
Lahore, —disturbances which led to the downfall of the Punjab Provincial government 
under Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana,445and were one of the major pretexts 
for the declaration of a brief spell Martial Law in Lahore in March of 1953 — was the 
first indication of what mobilized violence marshaled around an excluded minority could 
achieve. If the biopolitical movement of Pakistan began as minority movement bent on 
the exclusion of a Hindu majority, the second movement post-1947 reflects the mirror 
inverse of the same logic. That is to say the ‘secular’ biopolitical logic of Jinnah’s 
Pakistan (homeland for Muslims) is inversely reflected in the ‘theological’ logic of the 
Deoband ‘ulama (homeland for Islam). The exclusion of minorities begins with the 
targeted focus on the Ahmadiyya. This was of course a process that ultimately led to the 
juridical embodiment of a series of discriminatory and exclusionary constitutional 
amendments and ordinances in 1974 and 1984, known as the blasphemy laws. 
At the forefront of the assault on ‘apostates’ and heretics in Pakistan, driven in the 
main by anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment, were the various Khatm-i Nubuwwat (finality of the 
prophet) movements which have their political origins in the Majlis-e-Ahrar. Since their 
inception in Pakistan they have been organized and run by a series of well respected 
Deoband ‘alims, including such recent luminaries as Maulana Muhammad Yusuf 
Ludhianawi who was affiliated with the now notorious Banuri Town madrasa. Karachi’s 
Taliban Central, the Jami’at al-‘Ulum al-Islamiyya, as the Banuri madrasa is formally 
known, was founded by Sayyid Muhammad Yusuf Banuri (1908 –1978). Already in 
1994, it was linked with key players in the rise of the Taliban. Mullah Omar was an imam 
                                                
444 In Agamben’s terms; the attempt to decide on Muslimness in terms of a fact. 
445 Which led to the landmark Munir Report. See below. 
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at the Banuri masjid for a short period before 1994. One of its senior ‘ulama Mufti 
Nizamuddin Shamzai was apparently the go between for Osama bin Laden and Mullah 
Omar. The fiery Maulana Masood Azhar, was also a graduate of Banuri Town. Since 
then senior ‘ulama associated with the mosque have been routinely assassinated. In 
November 1997 Habibullah Mukhtar, the president of the madrasa was gunned down 
with several of his associates446. In May 2000 Muhammad Yusuf Ludhianawi was 
assassinated,447 followed in May 2004 by the targeted killing of Ludhianawi’s successor 
Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai.448 In the same year, September 11 2005, Shamzai’s 
successor Mufti Jamil was also killed in Karachi.449 
Prior to partition as President of the new breakaway faction of the JUH, the All 
India Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam, Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, on behalf of the Ahrar had 
declared not only that the Ahmadis were apostates but that they could also be given a 
death sentence.450 Following partition AIJUI was renamed the Markazi Jam‘iyyat al-
‘Ulama-i Islam (MJUI)451 and it played a lead role along with the underground Ahrar in 
the activities of Tahrik-i Tahafuz-e-Khatm-i Nubuwwat (KN). The early hierarchy of the 
KN included all the early heavy weights; Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi, Mufti Shafi 
Muhammad, Mufti Muhammad Hasan (1880-1961), Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali Jalandhari 
(d. 1971), and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi (1885-1981). One of the key demands of 
the KN was that “Qadianis” be declared a non-Muslim minority and that all Ahmadi’s be 
                                                
446 Dawn, November 3-8, 1997. 
447 Ludhianawi had a significant popular following because of his weekly Friday Islamic Q&A section in 
Jang. Huge protests followed in the wake of his assassination. See News May 19, 2000. 
448 Daily News, May 31 2004. 
449 Daily News, September 11, 2005. See also the reports in Dawn, News and Jang. Months earlier, June 24 
2005, Mufti Rehman and Maulana Irshad, senior ‘ulama at the Banuri Mosque, were also wacked. 
450 Fatwa-al-Shihab 
451 Later Markaz was dropped and it simply became the JUI. 
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removed from governmental posts including Jinnah’s Foreign Minister Chaudhuri 
Muhammad Zafarullah Khan (1893 - 1985). Liaquat ‘Ali Khan’s refusal to remove Khan 
from his post was in part the pretext for the Ahrar mobilization in 1953.452 After the 
disturbances had subsided martial law was withdrawn, and the Constituent Assembly of 
Pakistan passed a special Act to constitute a Court of Inquiry to investigate the “causes” 
of disturbances that led to the imposition of martial law. The landmark report, which has 
come to be know as the Munir Report,453 was produced in April 1954 and is a historians 
treasure trove. The report is a formidable investigation and offers a visionary forecast of 
the fate of the country if ‘ambiguous laws’ were allowed to enter the constitutional 
framework.454 
The committee examined the viewpoints of all leading ‘ulama in the country at 
that time. It seemed as if the ‘ulama could agree on nothing other than the belief that 
Ahmadi’s were kafirs (disbelievers) and that anyone becoming an Ahmadi was an 
apostate (murtid) and liable to the death penalty. What was also apparent is that beyond 
this exception, no positive definition of what constitutes a Muslim could be agreed 
upon.455 This is a most significant fact for our metacolonial thesis. Additionally the 
                                                
452 The Munir Report emphatically blames activists of the Ahrar, acting as fronts for the mainstream 
‘ulama, for the violent nature of the events. From the Munir Report: “The disturbances were the direct 
result of the rejection by Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, of an ultimatum 
delivered to him in Karachi on 21st January 1953 by a deputation of the ulama who had been authorized to 
do so by the Majlis-i Amal constituted by the All-Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention held in Karachi 
from l6th to 18th January 1953. The ultimatum was to the effect that if within a month the Qadiani 
Ahmadis were not declared a non-Muslim minority and Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister 
who is an Ahmadi and other Ahmadis occupying key posts in the State, not removed from their offices, the 
Majlis-i Amal would resort to direct action (rast iqdam).” p. 1. 
453 Fully: “Report of the court of inquiry constituted under the Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the 
Punjab disturbances of 1953.” 
454 The report includes 2600 pages of evidence, 339 documents, hundreds of letters, and a host of books, 
pamphlets, journals, and newspapers. 
455 “Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulama, need we make any comment except that no 
two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine 
has done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of 
 
 198 
leaders of the various sects stated that they could not stand one another and routinely 
called each other kafirs. The Barelwi ‘ulama held the Deobandis and Wahhabis were 
beyond the pale of Islam also potentially murtid. According to a fatwa of the Deobandis, 
the Shi‘a are all kafirs and murtad for not respecting and recognizing the caliphate of 
Abu Bakr and the Sahaba. (Companions) 
“The net result of all this is that neither Shi’a nor Sunnis nor Deobandis 
nor Ahl-i Hadith nor Barelwis are Muslims and any change from one view 
to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of 
death if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which 
considers the other party to be kafirs. And it does not require much 
imagination to judge of the consequences of this doctrine when it is 
remembered that no two ulama have agreed before us as to the definition 
of a Muslim.456 
 
Effectively today we see the metastatic unfolding of the apostasy dispositif, a tool 
designed initially to target Ahmadi’s and Shi‘a. The cancer is now endemic, with 
Pakistan effectively having declared itself an apostate nation. 
  
The Honor of Apostasy 
In his Tahafut-al-Falasifah, al-Ghazali is careful to distinguish between apostasy 
(murtaddun) and heresy (bid‘at , change or innovation)457 which can be of varying 
degree’s. Not all bid‘at constitute acts of apostasy. The nuances of medieval 
jurisprudence however are largely lost on the Deoband ‘ulama, who selectively apply 
their own rulings on apostasy so as fashion the laws into a practical weapon. According 
to the classical tradition, when a born or converted Muslim becomes a new kafir, (kufr 
                                                
Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the ulama, we remain Muslims according to the 
view of that alim but kafirs according to the definition of every one else.” (Munir Report, p. 218) 
456 Munir Report, p. 220 
457 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, 2nd ed., Studies in Oriental Culture (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 223. 
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tari’) he becomes a murtid and is exposed to the death penalty. The verdict in the annals 
of medieval jurisprudence that the punishment for apostasy and blasphemy is death 
would be near impossible to refute.458 As the Deoband trained scholar, Dr. Muhammad 
Asrar Madani writes in his booklet on blasphemy and apostasy, “the defense of Islam and 
the honor and dignity of the Prophet are the religious obligations of Muslims, from which 
there is no excuse.”459 Apostasy for Madani includes, “abandoning or forsaking Islam; 
repudiating any of Islam’s basic and principal tenets; reverting to the former state of 
falsehood from the absolute Truth of Islam or converting to any other religion … 
proclaiming prophethood for oneself or believing in an impostor as a prophet after the 
last Prophet of Allah, Muhammad (SWAT) and indulging in any deeds or uttering 
something that leads to kufr (disbelief).”460 From this catch all definition he concludes: 
“It is clear from the above meanings of apostasy that all blasphemers, mockers, Jews, 
Christians, their friends, associates and sympathizers, polytheists, atheists, and half-
hearted Muslims, non-believers in the Oneness of Allah and His Absolute Lordship and 
in all His prophets whose chain ends with the last Prophet Muhammad, are kafirs and 
apostates … The punishment for apostasy is death but if the person repents sincerely, 
then the death sentence can be lifted and the person forgiven.” Madani’s book/pamphlet 
is an extended series of selective quotations from the Qur’an, Hadith and Sunnah which 
support of this argument. At the close of his work, he approvingly cites a Hadith, 
ironically from the Shi‘a tradition of Imam Muhammad Baqir and Imam Ja‘far as-Sadiq: 
“If any Muslim turns away from Islam and disbelieves in that which was sent down to the 
Prophet Muhammad or undermines his personality, denies his prophethood, or accuses 
                                                
458 See Friedman, and Madani. 
459 Mohammad Asrar Madani, Verdict on Blasphemy and Apostasy (Lahore: Idara-e-Islamiat, 1994), p. 129. 
460 Ibid., p. 130. 
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him of lying, other Muslims who hear such blasphemy and apostasy are duty-bound to 
kill the guilty person as soon as they are able to do so. … It is incumbent on the present 
imam of the Muslims to execute him and accept no apology from him.”461 Since both 
Christians, Hindus and Ahmadi’s could be said to equally deny the finality of the prophet, 
the issue in question is not punishment for a denial of this belief, which would then 
require the state to murder, as Madani suggests, all Christians and non-believers, “unless 
they repent.” This would be impractical, which is why the specific laws for punishment 
are against blasphemy, which does not target a born kafir, who prima facia disputes the 
validity of Islam and the status of the Prophet. Rather what is punished is the offense of 
blasphemy which is based on the perception of an “insult” or “harm” to Islam and the 
Prophet (Ghustakh-e-Rasool). Blasphemy thus, in contrast to general kufr (disbelief), can 
be committed by either a Muslim or kafir. However it is precisely this ambiguous zone 
between apostasy and blasphemy which the Deoband have adroitly exploited. The 
definitions of what constitutes an act of heresy, blasphemy and apostasy, are ambiguous 
and bleed into one another. Since blasphemy constitutes an act of insult against the 
Prophet, or a public denial of his virtue or Prophetic status as the Last of the Messengers 
of God, blasphemy is an act that can technically encapsulate Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike462. Since the Ahmadiyya community believe that Ghulam Ahmad Mirza (1835–
1908) of Qadian was a prophet (albeit one who did not bring a new law or a new book), 
for most orthodox Sunni’s and Shi‘a this would constitutes a denial of the ‘finality’ or 
Prophet Muhammad. Thus technically the very definition of Ahmadi belief falls under 
                                                
461 Ironically Asrar Madani, who has a Fazil degree from Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband, also has a PhD in Early 
Arabic Poetry from the University of Glasgow in Scotland, and has chosen to reside in the land of the 
kufar, Canada! 
462 For instance a Church service declaring Christ the Son of God, would technically constitute an act of 
blasphemy against Islam. 
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the category of ‘insult’ and denial. The strategy of the Deoband has thus been two fold; to 
excommunicate the Ahmadi’s by officially declaring them non-Muslims (kafir) while 
simultaneously constituting their every day beliefs and practices as blasphemous acts, 
rendering them a permanent class of homo sacer. It would be sufficient to draw an 
Ahmadi into an open debate, or to utter the kalima, or read the Qur’an, to place charges 
of blasphemy against him.  
Given that the many deaths pertaining to the blasphemy laws have been carried 
out not by the state but by mob violence, demonstrates that the sovereign element of this 
law, the right to take life, is most directly exercised by the ‘ulama. Despite the fact that 
no one has yet been officially executed by the state, hundreds of people have been 
harassed and killed, including non-Ahmadi’s, and dozens still languish in prison awaiting 
the juridical process463. Acts of mob violence on the other hand have led to dozens of 
lynchings. It is these lynchings that produce a series of violent affects that sustain a quasi 
sovereign status for the ‘ulama; the right to declare the exception and kill the exceptio. 
Thus within Pakistan the Ahmadi’s have had to suffer persecution not only through 
courts of law, but also at the hands of prejudice by some of their fellow Muslims.464 
It was in 1974, during the tenure of Zulfikar ‘Ali Bhutto, in an effort to appease 
the religious right, that the Ahmadi’s were declared by a constitutional amendment to be 
a non-Muslim minority. Bhutto was also facing civil unrest of the kind that was fomented 
                                                
463 According the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan between 1994-1996, 94 Ahmadis were killed by 
sectarian mobs. Over 70 have been murderously assaulted, 38 places of worship were either burnt, 
damaged or forcibly occupied, 15 graves were desecrated and 26 burials of members of the community 
were either prevented, or the rites disrupted. Cited in Newsline (December 2000). 
464 For a sad, but excellent account of the travesties perpetrated against the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan see 
Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Contiuous: Aspects of Ahmedi Thought, vol. 3, Comparative Studies on 
Muslim Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 
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in 1952,465 unrest that was fomented by the thuggish wings of the JUI, the Tahaffuz-i 
Khatm-i Nubuwwat. Bhutto had wanted to defer to the matter of the Ahmadi’s to the 
Council of Islamic Ideology, but Mufti Mahmood led the demand for an immediate 
constitutional amendment. Other Islamist parties smelling blood and a point of weakness, 
joined the fray against Bhutto, including Mian Tufail the second amir of the Jama‘at-i 
Islami. The matter was taken to the National Assembly and subsequently a Second 
Amendment to the 1973 Constitution was passed in September of 1974.466 The state was 
now like a Pope, in the business of excommunication, directly contradicting the principle 
of religious freedom and the avowedly secular ethic of Jinnah. However the ruling was 
consistent with the Objectives Resolution which hovered over the constitution like a 
sovereign ghost, both simultaneously in and outside of the law. With the formal folding 
of the Objectives Resolution within the constitutional framework in 1985, a long sought 
after goal of the Deoband was achieved. The state was now constitutionally bound to 
ensure that no law of the state was repugnant to Islam. What had been a rather vague 
imperative was now a legal article. However what had been introduced under the cover of 
the Objectives Resolution, and formally incorporated into the legal system, is a system of 
dual and competing sovereignty. If the constitution were a personality it would now be 
diagnosed with multiple schizophrenia. Pakistan’s personality disorder is violently 
                                                
465 On May 22, a group of 160 students from Peshawar boarded a train to Multan. As they stopped in 
Rabwah, the predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual headquarters of the Ahmadiyya community, they 
began hurling insults at the locals. As the train returned from Multan, it stopped again in Rabwah, and this 
time a group of Ahmadi’s had formed to counter the students. An altercation with knives and sticks ensued 
which led to thirty serious injuries. Disturbances followed in the wake of the governments failure to meet 
demands by agitators to crack down on Ahmadi’s in the government. Sporadic violence against Ahmadi 
homes and properties ensued and a countrywide general strike took place in June. (Dawn News, May-July, 
1973). Though media reports of the time do not confirm this, it is likely that the students from Peshawar 
were affiliates of the Khatm-i Nubuwwat. 
466 Clause (3), added to Article 260 which defines a non-Muslim, expands a general definition to include 
See Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (Karachi & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 297. 
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apparent today, as the country verges on the brink of an expansion of an already ongoing 
de facto civil war in the NWFP and FATA regions. 
A decade following the 1974 act of excommunication, the war against the 
Ahmadi escalated from a theological rebuke to a matter of criminality. Under Zia ul-Haq, 
the anti-Ahmadi Ordinance XX was introduced into the Pakistani criminal code in 1984. 
Under article 298c467 introduced by the ordinance, Ahmadi’s could be criminally charged 
if caught “impersonating” a Muslim, with a possible sentence of up to three years. 
However the decisive shift occurred under the democratically elected regime of Nawaz 
Sharif,468 who introduced the notorious blasphemy laws in 1993. The penalty for 
insulting the Prophet, and if the SSP had their way the Companions of the Prophet,469 
now carried the death penalty, and a case could be filed without the need for an FIR. The 
law made it a capital offense for Ahmadi’s to publicly recite the Shahada or read the 
                                                
467 The offences prescribed for religious offences have been provided in Sections 295, 295a, 295b, 295c, 
296, 297, 298, 298a, 298b and 298c of the Pakistan Penal Code. Section 295 was originally a hold over 
from the introduction of a blasphemy clause introduced by the British in the colonial era. In 1990, the 
Federal Shariat Court declared the death sentence as mandatory for any blasphemy against the Holy 
Prophet. Originally article 298c only stipulated a prison penalty for those caught ‘posing’ as Muslims, aka 
the Ahmadiyya. Later in 1993, section 295c was added, covering the crime of blasphemy against the 
Prophet, with its stipulation of the death penalty. Section 295c of the Pakistan Penal Code (Blasphemy Act) 
imposes the death penalty on anyone found to have “by words or visible representation or by an imputation 
or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiled the name of the Prophet Muhammad of Islam”. Additionally 
any one accused of blaspheming against the Quran would also be awarded life imprisonment under the 
same section of the Blasphemy Act. See appendix A. 
468 It has recently been alleged that Nawaz Sharif’s 1990 election campaign was in part sponsored by both 
the ISI and Osama in Laden (Daily Times, Thursday, June 23, 2005), and represented a return of the 
military after a ‘democratic’ Benazir Bhutto hiatus. The more radical elements of his IJI (Islamic 
Democratic Alliance) coalition were demanding the implementation of Islamic finance which included a 
ban on interest. Since this would have resulted in the collapse of Pakistan’s finance and banking sector, 
Sharif allowed the introduction of those aspects of the ‘ulama demands which would not upset his 
economic standing with the ruling class of Pakistan. The blasphemy laws seemed like a fair concession to 
Sharif, but it was perhaps the final crack in the constitutional walls which allowed ‘ulama sovereign to 
spiral out of control. 
469 Such a law would target Shi‘a’s who generally show a disregard for the three caliphs (Sahaba, 
Companions), Abu Bakr, Usman and Omar, for usurping ‘Ali ’s leadership. 
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Qur’an.470 Khomeini’s 1989 fatwa against Rushdie was also playing itself out in the 
background, and was perhaps a major impetus behind the shift. The task was now easy, 
since the Ahmadi denial of the finality of the prophet could be folded under the charge of 
blasphemy.  
While the exemplary focus of such violence in Pakistan has been on the Ahmadi 
community, the real target of these laws are not simply members of the Ahmadi, 
Christian or Shi‘a minority (even if such excluded populations bear the brunt of the 
violence) but the entire body politick itself. While the blasphemy laws have certainly 
been directed with more viciousness at messianic tendencies within Islam (Ahmadi, 
Shi‘a), that is to say those that might challenge the validity of the Deoband as guardians 
of the law, the ‘ulama deployment of the laws of apostasy must principally be seen as a 
sovereign, rather than a juridical strategy; a strategy which as we shall see in the final 
chapter is deployed against the Deoband ‘ulama themselves. 
Veteran journalist I. A. Rahman has long documented the sad chronology of 
persecution facilitated under the new climate of 295c. One of the more prominent cases 
was that of the 13 year old boy Salamat Masih. On May 11, 1993 the case of the 
Christian brothers Salamat, Rehmat and Manzoor Masih made international headlines 
and was the cause for significant embarrassment worldwide. The case against the Masih 
boys was based on an allegation that they had written sacrilegious slogans on a wall, and 
                                                
470 In 1997, the landlord of the house my family was then residing at, suddenly passed away. Nasrullah 
sahib was a good friend of my fathers. The Defense Housing Society’s Sultan Masjid was a stone throw 
away from our house, and my father went to he mosque to procure siparas (individually printed chapters of 
the Qur’an which are recited during the wake ceremony. It is customary at a funeral wake for relatives and 
friends to complete a reading of the Qur’an). When the imam asked my father who had died, he told him 
that it was our landlord. The imam knew that Nasrullah was an Ahmadi and refused to loan the siparas. 




they were booked under Sections 295a and 295c of the Penal Code. During trial it turned 
out that two of the brothers were illiterate and could not write. Despite this they were 
sentenced to death by a Sessions Judge on February 9, 1995.471 Due to severe 
international pressure, the Lahore High Court, acquitted Salamat Masih and Rehmat 
Masih of blasphemy charges on February 22, 1995, and the boys were subsequently 
exiled to Canada for fear that the ‘Ulama would arrange for their extra-judicial murder. 
The case and the manner of its unfolding however sent shivers down the Christian 
community in Pakistan who realized that they were now permanent homo sacer.472 Prior 
to the arrest of the Masihs two persons had already been sentenced to death, one Christian 
the other Muslim. Both men suffered harsh conditions in jail, and during their trials 
remained under the threat of lynching by the zealous crowds that would gather at the 
court proceedings. The court events were turned into regular spectacles reminiscent of the 
crowds gathering around the scaffolds of Paris during the Ancien régime. The ‘ulama 
used each event as an opportunity to display the potential of their power over life. 
Furthermore in all of these cases the force that comes to bear on the subject (on the 
Ahmadi, or the Shi‘a) is directed against her very life and lifestyle, rather than particular 
acts. This represents a transition of ‘ulama power from a more pastoral ad disciplinary 
mode to a biopolitical and sovereign one. 
On May 5th 1998, John Joseph, a Roman Catholic Bishop from Faisalabad, who 
had long crusaded against the country's growing religious fundamentalism, intolerance 
and the discriminatory laws against minorities, committed an act of public suicide 
reminiscent of the June 11, 1963 political suicide of the Mahayana Buddhist monk Thich 
                                                
471 Newsline (May 1993) 




Quang Duc in Saigon, a self-immolation now immortalized in Malcom Brown’s Pulitzer 
prize winning photograph. Bishop Joseph shot himself in front the sessions court in 
Sahiwal in protest against the court’s decision to award the death sentence to another 
Christian Ayub Masih on the charge of blasphemy. The Bishop and the Monk, sacrificing 
their bodies in protest against new violent and imperial structures. The homology 
between Islamism and America could not be more complete. 
 
The Sovereign Space of Blasphemy 
If we take briefly into consideration the declining regard of the ‘ulama in 
postcolonial Pakistan473 then we can understand both the affective and socio-economic 
factors that facilitated their turn towards a strategy of power and authority that can be 
described as sovereign rather than juridical. The ‘ulama’s new sovereign strategy 
revolves around the production of boundaries and a space of obedience. As DeCaroli 
notes, “the work of sovereignty precedes the law … the sovereign field precedes and 
enables the judicial decision. This decision—a legal decision that is readily obeyed—
must have a territory to which it is applied. Not a neutral space, but a space that is 
capable of being obedient.”474 Additionally the ability to exercise the authority to define 
the boundaries of Muslimness and therefore of inclusion and exclusion, which is itself a 
necessary condition for the declaration of banishment (declaring who is in, momin and 
                                                
473 Enshrined in the early chapters of nationalist memory was the hostility of the majority of the ‘ulama (of 
the Ahrar and the JUH) to Jinnah and the Muslim League. For many ‘ulama what could not be 
countenanced was the hijacking of Islam by the Pakistan movement. This memory has since been erased by 
Zia’s revisionist orthodoxy. See Khursheed Kamal Aziz, The Murder of History in Pakistan (Lahore: 
Vanguard Press, 1998). 
474 Steven DeCaroli, "Boundary Stones: Giorgio Agamben and the Field of Sovereignty " in Giorgio 




who is out, kufaar) relies on the capacity for the violent enforcement of these boundaries 
rather than on a capacity for juridical reasoning. In this way the production of a space of 
exception and violent spatial affect go hand in hand. Hence ‘ulama authority is tied to the 
presence of and establishment of boundaries which are themselves maintained by acts of 
violence. That this power is exercised by rival faction of Deoband jihadists against each 
other, let alone their Shi‘a and Barelwi adversaries comes as no surprise. 
From a structural point of view, the effective deracination of the Ahmadi, their 
excommunication from the fold of the ummah, can be seen as a way of stripping them of 
their “Muslim” citizenship. This state sanctioned act of exclusion from the domain of 
Islam, should be seen as a parallel move to the denationalization of Jews under the 
Nuremberg Laws. Both were preludes to the production of homo sacer and hence can be 
regarded as a malleable juridical apparatus for sovereign power. The declaration of the 
Muslim as infidel (murtid), and the invocation of jahiliyyah (‘the state of ignorance’) is 
also of course the time honored strategy of all jihadist groups who seek to deploy their 
mythic violence against fellow Muslims. This is the general meaning of the biopolitical 
sovereign strategy of the ‘ulama, the assumption of the authority to decide when it is 
permissible to harm those who are haram. The political power to declare the borders of 
the umma-gination, between inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion, thus defines the 
basic logic of ‘ulama sovereignty. This is not a territorial logic but a juridico-political 
one. This sovereign logic is concerned not with the law itself, with ethics or with the 
illegal, but with the boundary between the legal and the non-legal. This between, or zone 
of indistinction, “appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form”,475 a “no-
                                                
475 Agamben, State of Exception. 
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man’s-land between public law and political fact … between the juridical order and 
life.”476 Effectively then the juridification of the shari‘a is marked by this collapse of the 
political and the juridical, and as shari‘a is understood as corresponding to the structure 
of canonized law. 
The biopolitical significance of the state of exception “as the original structure in 
which law encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension” therefore emerges 
not only paradigmatically in military orders, whether by Bush, Musharraf or Hitler, but 
also through the fatwa, which is itself transformed from an opinion on the path of ethical 
life, to a sovereign command. The exemplary case of the fatwa as a sovereign command 
was of course Khomeini’s 1989 declaration of Rushdie as apostate. The act was designed 
of course to shore up power for Khomeini. Agamben’s description of homo sacer could 
very well be a perfect description of Rushdie’s life following the fatwa; 
… his entire existence is reduced to a bare life stripped of every right by 
virtue of the fact that anyone can kill him without committing homicide; 
he can save himself only in perpetual flight or a foreign land. And yet he is 
in a continuous relationship with the power that banished him precisely 
insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditioned threat of 
death. He is pure zoē, but his zoē is as such caught in the sovereign ban 
and must reckon with it at every moment finding the best way to elude or 
deceive it.477  
 
Thus what is at stake in the power of the ban, in the maintenance of a “torturable” 
subject (pace Dick Cheney), or the apostate as homo sacer, is not the application of the 
law to a crime, or the determination of the illicit from the licit, but the creation of the very 
grounds of sovereign power and rule. And as we have seen in the previous chapter, this 
“space devoid of law” is “so essential to the juridical order that it must seek in every way 
                                                
476 Ibid. 
477 ———, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
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to assure itself a relation with it.”478 The Deoband and Taliban’s recourse to the notion 
that they are simply executing the shari‘a, is therefore a strategy of (self) misdirection, 
one that both sanctifies their drive for absolute sovereign authority over territory and 
bodies, and obscures the connection between sovereignty and the capture of bare life 
within their juridico-political orbit.  
With the example of the next section we can see how the Deoband ‘ulama have 
deployed these juridical and affective technologies, specifically injunctions against 
blasphemy and apostasy, to carve out the boundaries and the form of an Islamic body 
(ummah) over which they can exercise greater forms of sovereign authority and control. 
The case specifically highlights not only the tensions, contradictions and imbrications 
between competing forms of sovereign power over the space of the political in Pakistan, 
but also the ways in which such sovereign powers overlap and resonate. Specifically we 
are talking of the mullah-military complex. 
 
 
Heretics of the Modern 
 
Contemporary global understandings remain attuned to historical narratives that 
naturalize a particular, territorially oriented view of sovereignty, reinforce it with 
a political economy story that disparages precommercial systems of livelihood 
and exchange, and substitutes myths of evolutionary development for histories of 
violent confrontation and usurpation.479  
 
Territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it is first of all a juridico-political 
one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power.480  
 
                                                
478 ———, State of Exception. 
479 Michael J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997). 
480 Foucault in Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden, eds., Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and 
Geography (Ashgate Publishing Co., 2007). 
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Blasphemy is about many things but central to its articulations is the concept of 
boundaries, and limits (or hudud in Arabic). The ‘ulama’s juridification of the shari‘a 
facilitates their role in the marking of social boundaries and limits (hudood), and the 
corresponding exercise of the exception through banning and exclusion. By articulating 
the boundaries of Muslimness, the ‘ulama are able to constitute the ummah; Muslim 
People are produced through the deployments of specific biopolitical relationships and a 
distinctive logic of exclusion. 
What I am interested in here is the grammar of blasphemy and how its 
corresponding notion of the heretic, the apostate, the murtid, function, across a range 
borders and different spaces; appearing here as the jihadist, the fanatic, the Islamist, the 
suicide bomber, and there as the kafir, apostate and murtid. We should ask then, what 
does blasphemy look like when it is mirrored in spaces marked either as secular or 
religious (tradition/modern, secular/profane). I would suggest that the more general 
process of exclusion, and legitimized violence against the excluded, shows up on a 
number of horizons in addition to the more recognizable framework of ‘heresy’. This 
would include for instance the question of ‘national security’ which itself took the form 
of heresy in the United States during the McCarthy era. For some years after 911, and in 
many sub-cultures of the United States, being Muslim was tantamount to prophesying a 
heresy against the religion of the United States.481 
As Edward Said has taught (some of) us so well, imperial formations are 
sustained and imbricated within culture. In a recent fit of Huntingtonian rage, and quite 
reminiscent of the liberal excoriations directed against British Muslims during the 
                                                
481 One could recall numerous media instances; when North Carolina University required its incoming 
freshman class to read Michael Sell’s Approaching the Qur’an, Fox News’ mullah O’Reilly was outraged 
and demanded to know why students were forced to read “the book of our enemy?” 
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Rushdie affair, David Brooks, conservative ‘alim, of the NYT, draws banal yet emotively 
sharp demarcations between the West/Us/US and its constituent other, Muslim 
protestors/Islam/Them. Brooks writes “We in the West,482 were born into a world that 
reflects the legacy of Socrates and the agora. In our world … Our mind-set is progressive 
and rational. Your mind-set is pre-Enlightenment and mythological. In your worldview, 
history doesn't move forward through gradual understanding. In your worldview, history 
is resolved during the apocalyptic conflict ……”483 Of course one could comment 
endlessly on the magnitude of rank stupidities embedded in this piece, but I bring up his 
op-ed up not because it is one more variant of Islamophobia, but rather what interests me 
here is the notion that pious, secular and political Muslims (Islamists) alike, belong not 
just to another incommensurable civilization but belong outside of time. They are thus at 
best medieval specters, but certainly they are modernities heretics. Brooks, in a variation 
of a fatwa that is endlessly reproduced in the media, was effectively laying out both 
spatial and temporal boundaries of the West, in order to facilitate the production of 
“abombable”484 spaces. Similarly, the editors of the Zionist magazine Forward, in 
response to Cartoongate write: “Suddenly, that old sense of shared European-American 
culture and values, so quaintly archaic just a year ago, seems more alive than ever.” In 
best selling author Robert Kaplan’s heroic portrait of American Empire he writes about 
the Muslim World as the new Wild West: “‘Welcome to Injun Country’ was the refrain I 
heard from troops from Colombia to the Philippines, including Afghanistan and Iraq.... 
                                                
482 And I am afraid that even those Muslims living in the “US” and speaking very good English, are for 
neocons like Brooks, at best liminal moderns, that is, in the West but yet not of it. 
483 David Brooks, “Drafting Hitler”, New York Times, Feb 6, 2006. Emphasis mine. 
484 Short for abominable and bomb-able! 
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The War on Terrorism was really about taming the frontier.”485 The violence of such 
renewed Orientalist discourses thus collapses the distinctions of temporality and space 
between Iraqis and Iroquis, folding the two points into a newly constituted moral 
geography whose newly fashioned juridico-political boundary is subject to policing and 
the exercise of exceptional Imperial power. 
The 20th century elaboration of American Empire, especially in its relationship to 
Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Iran and more recently Iraq and Afghanistan, map out what 
Derek Gregory has called a colonial present, an ongoing and profound imperial perimeter 
of power.486 This element of the colonial present corresponds with the ontic elaboration 
of the meta-colonial. The Pakistani State has itself, clearly fallen under the ambit of a 
specifically American grand geopolitical strategy, in ways structurally analogous perhaps 
to the relationship between autonomous Indian Princely States and Colonial Britain after 
1857.487 It is thus not surprising that academic discourses on Pakistan have historically 
been dominated by “security” and political science studies. Additionally the vast corpus 
of otherwise insightful theorizing and sometime brilliant works that have emerged from 
within the field of postcolonial studies, are of limited provenance for understanding and 
evaluating Pakistan’s specific political career (as compared to India), especially when 
such paradigms privilege the colonial effects of the past while occluding a neo-imperial 
or colonial present.488 However we might wish to label this current imperial relationship, 
                                                
485 Kaplan, Robert, Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground. 
486 Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq. 
487 Citizen-subjects of the Pakistani nation state in relationship to Washington, their coloniality, so to speak, 
can be said to have structural analogies with metropole/colony relationship prior to 1947 
488 It should be noted that the terms Empire and Imperialism (with or without the qualifiers “new” or “neo”) 
are not being invoked as rigid or monovocal designators. I am mindful of the ways in which the 
applicability of these terms is fraught with its own challenges, in particular for accurately distinguishing 
aspects of difference and continuity from the colonial and imperial orders of the past. In this sense, given a 
host of international institutions (IMF, World Bank, NATO, US Military Bases, etc) which have effectively 
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whose primary modality of engagement has been though the cultivation of military 
networks, it is necessary to register the concrete and transformative effects of institutions 
of global power which intersect, interdict and are otherwise ineluctably imbricated with 
local “Pakistani” sovereignties. This is not to suggest that a fully determined and wholly 
constituted set of singular constraints and possibilities are determined by this neo-
colonial relationship. But it does allude to the substantial transformative effects on the 
political, cultural and affective cartography of the region, effects that have Empire as one 
its more significant conditions of possibility. By going beyond the paradigm of Pakistan’s 
postcolonial condition, the metacolonial aims to highlight a haunting by an intertwined 
metaphysical and colonial present. This formulation is designed not only to disturb the 
agency of Pakistan, and question the scope and effect of its supposed territorial 
sovereignty, but also to problematize the ascription of certain narratives of history 
(whether in the trope of ‘crisis’ or ‘success’) as ‘belong to’ or ‘being of’ something called 
“Pakistan” in the first place. That is to say Pakistan should not be understood in isolation 
from the wider network of imbricated politics, communications, ideas and economy. 
Conventional histories of Pakistan and its subject-citizens have become part of what Said 
has termed an “imaginative geography,” where distance from the imperial center is 
narrated as difference through a series of spatializations. What conventional narratives 
that seek to uncover or reveal aspects of the “history of Pakistan” occlude are the 
concrete and material imperial effects on such ‘autonomous’ spaces, spaces which are in 
                                                
continued to extend and exacerbate, spheres of inequality and uneven distributions of wealth and power, by 
means both overt and subtle, it makes little sense to talk of a uniform spaces of “postcoloniality” in either 
Asia, Latin America or Africa, let alone the Middle East. Broadly speaking however we understand the 
term Imperial, to designate the contemporary use and exercise of American military and economic power, 
ideologically infused with strains of neoconservative and American nationalist purpose, in the broader 
service of neoliberalism; that is a global system of political economy which extends the sovereignty of the 
market into all arenas of life. 
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effect subjected to disciplining and control within the wider politico-juridical landscape 
of Empire. And if both empire and capital themselves, from the vantage of the 
metacolonial, are symptomatic of yet another emergency, then the crisis of Pakistan 
should be viewed not as an anomalous divergence from the path of a proper political 
development, but merely one more, albeit rather bloody and precarious shade of the 
political itself. 
In this section then, I will attempt to suture the historical ruptures through which a 
series of boundaries and spatialized difference are established, spatializations that are 
central to the constitution of both otherness and the ‘architecture of enmity’.489 The 
seemingly oppositional politics of Empire and Islam, America and Pakistan, are instead 
only appositional; mutually constitutive and increasingly reliant on each other for the 
production of boundaries and affect, sentiments that in turn animate calls for violent and 
coercive political action. In relation to the broad assemblage and complex global 
networks of colossal power that goes under the term Empire, one needs to be mindful of 
the ways in which Islamist revolutionary fantasies becomes the basis for further Imperial 
desire and the doctrine of legitimacy of a new manifest destiny for the 21st century. A 
very local element of this tension is currently being played out between the Pakistan 
Army and the Taliban. What I am concerned with is negotiating a passage around 
multiple layers of imbricated policing functions. I am attempting to find a language that 
lies beyond Islamist Fantasies on the one hand and Imperial Desires on the other. As such 
my concern implicitly, and more broadly, is with the figure of the “Muslim” as a subject 
of, and as subject to, a variety of political, juridical, theoretical and historico-political 
                                                
489 The phrase is Gregory’s 
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discourses. My aim is to pry open the space for developing a language of critique and 
terms of understanding that refuse the universalizing hegemony of both liberal-secular, 
and Islamist discourses of modernity. 
 
A Tale of Two Shaikh’s 
Writing from within the dark solitary confines of his dungeon, a hapless prisoner 
makes an impassioned plea to his fellow nationals: “I am a victim of the abuse of Section 
295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code” wrote Dr. Younas M. Shaikh, from his Adyala Jail 
cell in Rawalpindi. “There was no definite evidence against me, still there was much 
religious pressure and so the mullaism [sic] and the abuse of religion got me here. I hope 
American war against religious terrorism [sic] will also affect the religious terrorism of 
codified law in Pakistan as well as its abuse in the administration of justice.”490 
Like all good tales about the Muslim world these days, this one too is suffused 
with reference to that most famous date in history, so famous that one need not even 
specify the year. Younas M. Shaikh’s plea was penned, on October 12, 2001. However 
even through the thickness of his jail’s dank walls, reverberating from beyond the Khyber 
Pass to his West, Younas could not but have failed to hear the booming chatter of daisy 
cutters, furiously uprooting the weeds of religious terror, to make way for more fertile, 
possibly liberal democratic pastures. In the coming months, another Shaikh Muhammad, 
Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, mastermind of the infamous event, the event when time and 
anti-time collided, and hundreds of heretics, blasphemers and assorted evil-doers like 
him, were soon to find themselves in similar dark cells, in lands far, far away, arrested 
                                                
490 “Blasphemy - My Journey through Hell”, statement by Dr. M. Younus Shaikh (www.iheu.org. Accessed 
January 12th 2006). 
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without warrant, held indefinitely, in places unknown, with secret evidence if any at all 
arrayed against them. As we know now the code name for these penal black holes is 
“Bright Light”, suggesting of course the liminal passageway on the edge of death. 
Returning to our first Shaikh, Dr. Younas, then a 45 year old Pakistani medical 
professor, had been arrested without warrant a year earlier by the Islamabad police in 
October of 2000, and was booked under Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. The son of a local 
merchant, with impeccable religious credentials, a Hafiz-i Qur’an no less, Shaikh had 
studied medicine in Pakistan and in Ireland, and at the time of his arrest he was working 
part time at a small clinic and teaching at a Homeopathic Medical College in Islamabad. 
Earlier, in 1992, Dr. Shaikh, single-handedly, inaugurated “The Enlightenment” in 
Pakistan, an organization committed to “rationalist and democratic principles” which 
advocated the “principles of liberalism, secularism and humanism.” Above all Shaikh’s 
enlightenment group argued for separation of state and religion. The blasphemy 
accusation against him was based on a few statement, which he allegedly made in one of 
his lectures while answering questions about the state of hygienic practices during the 
time of the Prophet Muhammad. He allegedly had insisted that the practice of shaving 
hair under the armpit was a modern invention, and not observed by the Prophet and his 
contemporaries. Additionally he had stated the obvious that Muhammad’s parents were 
not Muslims because they died before Islam existed. These allegedly ‘hair raising’ 
responses became the basis for an FIR, a criminal complaint under Section 295-C of the 
penal code. The complain was filed by Maulana Abdur Rafoof, an Islamabad based 
mullah affiliated with the Majlis-i Tahafuz-e-Khatm-i Nubuwwat. The Khatm-i 
Nubuwwat organization thus effectively functions as anti-heretical harassment wing of 
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the Deoband ‘ulama political party (JUI). The alleged informer, a student of Dr. Shaikh’s, 
who was also linked with the anti-Ahmadi anti-Shi‘a, Khatm-e Nubuwwat movement, 
had himself not personally attended Dr. Shaikh's lecture when the alleged blasphemy had 
occurred. The case of heresy was hence drafted almost entirely on hearsay.491 
According to Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, police can arrest an accused without 
obtaining a warrant of a judicial magistrate or filling an FIR (First Information Report). 
After his arrest, Dr. Shaikh was kept for fifteen days in police custody, and denied bail. 
There were reports that his reading glasses were broken, leaving him in a state of 
helplessness. Throughout his ordeal, he had no lawyer, since most of the lawyers in 
Pakistan don’t dare to appear in blasphemy cases for fear of becoming target of 
fundamentalists rage themselves. In the court room, at his first hearing, an aggressive 
group of some twenty clerics of the Deoband’s Majlis-i Tahafuz-e-Khatm-i Nubuwwat 
exerted pressure on the legal proceedings by appealing to religious sentiment. This form 
of what I will call “taqwa”492 politics, has become the standard procedure at such legal 
proceedings. As a sovereign tactic taqwa politics is designed to induce a fear of Islam 
among the population and bears little resemblance to the ethical meaning of taqwa. 
Although no body of crime was established nor was any substantive material evidence 
offered by the prosecution, Younas was pronounced guilty on 18th August 2001, fined 
Rs.100,000, and sentenced to death. In many ways the victims of these proceedings can 
be seen as judicial sacrifices offered to the clergy. In Pakistan, blasphemy-accused are 
not only facing a potential death penalty, but even while in jail, they are in danger of 
                                                
491 The parallels with the recent witch hunts at Columbia University spearheaded under the ominous David 
Project should be obvious. David Project is an organization dedicated, much like the Tehreek-e-Difa 
Sahaba which is itself a ‘propaganda’ countering organization, to silencing of any critique the State of 
Israel in its exercise of sovereign power over its own homo sacer constituent; the Palestinians. 
492 Piety, induced in part through the fear of God. 
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being beaten or killed by prison guards or fellow inmates. If acquitted, they face the 
further possibility of vigilante justice. Since the mid-1980’s when the blasphemy laws 
went on the books, hundreds of cases have been filled, and though no one has yet been 
awarded capital punishment, a few hundred individuals still languish in prison, and 
several incidents have resulted in the murder of alleged blasphemers, in some cases even 
before any legal proceedings went into play.493  
“For the next two years, I was held in solitary confinement in a very small death 
cell in the Central Jail, Rawalpindi, a dark and dirty death cell with unbearable, stinking 
and distasteful food. There was no facility for walking or exercise, and I was without 
books, newspapers, medication or treatment for my worsening diabetes. I remained 
constantly under threat of murder by Islamic fundamentalist inmates themselves in jail 
for murder and gang rape, or by some religiously-minded prison warden.”494 Subsequent 
to an appeal, Younas Shaikh, forced to defend himself by secretly smuggling law books 
into his death cell, was eventually acquitted on November 2003. His lamentable three 
year long nightmare ended up in forced exile in Switzerland.495 
Up until now my account of this witch hunt, which like the case of suicide 
bombers, and the exploits of jihadism in general, should produce the familiar forms of 
liberal discomfort if not revulsion. They both seemingly represent an implacable eruption 
of religious fanaticism, that simply does not belong in “our liberal-secular humanist 
space-time.” But there is one critical element of Dr. Younas Shaikh’s plight that I have 
omitted, and in covering this omission I am hoping to slide in one of my main 
methodological agendas, namely that we shift our gaze from the grotesque, from the 
                                                
493 I document one such tragic case in the next chapter. 
494 “Blasphemy - My Journey through Hell”, statement by Dr. M. Younus Shaikh. 
495 One is forced to conclude that he was not given a fair shake by the Pakistani juridical system. 
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register of politics as morality, to the register of the political understood as both discourse 
and concrete material relationships of power.  
Younas was also a strong public advocate of people-people relationships between 
South Asian nations, and specifically was critical of the Pakistani militaries abuse of the 
Kashmir problem: the ways in which it fostered a wedge between Pakistanis and Indians, 
and facilitated the construction of an enemy, which in turn fueled the logic of military 
rule. On 1st October 2001, Younas attended a meeting of the South Asian Union in 
Islamabad to discuss Pakistani-India Relations and Nuclear War. At the meeting he 
expressed the view that Pakistan and India should agree, that in the interest of the people 
of Kashmir, that the present line of demarcation should become an official line of peace 
line: the international border between the two countries. He also criticized the armies use 
of “freedom fighters” known elsewhere as terrorists – as a political instrument in 
Kashmir. Following Younas’ talk, Shaukat Qadir, a Brigadier from the ISI, threatened 
Younas and said that he would “crush the heads of those who think and talk like that”.496 
A few days after this, Younas was summoned to the principals office, fired without 
cause, and as he left the office was arrested by police. His first act of heresy, thus was 
thus against the dominant power structure of the Pakistani nation state, the military and 
its shadowy intelligence agency the ISI. 
My deliberate conjuncture of the case of Younas M. Khalid, the Pakistani 
blasphemer, with Khalid Sheikh Muhammad the Pakistani born Kuwaiti terrorist, is to 
suggest a kind of homology, not equivalence, between both types of heresy. The body of 
the blasphemer has traditionally been the cite for spectacular forms of disciplinary 
                                                
496 Quoted in Ardeshir Cowasjee “In the name of the law”, Dawn, March 14, 2004. 
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punishment and juridical excess, and specifically the use of torture (or the threat of 
mutilation and death) was designed to extract confessions. There are disturbing parallels 
with the CIA’s use of water boarding and indefinite solitary confinement, to produce the 
what I will call the Dershowitzian confession, and the forms of punishment and 
confessional extraction deployed during the Salem witch trials. Both forms of apostasy 
involve the denial and defilement of the symbols of sovereignty. What I seek to highlight 
however is the manner in which the two figures are constructed as fully biopolitical 
subjects, subjects who posses dangerous and socially destructive forms of knowledge, 
and on whose bodies then, a subsequent host of disciplinary and governmental 
rationalities are allowed to unfold.  
 
 
Taqwa Politics and the Publics Fear 
 
During the US financed and politically supported dictatorship of General Zia ul-
Haq (1977 – 1987), the Deoband were able to achieve two of their self-proclaimed major 
socio-political goals: the legislative and religious exorcism of the Ahmadiyya from the 
broader Muslim community in Pakistan, and the codification of blasphemy laws, under 
the ambit of a wider shariatization of the judicial framework. Placed within the context 
of the ‘ulama’s paradoxical relationship to the modern post-colonial nation state, the anti-
Ahmadiyya movement was one of the first steps towards what is improperly but widely 
understood as the “radical fundamentalism” or “Talibanization” of the Deoband. 
Talibanization is simply the logical fruition of the violent unfolding of a sovereign logic. 
I would argue that an understanding of the radicalization of the ‘ulama and its militant 
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policing of the boundaries of Islam, must be set within a series of postcolonial, meta-
colonial and metacolonial contexts. The easiest to identify is of course the later, in 
particular the repressive and regressive role of the State: namely the state’s ‘general’497 
legitimization of the use of violence, intimidation and coercion as the means for political 
participation and negotiation. The postcolonial context refers to the more complex 
process by which the textual tradition of an urbanized ‘ulama were politically privileged 
over and above the more widespread and dominant forms of ‘folk’ Islam and Sufi order. 
In this way the ‘ulama were elevated as the authentic representatives of the “Muslim 
community.” However with the decapitation of Muslim (Mughal) sovereignty the ‘ulama 
suffered a historical decline of their role, prestige and regard under colonial, and 
subsequently postcolonial modernity. The metacolonial context which is the principle 
burden of this work, needs a more careful elaboration. This metacolonial context is 
mirrored in the attempts by the ‘ulama, to politicize, and eventually dominate the process 
of defining the boundaries of Muslimness. This is but one mode of empowerment by the 
‘ulama, who have deployed the symbolic and sentimental weight of Islam, to push for the 
juridical enshrinement of blasphemy, thereby advancing their claims of political 
leadership and power over and above both civil society and the sovereign authority of the 
state. This otherwise marginal community of Islamic orthodoxy, has thus able to 
transform itself from mere subjects of daw‘a and tabligh, to agents of jihad and political 
power. 
Modern ‘ulama politics can thus be seen as drawing upon and deploying the 
symbolic weight of what is popularly marked as traditional, authentic discourse, to create 
                                                
497 pun intended! 
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new forms of political space and to exercise new forms of disciplinary power and 
authority within the ambit of larger more powerful sovereign orbits (the state, the 
empire). Additionally they engage in what I call “taqwa” politics. Taqwa is literally piety 
with resonances of a fear of the awesomeness of God. What is celebrated in taqwa 
politics however is the awesomeness of the ‘ulama, a sovereign strategy that translates 
piety to mean a fear of the ‘ulama. The military of course practices its own brand of 
taqwa politics. Thus taqwa politics is very much a politics which creates its reservoir of 
effects and affect through the cultivations of a “publics fear” within the pubic sphere. 
Since representation and display are central to strategies of power, the ‘ulama often 
choose public cites—court proceedings, women’s bodies and billboards—as spectacles 
and markers of their display of power. The production of the homo sacer is the ultimate 
form of this power. 
My primary suggestion however is that Islamic ‘theologians’, in particular those 
who advocate dwelling in political space, do not deploy something like taqwa politics as 
a conscious strategy of power. Rather their political practice represents a deeper 
alienation from the ontological ground of their own language. This is not a problem of 
misunderstanding on the part of the ‘ulama nor a transition in the formal structure of 
knowledge, one induced say by a change in the referential body of Islamic knowledges 
taught at a madrasa. Rather it is a transition in the very ‘epistemological unconscious’ or 
historical a priori, which arises as a result of the proliferation of the space of the political. 
The transition of ‘ulama practice and ethics can be seen as a transition from the exercise 
of discipline to that of control, with the rational for the exercise of sovereign power 
firmly anchored in a biopolitical understanding of the ummah. 
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From the Order of Things to Discipline and Punish, one of Foucault’s aims has 
always been to show that the basis of what we think today, the entire order of existing 
things, is radically different from that of the classical thinkers. Epistemic transformations, 
or discourses as he later called them, were ruptures that fundamentally reconfigure not 
only what kinds of things can become the objects of knowledge, but also the way in 
which these objects are configured within the new worldview. The task of a genealogy of 
Islam would be to trace these shifts. The epistemic re-configuration thus concerns the 
realm of power [savoir], and is eventually articulated in relation to the wider set of 
institutional and political developments within which Islam is put to work, mobilized and 
deployed, ways that are increasingly aimed at the salvation of the socius—the biopolitical 
body—rather than the soul.  
The movement of the Deoband into sovereign biopolitical space, their crossing of 
a spatial threshold, is a shift that was consummated in the Taliban’s capture and 
deployment of State power. It constitutes an sovereign shift in that it re-places Deoband 
authority by investing the ‘ulama with a form of power that is grounded in the ultimate 
right of the sovereign to take life, to execute, to take the decision on life and death. Today 
the only victory the Deoband (loudly) celebrates, is the victory over bodies, not souls. It 
is marked by the burst of the Kalashnikov rather than a meditation on the voice. The 
demand for the shari‘a as the preeminent law of the land, is thus not an ethical demand, it 
is a demand of sovereign power, since fatwa prescriptions will now have the force of law. 
It is the technologized relationship to being embedded in the modern political that 
results in the ‘ulama grasping Islam ontically rather than ontologically. It is not then 
Islam per say that is technologized but rather the framework of understanding, the 
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enframing grasp of modern man, which is a covering of being, and of being’s withdrawal. 
We are dealing hence not with a direct case of ‘ulama obsession for power but rather their 
possession by power (Gestell). Political Islam is therefore Islam’s historical destiny rather 
than a perversion of some original essence or a contradictory manifestation of a medieval 
spirit. Today the Pakistani Deoband’s every political gesture is stamped by this will to 
power, whereas in India it is marked by the will to survive.498 This comportment towards 
sovereign power betrays its opposition to the ethical, where the ethical is conceived as 
that which pertains to being. ‘Ulama practice is now only a competing form of 
governance over life and the body, through the enforcement, rather than enjoining of 
shari‘a; a shari‘a which is understood in terms of modern canonical law, and is thus today 
bereft of its onto-ethico possibilities. 
 
The Objectives Revolution and the Coup de ‘Ulama 
At its birth Pakistan was still effectively framed under a colonial constitution. 
Under the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the 1935 Government of 
India Act, became, with minor adaptations, the de facto working Constitution of Pakistan, 
and was known as the Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order. The colonial apparatus 
was effectively still in place, from the military to the legal establishment. It seemed only 
as if the State had been ethnicized. The unresolved problem of sovereignty however 
would prove calamitous. Today as Dr. Shashi Tharoor Minister of State for External 
                                                
498 Agamben introduces of a third formula between the symmetries of sovereign and biopower may be of 
interest here: “a formula that defines the most specific trait of twentieth-century biopolitics: no longer 
either to make die or to make live, but to make survive. The decisive activity of biopower in our time 
consists in the production not of life or death, but rather of a mutable and virtually infinite survival. … 
Biopower’s supreme ambition is to produce, in a human body, the absolute separation of the living being 
and the speaking being, zoē and bios, the inhuman and the human – survival.” Agamben, Remnants of 
Auschwitz : The Witness and the Archive. 
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Affairs of India rightly observed: “Most States have an Army. Pakistan is effectively an 
Army with a State.”499  
The first major step towards ‘decolonizing’ the inherited Constitution was taken 
by the Constituent Assembly in March 1949 when it passed a resolution on the ‘Aims and 
Objects of the Constitution’, subsequently known as the Objectives Resolution. The 
Objectives Resolution was effectively a blue-print for the new Constitution which was 
eventually adopted on March 23, 1956.500 The Constituent Assembly formed several 
committees and sub-committees to carry out its task of framing a Constitution. The most 
important one was the Basic Principles Committee which was appointed on 12 March 
1949, after the Objectives Resolution was passed by the Constituent Assembly. The JUI 
President Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani was appointed as one of its members. Its task was to 
report in accordance with the Objectives Resolution on the main principles of the future 
Constitution. The Basic Principles Committee submitted its interim report on 7th 
September 1950, and its final report in December 1952.  
The Basic Principles Committee also set up a special committee for ‘Talimaat-i 
Islamia’ (Islamic Teachings), which consisted of a range of Islamic scholars to advise on 
matters arising out of the Objectives Resolution. The Deoband had several key players on 
the Board,501 and their goal was from the beginning to make the Objectives Resolution a 
fundamental part of the constitution. The Resolution was effectively a mechanism for 
usurping the “sovereignty of God.” The Resolution was the subject of substantial 
controversy and most of the non-Muslim members of the committee wanted the 
references to the sovereign of God and Islam removed. The Objectives Resolution was in 
                                                
499 Stated on GPS with Fareed Zakaria. 
500 According to the new framework Pakistan was now an “Islamic Republic.” 
501 ‘Usmani, Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi (l884-1953) and Mufti Muhammad Shafi were members of the Board. 
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fact the key cipher, or Trojan horse, for the “shariafication” of the law, leading to the 
Shari‘at Enforcement Act of 1991, and thereby constitutes an under appreciated silent 
coup. It begins ‘In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful’ 
Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty 
alone and the authority which He has delegated to the state of Pakistan 
through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him 
is a sacred trust; This Constituent Assembly representing the people of 
Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for the sovereign independent 
State of Pakistan; … Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, 
equality, tolerance, and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully 
observed; Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the 
individual and collective sphere in accordance with the teachings and 
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah; 
Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to 
profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures; …502 
 
Much to the chagrin of the Deoband, the Principals committee only recommended adding 
the Objectives Resolution as a preamble to the constitution.503 There it hovered over the 
constitutional framework like a sovereign ghost, until 1985 when Zia formally 
incorporated it into the constitutional machine. The subsequent political haunting of 
Pakistan is evident to even the most casual observer of Pakistan’s benighted history.  
The incorporation of the Objectives Resolution as a substantive part of the 
Constitution triggered a wave of petitions to Pakistan’s superior courts attempting to 
invalidate laws on the basis of their “repugnance to Islam”. The power to examine which 
law or provision was or was not in accordance with Islamic injunctions had since the 
1956 constitution been decided either by the superior courts or parliament. Up until 1979, 
the Objectives Resolution’s provisions for ‘Islamization’ only provided for the setting up 
of advisory boards (like the Council of Islamic Ideology) that would advise on the matter 
                                                
502 For the full document see Appendix. Emphasis mine. 
503 The agitation’s of 1953 were also in response to this. 
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of conformity of laws. None of the recommendations of the advisory board carried the 
force of law. However in 1980 Zia ul-Haq established by fiat of the Provisional 
Constitutional Order, the Federal Shari‘at Court as a parallel legal body to the superior 
courts which he did not fully trust. Initially the court appointees were handpicked 
political allies, but not ‘ulama. Later however three ‘ulama were required to be on a 
Bench of five judges. The parallel Federal Shari‘at Court was now set up with powers to 
declare invalid any law or provision of a law deemed repugnant to the injunctions of 
Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an and the sunna of the Holy Prophet. Additionally as 
Foucault notes in Discipline and Punish, power gains its greatest hold on the body and 
the socius, when it intensifies, multiplies, and extends its realms of application. The 
Shari‘at Court thus effectively paved way for the ‘ulama to capture an important space 
within the ambit of state power. The entire state machinery was now constitutionally 
bound to uphold decisions of these “Islamic” Courts. The establishment of this parallel 
mechanism to Islamize the legal system independently from parliament stands undeniably 
as the main contribution of Zia ul-Haq to the “Talibanization” of Pakistan. 
Legal historian Martin Lau in his excellent account of the relationship between 
the judiciary and Islamization, makes the argument that the initial phase of Islamization, 
up until 1985 when the Objectives Resolution was formally incorporated into the 
constitution as Article 2-A, was effectively a process led by secular judges rather than the 
‘ulama. So long as the clauses relating to keeping the laws of Pakistan in accordance with 
the Shari‘a lay in the hands of the judges rather than the ‘ulama, a controlled form of 
Islamization could be used to enhance the power of the judiciary and expand the scope of 
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. In 1985 however the vague ideological 
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stipulations of the Objectives regarding the sovereignty of God were drawn into the 
Constitution. The nebulous outside was now the nebulous inside. This is a rarely 
commented upon yet landmark event. Lau suggests that this marks a transition within the 
“Islamization” process, allowing the class of ‘ulama to challenge the up until then 
judiciary led process of Islamization. Effectively this meant that Islam and its Shari‘a 
stipulations would no longer be controlled at the level of the state by largely secular, 
liberal and western trained jurists. Islam could now deployed as a “revolutionary force, 
which was threatening the state from within the very judicial institution set up to protect 
it.”504  
Lau sees this is a more radical phase of Islamization, however our thesis is to the 
contrary. Rather the Objectives Resolution should be seen as delayed revolution, and 
marks the attempts by the ‘ulama to give ‘their’ shari‘a modern powers; it marks the 
complete juridification and modernization of the shari‘a. In Agamben’s terms the shari‘a 
is now a constituted and not merely constituting power. Shari‘a transforms fully into its 
mode of enforcement. The Objectives Revolution, can also be seen as mirroring within 
constitutional and juridical spheres, the struggle between the Islamists and the All India 
Muslim League. It is not so much that the anti-Pakistan ‘ulama like the Ahrar opposed 
the idea of an Islamic State, what they opposed was the idea that the power of Islam was 
being deployed by lay, secular and elite classes. The struggle therefore at the level of the 
constitution can be seen to mirror these early political maneuverings which were aimed, 
albeit unsuccessfully, at wresting the leadership of the Pakistan movement from the 
secular, landowning elite. Through the Objectives Revolution and its eventual 
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 229 
incorporation into the ambit of the state, the subaltern class of ‘ulama have successfully 
challenged the powers of the liberal intelligentsia for leadership of the very definition of 
Pakistan. This represent a very substantial coup for the ‘ulama. 
Six years after the incorporation of the Objectives Resolution, the Supreme Court 
observed that:  
. . . in our milieu it has given rise to a controversy and a debate which has 
had no parallel, shaken the very Constitutional foundations of the country, 
made the express mandatory words of the Constitutional instrument yield 
to nebulous, undefined, controversial juristic concepts of Islamic fiqh. It 
has enthused individuals, groups and institutions to ignore, subordinate 
and even strike down at their will the various Articles of the Constitution 
by a test of what they consider the supreme Divine Law, whose supremacy 
has been recognized by the Constitution itself.505 
 
During the 1949 debates, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani expressed his views 
in support the Objectives Resolution by stating that “Islam has never accepted the view 
that religion is a private affair between man and his creator…” Islam “possess a 
comprehensive and all-embracing code of life. He then quotes Quaid-e-Azam from a 
letter he wrote to Gandhi on August, 1944. Jinnah: “The Qur’an is a complete code of 
life. It provides for all matters, religious or social, civil or criminal, military or penal, 
economic or commercial. It regulates every act, speech and movement from the 
ceremonies of religion to those of daily life, from the salvation of the soul to the health of 
the body; from the rights of all to those of such individual, from the punishment here to 
that in the life to come. Therefore, when I say that the Muslims are a nation, I have in my 
mind all physical and metaphysical standards and values.” The cipher proper then the real 
Trojan horse for the rise of Islamist power, are not the ‘ulama, but Jinnah himself. 
                                                





Force-of-Law and the Law of Force 
 
“Woe to you, men of the law, for you have taken away the key to knowledge: 
you yourselves have not entered, and you have not let the others who approached 
enter either.”506 
 
Today’s technological exploitation and devastation of nature is a marker of 
nihilistic mode of comportment towards being, or what Heidegger called technē. It is my 
contention that the comportment of modern Muslims to “Islam”, is similarly structured 
by the episteme of technē, a modality exemplified in the Deoband demand for the 
“enforcement of shari‘a.” 
A genealogy of Islam concerns itself then with the history of this presence, this 
episteme, and would trace the way in which Islam’s originary ethical potential, the ēthos 
of submission of the will exemplified in certain Sufi practices for instance, is in conflict 
with the ēthos of the modern polis, the political, whose essence is the will to power. The 
deployment of Shari‘a as an instrument of power represents this transition from a will to 
god, to a will to power. I am not suggesting here that Muslims ought not to have or 
engage in politics. In fact such a proposition would be impossible for the spaces we 
inhabit are inescapably political. The proper (authentic) task of politics would be to 
disclose this space in its coincidence with the exception, as the first task towards a de-
linking of law and violence. A genealogy of political Islam concerns itself with disclosing 
the transition of Islamic ‘ilm in its relation to power (its savoir). The emergence of 
Islamic subjectivity and the current obsession with Muslim identity (ethnos) is 
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inextricably linked to the metastasis of the modern polis, whose topos (topological 
structure) Agamben has shown to coincide, like sovereignty, with the state of exception. 
The crossing of a threshold of indistinction within Muslim society between auctoritas 
and potestas, marks this transition to modernity, which under the figure of the Taliban 
and the Islamic suicide bomber, has reached its catastrophic apogee. 
Couched behind the fidelity to the will of God, the (dis)honest claim of merely 
being followers of an Islamic logos, the political violence that drives the campaign for the 
primacy of the shari‘a (whether at the hands of the Saudi monarchy, Zia ul-Haq, or 
Mullah Omar) must be seen as the deployment of shari‘a as an instrument of use value 
which potentially confers authority and power (auctoritas and potestas) or sovereignty to 
those in possession of the cipher, or ‘ark’ of shari‘a. This power is itself enabled by the 
power to issue edicts and proclamations (fatwa). In this sense the technologization of 
Islam is manifest precisely in the transformation of the desire of the fatwa to extend from 
opinion to something like a force-of-law. Like the liberal assumption of rational 
objectivity, Islamism is effectively blind to the will to power that undergirds its pious 
homage to the gramma of Islamic law. As this chapter has in part labored to disclose, the 
‘ulama interest in the shari‘a as a force of law is most clearly betrayed through their 
intense efforts to produce the exception. The state of exception Agamben writes “is an 
anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law (which should 
therefore be written: force-of-law) Such a “force-of- law” in which potentiality and act 
are radically separated, is certainly something like a mystical element, or rather a fictio by 
means of which law seeks to annex anomie itself.”507 This force-of-law is also revealed in 
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the reverence for the jihadists who is a man of pure action. More significantly “the 
syntagma force of law refers in the technical sense not to the law but to those decrees 
(which, as we indeed say, have the force of law) that the executive power can be 
authorized to issue in some situations, particularly in the state of exception.” Thus taqwa 
politics also enable the fatwa to be mobilized as force of law, as decree rather than 
opinion. The ‘ulama then can be seen as interested in deploying the force of law, and in 
this way their articulation of the shari‘a is an extension or opening of a state of 
emergency. 
Severing this nexus of law and violence — whether it manifests itself in the 
dynamic of the war on terror, which masquerades as a war for freedom and democracy, 
the repeated iustitium of martial law, or the justifications of violence against society and 
the bodies of the vulnerable (women, minorities, Ahmadis, Christians and Shi’a in 
Pakistan) through appeal to heresy (safeguarding the sanctity and honor of Islam/Islam 
must be defended)— is as Agamben encourages, the central task of a reconstituted 
political ontology, a path of thinking that attempts to re-think the art of submission 
(Gelassenheit), that seeks the piety of thought. Recognizing the structure of the ban in our 
political relations and public spaces is key to this objective.  
We must learn to recognize this structure of the ban in the political 
relations and public spaces in which we still live. … The banishment of 
sacred life is the sovereign nomos that conditions every rule, the originary 
spatialization that governs and makes possible every localization and 
every territorialization. And if in modernity life is more and more clearly 
placed at the center of State politics (which now becomes, in Foucault’s 
terms, biopolitics), if in our age all citizens can be said, in a specific but 
extremely real sense, to appear virtually as hominess sacra, this is possible 
only because the relation of ban has constituted the essential structure of 
sovereign power from the beginning.508 
                                                




Summing up then, the primary goal of this chapter was to read ‘ulama’ politics, 
their arts of government, as having undergone a process of bio-politicization 
(technologization). Broad underlying transformations in the political space of modernity, 
have in turn effected a shift in the form, target and scope of ulama disciplinary practices, 
leading to their embrace of new forms, or rather intensities, of political (Islamo-political) 
rationality and sovereign biopolitics. These transformations must themselves be 
understood within a complex assemblage (or dispositif) of networks of force relations, in 
which the more specific mode of the governmentalization of the Pakistani State, is set 
within a larger, but not necessarily all encompassing, system of global sovereignty. The 
danger signaled by the emergence of radical forms of “political Islam” can then be linked 
to the gravitation of the ulama towards a toxic combination of biopolitical and sovereign 
modalities of power.509 This dual modality of power is not some ancient Islamic 
metaphysics working in opposition to the modernizing state, or against globalization as 
such, but is I suggest, a refraction, albeit through an Islamic discursive prism, of a form 
of power which is itself the essence of modern sovereign biopolitics. Furthermore I do 
not regard this new modality of power as a form of what ‘Ali Shari‘ati called 
“Westoxification”, but it is rather a tendency that has from its earliest inception been 
inherent within the juridical discourse of the ‘ulama. It is with the emergence of 
populations and the modern state, and the imposition of colonial sovereignty that 
(d)effaced the power of Muslim Empires, that these governmental potentialities 
underwent a transformation of degree, effect, method, target and scope (a transformation 
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in threshold). Overall this chapter suggests that we should turn our analytic gaze upon 
transformations in the polis rather than seek to understand and reform Islamic ideology or 
Islam as such. On a secondary plane, and related to this, I am also arguing strenuously 






The Space of War: Jihad, Body Politics & Homo Islamicus 
 
 
All Muslims are like one body… Wherever the Muslim body is being oppressed 
it is our duty to support Jihad” – Sami-ul Haq510 
 
When she spoke of becoming a suicide bomber, Umm Anas’s voice was strong 
and steady: “This is a gift from God. We were created to become martyrs for 
God,” she continued, her eyes burning behind the full face veil. “All the 
Palestinian people were created to fight in God’s name. If we just throw stones at 
the Jews they get scared. Imagine what happens when body parts fly at them.”511  
 
 
The Kafirs Condemned Body 
 
On 21st April 1994, in a scene reminiscent of Damiens the regicide, whose terrible 
fate is vividly described in the opening pages of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, an 
angry mob gathered outside a local police station in the town of Gujranwala in Punjab. 
Hours earlier the police had taken a local doctor, Hafiz Farooq Sajjad, into custody. The 
crowd demanded that the police turn over custody of Farooq Sajjad. The mob slowly 
grew into a crowd of hundreds and began attacking the police post, eventually storming 
                                                
510 The Deoband principle of the famous Madrasa Haqqania in Akhora Khattak, and the leader of the JUI-S, 
Sami-ul-Haq. Quoted in Dawn News. Madrasa Haqqania has become the notorious symbol of the militant 
madrasa, ruining the reputation of hundreds of other deeni madaris that do not have over or direct links 
with jihadist groups. However it remains well documented that Haqqania is one of the leading madrasa 
which has supplied jihadist fighters and members of the core leadership for both the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and jihadist outfits in Kashmir. See Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘Jihad U.: The Education of a Holy Warrior’, The 
New York Times Magazine, 25 June 2000) 
511 BBC transcript. 
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the police lock-up and dragging the already dazed, confused and handcuffed Sajjad into 
the streets. As he lay bleeding on the ground outside the police station, the crowd pelted 
him with bricks and stones. Still writhing, elements of the crowd then poured kerosene oil 
over his body making several attempts to set his body on fire. Eventually the body was 
tied to a motorbike and dragged through the streets for hours.512 This was the body of a 
blasphemer. 
What had so enraged the crowds? Investigations of the incident which drew 
national alarm, and forced Benazir to attempt to introduce amendments to 295c to prevent 
its obvious and widespread abuse, remain conflicted over the cause. What is known is 
that Farooq Sajjad was a devout Sunni Muslim, a Hafiz-i Qur’an no less (one who has 
memorized the Qur’an), and a regular at the local mosque. Additionally he had a diploma 
in tibb (eastern medicine) and an MA in Arabic and Islamic Studies. Sajjad’s father was 
also a well-respected leader of the local chapter of the Jama‘at-i Islami. Apparently a call 
had gone out from a local Deoband mosque that an atai (quack) doctor had burned the 
Qur’an. Since atai sounds like Essai (the Urdu word for a ‘Christian’) many people 
thought that some “Christian” had burned the Qur’an. A large crowd had already 
gathered for a funeral and somehow descended on the nearby house of Sajjad where he, 
along with members of his family were beaten up and assaulted. As news of the incident 
spread the police arrived and took Sajjad away for his own protection. To date no one has 
been arrested for the murder. 
 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish shows us how modernity discovered the body as 
an instrument of power, and today it is apparent that body is the primary hinge for the 
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deployment of ‘ulama power. But in what way is this obvious form of disciplinary and 
sovereign power also simultaneously biopolitical as I have been asserting. For Foucault 
as we have noted, the term “biopower” indicates the way power, at a certain historical 
juncture, transforms itself to govern not only individual bodies through a disciplinary 
processes, but also the body-politick constituted in terms of populations. “The discovery 
of population is, simultaneous to the discovery of the individual and the trainable 
(dressable) body, the other great technological node around which the political processes 
of the West have evolved.”513 Whereas discipline was an “anatomo-politics” of individual 
bodies, designed in part to insert docile bodies into the new capitalist machinery, 
biopolitics attempts the control of populations in order to govern, secure and control the 
life of the collective. With the introduction of biopower the ‘social body’ is constituted as 
an object of government. The new biopower subsumed the older form of sovereign power 
which was based on the principle “To make die and to let live” and exercised as the right 
to punish and kill. By contrast biopower seeks to make live and to let die with its primary 
objective being the care of life and the biological with regards to its utility for production 
and efficiency. Biopolitics is thus a network of powers, an apparatus, that is not 
necessarily stable, or coherent, a collation of practices and knowledges which can gives 
rise to a variable range of subjections and subjectivities.  
The deployment then of apostasy as a sovereign mechanism reflects how “the 
right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defense of 
society.”514 In this way the right to punish and kill is always expressed as a “defense of 
Islam”, as the defense of Islamic society, the ummah body. As Foucault made clear the 
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various forms of power he described can form daemonic permutations and 
combinations.515 
The task of genealogy is to provide a cartography, or diagram of such powers. 
While I have suggested in the previous chapter that the technologies of blasphemy 
constitute a sovereign strategy on the part of the ‘ulama, correctly speaking what is being 
made sovereign is Islam itself, and not the ‘ulama per say. It is the defense of Islam in the 
name of the sovereignty of Islam that is at stake in the exercise of these powers. There is 
therefore an element of truth to the jihadist claim that he gives his life for Islam. This is 
why, in answer to Agamben, “a power whose aim is essentially to make live instead 
exerts an unconditional power of death.”516  
As Foucault elaborates in his 1976 College de France the vehicle which allows 
thanatopolitics to coincide with biopolitics is racism; that which “allows biopower to 
mark caesuras in the biological continuum of the human species, thus reintroducing a 
principle of war into the system of “making live.””517 Racism is the production of 
inferiors (infidels) “ways to distinguish different groups inside a population. In short, to 
stabilize a caesura of a biological type inside a domain that defines itself precisely as 
biological.”518 Thus when the sovereign face of biopower is exercised it is almost always 
on the bodies of those deemed ‘other’. As Foucault describes in Discipline and Punish, 
sovereign power is characterized through its control over the life and death of the bodies 
of others. Sovereign power subjugates the body, it is a power over the body of the other, 
                                                
515 As I have argued in an earlier chapters, Agamben’s problematizion of Foucault’s apparent separation of 
sovereign power and biopower, his argument that the juridico-sovereign and the biopolitical cannot be 
separated, is premature and rests itself on a weak reading of Foucault’s political ontology 
516 Posed in Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz : The Witness and the Archive. 
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and its uses the body as a place, cite and marker for the display of sovereign power. Like 
the ceremonies of supplice that Foucault documents, these acts are spectacular and visual 
displays of power, that inscribe the marks of the sovereign in prominent places. In the 
ancien régime, gallows, and the corpses of the executed were displayed for several days. 
The scaffold and torture were exemplary places and technologies for the demonstration 
and displays of such power. What Agamben adds to this topology of power is the notion 
of the exception.  
Living in the state of exception that has now become the rule has meant 
also this: our private biological body has become indistinguishable from 
our body politic, experiences that once used to be called political suddenly 
were confined to our biological body, and private experiences present 
themselves all of a sudden outside us as body politic.519 
 
This serves then as an excellent description of the sovereign biopolitical turn of 
the ‘ulama, bound up as they have been from the start, with the proliferation of the state 
of exception. Contrary then to the understanding of liberals520 who see Islam in dire need 
of a reformation, it is not the rights-bearing free citizen that marks the beginning of the 
modern age, but the entry of the body into political calculations. We can say that there are 
three visible forms of the expression of biopolitical sovereignty in Pakistan today; by 
Allah (Islam), the Army and Amrika. In this chapter I shall further elaborate on the 
meaning of this capture of life and the body by the ‘ulama. 
 
Sexual Somatics 
When the juridical (or juridico-spatial) technologies of blasphemy examined in 
the previous chapter are viewed together with the Deoband ‘ulama’s obsession with 
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sexuality and their violent and coercive attempts at the regulation of bodily norms and 
practices, we can see that they do not simply constitute the logical corollary of 
implementing ‘timeless’ shari‘a prescriptions, but rather together formulate a somatics 
that targets the individual and the collective body. Additionally because the ‘ulama view 
their configurations on the limit of sex and pleasure and their strict gendered division of 
bodies, as practices of resistance against the West, the link between subjectivity and 
sexuality which Foucault had already exposed, undergoes a doubling effect. By regarding 
their sexual politics as forms of resistance to the West (a resistance to western 
jouissance), the ‘ulama collapse the distinction between morality and identity formation. 
But these somatic and sexual controls, which are regarded as mechanisms that evade the 
hegemony of Western culture, are themselves nothing more than ways of carving out 
spaces for the alternative regulation of individual and collective bodies. In this way we 
may suggest a homology between Foucault’s analysis of the “veritable discursive 
explosion”521 of discourses on sex in the Victorian age, discourses which presaged the 
emergence of the biopolitical subject and the current explosion of discourses on/of Islam, 
as mechanisms of intensification of the production Muslim subjectivity—homo 
Islamicus. Properly speaking then we are not talking about the re-emergence, or 
resurgence of Islam, but the emergence of homo islamicus, a kind of Muslim humanism 
with its attendant assertion of a subjectivist metaphysics grounded in the will to power. 
Sexuality as Foucault writes in the Will to Knowledge, 
must not be described as a stubborn drive, by nature alien and of necessity 
disobedient to a power which exhausts itself trying to subdue it and often 
fails to control it entirely. It appears rather as an especially dense transfer 
point for relations of power: between men and women, young people and 
old people, parents and offspring, teachers and students, priests and laity, 
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an administration and a population. Sexuality is not the most intractable 
element in power relations, but rather one of those endowed with the 
greatest instrumentality: useful for the greatest number of maneuvers and 
capable of serving as a point of support, as a linchpin, for the most varied 
strategies.522 
 
The vast emphasis of Islamic cultures on preventing sexual transgression, must 
thus be situated today within the added context of the truth-event of populations 
(biopower). Hence the severe social and self-management of the woman’s body and her 
dressage, bespeaks infinitely to the principally biopolitical form of power that Islam and 
its experts have assumed. The dual deployment of Islam, like the deployment of sexuality 
“has its reason for being, not in reproducing itself, but in proliferating, innovating, 
annexing, creating, and penetrating bodies in an increasingly detailed way, and in 
controlling populations in an increasingly comprehensive way.”523 As Foucault 
emphasized in Discipline and Punish, the body is a principal factor in the political 
economy of power. The tactics of the body are clearly a disciplinary mechanism of 
‘ulama power that is perhaps itself quite old, but when expressed as the capacity to defile 
or punish the body through the hudud524 and blasphemy laws, they take on a distinctively 
dark tone of biopolitical sovereignty. The incredible resistance to any reforms of these 
laws, speaks to their role as an instrument of power. The increasingly violent and direct 
targeting of the body (enforcement of the beard, lashing and stoning for adultery, 
throwing acid on the unveiled faces of women, etc) hence testifies to the diabolical 
mélange between older sovereign and disciplinary modes of power with the biopolitical. 
In clarifying the mutations of modern power from the sovereign to biopolitical mode, 
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Foucault writes that “the right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of the 
sovereign to the defense of society.”525 In this way the right to punish and kill is always 
expressed as a “defense of Islam”, as the defense of Islamic society, the ummah body. 
The constitution of British Indian Muslims as a uniform body, begins of course under the 
imperative to govern India on behalf of the colonial oikos. However the biopolitical logic 
that the ummah must constitute, by itself a national body, was not originally a demand of 
the ‘ulama, but rather was the founding logic of the Pakistan movement. The idea of 
Pakistan, leaving aside for a moment the duplicitous landed interests that sustained its 
real politick , was thus the first principle of a biopolitical drive, the idea that Islam, now 
indistinct from Indian Muslims, must be defended. Since then this biopolitical logic has 
metastasized. 
Sexuality as Foucault observes is the point at which the body and the population 
intersect, a “dense transfer point of power”; a matter therefore of discipline and also 
normalization. And so the obsession of the ‘ulama with sexuality can be seen as an 
attempt to curb the aleatory and creative excess of the body. Additionally it allows them 
to shift technologies of power into a higher gear, maintaining on the one hand a concern 
for discipline over the body while simultaneously expanding the scope of operations 
across the broader mass of Muslim subjects, constituted as either Muslim citizens of the 
Islamic State or as more loosely defined members of a transnational body, the ummah. 
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Of Beards, Bodies and Buddhas: The Radical Fatwas of the Deoband 
 
The beard and [trimmed] moustache on a Musalmans face gives him the strength 
of manhood, an upright character, individual integrity and exclusive identity. His 
survival and safety may rest on this brave appearance. The beard is the only kind 
of hair that differentiates males from females. The hair on all the other parts of 
the body are common between male and female.526 
 
Normalized Bodies 
Scholars working on the questions of gender and Islam have of course become 
familiar with the ways in which the woman’s body has become a cite for contestations of 
religion and identity across a global array of Muslim communities. The absence/presence 
of the hijab has come to be seen as a marker of a particular form of religiosity (the right 
kind if one is an Islamist, the wrong kind if one is liberal527). The recent controversies in 
France testify to the polysemic range and significance of the hijab question. Until the 
arrival of the Taliban however, the male gender had been relatively unburdened from 
having his body become the cite of religious battles/debate. While the absence/presence 
of a beard had always been seen as a marker of male religiosity, within Pakistan, the 
“clean shaven” Muslim, like Iqbal or Jinnah, embodied its own nationalist prestige. As 
recently as 2002, Pervez Musharraf was heard excoriating a crowd of Mullahs regarding 
the lack of any essential link between being a good Muslim and having a beard. The 
governing and military classes have by and large been clean shaven. Every head of state, 
governor general, president and prime minister, event the Islamizing zealot Zia ul-Haq528 
has valued his disposable Gillette! The beard remained a marker of religiosity, but it 
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could also signify other negative qualities.529 The monumental decision to shave every 
morning remains for most males in Pakistan, a largely professional or aesthetic question. 
Given the social status of revered non-bearded individuals, the ulama have always 
stressed the sunnat of the beard, but preferred not to openly criticize those Muslims who 
did not choose to grow one! There was somewhat greater measure of approbation for 
those that grew a beard and shaved it off, which verged on a kind of facial apostasy! 
Under the Taliban however, the “complete enforcement” of the shari‘a , with no 
compromises to worldly convenience or liberal/modern values, meant that the beard was 
to be mandatory. This insertion of ‘ulama authority within the space of the everyday and 
seemingly insignificant matter as the length of ones beard, became eventually a powerful 
way to inscribe the shari‘a, and hence the juridical power of the Taliban, literally into the 
bodies of men. Punitive legislation measures the body and penetrates its everyday mode 
of conduct. 
Contrary to Musharraf the Deoband tradition has regarded the beard as an 
essential marker of Muslim identity. In addition to the quote from no less an authority 
than the Shaikh-ul Hadith, Sheikh Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhalvi (1898 –1982)530 we 
could take a more recent example: a letter to the editor that appeared in Karachi Dar-al 
‘Alum’s monthly organ, Al-Balagh, is typical of the emphasis being placed on the beard 
as a marker of Muslim identity: 
                                                
529 There is the popular adage that trust for a trader should be inversely proportionate to the length of his 
beard. 
530 Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhalvi’s was the Principle and Shaikh-ul Hadith of the Mazahir ul-‘Ulum in 
Saharanpur. His major work Faza’il-e-A’maal (Virtuous Deeds), is essential reading for the Deobandi 
madaris. He was the nephew of Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhlawi, the founder of the revivalist Tablighi 
Jamaat. For details on the life and work of Kandhalvi see Barbara D. Metcalf, "The Past in the Present: 
Instruction, Pleasure and Blessing in Maulana Muhammadzakariyya's Aap Biitii," in Islamic Contestations: 
Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
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Muslims are overcome with western influence in their lives and it’s easy 
to forget, nay, neglect the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). 
Little do these Muslims realize the magnitude of their actions in imitating 
Kufaar. This is a truly shocking! …… And then there are others who 
claim that the matters concerning beards is a “little” issue not worthy of 
mention nor practice. To them I say get off the denial bandwagon, you’re 
a Muslim! Follow the Prophet (PBUH) in all aspects of life, for he was the 
best of examples. I couldn’t tell you how many times I’ve mistaken a 
Muslim brother (outside of the Masjid) for a kafir on account of his clean-
shaven, well oiled, face. How can I say “Asalamu Alaikum Brother!” when 
I do not know if he is a Muslim. Yet that very brother then wonders why 
he was ignored! … From one brother to another, I say: “Grow a beard, 
then, since it also promotes Brotherhood in the real world. Stand with your 
Brothers, be one. We know you think you are handsome without it (a 
beard), but who cares? What matters is how Allah (S.W.T.) sees you. And 
when you do grow a beard, don’t mock the Sunnah, please grow it 
correctly, i.e. FIST LENGTH. That is the prescribed length and no 
shorter.”531 
 
As is now well known, under the Taliban regime, Muslim males were required to 
grow beards according to the “fist length” prescription. Failure to comply would often 
lead to fines and even imprisonment for period that was correlative to the rate of follicle 
growth! The consensus on the importance of the beard is historical, but calls for its public 
“enforcement” by the State is a peculiarly modern and recent development, and is merely 
a corollary of the transition to the enforcement of shari‘a that we have discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
Writing in the mid seventies, Zakariyya Kandhalvi, notes in the introduction to his 
widely referenced work, Daarhi ka Wajub (The Mandatory Beard): 
“On my journey to India this year 1395 Hijri [1975], I noticed something 
very new. …….. During my stay in Saharanpur, I was quite unusually 
infuriated with the question of the beard. I myself had noticed, and indeed 
many close friends also pointed this out, that I had never previously taken 
                                                
531 Mufti Ebrahim Desai, Darul Ifta, Madrasah In’aamiyyah, Camperdown South Africa, Fatwa 
Department, (printed in Albalagh, Aug 2001). According to one famous author: “To trim the beard when it 
is less than one palm in length; like some Maghrabis do, is the way of the Hermaphrodites.” Maulana Qari 
Muhammad Tayyab in Daarhi ka Shari-i Ahammiyat. 
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such a harsh stand before. But whenever I saw a person who had shaved 
his beard, I was enraged, and I denounced this act at every meeting. I 
strongly admonished people regarding the prohibition of shaving the 
beard. I could not determine the cause of this strong feeling towards this 
sunna except perhaps that I had began noticing that more and more people 
were neglecting it and also that admonishments in this matter were also 
dwindling. During his last three or four years, the late Maulana Husain 
Ahmad Madani (may Allah’s mercy be upon him) during the last years of 
his life also strongly denounced the shaving of the beard.”532 
 
Kandhalvi then goes on to suggest that unlike other sins, such as adultery or theft, 
where the act is temporary, a shaved beard constitutes an ongoing violation of the shari‘a. 
“The shaving of the beard is a continuous act, and is exhibited all the time. Thus when 
performing salad, the sin remains. Similarly during the fast, Hajj and all other Ibadaat 
this sinful act accompanies him.” Kandhalvi’s definitive account on the mandatory status 
of the beard, like almost any other work by a Deoband ‘alim, consists largely of multiple 
citations from the accepted corpus of hadith, sirah and commentaries, and also includes 
similar judgments from other senior and well respected Deoband giants. Kandhalvi draws 
routinely on the authority of Husain Ahmad Madani, and Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (1863 – 
1943). For instance he cites Abu Hurairah: “Abu Hurairah reports that the Rasul Allah 
[Prophet] said: ‘Lengthen your beards and cut your moustaches, and in this matter do not 
imitate the Jews and Christians.’” He goes on to remark that it is “unfortunate that today, 
by aping the Christians, we are neglecting and destroying this blessed and very important 
Sunnat of the Prophet.” By quoting numerous sources he goes on to verify the “Shari‘a 
commands that the length of the beard should be one fist full, when held from below the 
chin. According to the ijma of the ulama it is not permissible to have a beard shorter than 
this.”  
                                                
532 Zakariyya Kandhalvi, Daarhi ka Wujub 
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While Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi and Husain Ahmad Madani could not agree on the 
question of nationalism, their agreement on the mandatory status of the beard was near 
unanimous. Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi in his work “Islahur Rusoom” also 
categorically states the centrality and importance of the beard. It is worth quoting sections 
from his work: 
The Hadith categorically states that the beard should be lengthened and 
the moustaches cut. This is narrated both in ‘Bukhari’ and ‘Muslim’. The 
Prophet has sternly commanded this to his followers. Wherever Rasul 
Allah gives a command then that act becomes wajib (compulsory), and to 
neglect this wajib command is completely Haram (forbidden, prohibited, 
banned). Thus it is haram to shave the beard and keep long moustaches. 
… Now, since it has been factually established that it is a sinful act to 
shave or shorten the beard, those who are adamant in this practice, and 
furthermore regard the growing of the beard as an embarrassment, and jeer 
and mock at those who do keep full beards; for such people to maintain 
their Imam (faith) is most difficult. For them it is imperative that they 
repent forthwith and also renew their Imam and marital vows; and fashion 
their appearances according to the teachings of Allah and His Prophet.533 
 
Thanawi then deploys a series of psychological, rational and aesthetic, arguments in 
favour of keeping the beard according to shari‘a prescriptions:  
Some people shave to appear young and to hide their age ….. this is totally 
meaningless ….. Age is a gift from Allah, the more years you have lived, 
the more blessed you are. …. if according to some fools the keeping of the 
beard is the cause for embarrassment, then they should remember that 
according to many kafirs, to be a Muslim is itself a cause of 
embarrassment and a sign of backwardness. So Allah forbid, should you 
forsake Islam also? Just as we do not abandon Islam because the kufaar 
regard it as backward, so why should the very symbol and appearance of 
Islam be neglected because some irreligious misfits think it [the beard] is 
an embarrassment and an uncomely appearance. … Also, rationally, the 
beard for men is like the beauty of the hair on a woman’s head, both being 
creations of beauty. If the shaving of the hair on a woman’s head is 
considered unnatural and depraved, then how could the shaving of a males 
face ever contribute to his good looks. Surely there is no explanation, 
                                                
533 Thanawi, Islahur Rusoom 
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except that foreign customs have pulled a curtain over our insight and 
reasoning, and have clouded our common sense. 
 
In his intervention on the subject of the beard, “Daarhi ka Phulsafa” (The 
Philosophy of the Beard) Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani further articulates the 
connection between the beard and Muslim identity. For Madani the beard is the uniform 
of the Muslim! The biopolitical significance of the beard as the equivalent of a nationalist 
flag could not be more explicit. 
If we observe the English, French or Germans etc., we see that they have 
their own flags and their exclusive uniforms, such that those who are 
familiar with them could immediately identify any of them. They can be 
identified on the battlefields and in political arenas. Every nation does its 
utmost to promote and protect its flag and also its national symbols and 
emblems. In fact if transgressions are made [against those symbols] it 
could lead to dangerous situations. Pull down a flag or insult it in any way, 
and then see the consequences, they could even lead to war. …..Uniforms 
are necessary for the effective functioning of any kingdom or government, 
that is why they important among all tribes and nations … in Allah’s 
Kingdom. … Those nations and countries who do not preserve and protect 
their uniform and identity are very easily and quickly absorbed into other 
nations. They disappear in such a manner that no trace of their name or 
culture remains. … The Sikhs uphold their symbol of identity by keeping 
the hair of their head and beard. … The British came to India at the end of 
the sixteenth century. They stayed for about two hundred and fifty years. 
They came from a country that is cold, but they did not give up their coats, 
trousers, hats and neckties in this country, which is very hot. That is why a 
nation of three hundred and fifty million could not absorb the 
comparatively small numbers that came. They held forth their identity as a 
separate nation and as an exclusive government. … It is evident from this 
that any nation or religion can only continue to survive when it adopts an 
exclusive form of appearance, civilization and culture, custom and 
language. Therefore it is necessary for the religion of Islam— which is 
higher than all other religions in its beliefs, character and practice—to 
adopt an exclusive uniform and outlook. To protect and preserve this 
mode and uniform is tantamount to protecting the religion itself, and lives 
will readily be sacrificed for this purpose.534  
 
                                                
534 Madani, Daarhi ka Phulsafa 
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Madani, having defined the West as an essentially “shaven community”, redirects the 
essentializing gaze of Orientalism back upon Europe with the same biopolitical 
occularity; viewing white man as in essence determined by his hair style, the filth of 
swine and pork eating, and sexual and moral decadence. He continues with his islah 
(admonishment): 
He who chooses for himself the [fashion] of another people will be 
regarded as from them’. This is the Hadith which at times annoy many un-
lslamically inclined youth. [But] historical facts should be studied and in 
view of what the enemies of Islam have done, their exclusive uniforms and 
their attire and fashions should be shunned and disliked. It does not matter 
whether the fashions are those of Curzon; Gladstone, France or America, 
or whether they are related to dress, body, language, culture or customs. In 
every locality and every country of the world it is regarded as natural and 
human to like and adopt everything that a friend likes, and to regard 
everything of an enemy with contempt and as foreign. Especially those 
things that exclusively belong to the enemies. Therefore our earnest effort 
must be to become loyal and honest followers of Muhammad, and not 
slaves of Curzon, Harding, France or America. 535 
 
What is to be noted here, in these tedious yet revealing extracts is that despite the 
passionate arguments, and chastisements, at no point do any of these figures suggest that 
the state or any other authority enforce compliance with this prescription. Thus as we can 
see even as late as 1975, Kandhalvi was merely annoyed that fellow Muslims were 
neglecting the sunnat. For Thanawi the question of the beard is expressed largely an issue 
of love for the prophet, ones community, identify and ultimately personal salvation. In 
Madani’s work there is a clearer sense of the us vs. binary being developed. However this 
formal opposition to the customs and practices of the non-Muslim, especially in light of 
their political superiority, left the ‘ulama helpless against the very savoir of the colonial 
period; the idea that Muslims constitute a people with a flag and a uniform! 
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In Hayat-ul Muslimin,536 Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi heightens his fetishization of the 
subject when he states that “appearance” is fundamental to “identity” and that it was 
prohibited for a Muslim to shave his beard, and take on the appearance of a Westerner: 
“Thus shaving or cutting the beard… wearing shorts, are completely forbidden… If a 
Muslim despises or mocks at such shari‘a prohibitions, his act of transgression progresses 
from sin to kufr.” One could of course argue that this is precisely the foundation for 
classic Taliban politics, who had taken the bearded sentiments of the traditionalist 
masters, and carried them to their practico-political conclusion. Under an ‘amr bil marouf 
regime, such as the Taliban’s, the enforcement of the beard was thus bound to occur? If 
shaving is an act of kufr, then does not the Muslim become a murtid? 
While this formulation of the argument, Thanawi + political power = Taliban 
(reformulated elsewhere as Islam + Power = Radical Fundamentalism), is perhaps too 
linear and problematic, it certainly makes it tendentious to simply dismiss the Taliban as 
aberrant extremists! Arguably however Thanawi makes his admonishments and 
passionate judgments as he does precisely because he was operating in a juridically 
neutered space. In such a context the invocation of kufr would have had a different 
affective resonance.537 So we might ask, what has intervened between Thanawi of the 
1930’s (or even the Kandhalvi in the 70’s) and the Taliban today? One obvious answer is 
the State. Given however the way in which Thanawi and the Ahrar gravitated to the 
possibility of an Islamic State, one might detect another logic at work, one which has 
today crossed a (biopolitical) threshold. Given the extraordinary emphasis placed on 
“Islamizing” the State through the judiciary, it is clear that Thanawi must have imagined 
                                                
536 Thanawi, Ashraf ‘Ali, Hayat-ul-Muslimeen, (Idaratul-Ma’arif, 1419 AH / 1998 ). 
537 In the way for instance that the term evil is invoked in everyday discourse. 
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what State power could do for the restoration of Islamic sovereignty. While it is unclear if 
Thanawi would have suggested the deployment of coercive State forces to enforce all 
forms of shari‘a norms,538 it is clear that the idea of Pakistan was attractive because it was 
simultaneously an idea of Muslim power. Thanawi’s piety had given way to the lure of 
the political, and the constitution of the Muslim as a biopolitical body was essential to 
that thrust. 
But we can also read these earlier admonishments as efforts to preserve a 
historically normalized consensus regarding the status of the beard. The normalizing 
force of ‘ulama disciplinary power was coming under increasing erasure. The punitive 
potential of ‘ulama discourse therefore rested on the counter-construction of a delinquent 
subject. For Thanawi and Kandhalvi the shari‘a violator was just such a delinquent in 
need of rehabilitation and repentance. Under a Taliban style dispensation however the 
mere delinquent becomes the offender: “The delinquent is to be distinguished from the 
offender by the fact that it is not so much his act as his life that is relevant in 
characterizing him. … The legal punishment bears upon an act; the punitive technique on 
a life.”539 Normativity can be viewed as a spatial practice, one that is sustained by 
discipline and transformed into a classifying lifestyle through the rise of biopower.  
In terms more prosaic terms, one of the tasks of a critical, effective history is to 
trace and identify the kinds of sociopolitical and discursive transformations, the shifts in 
mood and history, that can be marshaled to understand the ways in which the Deoband 
                                                
538 Imam Abu Hanifa was always weary of entrusting morality to the state. See David S. Powers, Law, 
Society and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300-1500, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). Also Brannon M. Wheeler, Applying the Canon in Islam: The Authorization and 
Maintenance of Interpretive Reasoning in Hanafi Scholarship, Suny Series, toward a Comparative 
Philosophy of Religions (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). 
539 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, p. 251. 
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community has facilitated and spawned particularly violent, intolerant and sectarian 
forms of political practice; practices that are simultaneously distanced and sanctioned by 
many of the mainstream Deoband ‘ulama. In other words how is it possible that the heirs 
of the deeply meditative, erudite, pietistic and scholarly tradition has morphed into a 
violent and abject movement known as the Taliban. What happened to the heirs of Ashraf 
‘Ali Thanawi—revered as one of the “greatest ‘ulama of the century”—and the heirs of 
Husain Ahmad Madani—mohtamim of the seminal seminary at Deoband, leader of the 
JUH, and a man who argued for co-operation with the “Hindu infested”540 Indian 
National Congress over and above his Muslim nationalist co-religionist. How could such 
traditions produce the now equally revered (and feared) Mullah Omar, the one-eyed 
captain of the Taliban, the surrogate “Amir al-Momineen” (commander of the faithful) of 
the new Deoband.541 Alternatively put, what are the conditions of possibility that allow 
for the emergence of diametrically opposed politics and sensibilities from within an 
ostensibly uniform set of religious discourses and practice (Deoband). The opposition I 
am exploring here is the apparent gulf between the sensibilities of the early founders of 
the Deoband and the most recent permutation of that institution the Taliban. The Taliban 
have of course been widely coded as radical fundamentalists, as an incarnation of a 
medieval specter, stubbornly refusing its Hegelian destiny to dissolve under modernity or 
at best as a pathological phenomenon that suggests containment or control. On a meta-
colonial level the politicized traditionalism of the Taliban has undoubtedly been forged 
through the distortionary violence of cold war geo-politics. But as I have tried to show 
this phase transition begins well before the influence of the American empire. Like 
                                                
540 Mawlana Mawdudi’s term. 
541 Currently in ghaiba. 
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colonialism, American Empire should be viewed not as a primary cause of Taliban 
violence (the US supported the Mujahideen argument), but as merely a conductor and 
intensifier of the conditions of possibility of sovereign power. 
From the metacolonial perspective however, we can view this phase transition of 
the ‘ulama as one from disciplinary power to biopower. Under a disciplinary regime the 
‘criminal’ is known through his transgressive deeds. Under biopower the delinquent is 
known through her abnormal personality (the terrorist, the heretic). The fetishization of 
subjectivity that characterized the ‘ulama angst regarding the beard, has today intensified 
in the Islamist production of a biopolitical society, where delinquency is specified in 
terms not so much of the law but of the norm542” The shari‘a order thus coincides 
perfectly with the “‘criminological’ labyrinth from which we have certainly not yet 
emerged”.543  
 
My endeavor in the dissertation as a whole was to underscore, and bring to the 
surface, modes of hegemony and forms of dialogic that operated outside of and alongside 
the larger Islam/West, Islam/Modernity binarisms. Hence in raising the issue of the 
relationship between the mainstream Deoband ‘ulama and the Taliban, I am not so much 
concerned with the specter of “Political Islam,” a ghost that haunts liberal consciousness 
as much as it animates a revived neo-conservative agenda for full spectrum global 
dominance. Instead I am interested in underscoring the deeply historical play of forces as 
they play out in the going process of contestations between diverse social groups, not 
only for political, economic and ideological power, but also for the mantle of Islam! 
                                                
542 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, p. 253. 
543 Ibid., p. 254. 
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The question that the enforcement of the beard raises is complex. The views of 
the ulama on the beard have been clear for centuries. Madani and Thanawi had published 
fatwa on the beard in the mid 1920’s and 30’s, and the Fatwa-e-Deoband also contains 
dozens of related fatwa. Every Dar-ul Ifta routinely produces fatwa concerning the 
mandatory status of the beard. But at what point did the beard become politicized? Not all 
kufr are equal it seems. The issue of the beard was not a rallying point until the Taliban, 
Kandhalvi’s irritation not withstanding. But it is clear that the increased clout resulting 
from the blasphemy laws, coupled with the Taliban’s defiant assertiveness, have provided 
the conditions of possibility for the reassertion of the beard! The strategy of sovereign 
power includes the criminalization of increasing spheres of everyday life. By appealing to 
a history of colonial domination and the need to preserve and protect Muslim identity, the 
power and prestige of the ‘ulama as protectors of the faith and therefore as sovereign 
surrogates was suddenly enhanced.  
 
Power over Speech: The “Mohasib” Case 
Whereas in Afghanistan the State was subordinate to the shari‘a, in Pakistan the 
situation was still reversed, despite the introduction of the parallel legal track of the 
Shari‘a Courts. These parallel tracks were however to increasingly cross over and conflict 
with one another. Despite a desire to mimic such a ruling, the ‘ulama did not wield 
sufficient influence or power to introduce a Taliban style “beard bill.” However the 
potentiality of the beard, like mandatory hijab in Iran and Saudi Arabia, remains an allure 
for the ‘ulama who seek to extend their logic of control over every segment of life. 
Therefore even the beard cannot be enforced, its sacred status can not be challenged. 
 
 255 
Challenging the importance of the beard is thus tantamount to an active heresy. In a 
similar fashion Azam Tariq of the SSP declared that it was blasphemous to challenge the 
blasphemy laws!  
In May of 2001, Pakistan’s NWFP authorities sealed and took away the 
publishing license of the regional daily “Mohasib”, published in Abbottabad (fifty 
kilometers north of Islamabad). This decision followed the publication, on 29 May, of an 
article titled “The Beard and Islam.” In this text, local intellectual and poet Jamil Yusuf 
criticized the position of Pakistani ‘ulama who affirm that a man without a beard could 
not be a good Muslim. The article also criticized the role of religious leaders who used 
religion to serve their personal interests. Following its publication, students from a nearby 
madrasa publicly threatened the newspaper, and threatened to kill the editor unless he 
was arrested.544 During a demonstration organized on 8 June, in Abbottabad, the ‘ulama 
called for the death penalty against the writer responsible for this act of “blasphemy”.  
The same day, police arrested managing editor Shahid Chaudhry, news editor 
Shakil Tahirkheli and sub-editor Raja Muhammad Haroon, in accordance with sections 
295a and c of blasphemy law. They were detained for two days in the Cant police station 
and then transferred to a jail in Abbottabad.545 These arrests were linked to a blasphemy 
complaint that was lodged by Waqar Jadoon. Jadoon as one can now predict was an avid 
member of the youth wing of the local Khatm-i Nubuwwat chapter. Although the charges 
were eventually dropped, the unofficial street violence and death threats, had a censuring 
effect on the entire press establishment. The Deoband may not have had the power to 
                                                
544 The government has often intervened in such situations in order to protect the individual from mob 
harassment. In addition to the case mentioned at the opening of the chapter, several such lynchings have 
occurred in the past. 
545 The News, June 16, 2001. 
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“enforce” the beard, but they certainly exercised their power to make any author and 
editor think twice about challenging the sacred status of the beard! Once again this is an 
example of taqwa politics; a politics of the “publics fear!” 
Of course the template for this form of mass mobilization and street power is by 
no means novel. The Ahrar as we have seen used it to stunning effect in 1953 and 1974. 
Nor is this form of harassment the strict preserve of religio-political parties. The ethnic 
party, the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM)546 routinely deployed such tactics aimed at 
stemming any public critique of its ‘sacred’ leader Altaf Hussain (1953–).547 The MQM’s 
meteoric rise to power in the 1980’s became a model for the acquisition of popular 
power. The populist MQM which routinely swept Karachi’s local and national elections, 
had an exemplary track record of intimidating and attacking journalists and newspaper 
offices in the late eighties and early nineties. A coalition partner in the provincial 
government of Sind, the MQM is known to have pursued terror tactics against journalists 
critical of the party. Even imaginary snubs became the basis for the boycott of certain 
newspapers. Major newspapers of Karachi still live in fear of the MQM. In 1990, the 
home of the publisher of Jang, Pakistan’s largest circulated Urdu-language newspaper, 
came under fire from MQM activists in protest against reports critical of the party chief. 
Threats against lowly newspaper hawkers and distributors effectively lead to a boycott of 
the newspaper. 
In addition to thinking about the specificity and diversity of Islamic societies, the 
above analysis also shows why it is necessary to resist deploying the over-determining 
factor of “religion/Islam” or “ethnicity” as a central category for explanations of Muslim 
                                                
546 Migrants’ National Movement, later known as the Muttehida Qaumi Movement or United National 
Movement. 
547 In exile in London since 1992. 
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politics.548 The limits of deploying “Islam” as a central category for understanding 
Pakistani politics come into particularly sharp focus when we consider the recent sudden 
shift in student politics in Karachi. Prior to the rise of the MQM (Muhajir National 
Movement) both the JUI and the JI found a strong base of support within the Muhajir 
community. But this identification with “Islamic” politics, underwent an overnight shift 
as the MQM rose to political dominance by the mid 1980’s. When the MQM became the 
concerted target of the State, many activists jumped ship in late 90’s to the Lashkar-i 
Tayeba. Such sudden shifts point to the strong need to analyze Pakistani politics in terms 
that do not distinctly privilege primordial categories such as “Islam” or even “ethnicity.” 
The over determination of “ethnicity” or “Islam” as causative elements in the political 
arena, tends to mask several factors which are more significant; in particular, the role of 
the military, which from the very outset of the nations history, has attempted to control 
the political process and gear the state towards maintaining a political economy of 
defense.549 
By weighing in over the spaces for pluralistic thinking and limiting the scope of 
free speech, the ‘ulama have been able to accrue forms of power that have historically 
been unattainable. The space of juridical authority that had been domesticated under 
colonialism, and further marginalized under the postcolonial regime, became suddenly 
enlarged. The Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan were embraced in part because they 
represented the new power of the ‘ulama over those segments of society that had rejected 
and spurned them. Fear of Talibanization meant indirectly fear of the ‘ulama (taqwa 
politics). The Deoband’s overall enthusiastic support for the Taliban, even in matters that 
                                                
548 See the introduction by Juan R. I. Cole, in Cole, ed., Comparing Muslim Society: Knowledge and the 
State in a World Civilization. 
549 See Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence. 
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seemed in contention with the generally accepted ēthos of Islam, was a marker of their 
embrace of new forms of power (or puma). The case of the destruction of the Bamiyan 
Buddhas bears this contention out. 
 
 
The Buddhas of Bamiyan 
 
The Taliban are not extracting any hidden treasures from underneath these 
statues nor are they going to benefit materially from this act in any way. 
What is it that these people are doing? Is there a message that is being 
transmitted to the world? …The very fact that they are undertaking an act 
that has no economic or materialistic motive despite world opposition is in 
itself a very potent defiance of the ideology of “follow the rising sun.” It is 
not the demolition of stone statues then that is causing the hue and cry, it 
is the defiance of the current world order! Taliban are openly demolishing 
the belief system of the forces of darkness! They are defying the ideology, 
not of the Buddhists, but of the western powers! … Believers of Islam will 
choose to defy the powers of darkness at the time and manner of their own 
choice!550  
 
In this section I will develop my understanding of the unapologetic subject, by 
analyzing Mullah Omar’s resoluteness in the face of world opinion following his order to 
destroy the Bamiyan Buddhas in March of 2001. I am making an argument that suggests 
we read this act in terms of public spectacle, performativity and power, rather than as the 
logical implementation of shari‘a prescriptions regarding the smashing of idols (but 
shikani). It is clear that for centuries the Bamiyan Buddha statues survived Islam, but 
they did not survive the Taliban. This fatwa can be compared with similarly controversial 
edicts (the enforcement of the beard and forced prayers) and the support for these 
measures among Deoband ulama in Pakistan, must also be placed within the context of 
the unapologetic subject and its dimensions of sentiment and performativity. 
                                                




Idol Smashing or Idle Smashing? 
On February 26th, 2001, the Taliban leader and caricature of a caliph, Mullah 
Omar, whose obdurate power still resides in his multiple parallels with the unseen — the 
unseen of his omniscient and transcendent master, the unseen of the Prophet himself, the 
unseen of his shrapnel wounded left eye, but most importantly his being unseen by NSA 
satellites —pronounced his infamous Bamiyan fatwa, which was quickly broadcast over 
Afghanistan’s Radio Shari‘at. In this latest of his edicts, he proclaimed all-out war 
against two 1,500-year old statues of the Buddha carved into sandstone cliffs in 
Afghanistan’s Bamiyan province. These towering idols, 175 and 120 feet high, were 
regarded as one the most impressive relics of Afghanistan’s pre-Islamic era. Additionally 
the Amir-ul Momineen551 ordered the demolition of all other statues in the country, 
including those in museums, since they are also “repugnant” to the laws of Islam. “All 
statues and non-Islamic shrines located in different parts of the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan should be destroyed.”552 
The Taliban had seized Bamiyan, a stronghold of the opposition and home to a 
majority ethnic Shi‘i Hazaras, on Sep 10 1998. In August just a few months earlier the 
Taliban had conducted a massacre of some 8000 Hazaras during the campaign to capture 
Mazar-i Sharif (on August 8). But there has been sporadic fighting in the area since then 
between troops of the hard line Islamic militia and members of the opposition coalition 
led by Ahmad Shah Masood. The anti-Taliban Hezb-e-Wahdat party, took Bamiyan back 
briefly in early Feb 2001 but were routed comprehensively a few days later. It was a few 
                                                
551 In a bid to extend his authority across the umma, Mullah Omar was set up as a quasi-Caliph, or Ameerul 
Momineen (Commander of the Faithful). 
552 Dawn, March 10 2001. 
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days after this recapture of Bamiyan that Mullah Omar issued his famous fatwa. Like the 
fatwa issued by Khomeini against Rushdie, the power of Omar’s fatwa reverberated 
beyond the geographical borders of Afghanistan. Within hours international and local 
media condemned the fatwa as an act of savage destruction against a world heritage cite.  
In an editorial in the international Deoband journal, Al-Balagh, Mufti Rafi 
‘Usmani, the Grand Mufti of Pakistan, denied the assertion that the destruction of statues 
was an un-Islamic act. He noted that Qur’an narrated the story of the Prophet Abraham, 
who was a “destroyer of idols”. Rafi ‘Usmani reminded his audience that the Prophet 
Muhammad did in fact destroy all 360 idols in the Ka’ba after the conquest of Mecca. He 
concluded however by suggesting that there could indeed be a disagreement among the 
‘ulama regarding the priorities and the methods used by the Taliban. “There are many 
evils in the society,” he said. “And scholars may disagree over which ones need the most 
attention at a given time.”553 Similarly he noted that scholars could disagree over the 
particular approach taken to eradicate an evil. Some might question whether the action 
would alienate the Buddhists nations in Southeast Asia at a critical time for Afghanistan. 
However, according to ‘Usmani, the Taliban had taken the decisions in light of guidance 
from their respected scholars. The Grand Mufti of Pakistan also questioned the right of 
the world leaders to criticize Taliban. “The people who nuked Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
who killed hundreds of thousands of people in Iraq, and are killing people in Afghanistan 
through the recently imposed sanctions, how strange that they should be raising their 
voice in support of stone statues?”554 ‘Usmani also cautioned Muslims not to mistake the 
Taliban for a “bunch of ignorant people. I know them personally. They themselves are 
                                                
553 ‘Usmani, Rafi, editorial, Albalagh, April 2001. 
554 ‘Usmani, Rafi, editorial, Albalagh, April 2001. 
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not ignorant in shari‘a. They also have scholars among them and their decisions are based 
on the guidance from their respected scholars.” In other words this was at once a tactical 
way of preserving support for the Taliban’s actions, and thereby drawing on their reserve 
of actual and symbolic political power, while simultaneously maintaining the scope of 
legitimate scholastic difference within an institution (Dar-ul ‘Ulum) not otherwise known 
for its links with ‘extremists.’ 
The diverse set of condemnatory and justificatory discourses that ensued around 
this event is fascinating. Pakistan’s premier, and relatively liberal English daily Dawn, 
ran almost 20 opinion pieces on Bamiyan, which were by and large harshly critical of this 
latest of Taliban antics, deriding Mullah Omar and the Taliban as an insult and 
embarrassment for Islam and for Muslims worldwide. However this criticism was also 
couched behind a series of attempts to show this event up as a political rather than 
religious maneuver. This was typified in the commentary of the now famed author of the 
book “The Taliban”, Ahmad Rashid.555 Rashid claimed that “the controversial decision 
was apparently influenced by the hardliners who appear to have emerged much stronger 
after the imposition of UN sanctions.” Juan Cole has suggested that Mullah Omar was 
influenced in this decision by Osama bin Laden. Others touted the act as an outburst of 
revenge, a signal of defiance against UN sanctions, and the world community. Other 
editorials touched on the more local political factors, namely that the Shi‘i Hazaras of 
Bamiyan had allied themselves with the Northern Alliance and had put up a stiff 
resistance against the Taliban. 
                                                
555 Rashid, in Pakistani journalist circles, is more affectionately known as “lucky bastard!” (and anyone 
who knows what 911 did to the sale of his books, would be forgiven for thinking that there is a link 
between al-Qaeda and Ahmad Rashid.) 
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In the Urdu press, Jung editorials and letters were less overtly hostile and 
condemnatory towards the Taliban, but often registered a polite disagreement about 
whether the fatwa was necessary or even Islamic. The Western concern for pieces of 
“rock” in the face of their ‘indifference’ to the suffering of the Afghan people through the 
imposition of crippling UN sanctions, was however highlighted as classic case of 
hypocrisy (munafiqat).556 
But what is ultimately more illuminating, are the various public and private 
reactions to this events, from within the broader Deoband establishment. Maulana Fazlur 
Rahman, leader of the Deoband’s main political faction, the JUI (F), who has very close 
links with the Taliban, supported Omar’s viewpoint. “As a leader of an Islamic party, I 
say that statues are not acceptable in Islam.”557 However when pushed by reporters about 
the shari’a validity of the fatwa, he went on to say: “Let us not forget that the UN has 
imposed sanctions on Afghanistan at a time when hundreds of children are dying of cold 
and hunger. … Maybe that is also why they have taken this drastic action, to show their 
anger.” Rahman was certainly not eager to present the Islamic basis for the ruling by the 
Afghan Ministry of Vice and Virtue, because he would not have been willing to 
pronounce or support a fatwa issued on this subject for idols and statues housed in 
Pakistani museums and archeological sites. More interestingly Sami ul-Haq of the 
Haqaniyya madrasa, suggested that the statues should be locked in a museum or sold 
“because there are infidels who are interested in buying them. Then the money should be 
used for Afghanistan.”  
                                                
556 Within the Quranic lexicon, the munafiq (hypocrite) stands a rung lower than the kafir (unbeliver) in his 
proximity to hell 
557 Interview, News, March 13, 2001 
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In India however, where this act provided fodder for the RSS, the destruction of 
the idols was proof of “Muslim marauders version of history.” However the Deoband 
‘alim Abdul Khaliq, vice-chancellor of the Dar al-‘Ulum at Deoband, the Mecca and 
birthplace of the Deoband movement, stated emphatically that: “We don’t support the 
Taliban action in any way. It is anti-Islamic.” By distancing himself from any suggestion 
that this act was sanctioned, this Deoband ‘alim, removed from his Pakistani colleagues 
by no more than a few hundred miles, precisely did not want this form of power accruing 
to his institution. This did not however prevent Asad Madani, the mohtamim of India’s 
Deoband from attending the April 2001 Deoband conference.558 
By contrast to all these apologetic or condemnatory statement, the leadership and 
officialdom of the Taliban were loath to attribute any political motive, revenge, defiance, 
or otherwise to this act, and made it out to be an action that was resolutely an act of piety 
and fidelity to Islam. Taliban’s culture minister Mawlawi Qudratullah Jamal told The 
Times of India: “The status of all religious ma’abut, or deities, had been under 
consideration for some time. The ministry for the promotion of virtue and prevention of 
vice recently submitted its findings.”559 For him, the act was a routine bureaucratic 
enforcement of shari‘a law. He dismissed the pleas against the demolition as “drama” and 
in another broadcast over Radio Shari‘at stated: “The infidels want to rob Islam of its 
spirit. I would like to ask the world Muslims not to harmonize their voices with those of 
non-believers. These statues were the gods of infidels and these infidels continue to 
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worship and respect these icons. Allah Almighty is the only real god and all false gods 
should be smashed.”560 
On a similar note Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Muhammad Hassan said 
in his Eid-ul Azha sermon at a local mosque that it was “foolish” to claim that Omar’s 
decree was un-Islamic. “It is a shame for Afghans even to think their forefathers were 
idol worshippers. Islam is our only true pride.”561 And in what was perhaps a retort to 
Sami-ul Haq, Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, the powerful Taliban justice minister, who is 
said to have persuaded Omar to issue the edict to destroy the statues, stated: “We want to 
be known as the smashers of idols, not sellers of idols.” 
 
The Unapologetic Subject 
Like many of the other students and ulama I had occasion to talk with, Maulana 
Walli Khan, a junior scholar at Jami‘a Faruqiyya, displayed a sense of enormous pride 
that Taliban had defied the world community. He was less concerned with explaining the 
shari‘a basis for the ruling. For the first time Maulana Wali Khan informed me, “we have 
an Islamic regime that can stand behind the Sunnah without apologetics or concessions to 
the west.” This theme of an unapologetic Islam, flying in the face of western modernity 
was re-iterated in numerous conversations. It is hence not surprising to find that most 
popular and many academic discussions of political Islam, regard such statements as 
implicitly suggesting the radical alterity of Islamist politics, an alterity that arises from a 
primal commitment to certain essentialized texts. If however we see these acts and 
discourses in terms of the assertion of sovereign power, and as counter measures to other 
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forms of competing sovereignty, then a slightly different picture begins to emerge. The 
problematic of “Pakistani” history, and histories of political Islam in general, can thus be 
situated within, rather than against, the condition of political modernity. Viewing this 
phenomenon across a horizon of shared historical experience and political affect also 
brings the narrative of Kabul into greater proximity with K-Street than Karachi. 
The use of violence and the Kalashnikov, as a means of settling public debates 
had clearly benefited the MQM in the 80’s. As mentioned above Karachi at one point 
trembled whenever Altaf Hussain sneezed. As a model for enhancement of one’s poll 
profile and overall clout, the MQM model was an enviable one. It was only when the 
MQM came at loggerheads with the nationalist army, that its own fate was decisively 
sealed. The Deoband’s hope for political power hence rested on some measure of direct 
and indirect collaboration with the ISI. Even thought many ulama would deny direct 
linkages between the activities of their ‘former’ students, the masculinity of the SSP and 
other jihad groups like Harkat ul-Ansar and the Lashkar, indirectly played into the hands 
of the Deoband. In the language of the streets, it was a clear sign: “do not mess with us 
now.” The numerous cases of hunting down “alleged” blasphemers, or reckless editors 
who dared to post “offensive” materials, or Medical School professors who discussed 
prophetic hygiene, all served as examples of the ways in which new forms and spaces of 
power were being reconfigured. For the Pakistani Deoband the Taliban served just such a 
foil. By linking themselves more closely with the Afghan Deobandi’s the Deoband in 
Pakistan could capitalize on the symbolic victories of the Taliban over the “liberal west.” 
Unapologetic Islam was less a debate about theology and the principles of usul al-fiqh, 
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and more about “cultural” capital and the rhizomic flows of power. It was a performance 
of power. 
But this form of defiance, remains problematic as a form of uncontaminated 
resistance because in either its apologetic or unapologetic moment, it still stands under 
the shadow of the West (as apologizing to, or refusing apology to the West). Moreover 
this form of contemporary self-fashioning of Islam, being merely one manifestation of a 
global conservative turn, uncritically inverts the dominating and polarized discourse of 
European culture. In other words the West remains central either as rapprochement or 
rejection. This constricts their own interpretive flexibility by setting themselves off of 
and against the already fixed and essentialized spaces of “modernity” and a “Western 
Other.” Additionally from the perspective of the larger metacolonial thesis we have been 
developing, the destruction of the Buddhas, the enforcement of the beard, etc, are al 
valorized as an expression of the formation of subjectivity. As acts of power they 
participate in the shared metaphysical space of the West in its understanding of the place 
of life. That is to say, the unapologetic subject, derives the animus of his stance from 
opposition to the West. By ding so he operates within a filed of the political whose broad 
contours are already marked off as given, with the recourse to Islamic symbols and 
theology being largely symbolic deference’s to difference in order to be the same. 
In pressing for such laws like blasphemy, enforcement of prayer and beard and 
the circumscription of public bodily practices and consumption etc., the ‘ulama are 
tapping into a powerful means of re-inscribing the fear of God, and hence the fear of the 
‘ulama, back into society. In a secular space the language of ‘ulama holds little power. As 
we have seen the deployment of taqwa politics serves as the mechanism for the 
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enhancement of a juridico-discursive space where ‘ulama sovereignty can be activated. In 
contrast to the colonial era, where the ‘ulama’s juridical space was confined to the 
domestic sphere (the classical oikos), the postcolonial state has afforded the possibility of 
the reunification of the polis and the oikos. But this merger of spheres is now fully global 
as Agamben’s Apparatus essay demonstrates. The western oikos was all along a Christian 
oikos. The politicization of the ‘ulama which is often regarded as contrary to the 
modernist secular template of the separation of powers, is then, from the perspective of a 
biopolitics, an intrinsically modernist move. From the perspective of liberal, secular and 
even some traditional Muslims, ‘ulama appropriations of mechanisms of coercive control 
and their recourse to violence, represents “the final argument of the ‘ulama”562 in a fast 
globalizing postmodern universe. Instead I would suggest that we read these 
transformations as the effect of globalization itself. 
 
                                                





The Space of Nation: Ummah and Imagination 
 
 
‘Don’t you know that Islam was born on 14 August 1947?’  
— Egyptian King Farouk I563  
 
 “Pakistan,” I said aloud, “What a complete dump!” And we hadn’t even arrived. 
— Salman Rushdie564 
 
 
In this chapter I will be examining the way in which the biopoliticization of Islam 
is reflected in both popular and scholarly understandings of two key terms that broadly 
designate the community of the faithful; ummah and millat. I will suggest that the 
biopoliticization of these concept, most forcefully articulated in the work of “Sir” 
Muhammad Iqbal (1877 – 1938), has meant the subsumption of the ummah and Islam 
within the violent spatial imaginary of the modern political trinity of nation-state-capital. 
Configured around the ummah, an entire new field of security practices has emerged, 
constituting a new biopolitics of the Muslim population. In the figure of the jihadist then, 
the link then between millat and militancy is maximally exposed. Through a brief 
analysis of the 2001 Deoband conference near Peshawar, which marked 150 years of the 
Deoband’s service (khidmaat) to Islam, I will show how political Islam, with its primary 
                                                
563 Quoted in S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University 
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564 Salman Rushdie, Midnight's Children (New York: Penguin Books, 1995). 
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logic of ummah security, is best analysed in terms of what Foucault called an apparatus 
(dispositif), a technology of power, rather than a distinct political ideology. The apparatus 
of securitization has lead in turn to the increasingly violent sequence of sectarian 
demarcations (biopolitical caesura) as the sovereignty of the ‘ulama is effectively 
exercised as a bordering practice; as a form of territorialization. These bordering 
practices carve out the space of exception and mark the zones of inclusion/exclusion. 
This tendency, manifest in the latest and more deadly round of fatwa fragging that has 
characterized the Deoband’s history, has exposed a civil war at the very heart of the 
Pakistani Deoband establishment. At the end of the chapter I will briefly consider how 
new ethical possibilities of Islam may be recovered through a rethinking of the concept of 
the ummah with Agamben’s notion of infancy (ummi). 
 
 
Pakistan: The Banner of Islam 
 
In Pakistan official states of emergency and martial laws are declared with routine 
familiarity, they have become cyclical almost predictable. Popular movements and public 
agitations have been equally instrumental in forcing the military to return to the barracks. 
They too have been cyclical but are now increasingly cynical. The eloquent and 
indefatigable Marxists critic Tariq Ali, has never been in doubt about the causes of the 
ongoing crisis. In his 1983 classic of political history, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death 
of a State, ‘Ali placed the onus of responsibility squarely with the praetorian ambitions of 
the Armed forces and its repeated liaisons with an imperial America.565 Almost three 
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decades later one is tempted to answer Ali’s question: Yes, Canned Pakistan survives! 
But there seems to be something too neat, too subjective, too linear, too historicist and 
rational and self-contained about the Amrika-Army explanation.  
By contrast in her recent attempt to make sense of the senseless, Farzana 
Shaikh,566 begins by downplaying the standard neo-Marxist accounts of writers like Tariq 
Ali567 and Hamza Alavi who both privilege economic materialist explanations.568 Instead 
she seeks to supplement the standard explanations of Pakistan’s political crisis (corrupt 
politicians, army interventions, feudal hierarchies, imperial liaisons etc.), with a more 
forceful probing of the underlying ideological contradictions and ambiguities — the 
“vexed relationship between Islam and nationalism”569 — that lie at the heart of the 
Pakistan project. While her initial move towards ideological incoherence places the 
question of Islam more forcefully at the center of analysis, rather than regarding it as an 
epiphenomenon of false consciousness, her overall approach is severely hampered by an 
uncritical uptake of the key terms of the analysis; religion, culture, the political, 
nationalism, and Islam itself. The key political question of sovereignty, does not even 
arise. While today one cannot but agree that “Pakistan’s national identity came to be a 
divisive rather than a unitary force,”570 she falls just short of essentializing Islam. In her 
attempt to avoid the materialist camp she consequently swings too far in an idealist and 
subjectivist direction, rater than problematize the realist/idealist binary itself. Drawing on 
                                                
Review Press, 1988). Also see Hamza Alavi “Class and State” in Gardezi and Rashid, Pakistan, the Roots 
of Dictatorship : The Political Economy of a Praetorian State. As she rightly observes “This focus on 
‘class’ interests obscures the complex relationship between Pakistan’s religious identity and its most 
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566 Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan. 
567 Ali, The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power. 
568 Alavi’s notion of the salariat. 
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the insights of Metcalf and Nasr,571 she effectively traces the problem of Pakistan’s 
instability to a contradiction between “two rival discourses of Islam—the communal and 
the Islamist.” Both of these camps, she argues “have struggled for ascendancy in defining 
Pakistan’s national identity.”572 Pakistan’s problem is thus in part, one of failed 
signification, a problem of definition! This is an important move, but it remains at the 
level of ideology rather than discourse. She goes on to suggest that it is the “contested 
versions of Islam, rather than any disjunction between a ‘secular’ leadership and a 
‘religious’ establishment that account for the difficulties in forging a coherent national 
identity.” She concludes her otherwise thoughtful and reflexive account by suggesting 
that it is not more consensus, but the very nature of consensus itself that is problematic.573 
But this insightful redirection is not explored, and she falls back on the more quotidian, 
albeit correct, assertion that it is Pakistan’s “problematic and contested relationship with 
Islam that has most decisively frustrated its quest for a coherent national identity and for 
stability as a nation-state … It is this contestation over the multiple meanings of Islam 
that accounts today for the doubts about the meaning of Pakistan and the significance of 
being Pakistani.”574 In her analysis Pakistan and Islam appear as reified, albeit somewhat 
schizophrenic, multiple personalities. 
By contrast in this dissertation I have suggested that the very concepts of 
Pakistan, Islam and being Muslim cannot be neatly separated and exist together on a 
                                                
571 Shaikh draws on Syed Vali Nasr, “National Identities and the India Pakistan conflict” in T. V. Paul, ed., 
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573 “Pakistan’s stability as a nation-state is not so much greater certainty or a stronger sense of consensus. 
Rather, it will depend on the nature of the consensus itself.” Shaikh 
574 Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan, p. 209. 
 
 272 
biopolitical horizon. This is why a Deoband orientation can coexists within a range of 
politico-ideological arrangements; an authoritarian/totalitarian system (Mullah Omar-
Taliban), a secular system (Husain Madani-JUH), Islamic ‘democracy’ (Ashraf Thanawi-
JUI) and all ranges and combinations thereof. This does not mean, pace Metcalf, that the 
Deoband is politically hollow, it simply means that ideology is itself compelled by other 
arrangements. I have suggested therefore that we view political Islam as a technology of 
power, and the Deoband movements as a series of specific dispositifs that exist within a 
complex topological space of power. The task then is to view Pakistan as a certain kind 
of dispositif, a thought which in responding to an existing set of problematizations, brings 
into being a whole new series of affects, institutions and configurations. It is therefore 
towards understanding the shifting dynamics of the space of power that we must turn our 
analytical gaze. In this way there can be no mistake of viewing Pakistan as a good idea 
gone bad, but rather as a dispositif that emerges within an already existing field of 
complex biopolitical and sovereign elements. 
 
In his foreword to Professor Sharif al-Mujahid’s Ideological Foundations of 
Pakistan, Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi,575 Director General of the shari‘a Academy and 
former President of International Islamic University, writes that Pakistan essentially 
represents an idea. “It reflects the idea of a distinct and unique socio-political and religio-
spiritual collective personality of the Muslims of South Asia.” In Ghazi’s view, a view 
standard within Pakistani nationalist historiography, Pakistan is the outcome of a trans 
historical telos of Islam. Jinnah’s Pakistan movement, Ghazi tells us, was “preceded by a 
                                                




long and conspicuous history of Muslim self-assertion as a singular civilizational entity, 
the traces of which are prominently manifest in all the significant landmarks of Indian 
history.” 576 One would of course be curious to know what histrionics and conspiracy 
theories Ghazi would appeal to in order to make sense of this “singular civilizational 
entity” in the wake of the bombs that were exploded outside his former office. 
Today a generalized yet immanent uncertainty of violence pervades the entire 
socio-political landscape of Pakistan, affecting the elite and masses alike. I have thus far 
attempted to understand Pakistan’s crisis, as a sovereign anxiety, a chronic state of 
emergency which parallels a “nervous system”.577 One is tempted to invoke Michael 
Taussig’s observations with regard to Colombia, to talk instead about Pakistan’s “ordered 
disorder.” But whose order is this chaos?578 As we have seen, in Agamben, the state of 
exception is not merely an attribute of the state apparatus, and therefore we cannot simply 
rest content with tracing the exception back to its more exemplary intuitions, the Army or 
Imperialism. A general clue then towards thinking the indistinction between Islamists and 
communalists,579 lies in thinking abut the “state fetish” that animates the desire of both 
groups. Neither, I would argue, challenge, nor quite understand the more fundamental 
nature of the Leviathan, the Behemoth that they seek to harness to protect, securitize, 
Islam/Muslims. Paraphrasing Taussig and bringing him more in line with Agamben, the 
State is not the reality behind the mask of the political, but rather the mask which 
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579 Which can be read, in Shaikh’s terms, as the ostensible difference between those calling for an Islamic 
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prevents us seeing a certain reality of the political.580 Analagously Islam. Both Islamists 
and modernists alike have deployed a fidelity towards “true Islam” as a mask for their 
state fetish, or what Agamben more rigorously identifies as sovereign power. The ummah 
in short is the new God, the biopolitical sovereign that must be defended. The profound 
ambiguity therefore of the concept of Pakistan, with its incessant discourse of the pure 
and the impure, mirrors the profound ambiguity of the concept of the sacred itself.581 
Pakistan the pure (pak) state, the sacred state, is also the state which produces homo 
sacer. It is therefore a state which is subject to the continuous ritual of purification and 
absolution, a process which Agamben calls the biopolitical caesura. The logic of this 
caesura, this deadly merger between the sacred and the State, between Islam and 
Pakistan, has its foundations not in the Deoband but in the very “secular” movement for 
an Islamic State. It is thus the very conjunction between Islamic reason (governmentality) 
and violence that sutures the ‘legitimacy’ of modern jihad, that — like the western 
conjunction between peace and war,582 reason and violence583 — must be exposed. 
Thus greatly expanding Weber’s emphasis on ‘legitimate’ violence, the monopoly of 
which is said to define the modern state, Taussig, like Agamben redirects our gaze 
towards “the intrinsically mysterious, mystifying, convoluting, plain scary, mythical, and 
arcane cultural properties and power of violence to the point where violence is very much 
an end in itself— a sign, as Benjamin put it, of the existence of the gods.” Thus by 
extending Taussig’s notion of State fetishism and Agamben’s disclosure of the political 
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theology of sovereignty, we can expose the logic common to both Islamists and 
modernists alike. If it is “precisely the coming together of reason-and-violence in the 
State that creates, in a secular and modern world, the bigness if the big S”,584 then 
similarly it is the coming together of Islam and violence in the practices of both the state 
and the ‘ulama, that animates the command, the bigness, of political Islam. Pakistan 
serves as the primary vehicle for this fusions of reason and violence, the fusions of Islam 
and the State. 
 
Borders of the Ummagination: The Two Nation Notion 
One of Pakistan’s most celebrated nationalist historians, the late Prof. Dr. Ishtiaq 
Hussain Qureshi (1903—1981), the first education minister of Pakistan, barely mentions 
the pro-Pakistan ‘ulama in his oddly titled Short History of Pakistan. This weighty tomb, 
of over a thousand pages, was the standard text for the Pakistan Studies Intermediate 
(FSc) level syllabus up until the mid 80’s. The book begins its short account of Pakistan 
in the Vedic period, and is largely a history of the Islamic world. The sections dealing 
with British colonialism and the post-1857 nationalist movements comprise the last fifth 
of the book. The pro-Pakistani Deoband are barely mentioned.585 ‘Ulama hostility to the 
League is given sharp notice. The text serves as a general marker of the lowly regard 
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mainstream nationalist elite had for the ‘ulama, a pattern which changed suddenly by the 
revisionist assessments of the ‘ulama’s role under Zia’s tenure.586 
The ‘ulama then are burdened with this double sense of irony; that within the very 
boundaries of a nation state that was created ostensibly in the name of Islam, those 
entrusted with its “preservation”, those trained to speak in its name, and those conversant 
in the language of the sacred revelation, remain a mere subaltern, economically 
disempowered and at times despised class. In no small measure must this stark irony have 
contributed toward a degree of social schizophrenia (see Nasr on the Pakistan Madani 
faction). The ‘ulama thus began their political career in Pakistan, as relatively 
marginalized political agents, largely written out of both modern nationalist and 
fundamentalist narratives, as lingering specters of a bye gone era, and representatives of a 
community that have held back both Islamic and nationalist progress. The madrasa as the 
chief institute for the production of other ‘ulama, increasingly found itself drawing only 
the subaltern and largely impoverished urban and rural classes, and were increasingly 
confined to a private sphere of religious education587 which did not connect in any 
significant way, with the production of more useful citizen bodies. This problem of a lack 
of authority amidst a series of contradictory and competing voices, is what contributed to 
their adoption of what I have earlier called taqwa politics, an affective politics of 
sentiment, regard, fear and ultimately the sovereign fetish.  
                                                
586 Aziz, The Murder of History in Pakistan. 
587 Zaman very nicely illuminates the contradictory ways in which the ‘ulama have contributed to their own 
marginalization and confinement within the private sphere, by marking off distinctions between the space 
of Islam and the worldly, while simultaneously claiming Islam is a complete code of life. That is to say the 
sacred and the profane are both enacted and disavowed. Zaman, The 'Ulama in Contemporary Islam: 
Custodians of Change. 
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But along with these considerations, it must be stated that the “secular nationalist” 
narrative is both disingenuous and historically myopic. Both the involvement of the 
‘ulama in the Pakistan movement and the passionately Islamic dimensions of Iqbal and 
Jinnah are seriously downplayed. Secularists narratives tend to define the commitments 
of Iqbal and Jinnah to Islam as existing at the level of generalities and broad universalist 
principles; brotherhood, unity, egalitarianism, justice, democracy, and all that. But the 
devil, and not merely the ‘ulama, so it would seem, are very much in the details.  
We have already seen how this problem of details with respect to the Objectives 
Resolution, led to a virtual coup by the ‘ulama. Liberal Pakistani’s are quick to suggest 
that the theocratic mayhem that has beset Pakistan was in large measure because the 
original father of the secular nation, Jinnah, and his trusted successor Prime Minister 
Liaquat ‘Ali Khan,588 did not, unlike Nehru, live to see the destiny of Pakistan to its 
fruition. But we must recall that Liaquat ‘Ali Khan, the Quaid-e-Millat, during the debate 
on the Objectives Resolution, had described Pakistan, not merely as a homeland for 
Muslims, but as “a polity, which may prove to be a laboratory for the purpose of 
demonstration to the world that Islam is not only a progressive force in the world, but it 
also provides remedies for many of the ills from which humanity was suffering.” In 1951, 
during his address to a gathering of members of the Islamic World Federation in Karachi, 
Liaquat asserted that the underlying idea of the Pakistan movement was not just to add 
one more country to the conglomeration of nations on the world map. Rather,  
                                                
588 Liaquat ‘Ali Khan was assassinated in Rawalpindi on 16 October 1951. Khan was shot twice in the 
chest by an Afghan Said Akbar. In what is perhaps a strange twist of irony Benazir Bhutto was also 
assassinated in Liaquat Bagh, the park named after Liaquat ‘Ali Khan in the wake of his assassination. 
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Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge by the Muslims of this subcontinent to 
secure a territory, however limited, where the Islamic ideology and way of life could be 
practiced and demonstrated to the world.589 
In this way Liaquat was merely being faithful to the spirit of the architects who 
envisioned Pakistan; that the State of Pakistan, however “moth eaten,” was to be an 
Islamic democracy and also a beacon and “bulwark of Islam.” The merely pragmatic 
argument that Pakistan functioned as an arrangement or mechanism to prevent the 
tyranny and discriminations of a Hindu majority, is buried as a minor clause in the more 
destinal configuration of Pakistan’s overt Islamic ideology. Pakistan is therefore an 
experiment with history. If much discussion, though largely paranoid and conspiratorial, 
has been focused on why this experiment has gone sour, it would be naïve to simply 
blame the lab techs for their faulty execution of an otherwise sound science. Rather it is 
the very ideologization of Islam that is problematic. And with the term biopoliticization 
(statification) of Islam, we can take this critique beyond the limits of the Marxist idealist 
paradigm. 
 
Djinns of the Nation 
In his January 1938 address to the Gaya Muslim League Conference in Bihar, the 
Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, described the flag of the Muslim League as “the 
flag of Islam”590 and Islam as “a complete code” of life. We should not fail to note off the 
bat, how two key paradigms of the modern that Agamben exposes, the flag (banner) and 
                                                
589 His address to the Motamar-i Alam-i Islami at Karachi on February 9, 1951 (Dawn, February 10, 1951) 
590 See Agamben on the relationship between the flag, the banner of the nation, and the structure of the 
sovereign ban itself. Agamben, ‘What is a People’ in Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics. 
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technē (code), are here internalized and normalized in Jinnah’s Islamo-nationalist 
discourse. 
Today in this huge gathering you have honored me by entrusting the duty 
to unfurl the flag of the Muslim League, the flag of Islam, for you cannot 
separate the Muslim League from Islam. … When we say “This flag is the 
flag of Islam” they think we are introducing religion into politics – a fact 
of which we are proud. Islam gives us a complete code. It is not only 
religion but it contains laws, philosophy and politics. In fact, it contains 
everything that matters to a man from morning to night. When we talk of 
Islam we take it as an all-embracing word. … The foundation of our 
Islamic code is that we stand for liberty, equality and fraternity.591 
 
If the persistent confusion about the nature of the Pakistan’s relationship to Islam 
persists,592 this owes in large measure to the fact that Jinnah was himself either confused 
about this relationship, or engaged in deliberate double talk. In the Gaya address, for 
instance, he emphatically equates the Pakistan movement with Islam, and Islam with a 
complete code of life. In another address at Edwards College, he went as far as describing 
Pakistan as “the premier Islamic State”; as the state which would safeguard and preserve 
Muslim ideology “which has come to us as a precious gift and treasure.” It was of course 
precisely this kind of talk, in which Islam, Muslim and Pakistan were used 
interchangeably, that animated the small yet important sector within the Indian Deoband 
leadership which subsequently begin countering the leadership of the Indian Deoband 
‘ulama (JUH) under Husain Madani. Even if Jinnah used the term “Islamic state” on rare 
occasion for most of his Urdu speaking audience, “Muslim state” was invariable heard as 
Islami riyasat or Islami hukumat.  
                                                
591 Muhammed Ali Jinnah, Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947-1948, Millenium Series (Karachi: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), emphaisis mine. 
592 For a characteristic example of the ongoing ideological ritual / impasse see Tarik Jan, ed., Pakistan 





One of the few articles ever penned by Jinnah was published in the March 1940 
issue of the London based rag Time and Tide. In this essay Jinnah is at pains to 
rearticulate (dare I say mimic) the immensely profound, dense and intellectually sober 
conclusion of the 1933 report of the Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Reforms. 
This report anticipates Samuel Huntington’s equally profound (please do not fail to mark 
my irony) and consequential clash of civilizations thesis.593 Jinnah, lamentably, says of 
this colonial report: “Perhaps no truer description of India has been compressed into a 
paragraph, without which no understanding of the Indian problem is possible. … that 
Islam and Hinduism “represent two distinct and separate civilizations and moreover are 
as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are nations of 
Europe.”594 On Jinnah’s understanding democratic systems are based on the concept of a 
“homogeneous” nation, and as such what is applicable to England is “very definitely not 
applicable to heterogeneous countries such as India, and this simple fact is the root cause 
of India’s constitutional ills.”595 What then does the homogeneity of the multiple 
ethnicities, languages, histories and traditions of the provinces that were to constitute 
Pakistan consists in? For both Jinnah and Iqbal, this unity, or homogeneity of people was 
determined by religious identity, Islam. Muslims therefore constitute a nation, a people. 
Here it is clear then the Jinnah had deeply imbibed a racist colonial anthropology which 
                                                
593 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order (Simon & Schuster, 
1998). 
594 In his article Jinnah quotes the first paragraph from the Report of the Joint Select Committee on Indian 
Constitutional Reforms (Sessions 1933-34, Vol. 1). It begins: “India is inhabited by many races … often as 
distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are the nations of Europe.” It then goes 
on to describe the essentialized characteristics of these two ‘races’.  
595 M.A. Jinnah, Time and Tide (London) March 9 1940, reproduced in Mujahid, Ideology of Pakistan.  
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split the Indian population into two ‘communal’ categories of Hindu and Muslim.596 
Being Muslim was not a matter of a private inner disposition towards the divine, but a 
racial identity marker. Islam therefore is no longer a private matter, but a public one. As 
such the two nation ‘theory’ is rooted in the consequences of a racialized colonial 
hierarchy.597 It becomes clear to see how Pakistan can be seen as biopolitical project, 
especially when we take into consideration Foucault’s articulation of race and biopolitics. 
To recall, for Foucault, a threshold of biological modernity occurs when the pole 
of biopower is directed towards the collective body and operates through regulating the 
processes at the level of a population. In other words, problems such as the birth and 
death rates, health and aspects of economic production have an immediate political 
dimension.598 Biopolitics is hence about governing life and ways of life, and regulating 
the exposure of a people to danger and accidents at the level of both the individual and 
the species. The key to a biopolitical regime or mentality then is to secure and preserve 
normality and order at the aggregate level of the population. This is the statification 
(étatisation) of the population as species, and it marks a decisive threshold of transition in 
the history of modern politics. Now, although Foucault distinguishes between classical 
sovereign power and modern biopower, he does not claim that sovereign power 
disappears. Rather sovereign power is recoded and folded into modern biopower, often 
manifesting itself as ‘state racism’. This is biopowers thanatopolitical underside. The 
sovereign element then continues to both disturb (caesura) and preserve a biopolitical 
                                                
596 For a critique of communalism see the pioneering study by Pandey, The Construction of Communalism 
in Colonial North India. 
597 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, ed. Geoff Eley 
and Sherry Ortner Nicholas Dirks, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). 
598 Which perhaps explains why Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the JUI is so obsessed with NGO’s. See Ameer 




logic. Like Renan then Iqbal and Jinnah inadvertently espouse a form of modern 
biopolitical racism which makes distinctions within the biological continuum, not at the 
level of physiognomy, but deeper, at the level of culture and ways of life. The distinction 
between Hindu and Muslim life forms effectively divides the population into communal 
subgroups and races. Now the decisions to ‘take life’ or ‘make die’ can be seen as part of 
a bio-logic: Hindu life is inferior, dangerous or life threatening to the security of the 
aggregate Muslim body (clearly Muslims in Hindu majority states were not to be 
included in Pakistan). In contrast to disciplinary forms of power, which seeks to form the 
concrete and specific habits of each individual, the logic of security and biopower only 
plans for an uncertain and probalistic future; “a future that is not exactly controllable, not 
precisely measured or measurable.”599 That is to say Jinnah’s concern was for the 
population as a whole, and his concern was to assure the probable security for most 
Muslims in India. Now while Jinnah may not have approved the elimination of dangerous 
Hindu life, by providing the logic of separatism (exclusion) as necessary for the survival 
of the Islamic bios, partition violence simply expressed the hidden logic of exclusion 
logics. During partition a pervasive state-biopolitical-racism thus allowed everyone the 
right to eliminate others in the name of ways of life (Hindu and Muslim) Jinnah and 
Iqbal’s Islamic exceptionalism, and by extension the exceptionalism of the Taliban and 
America, must therefore be situated on a biopolitical horizon. This horizon must be 
problematized, before an adequate framing of the solution to the violences that plague the 
region can be found. Thus after crossing a biopolitical threshold the Islamic expression of 
sovereign power takes the form of a decision on life and death inclusion/exclusion. Thus 
racism, understood not in a genetic or superficial sense, but rather as essential distinctions 
                                                
599 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 20. 
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made between peoples at the level of ways of life, allows racism (sovereignty) to assure 
the function of death within the economy of biopower. 
For Agamben politics has from the very beginning been biopolitical, the very constitution 
of the polis (political space), implies inclusive/exclusion, or the banning of naked life. 
The subject caught in the ban, the homo sacer, is one who is captured under the force of 
sovereign violence precisely by virtue of his exclusion. Hence for Agamben, sovereign 
power has from the very start, evinced a biopolitical dimension. With modernity the 
spaces of exception simply proliferate and become increasingly the rule. It is this relation 
between sovereignty and bare life, Agamben claims, that remains un-thought in Western 
and I am suggesting within Islamism more broadly also. Hence totalitarianism, Islamism 
and democratic liberalism remain trapped within a horizon circumscribed by the 
convergence of biological and political life. Afghanistan is the exemplary place of this 
convergence. 
To be fair to Jinnah what was envisaged here was not the more debauched notion 
of a clash of civilization, but instead civilizational identity and difference. As we know 
from the excellent study by Jalal, during this period Jinnah was not hell bent on a 
separate state for Muslims,600 but rather was keeping the multiple possibilities of the 
Pakistan idea as a bargaining chip for greater Muslim representation in any Nat 
Assembly. As late as the 1946 Cabinet Mission plan, two nations one state was still on 
the cards. What Jinnah wanted, among many other things, was an appropriation for 
Indian Muslims of the high mark of European modernity, nationhood. Muslims constitute 
a nation and as such their rights must be protected by a constitutional arrangement that 
gave maximal provincial autonomy to Muslim majority provinces. When Jinnah felt that 
                                                
600 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan.  
 
 284 
a space for Muslim sovereignty could not be preserved from the encroachments of the 
kind of strong centrist state that Nehru, Patel and Gandhi had in mind, Jinnah re-affirmed 
the alternative: a separate Muslim State. 
Jinnah was also of course a politician and had a keen sense for demographics. The 
Lahore Resolution made it clear that his demands from Muslim autonomy would not 
come to fruition through some constitutional fait accompli. Now the matter was to be 
turned over the passions of the people, and the ML exploited the sense of a threat to 
Muslims under a Hindu dominated parliament with éclat. Jinnah may have been a quasi-
secularist but he was also a politician. I do not dispute then widely shared notion that 
Jinnah’s formal ideological commitments were on balance “secular,” and certainly his 
many formal declarations consistently railed against the notion of theocracy; “Pakistan 
shall not be run by priests with a divine mission” etc. And yet he never failed to suggest 
that the mission of Pakistan was itself divine. Take for instance his Id ul-Fitr address 
delivered in September on the eve of 1945 elections, in which he draws upon Edward 
Gibbon to make his case: 
Every Musalman knows that the injunctions of the Qur’an are not 
confined to religious and moral duties. “From the Atlantic to the Ganges”, 
says Gibbon, “the Qur’an is acknowledged as the fundamental code, not 
only of theology, but of civil and criminal jurisprudence, and the laws 
which regulate the actions and the property of mankind are governed by 
the immutable sanctions of the will of God.” Everyone, except those who 
are ignorant, knows that the Qur’an is the general code of the Muslims. A 
religious, social, civil, commercial, military, judicial, criminal, penal code; 
it regulates everything from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily 
life; from the salvation of the soul to the health of the body; from the 
rights of all to those of each individual; from morality to crime, from 
punishment here to that in the life to come, and our Prophet has enjoined 
on us that every Musalman should possess a copy of the Qur’an and be his 
own priest. Therefore Islam is not merely confined to the spiritual tenets 
and doctrines or rituals and ceremonies. It is a complete code regulating 
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the whole Muslim society, every department of life, collectively and 
individually.601 
 
It is not then the theocratic religious basis that Jinnah objects to. He only disputes 
the singular moral authority of the ‘ulama to determine the code and ‘regulate’ society in 
all of its minute details. What better example do we have of the governmentalization of 
Islam than this? Thus he effectively made numerous verbal concessions to the Pakistan-
Deoband faction led by Shabbir ‘Usmani, in order to bolster support for the ML. Jinnah 
spoke two languages, one to Muslim nationalists and one to Islamic nationalists, not 
because he way a hypocrite, but because he did not really see a distinction between the 
two. What remains incomparable in Mr. Jinnah then is the temerity with which he was 
able to contain the bristling poles of contradiction that lay at the heart of both his political 
praxis and his political ideas. Islam was at the imaginary heart of his platform but its 
symbolic masters the ‘ulama remained unconvinced that the flag of Pakistan and the flag 
of Islam were one and the same. Jinnah for his part was always weary of the djinns that 
the Deoband could unleash, whilst conversely, the Deoband ‘ulama were concerned with 
Jinnah’s relationship to bottled spirits of another variety. Ultimately however a 
significant faction of the ‘ulama were won over by explicit promises by Jinnah, made 
both in public and private, that the Qur’an and Sunnah would guide the framing of the 
constitution. 
 
                                                
601 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, 3rd ed. (Lahore,: Sh. M. 
Ashraf, 1943), p. 299, emphasis mine  
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‘Allama’s Law: Islam, the State and Muslim People 
 
We must learn to recognize this structure of the ban in the political relations and 
public spaces in which we still live. In the city, the banishment of sacred life is 
more internal than every interiority and more external than every 
extraneousness. The banishment of sacred life is the sovereign nomos that 
conditions every rule, the originary spatialization that governs and makes 
possible every localization and every territorialization.— Agamben602 
 
It was however Muhammad Iqbal, who sanctifies the proper marriage between 
Islam and the State, not at the level of prose, but poetry, at the level therefore of affect 
and aesthetics. In this way I regard him as the exemplary Islamist. It is no accident that 
during a 1986 conference on Iqbal in Tehran, then President of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, stated that the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic were ‘the embodiment 
of Iqbal’s dream’.603 Iqbal is of course widely regarded as the spiritual founder of 
Pakistan. In her study of Iqbal, Annemarie Schimmel calls him a ‘talisman’ of 
Pakistan.604 To be sure Iqbal was a complex, ambivalent figure605 and despite his title as 
the architect of Muslim nationalism, he is simultaneously know for his rejection of 
nationalism.606 However in his attempt to critique western conceptions of nationhood as 
rooted in ethno-linguistic properties, he substitutes an Islam-State duality in place of the 
                                                
602 Agamben, Homo Sacer 
603 Quoted in Javed Majeed, Iqbal: Islam and Post Colonialism in South Asia, Pathfinders (Routledge India, 
2007), p. xxiii. 
604 Annemarie Schimmel, Gabriel's Wing: A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir M. Iqbal, vol. 6, Studies 
in the History of Religions (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963). See also Iqbal Singh, The Ardent Pilgrim: An 
Introduction to the Life and Works of Mohammed Iqbal (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), and 
Mustansir Mir, Iqbal: Makers of Islamic Civilization, Makers of Islamic Civilization (I.B. Tauris, 2005). 
605 For a recent excellent study which highlights the complex relationships between the Iqbal’s politics of 
Muslim and European imperialist discourses, see Javed Majeed, "Geographies of Subjectivity, Pan-Islam 
and Muslim Separatism: Muhammad Iqbal and Selfhood," Modern Intellectual History 4, no. 01 (2007).. 
See also Majeed, Iqbal: Islam and Post Colonialism in South Asia. 
606 Thus Iqbal could write on one hand the Tarana-i Hindi (Song of an Indian), which came a close second 
— to Tagore’s Jana Gana Mana — to being adopted as the national anthem of India. And on the other, he 
also wrote the Tarana-i Milli (Song of a Muslim Millat): “China and Arabia are ours; Hindustan is ours; 
We are the Muslims, the whole world is ours ...” 
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classical nation-state formula, thereby retaining the State fetish and reconstituting 
national belonging on grounds of religious identity.  
Iqbal’s presidential address to the twenty-first session of the All India Muslim 
League at Allahabad on December 29, 1930 was, in retrospect a landmark speech. Even 
though the word Pakistan had not yet been coined, the speech is widely regarded as the 
precursor to the “Pakistan” Lahore Resolution of 1940. In this text Iqbal, unwittingly 
presaging Foucault’s definition of biopolitical governmentality, defines Islam as “a 
system of life and conduct.” The speech however gives us a key insight into a series of 
confused and unresolved dialectical tensions in Iqbal’s thought, tensions which sustain 
his poetry but destroy his politics. Iqbal offers an almost Hegelian characterization of 
Islam as the unfolding, albeit inversely, of a universal European spirit: “In Islam, God 
and the universe, spirit and matter, Church and State, are organic to each other. […] To 
Islam matter is spirit realizing itself in space and time.” Islam for Iqbal is not only an 
ethical ideal it is also a polity; “a social structure regulated by a legal system and 
animated by a specific ethical ideal”. Because of Islam, writes Iqbal, Indian Muslims 
were transformed “into a well-defined people, possessing a moral consciousness of their 
own”, a society with “remarkable homogeneity and inner unity.”607 The idea that a nation 
or people consists not of objective factors like race, language, or geography, derives from 
Ernst Renan who Iqbal cites in the address. A nation thus transcends geography and race, 
but is united by “a moral consciousness”. “The formation of the kind of moral 
consciousness which constitutes the essence of a nation in Renan’s sense demands a price 
                                                
607 It is not merely the irony of the present that makes us gasp at this remarkably essentialist claim, but it is 
also the irony of Iqbal’s moment in 1930, when it was precisely the political division and confusion of 
direction that Iqbal was called upon to address. Not to mention of course that such essentialized visions of a 
unified Muslim population were projections of Iqbal’s biopolitical desire rather than reflections of Indian 
Muslim history to begin with. 
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which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay.” The implications of this passage was 
clear; Hindu’s and Muslims did not share a moral consciousness and hence could not 
constitute a united nation. In this way Iqbal places ethics under the sign of biopolitics. In 
rejecting formal racism, which divides Muslim people along 
tribal/national/ethnic/territorial lines, Iqbal embraces what he calls “higher 
communalism” which unites the pan-Islamic community, the global ummah, solely by 
virtue of a homogenous religion. The Muslims of India, Iqbal states decisively, “are the 
only Indian people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the 
word,” for the unlike the Hindu, possess “homogeneity which is necessary for a nation.” 
Thus we must be clear, Iqbal did not reject nationalism qua nationalism, but instead 
situated national-communal belonging at the level of religion and culture instead. But 
then, remarkably, in the same breath, Iqbal seeks to territorialize this homogenous non-
localizable pan-Islamic community, offering words which undeniably shaped the 
trajectory of Muslim politics from that moment on: “I would like to see the Punjab, 
North- West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. 
[…] the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears, to me to be 
the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.”  
It is with this transition from the idea of a moral consciousness to its embodiment 
in a State, that a biopolitical threshold is decisively crossed. What Iqbal effectively 
articulates is that Muslim species life should becomes the object and target of the modern 
state, because only the later can secure it, on aggregate.  
“The truth is that Islam is not a Church. It is a State conceived as a 
contractual organism long before Rousseau ever thought of such a thing, 
and animated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted 
creature, defined by this or that portion of the earth, but as a spiritual 
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being understood in terms of a social mechanism, and possessing rights 
and duties as a living factor in that mechanism. […] I therefore demand the 
formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and 
Islam.” 
 
Here we see the merger of the spirit with the socius, and the socius with the State. The 
collective body and the body of Islam become indistinct, and it is this Islamic body which 
must be defended. 
Iqbal who talks of a homogenous Islamic moral consciousness, who exhorts his 
audience to fashion “organic wholeness of a unified will” and achieve “a real collective 
ego” derives his aspirations from the principle of tawhid. Tawhid is almost universally 
regarded as the central concept and principle of Islam, and is usually translated as the 
unity or oneness of God. But in Iqbal, this principle of divine singularity, in mapped onto 
life, and transformed as the unity of the ummah, and even the unity of humanity. ON the 
surface this seems like a wonderful idea, much like the peace of liberalism, but it is in 
fact the attempt to harness divine powers, singularity and sovereignty, and transfer them 
to the Muslim body politic, and the Muslim State. Additionally through the politicization 
of tawhid, Iqbal seeks to reverse the bifurcation of “worldly” and “religious” domains 
that are the hallmark of the secular state.608 “Reason” and “spirit” do not therefore require 
to undergo a laborious Hegelian dialectic because in Islam, according to Iqbal the state is 
already sacred and spiritual: “The state according to Islam is only an effort to realize the 
spiritual in a human organization.”609 Elsewhere Iqbal stated that “according to the law of 
Islam there is no distinction between the Church [religion] and the state. The state with us 
is not a combination of religious and secular authority, but it is a unit in which no such 
                                                
608 Allama Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Sang-Pak ed., Sang-E-
Meel Paperbacks (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1996). 
609 Ibid., p. 155. 
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distinction exists.”610 In this absolutely Islamic state, the principle of tawhid requires us 
to offer our final and definitive allegiance to God and to the laws of God as revealed to 
His Prophet. “Prophethood is the basis of our organization, our religion and our law. It 
creates unity in our diversity and makes us into a well-knit community.”611 Thus 
according to Iqbal’s reading of the Qur’an, “Islam does not aim at the moral reformation 
of the individual alone; it also aims at a gradual but fundamental revolution in the social 
life of mankind”.612 There is very little here that the Pakistan Deoband would disagree 
with. The law of the ‘Allama and the law of the ‘ulama are not then separated by the 
chasm that nationalist historiography is so keen to assert. On the surface of course the 
distance between the thought of Iqbal and someone like Mawdudi is indeed significant, 
and I do not mean to suggest that these differences are either irrelevant, or superficial. 
However the standard analysis operates at the level of connaissance and not savoir. My 
argument is in part that if we rethink the emergence of political Islam at the 
archaeological level, then the chasm between a ‘modernists’, ‘traditionalists’ and 
‘fundamentalists’ begins to appears in a different light. 
 
Iqbal and the Separation of the Ahmadi 
In Foucault’s conception of biopolitics, under modernity life is increasingly 
placed at the center of the political and of State politics in particular. The appearance of 
the Ahmadi then as the hominess sacri of Deoband sovereignty, “is possible only because 
                                                
610 Iqbal, Syed Abdul Vahid, ed., Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal (Lahore,: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 
1964), p. 60-61. 
611 Iqbal, Rumuz-i Bekhudi in Muhammad Iqbal, Poems from Iqbal: Renderings in English Verse with 
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the relation of ban has constituted the essential structure of sovereign power from the 
beginning.”613 It comes as no surprise then that Iqbal was himself an early advocate of a 
state sanctioned excommunication of the Ahmadi’s from the Muslim ummah. Taqi 
‘Usmani who compiled a substantial brief against “the imperial and satanic plot of 
Qadiyanism” showcases a series of statements from Iqbal to buttress the ‘ulama crusade: 
“The best course of action for the [British] Government is to declare the Ahmadi’s a 
separate religious group”; “The Muslim ummah has every right to demand the separation 
of Ahmadi’s from the Muslims.”614 Iqbal in fashioning the people, is also fashioning 
excluded and bare life. “Where there is a People” Agamben writes “there will be bare 
life.” Pakistan’s history, as a history of the land of the pure (Pakistan), thus bears out 
Agamben’s contention that every identity must, “continually be redefined and purified 
through exclusion, language, blood, and land.” The Muslim as a “people” thus always 
already carries the fundamental biopolitical fracture within itself.615  
 
Two points emerge clearly from this discussion. Iqbal was no conventional 
secularist, and neither was Jinnah. Secondly Iqbal did not reject either the State or the 
nation, but rather fused the two in the body of Islam. His pragmatic’s, his nomos, 
subsequently dictated the need to localize the unlocalizable. As Agamben writes, “When 
our age tried to grant the unlocalizable a permanent and visible localization, the result 
                                                
613 Agamben 
614 Muhammad Iqbal, Harf-i Iqbal, cited in Taqi ‘Usmani Qadiani Fitna awr Millate Islamiya ke auqaf 
(Idaratul-Maarif, 1996). 
615 The constitution of Muslim species life as a political body, the life of the umma, thus passes through a 
fundamental division which defines the original political structure of modernity; namely the categorical 
pairs of bare life (people) and political existence (People), exclusion and inclusion, zoē and bios. 
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was the concentration camp.”616 Iqbal initiates the production of the Pakistani camp, and 
the penetration of “the spirit of Islam” by the specter of the exception by linking the 
survival of “Islam as a world force” with the need for an independent sovereign state.617 
Thus the political theology, or metaphysics, embedded in the erstwhile secular concepts 
of the state and modern sovereignty (now clearly exposed by Agamben, if not already by 
Schmitt), come to traverse Muslim discourse precisely at that moment when those 
discourses viewed themselves as opposing the hegemonic order of the West. In order to 
understand the homelessness of today’s Pakistani Muslims, we must examine the 
metaphysical and affective aspirations of the Pakistan idea, a functional concept which 
sought to respond to the problem of Muslim population security. It was not however 
merely a homeland for Muslims, but a homeland for the indistinction Islam-Muslims. It is 
this merger and identification of Islam with the biopolitical body of the ummah that is of 
utmost significance. With Iqbal the task of safeguarding Islam, falls to homo islamicus 
rather than divinity. This homo islamicus does not merely reside in the madaris, or the 
pious momin body, but in all Muslims by virtue of birth. As Jinnah was fond of saying, 
“Pakistan is our birthright.”  
In his superlative study, Gyan Pandey has noted that partitions primary metaphor 
was the “two nation theory”618 which both Iqbal and Jinnah confabulated. But perhaps the 
moment is now sufficiently ripe to make a necessary corrective. To begin with, on pain of 
factuality, it must of course already, with Bangladesh, be the “three nation theory”, and 
                                                
616 “The camp as dislocating localization is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living.” 
Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
617 Islamism is just such a new nomos, and not a return to older forms. ‘Ulama law, its anticipated 
coincidence with the state and its current romance with violence, is not a return, but rather an extension of 
the modern nomos, of the state of exception now becoming the rule. 
618 Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism, and History in India, vol. 7, 
Contemporary South Asia (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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perhaps was always really the x nation theory. But to call the “two nation theory” a 
theory would be to needlessly dignify its profoundly absurd and essentialist axioms. 
Perhaps not even the two nation hypothesis suffices, for it was more of a two nation 
suggestion, a two nation notion. This is of course not to denude it of its very real and 
violent ongoing effects, for such indeed is the power of suggestion.  
 
 
Dar al-Harb: Discipline to Security619 
 
Fatwa-e-Pakistan 
The Khilafat movement (1919-1924) of course marks a new threshold of ‘ulama 
involvement in the political sphere, begging with the formation of the JUH. But if this 
period stands as the high mark of Hindu-Muslim cooperation, it also sowed the seeds for 
a double and lateral divisiveness, between Muslims and Hindus on the one hand and 
between Muslims and Muslims on the other. The bulk then of the new Islamist groups, 
from the Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam, Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Hind, and the Jama‘at-i Islami, 
opposed for varied reasons, the Muslim separatist platform of the Muslim League. After 
the 23 March 1940 Lahore Resolution, however a few ‘ulama, under the silent 
stewardship of the ‘ulama don Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, began to see the potential of the 
“Pakistan idea” for a Hukumat-e-Illahiyya.620 They began to delight in the possibility of 
attaining full state power, such that the domain of the fatwa, their exclusive preserve, 
could be enlarged from the sphere of domesticity to the full bandwidth of the political 
and the economic.  
                                                
619 The space of war, the classical opposite of dar-al Islam, the space of peace. 
620 Divine Government; effectively a theocracy led by ‘ulama divines. 
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However the mainstay of the Deoband and the Ahrar, still resolutely opposed 
Jinnah, labeling him Kafir-i Azam (The Great Kafir). Through a fatwa in 1945, Maulana 
Husain Ahmad Madani, leader of the JUH, denounced the 1940 Lahore resolution and 
asked Indian Muslims not to join the Muslim League on the grounds that its demands and 
actions were contrary to the dictates of Islam.621 Counter fatwas were promptly issue. The 
fatwa wars of 1945 are today being repeated in the halls of the Deoband establishment as 
we shall see below. According to Imran ‘Usmani,622 Maulana Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani’s 
(1885-1948) played a major role in countering Madani’s fatwa and he issued a series of 
counter fatwas. ‘Usmani declared Madani’s concept of Muttahidah Qaumiyyat (United or 
Composite Nationalism) as antithetical to Islam and Muslim interests, a surrender to the 
domination of Hindu’s. These fatwa’s were publicly announced in his message to the All-
India Jami‘at-ul Islam Conference, in Calcutta on October 26-29, 1945.623 ‘Usmani also 
directly debated Hussain Ahmad Madani at the Deoband madrasa on December 7, 
1945.624 Mufti Muhammad Shafi (1897-1976) also gave a series of fatwas in favour of 
the League.625 Fatwas were also issued against the JUH by Maulana Muhammad Idris 
Kandhlawi (1898-1974), Maulana Zafar Ahmad Thanawi, Mufti Jamil Ahmad Thanawi 
(1905-1994), and Maulana Khair Muhammad Jalandhari (d. 1970).  
In these fatwas the demand for Pakistan was sanctioned as Islamic. The fatwa by 
Mufti Muhammad Shafi, the Grand Mufti of Deoband, was more emphatic. According to 
                                                
621 Metcalf, Husain Ahmad Madani: The Jihad for Islam and India's Freedom. 
622 Maulana Imran Ashraf ‘Usmani, Jihad ka Mutlab Kya awr ‘Ulama-e-Pakistan ka Siyyasi Afkar in 
Albalagh, 1993. 
623 Shabbir ‘Usmani also voiced his opposition to Madani in his address at the Muslim League Conference, 
Meerut, and the Punjab Provincial Jami‘at-ul-UIama-i Islam Conference, in Lahore, on January 26, 1946. 
These fatwas are compiled in Maulana Shabbir ‘Usmani, Hamara Pakistan (Hyderabad, Dn, 1946) 
624 Shabbir ‘Usmani, Khutbat-i ‘Usmani (Lahore, 1946) 




him the demands of the AIML were the only legitimate course open to the Muslim of 
India. Supporting Congress and hence the Madani position, amounted to 
kufr.626According to Imran ‘Usmani, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi resigned his Rectorship of Dar 
ul-‘Ulum, precisely on these grounds, and formally joined the AIML. However this move 
was taken only when Thanawi was given assurances by Jinnah that Pakistan would be “a 
pure Islamic order where Islamic laws are fully enforced and all Islamic teachings are 
followed in every walk of life.”627 Only Thanawi’s fatwas had the power to counter 
Madani’s and so Jinnah said what he had too. According to Imran ‘Usmani, Thanawi 
would never have issued his “Tanzim-ul Muslimeen” fatwa if Jinnah had not made such 
promises. 
However it was not only post 1940 that these issues came to a head. One of the 
most decisive and perhaps important refutations of Madani’s “united nationalism” theory 
appears embedded in the twelfth volume of the massive twenty-one-volume commentary, 
the I‘la al-sunan628 compiled by the nephew of Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, Zafar Ahmad 
‘Usmani (d. 1974) and published in Arabic in 1939. The significance of this critique 
appearing in Arabic within the discursive form of the Hadith commentary is analyzed at 
length by Zaman. Zafar ‘Usmani’s main contention, Zaman tells us, is that in a mixed 
nation society, the distinction and identity of Muslim life is diluted. In a unified nation in 
which the non-Muslims form the numerical majority would result in “the destruction of 
Islam, its laws, and its rituals, and it is therefore forbidden from the viewpoint of the 
shari‘a.”629 Zafar Ahmad repeatedly emphasizes that the idea of a united nationalism, will 
                                                
626 Bukhari, Syed Hafiz Muhammad Akbar Shah, ed., Chalis Baray Musalman (Idaratul Qur’an, 2001) 
627 Imran ‘Usmani. 
628 The exaltation of the normative practices [of the Prophet] 
629 Zaman, The 'Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. 
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lead to the destruction of the foundations of Islam. “Distinguishing Muslims from 
unbelievers (including “the People of the Book”) is, indeed, one of the “fundamentals” of 
the shari‘a. And anyone who denies the importance in Islamic law of maintaining sharp 
boundaries between Muslim and non-Muslim—he says in a thinly veiled allusion to 
Madani—is neither a competent scholar of Islamic law nor even a proper Muslim.”630 
In the commentary, and importantly for our thesis, ‘Usmani cites a number of prophetic 
traditions which underline the almost Iqbalian idea that the only legitimate mark of 
distinction between people is “piety.” Taqwa, or piety thus takes on a key biopolitical 
function, since it is invoked not only as a critique of nationalism but also as a marker of 
peoples and the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion631. 
 
The split between Madani and ‘Usmani, was a source of much consternation 
within the lower rank and file of the Deoband establishment. Maulana Muhammad 
Zakariyya Kandhlawi (1897 – 1982)632 was so vexed with this problem that he traveled 
from India to Pakistan several times to sit at the feet of his personal and political mentors 
to resolve this fundamental split over the question of nationalism. The product was a 
polemical tract titled “Islam awr Siyyasat”,633 largely filled with hadith quotes, which 
concluded that the contradiction in positions between the two Deoband luminaries was 
not real but only apparent. Kandhlawi was concerned with preserving the fundamental 
unity of Islamic political theory, at least as it was subject within the career of the 
                                                
630 Zafar Ahmed ‘Usmani cited in Ibid. 
631 This point further advances the necessity to view the personal, piety and other such inner qualities like 
honor, chivalry, etc as properly political precisely because they aim at the defining boundaries of 
inclusion/exclusion 
632 For a brief apolitical account of Zakariyyah Kandhlawi’s life seeMetcalf, "The Past in the Present: 
Instruction, Pleasure and Blessing in Maulana Muhammadzakariyya's Aap Biitii." 
633 Kandhlawi, Muhammad Zakariyyah, Islami Siyyasat (Umar Publications, Lahore,. n.d.) 
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Pakistani Deobandiyyat. The split over nationalist question he declares, does not 
constitute a contradiction within the Deoband School, only a difference of opinion as to 
how to realize the same goals, an Islami Muashra (Society). The distinction between the 
two groups can thus be seen as based not in theology, but in the attitude towards the 
question of sovereign power. The fact that Kandhlawi resolves the glaring political split 
at the level of the social body, shows once again how the social and the political are in 
fact indistinct. For both factions the social body is the target for governmental 
interventions, regulations and disciplining. 
To the class of intellectuals reformers, and those who felt it necessary to rethink 
Islam in consonance with the changing circumstances of the age (and in this batch we 
must include the insider/outsider ‘ulama Sulayman Nadwi) the ‘ulama had already lost 
the mantle of leadership, and it took the endeavors of that quintessentially honorary 
“maulana”, Muhammad ‘Ali Jahur, leader of the Khilafat movement, under whose milieu 
Mawdudi first cut his political teeth, and who inspired the formation of the JUH, to take 
on this mantle of leadership, which was passed on not to Deoband ‘ulama, but to the 
stalwarts of the Muslim League.  
Despite their severe political handicap, and the prognostications of modernization 
theory notwithstanding, the Pakistani ‘ulama were able to carve out their own inviolable 
domain, and within its confines both survive and then thrive. Jinnah had of course deftly 
played his hands, but his recourse to Islam, and his promises to the leaders of the JUI, 
Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani in particular, animated the ‘ulama into a series of new projects, 
the primary political goal of which was to bring the laws of the State into conformity with 
the shari‘a. The Objectives Resolution as we have discussed was then the primary vehicle 
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for the restoration of ‘ulama authority and power. In this regard their early victories were 
largely symbolic. What concerns us here is to reiterate the fact that while the Deoband 
could point to some degree of success in achieving their multi-platformed goals, they 
remained until the 1980’s a largely subaltern class. Victories in successive elections were 
marginal, enrollment in madrasas had seen growth only proportionate to population 
growth, and furthermore only the economically depressed sectors of society were sending 
their children to become trained in their maslak. The only dramatic, if not draconian, 
victory that the ‘ulama could boast off was achieved through the violent political activity 
of the anti-Qadiani movement, the Khatm-i Nubuwwat Tahrik, spearheaded by Maulana 
Ludhianawi (d. 2000) in the 1970’s. However with the arrival of the Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan, and the shifting of new security apparatus, the fortune of the Pakistani 
Deoband was about to undergo a dramatic transformation. 
 
The Jihad On 
Between 1988 and 1991, Al-Balagh, the Urdu monthly of the Dar al-‘Ulum634 
printed the jihad memoirs of the Dar al-‘Ulum vice principal Maulana Rafi Ahmad 
‘Usmani. Selections of his memoirs would also show up in the pages of Pakistan’s largest 
Urdu daily, the Jang, and in al-Irshad, the monthly rag of the jihadist outfit Harkat-ul 
Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI, Movement of Islamic Jihad, or Islamic Struggle Movement).635 
The memoirs were eventually published in a single volume, Ye Teray Pur Asrar 
                                                
634 The Harvard of the Deoband madaris in Pakistan. 
635 See chapter on the Space of Law: Shari’a 
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Banday,636 an edition replete with maps, and color photo inserts of jihadist paraphernalia 
and weaponry. The essays provide a fascinating glimpse of the jihadist movement from 
the perspective of one of the Deoband’s allegedly most moderate and pro-establishment 
institutions in Pakistan. Additionally in this work we can see the indistinction between 
the Islam and Pakistan at play. Rafi’s brother, Taqi ‘Usmani is the principle of Dar al-
‘Ulum, and one of the senior most clerics in Pakistan. Mufti Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani 
(b. 1943) is also the editor of Al-Balagh, and is perhaps the most prolific and highly 
accomplished contemporary scholar of the Deoband in Pakistan. He has dozens of 
publications in Urdu, Arabic and English to his name. His collection of fatwa span 
several volumes. Son of the late Maulana Mufti Muhammad Shafi (the former Grand 
Mufti of Pakistan (Mufti-e-Azam-e Pakistan)), Taqi ‘Usmani was born in Deoband, India, 
and received his Takhassus degree from the Dar al-‘Ulum in Karachi in 1961, where he 
now serves as its President. He also obtained an MA in Arabic literature from Punjab 
University and an LLB (Law) degree from Karachi University. Under Zia, whose own 
father was a Deoband cleric, Taqi ‘Usmani was appointed to serve as an ‘ulama 
appointee of the Federal Shari‘at Court of Pakistan from 1980 to 1982 and the Shari‘a 
Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan from 1982 to 2002. Taqi received his 
ijaza to teach hadith from a number of Deoband ‘alim under whom he studied, including 
his father, Maulana Idris Kandhlawi, Maulana Rashid Ahmad Ludhianawi, and Shaikh-ul 
Hadith Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhlawi. ‘Usmani still considers tasawwuf (Sufism) an 
integral part of the Deoband heritage, even as many of his more Wahhabi leaning 
contemporaries offer a more resolute denunciation of Sufism. His unofficial murshids 
                                                
636 “These Incredible Servants of Yours”. Could be translated as “These Secret bodies”, “These Completely 
Trustworthy Men”, “ or “These Protectors.” Maulana Muhammad Rafi ‘Usmani, Ye Teray Pur Asrar 
Banday, Idara-tul Maarif, Karachi, 2005. 
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were Sheikh Abdul Hayy Arifi and Mawlana Maseehullah Khan, themselves disciples of 
Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi.637 Almost every week Taqi ‘Usmani delivers his sermons on islah 
and hadith (his hadith specialty and expertise are on Sahih al-Bukhari). Like most 
Deoband ‘ulama, ‘Usmani played a key role in the formation and organization of the 
Khatm-i Nubuwwat, anti-Ahmadi movement. He was also instrumental in drafting many 
of the controversial Hudud laws for the Shari‘at Bill’s which passed under Zia’s tenure. 
Rafi ‘Usmani’s jihad memoirs can be seen largely as valorization of the 
Mujahideen effort in Afghanistan, and a series of excuses as to why he was unable to 
participate in the jihad himself, except for a minor skirmish at Urghun in Paktika 
Province. His personalized and often humorous account of the jihad is of course peppered 
with citations from hadith and the Qur’an. For instance he narrates the tale of a paan 
chewing Memon mujahid, who had been deprived of paan for months while on the 
battlefield. A serious paan paragh himself, Rafi ‘Usmani describes the delight on the 
Mujahid’s face when the master unveiled his own little silver paan case. The memoirs 
also furnishes accounts of mujahideen heroism, courage, sacrifice, death and miracles on 
the battlefield. It is an account of the Jihad in Afghanistan where “a million and five 
hundred thousand martyrs gave their blood to liberate Afghanistan from the infidels and 
save Pakistan and the Muslims countries of the Middle East from the communists.” 
‘Usmani is emphatic that “this is not an account of the misrule that was seen in 
Afghanistan after victory in the fight for leadership.” He blames the “shameless civil 
war” that followed the Soviet withdrawal, on “the politicians”638 and “the greed of 
leadership [which] has given the enemies of Islam an opportunity to ridicule jihad and the 
                                                
637 Thanivi’s Silsila-i-Ashrafia is a blend of Chistiyyah amd Naqshbandi Sufism. 
638 Failing to note that the politicians were the ex-Mujahideen. 
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mujahideen. However, the power that has emerged in the form of Taliban gives us hope 
that the sacrifices offered in the jihad against disbelief would bring their result. May 
Allah preserve the Taliban from every mischief of self and the devil and from the 
conspiracies of the enemies of Islam, and may he make them worthy of renaissance of 
Islam.” Though penned in the 90’s the very Mujahideen that he praises have now turned 
their Kalashnikovs against the ‘Usmani brothers. 
In Purr Asrar Rafi recounts memories of his youth, and the delight he felt when 
people raised the slogan of Pakistan: “Pakistan ka mutlab kya? Laillaha Ilallah” (What is 
the meaning of Pakistan? There is no God but God). In preparation for the partition 
violence, he and his brothers trained in the martial art of binnawt (desi kung fu!)639 which 
apparently had been added to the syllabus at the Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband. “The local 
Muslims were expert in this art and the Hindus stood in awe of them.” As children he 
writes “we prayed eagerly after every salah that they [Hindus] should attack and we 
should have an opportunity to fight. … Anyway, the enemy did not dare to attack 
Deoband.” 
His memoirs constitute a masculinist history of Pakistan as jihad, and he folds 
into this account a strong jihadi affect. His recollections describe a morbid eagerness to 
partake in every conflagration between Pakistan and the state with India (which are all 
jihads of course, Maulana Mawdudi’s counter fatwa not withstanding). Throughout the 
work, his recollections of Pakistan’s history of war/jihad with the “Hindu’s” includes 
glowing narratives of Army heroism (even the secular Ayub is praised), and he paints the 
soldiers of the Pakistan Army as shaheeds (martyrs) fighting for Islam. Thus this can be 
seen as a narrative of the martial body and its desire for war against the infidel. As 
                                                
639 South Asian fighting and wrestling style. 
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Pakistan’s history from the Ahrar movement through the Munir report till today’s Taliban 
insurrection shows, the space of the infidel and kufaar is almost coextensive with the 
entire body politic. Jihad is an in this sense very much like a cancer, an autoimmune 
deficiency that consumes its own body in the name of over production and protection. In 
Rafi ‘Usmani’s memoirs the duty to the state and the duty to Islam become at points 
utterly indistinguishable. The work is not the raving of a minor ‘alim, but a chief mufti in 
the Deoband establishment. Nor did these memoirs appear simply in the obscure pages of 
a Deoband monthly. The work aims to be a paradigm for jihad, which we read as a 
modality of the polemos: the political as war. The place then of jihad, and its biopolitical 
inflection, appears most vividly in this continuous and consistent overlap between jihad 
for the nation and jihad for Allah. In Rafi ‘Usmani’s account Pakistan and Islam clearly 
enter into a zone of indistinction. For ‘Usmani then politics is jihad by other means. 
Even Husain Ahmad Madani, in his Naqsh-i Hayat, writes admiringly about the 
military exploits of the progenitors of the original Dar al-‘Ulum (namely Hajji 
Imdadullah, (1817-99), Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotawi (1832 – 80) and Maulana 
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1828-1905). The incredible ferocity with which the British 
quelled the uprisings640 had no doubt some role to play in turning these former mujahids 
into mujtahids. This ‘pacifist’ turn, which in turn bred the movement of Maulana Ilyas, 
founder of the Tabligh-i Jama‘at, was a concession to the need for a radical new style, in 
addition to being a concession to the overwhelming disciplinary power of the colonial 
apparatus. 
 
                                                
640 On the ferocity of the British “shock and awe” campaign see Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 
vol. 3 #4, The New Cambridge History of India: The Indian Empire & the Beginings of Modern Society 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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The Deoband Conference  
 
“Afghanistan is the only country in the world with a real Islamic system. All 
Muslims should show loyalty to the Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad 
Omar”  
— Osama Bin Laden, April 9th 2001 
 
Between April 9th and 11th of 2001, an estimated 300,000 – 400,00 Deoband 
supporters converged on a small town of Taru Jabba, situated near the Jalozai Afghan 
Refugee camp, some 10 km east of Peshawar.641 The “International Deoband 
Conference” was sponsored by Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s Jam’iyyat al-‘Ulama-i Islam 
(JUI), and was ostensibly held to celebrate the founding of Deoband Dar al-‘Ulum in 
India in 1866, and its 150 years of service.642 The 150 years date from 1273 – 1422 A.H. 
of the Islamic calendar, affirming that the Deoband consider their formal origin to lie in 
the events of the 1857 Rebellion, and not the 1866 founding of the school. The event 
however was a clear display of strength in numbers and a celebration not of piety but of 
pan-Islamic fervor, and jihad. In addition to being an overt celebration of Taliban rule in 
Afghanistan the conference was a series of pep rallies designed to inculcate fervor among 
Pakistani Deobandi’s to bring about a similar Islamic revolution in Pakistan. According 
to Ahmed Rashid the event was funded by the ISI.643 Given that at the time, Musharraf 
                                                
641 Deoband organizers put the figure of attendees at over a million. Regardless of this it was still one of the 
largest religio-political gatherings after the annual Tabligh event in Raiwand. 
642 The Daily Jang issued a special four page spread to cover the event. The heading was “Dar al-‘Ulum 
Deoband ke 150 sal khidmaat” (Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband’s 150 years of service) 
643 Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Central Asia, p. 53. 
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has placed a formal ban against ‘political’ rallies, the fact that the authorities allowed an 
event of this scale to take place was a tacit signal of the acceptance of its general goals644. 
The conference itself is an example of what Foucault called a dispositif, a 
strategic alignment of forces each with its otherwise own series of tactical aims. The 
highlight of the event included the playing of a taped audio message from Osama bin 
Laden in support of Mullah Omar, and the Taliban, and a live address to the conference 
participants by Mullah Muhammad Omar, who was hailed as the Amir-ul Momineen, 
Commander of the Faithful not just of Afghanistan, but also implicitly, the Commander 
of the global ummah. The Jang special edition report on the conference reproduced his 
speech under the heading “A message from Amir-ul Momineen Mullah Muhammad 
Omar.” Bin Laden told his audience that Afghanistan was the only country in the world 
with a real Islamic system, and that all Muslims should show loyalty to the Afghan 
Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar. “Allah Almighty and you should be witnesses 
that I, Osama bin Laden, am giving allegiance to Mullah Omar.” The Saudi dissident’s 
offering of bait to Mullah Omar drew the wild applause of the tens of thousands who had 
gathered at the rally. Western embassies in Islamabad protested against the governmental 
for sanctioning the rally, since it was clearly a rally in support of the Taliban, their aims 
and their leadership, in violation of the UN sanctions against the Taliban. However this 
was 2001 April, and the rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan was precisely what 
drew the widespread support of the Pakistani Deoband ‘ulama. 
But the event also featured the participation of religious and political dignitaries 
from almost every Muslim country in the world, including a key note address by Libyan 
                                                
644 A similar rally was held in Lahore later in April under the auspicies of Lashkar-i Tayeba, again an ISI 
sponsored event which the government permitted despite the ban on other political parties. 
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leader Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi, who was once famed for his contempt of the ‘ulama 
during his own Green revolution. Since the key motif however was political defiance 
against the West (aka the USA and Israel) and its economic globalization,645 Qadhafi 
added a certain pan-Islamic clout to the gathering. But since the event was also a 
celebration of the founding of the Deoband, and a follow up to the 1980 centenary held in 
India, prominent members of the Indian Deoband establishment also attended, including 
the head of the Jam’iyyat al-’Ulama-i Hind the Amir ul-Hind Maulana Syed Muhammad 
Asad Madani, the vice-chancellor of the Indian Dar al-‘Ulum Maulana Marghoobur 
Rahman and the Indian Deoband madrasa’s top-ranking scholar Shaikh-ul Hadith646 
Maulana Nizamatullah Aazimi. There were several other prominent Indian Deoband 
‘ulama including the son of Hakim ul-Islam Qari Muhammad Tayyib, Muhammad Salim, 
and the secretary of the JUH Amjad Madani.647 
What was apparent here, despite the enthusiastic attendance by the Indian clerics, 
was a sign of a major split between the Pakistani and Indian Deoband over the question 
of support for the Taliban, an issue which was to came to a head in September 2001. 
Already as I have discussed the destruction of the Buddhas in Bamiyan which preceded 
the conference, already showed distinct differences between the Deoband ‘ulama. In 
contrast to the stridently militant and jihadist tenor of the most speeches, the Indian 
‘ulama attempted to focus on questions of Muslim unity and questions of education. 
Maulana Marghoobul Rahman’s speech confined itself to the educational, literary and 
                                                
645 Western products, including Coca Cola were banned from the event kiosks, and to make sure that this 
message was clear, Coca Cola signs were placed on certain stalls only to be blackened with prominent x’s 
painted across them. According to news reports one of the most popular souvenir’s were posters depicting 
burning U.S. and Israeli flags. 
646 As Zaman correctly notes, the Shaikh-ul Hadith is a title given to the highest ranking professor of hadith 
studies, and is the most important ‘ulama rank in the Deoband madaris. Zaman, The 'Ulama in 
Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. 
647 For a complete list of attendees see Jang special issue April 9 2001. 
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political achievements of Dar al-‘Ulum in Deoband, and he urged Muslims to refrain 
from aggression so that they would not be labeled as terrorists or fundamentalist. Also in 
one of the concluding panels chaired by Asad Madani, a series of resolutions were 
affirmed which included general denunciations of the role that the United States had 
played in the Islamic world. Yet despite their discomfort and unease, none of the 
leadership returned to India and criticized the event, nor did they try to distance 
themselves from the conference and its explicit backing and support for the Taliban. One 
of the conference organizers, and a trusted lieutenant of bin Laden, Muhammad Rahim 
Haqqani,648 was more emphatic about the nature of the conference: “We want to send the 
message that only Islam has the capability of bringing peace and stability in the world. 
The West has failed … The Taliban are the practitioners of the pure Deoband Islamic 
thought. They have implemented laws in the real spirit of Islam. This is what we want 
here in Pakistan. We do not have true Islamic laws here”. It might have been useful for 
the Indian ‘ulama to counter such claims about the true spirit of the Deoband, but they 
were largely silent.649  
While Bin Laden’s message was not reproduced in the Jang, Mullah Omar’s 
rhetorical speech was. Unproblematically introduced as the Commander of the Faithful, 
Mullah Omar’s speech hailed the “World” Deoband Conference as “a milestone for 
establishing the superiority of Islam.” “If we were not at war”, Mullah Omar declares, 
“all the Afghan Muslims would come to Pakistan to help hasten the establishment of the 
Islamic Shari‘a system.” But I would like to focus mainly on the fiery speech of Fazlur 
Rahman, because today he is still widely regarded as one of the more moderate JUI 
                                                
648 Muhammad Rahim al Afghani, a senior aide to bin Laden, was captured in August 2007 
649 The situation has changed in India since 2008, especially in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. The Indian 
Deoband held several press conferences formally denouncing all acts of violence against innocent civilians. 
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‘ulama. It will also be instructive to see how the thematic focus on the body of the 
ummah, and the danger to Islam posed by the enemies of Islam, has similarities with the 
rhetoric of the AIML with its slogan of “Islam in Danger”. Islam, Fazlur Rahman tells us, 
is still in danger, but now the threat is a new combination of internal and external powers 
— the US, the UN, Christianity and secular NGO’s are all charged with conspiring 
against Islam. And of course the Qadiani threat resurfaces. Fazlur Rahman’s speech was 
reproduced in the Jang newspaper under the title; “All of Pakistan will become the 
fortress of Islam.” This of course could have easily been the title of any one of Iqbal or 
Jinnah’s speeches. The text of the speech is worth quoting at length. “We are calling for a 
jihad against the secular system, announced the JUI leader.  
At this hour the Muslim ummah is in grave danger. America and Western 
powers through the agency of the UN, are trying to trample on the 
Muslims, and they have a determined footing on this policy of destruction. 
All of Afghanistan is being punished for its establishment of an Islamic 
system (nizam). In Pakistan Bangladesh and other Muslim countries, 
NGO’s, Qadianis and other non-religious (la-dini) powers want to destroy 
Islamic values and enforce on us their European culture and traditions 
(tehzib). Not only are the trying to get rid of Islamic value/identity they are 
weighing the possibility of setting up a Christian and Qadiani state in 
Pakistan. On the one hand the Muslim ummah is being divided into sects, 
and on the other hand NGO’s are attacking religion. And so at this 
juncture we are left with only one path, that we take our knowledge (‘ilm) 
and spiritual (ruhani) traditions and just like the Deoband Dar al-‘ulum, 
we must wage a struggle (jidd-o-jahad) to maintain our Muslim identity 
and to protect our faith and freedoms. Through the energies and ideas 
developed at this conference, we will try to avert the designs of US. The 
aim of this conference is to thwart all the influence and designs that the 
enemies of Islam [NGO’s, America, UN] have in Pakistan. …. This 
conference will prove to be a critical path towards establishing a complete 
Islamic system in Pakistan and thwarting the secularism of NGO’s.”650 
 
How do we begin to make sense of this ensemble of ideologically diverse 
groupings. The Deoband assemblege at this conference in 2001 is very different today in 
                                                
650 Jang 9 April 2001. 
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2008 as we shall see below. What kind of configuration are we are dealing with then? It 
is certainly not best understood as an ideological configuration. Instead I would suggest 
we view this in terms of what Foucault called an “apparatus of security” which is itself a 
key element of modern governmentality. In Sécurité, Territoire, Population Foucault lays 
out his genealogy of modern “governmentality” which he regards as a correlation among 
different forms, or technologies, of power. Foucault distinguishes between three different 
modalities in the history of the relations of power: the legal system, which corresponds to 
the institutional model of the territorial State of sovereignty;651 disciplinary mechanisms, 
which correspond to the modern society of discipline and put in place, alongside the law, 
a series of police, medical, and penitentiary techniques designed to order, correct, and 
modulate the bodies of subjects; and finally dispositifs of security, which correspond to 
the contemporary state of population and to the practices which define it. Political Islam 
must hence be situated as a general element of the government of Muslims. Foucault 
takes care to specify that these three modalities do not chronologically succeed nor 
successively exclude one another, but coexist and articulate with one another in such a 
way that one of these constitutes in turn the dominant political technology: “in reality we 
have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, governmental management, which has population 
as its primary target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism.”652 One 
technology of power may provide guiding norms and an orienting telos, but it does not 
saturate all power relations. There is instead a principle of assemblege at work, which 
determines how heterogeneous elements – techniques, institutional arrangements, 
material forms and other technologies of power – are taken up and recombined. The 
                                                
651 And not to be confused with Agamben’s conception of sovereign power which is biopolitical. 
652 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 107. 
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Deoband conference then can be seen as a configuration of elements, what Foucault calls 
a dispositif that constitute a particular space of topology of power. As Agamben notes the 
word dispositif, or “apparatus” was the decisive technical term in the strategy of 
Foucault’s thought especially at the point when he begins to concern himself with what 
he calls “governmentality” or the “government of men.”653 
. . . by the term “apparatus” I mean a kind of a formation, so to speak, that 
at a given historical moment has as its major function the response to an 
urgency. The apparatus therefore has a dominant strategic function. …  
… the nature of an apparatus is essentially strategic, which means that we 
are speaking about a certain manipulation of relations of forces, of a 
rational and concrete intervention in the relations of forces, either so as to 
develop them in a particular direction, or to block them, to stabilize them, 
and to utilize them. The apparatus is thus always inscribed into a play of 
power, but it is also always linked to certain limits of knowledge that arise 
from it and, to an equal degree, condition it. The apparatus is precisely 
this: a set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and supported 
by, certain types of knowledge.654  
 
For Foucault the most crucial articulation of the technology of power was 
“security”, a mechanism through which the figure of population is constituted as a target 
of governmental reflection and intervention. Between the Deoband today and the Muslim 
League before it, political Islam discovers the paradigm of ummah security; the security 
of the global Muslim population at large. It is this persistent sense of the oppression 
against the Muslim body world wide (Bosnia, Kashmir, Palestine etc) that subtends the 
primary affect of the speeches at the conference. It is also a persistent feature of Deoband 
journals like Al-Farooq, to feature regular reports on the various crisis afflicting the 
Muslim ummah. Once political Islam is understood in relation to population and security, 
                                                
653 Giorgio Agamben, What Is an Apparatus? And Other Essays, ed. Werner Hamacher, trans. David 
Kishik, Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 
654 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, Random House, 1980), p. 194 - 96. 
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the underlying affect of “secularists” Muslims and “Islamists” begins to dissolve. In this 
light it becomes clearer to see why Fazlur Rahman, reserves as he does here and 
elsewhere, so much invective for NGO’s. This is because he recognizes himself as a 
player on the field of governmentality. Like the State, the ISI and other groups then, the 
Deoband are also actively engaged in recombining elements of sovereign power and 
security, and adapting them to the problems of population, war and threats from internal 
and external formations. The speech above shows how Fazlur Rahman, albeit clumsily 
and with all the paranoia that is part of the milieu of violent uncertainties in which he is 
thrown, is driven by a similar series of security logics that compelled Jinnah and Iqbal; 
logics of security that now operate in a new set of complex cartographies of power. It is 
this space that I have been trying to articulate as the critical matrix in which our analysis 
of political Islam must proceed. All forms of political Islam are thus variations of a 
technology of power in which Islam and security are the key elements. 
 
In Society Must Be Defended Foucault returns to the theme of biopolitics that he 
had began to articulate in the History of Sexuality: ‘one of the basic phenomena of the 
nineteenth century was what might be called power’s hold over life.”655 This new power 
is to be understood not solely at the level of the state or political theory, but rather “at the 
level of the mechanisms, techniques, and technologies of power.”656 Foucault introduces 
the distinction between the two poles of biopolitics as the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of 
‘power’s hold over life’. On the one hand, Foucault argues, ‘we saw the emergence of 
techniques of power that were essentially centered on the body, on the individual body’. 
                                                
655 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 239. 
656 Ibid., p. 241. 
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Here he refers to the disciplines, and to what in History of Sexuality he calls a ‘micro-
politics of the body’. On the other hand, a second pole of biopolitics relates ‘to man-as-
species’, to human beings insofar as they form a ‘global mass that is affected by overall 
processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on’. He names this new 
technology of power a “biopolitics” of the human race’. In light of this schema we can 
now reconfigure the transitions of the Deoband ‘ulama, which shift from a form of power 
centered primarily on the individual body, to a form of power centered largely on ummah 
security, as the transition from Dar ul-discipline to Dar ul-Security. It is Pakistan which is 
the device or logic that facilitates this transition.  
The Deoband movement begins in the wake of the failure of the 1857 rebellion to 
restore Muslim sovereignty. In the wake of that failure the Deoband madrasa is 
established and it increasingly turns towards the project of normalization. The madaris is 
the cite where initially discipline and normalization come together. Now however we 
have a new series: sovereignty-discipline-security. The variations then between the 
Indian, Pakistani and Afghan Deoband can be seen in light then of the security apparatus, 
and not therefore in light of textual interpretations, political ideologies and subjective 
interiorities. The security apparatus bearing on each country, the specific topology of 
power is what varies, and it is to this variation that Muslim politics responds. 
 
 
Fat-war: Reading the Fatwa as Strategy 
 
Through a reading of the strategic deployment of a series of fatwa-proclamations 
by the ulama this section will further advance the following suggestion: that while the 
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‘ummah’ today has no formal significance or substance, discourses of and on the ummah 
might still be usefully understood along a series of biopolitical and affective registers, 
well before the range of material and embodied practices (invocations) of the ‘ulama can 
be considered in all their rich material and polemical particularity. Thinking the ummah 
biopolitically means in part to recognize with Foucault that under girding the discourses 
on Muslim community/society, and its associated polemics of peace, brotherhood and 
unity, is the logic of sovereignty and polemos: antagonism and war. The invocation of the 
ummah and discourses on Islamic community (transnational or local) effectively provide 
the rational for a series of violent inclusions/exclusions (kufaar, murtid, jahiliyya) and 
subsequently open the space for the exercise of sovereign power with its attendant rights 
of war and death. In this way we can see that the existence of ‘Islamic’ violence/terrorism 
is not a political or religious problem as such, but rather a problem of the political, or 
better yet, an onto-political problem. 
In a most general sense the term ‘ummah’ is of course as vacuous as the term 
‘humanity’ or the ‘west’, and functions more like a political metanarrative or polemical 
quilting point. But it is important to keep in mind that the invocation of the idea of the 
ummah, is almost always a way to designate a mass, a population, and hence an object of 
knowledge regulation, and policing. In this sense ummah discourses are doubly 
biopolitical, in that they are not merely a feature of a range of Muslim political 
imaginaries, but rather constitute a modality that is useful to the logic of security that 
drives the proliferating indistinctions of the wars of/on terror. Transnational discourse on 
the ummah are perhaps, in this sense, more vital to the political economy of liberal 
regimes, whose pervasive logic of security and martial capacities for war thrive on the 
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affective deployment of Islam as a vital threat. The American project for the imposition 
of liberal peace across the “Muslim World” is defunct without expert discourses on 
(political/radical) Islam as the engine of a counter-modernity, a unified homogenous plot, 
whose profuse resentments threaten “Western civilization” and its “way of life”. The idea 
of a unified ummah is thus central to the metaphysics of both Islam hating (e.g. 
neoconservatives) and Islam loving (jihadists). In our rapidly globalizing era then, the 
third biopolitical triad between ‘Security’, and ‘Population’ is ‘Terror’ rather than 
‘Territory’. The ummah (as Islamapolis) may then be seen as an extension of the carceral 
polis, replete with an imaginary geopolitics, that seeks to exercise yet again the power of 
normalization (Islamization). What presides over these sovereign mechanisms “is not the 
unitary functioning of an apparatus or an institution, but the necessity of combat and the 
rules of strategy. … In this central and centralized humanity [ummah], the effect and 
instrument of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple 
mechanisms of ‘incarceration’, objects for discourses that are in themselves elements for 
this strategy, we must hear the distant roar of battle.”657  
 
Dark Knights of Infinite Resignation 
Karachi has received many global accolades, including on several occasions that 
of “The Most Dangerous City in the World.” Such titles have usually been shrugged off 
as mere Western hyperbole. But since 2007, an apocalyptic mood has perceptibly 
permeated the otherwise thick dermis of this immense and unruly megopolis. A severe 
case of sovereign anxiety and radical uncertainty pervades the country and I arrived there 
this summer (Aug 2008) in what seemed to be the eye of a storm. It was certainly not a 
                                                
657 ———, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, p. 308. 
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good time to be enquiring into the resonances of the ummah. If the fiction of community 
is sustained by feeling, then neither nationalism nor Islam were serving well the function 
of a discursively mobilized sentiment of belonging. A nation that ostensibly had as its 
raison d’être the security of the Indian Muslim population, whose founding chant was 
“Islam must be defended” was now being torn apart by the very logic of its unity. In the 
Age of Terror, Dar-ul Harb and Dar-ul Islam have entered into a zone of indistinction. It 
would not be inaccurate to suggest that the very logic of territorial consolidation that 
underwrote the sovereignty of Pakistan, the existence of an Islamic difference, was once 
again busy with the task of its endless biopolitical caesurae. If Islam, and the invocation 
of the Indian ummah were the solution to the original crisis of colonialism and 
mineralization, then the solution has now itself become the crisis. A pervasive fear of 
Talibanization and general Terror — understood not in localized terms but as a general 
dislocation — now haunts the nation. By all accounts Islam, now emptied of its 
ontological content, is also at war with itself.  
Before proceeding then to the analysis of the biopolitical discourses of the ‘ulama, 
it may be useful to foreground them with a series of excerpts from everyday responses to 
a series of general question regarding the ummah.658 
 
                                                
658 As part of an ISGP sponsored research trip to Pakistan, investigating Transnational Islamic Discourses, I 
informally interviewed twenty Pakistani’s regarding the significance and meaning of their conceptions of 
the umma, the community ideal, or ideal community of believers. As would be predictably self-evident the 
singular term and its general level of abstractness were grossly inept at capturing the complex and 
perplexing mood of the moment. Real names have been changed to protect the identity of my interlocuters 
who spoke openly and frankly about Islam and politics, without regard for anonymity. 
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What Fucking Ummah? 
Abbass, a wealthy area businessman (college level education from leading 
institutions in Karachi. Interview in English): “Ummah to me means the community of 
Muslims everywhere. It should mean peace, and security for everyone, not just Muslims. 
In reality its all hypocrisy.” 
Urooj, a senior executive banker at ABN Amro (college level education from U.S. 
and leading institutions in Karachi. Interview in English) : “The ummah are you kidding 
me. Is that a real question? What fucking ummah… are you blind? Jeez, what a dumb ass 
question!” 
Dowd, a Pathan Taxi Driver (elementary Urdu medium schooling in Peshawar. 
Interview in Urdu]: “Ummah… sorry I don’t understand?” … Upon clarification of the 
question … “Sir I don’t get into these things [read: I’m not political]. I am a simple God 
fearing man. I just try to support my family.” [read: who cares about the ummah. Or I 
don’t want to divulge my personal views to you.] 
Zaheer Khan, the Pathan Security Guard in the house I was residing in (basic 
madaris schooling in Dir (NWFP): “Najeeb bhai, the ummah is a farce, everyone is 
looking out for their own skin, the politicians are bhudwas [pimps] and even some of the 
mullahs are liars. The army are puppets of America. But I support the Taliban because 
they will bring shari‘a…… It is not the Taliban who are conducting terrorism, it is 
America. They want to destroy Pakistan.” 
Sheryaar, an MTV producer, attended college in the United States. Interview in 
English: [pontificating while smoking a joint and drinking red wine] “Aree Yaar 
[dude]…. this is so fucked up where should I begin….. [incoherent rambling]…. Man I 
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tell you this country was supposed to be for Indian Muslims, but it’s a bloody shit hole. 
Not for people like us [the bourgeoisie] but look at all the crap around you… But I tell 
you … [takes a sip of wine] … I’ll be the first to leave Karachi when the jihadis come 
[Taliban], and there coming dude….. your lucky your sorry ass isn’t here to deal with 
it…. but I’m telling you and shit… those guys are fucking awesome… I mean they 
believe in something, there ready to kill for it… we only believe in ourselves … and they 
are like not afraid to die man … don’t you get it … they live what they believe, they’re 
not hypocritical. Its seriously fucked up!” 
I had interviewed over 20 people, and it quickly became apparent that the ummah 
as a concept had limited and variegated popular circulation. Most people were in fact 
thrown off by my question, and were surprised that one could even do research on 
something that was either an abstraction or a simple definition. Most people did not think 
of it beyond its formulaic generality. For the most part their involvement with community 
was highly local, bound up more with either class, ethnic or sectarian affiliation rather 
than Muslim generality. In short the alleged metanarrative of the ummah, had no day to 
day relevance other than as an invocation of a counter hegemonic discourse (unity 
directed against the historical and ongoing colonial intrusions of the ‘West’). Invariably 
where the term evoked passion it was across a series of biopolitical registers, the idea of 
Muslims as a people, as a power that could guarantee the defense of Muslim life.659  
Ibn Naqshibandi, an ‘alim teaching at Jami‘a Faruqiyya, a major Deoband 
madrasa (interview in Urdu): “Najeeb Sahib, I’m not sure my answer will satisfy the 
                                                
659 It may also be useful to point out that other forms of non-religious transnational discourses and practices 
were more immediately important: networks of business, connections with former college friends in the 
US, discussion of Indian and American films, tales of international travel, hopes for migration and better 
pay, supporting international sports clubs, etc. 
 
 317 
‘scholarly’ nature of your inquiry. I’m sure there are ‘ulama-e-karam [noble religious 
scholars] who have done some taftish [research] on this, but I am not aware of their work 
… but I don’t think the ummah is an idea behind which a series of complicated words 
and formulae can stand. The ummah is rooted in a practice, and the ‘ilm of this practice 
does not come from learning by books, but from sitting and learning at the feet of one 
who has learned hadith form his teacher who has learned it from the greater teachers, like 
Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Hajji Imdadullah or Maulana Idries Kandhlawi, who 
learnt it from the shah girds [students] of Shah Walliullah and so on all the way back to 
Prophet Muhammad … .” (add note on Mimesis) 
Naqshibandi then went on to describe the tabligh activities of a variety of 
Deoband ‘ulama who traveled to India, South Africa, England and who without thought 
of worldly reward established madaris for inculcating sunnat. For Naqshibandi then the 
ummah is constituted as a space that is opened up by the sacrifices of the great ‘alim. 
Which is to say that he was not quite interested in my quasi-political line of questioning, 
regarding inclusion/exclusion and power, but instead wanted to reaffirm the centrality of 
authority that flows from the Deoband genealogy (silsila) and the quiet anti-intellectual 
practice of following shari‘a (taqlid). That is to say he was merely re-inscribing the 
structure of authentic authority, and letting me know that no genuine knowledge of Islam 
could emerge from an American academy! Before leaving however he hands me a gift! 




The Taliban and the Teli-ban 
I did not get a chance to read the paper I was handed until I was flying home 
(September 1st). As I read the fatwa that he had handed me — a fatwa that was 
distributed by mail to thousands of followers, and was to be published the following day, 
Aug 30 2008, in a full page add in the leading Urdu News paper, the Daily Jang660 — I 
nearly jumped out of my seat. It was a declaration of (civil) war! Its opening salvo at 
least. Here before me was a classic case of shari‘a being deployed as an instrument of 
war by other means. Already a year earlier as a premonitory indication of the seriousness 
of the fatwa, a major leader of JUI (F) Maulana Hassan Jan was gunned down by 
unknown assailants in Wazir Bagh area after iftari.661 Only weeks before the seventy year 
old cleric had gone on national TV publicly denouncing the Taliban and their terrorist 
attacks against Pakistani civilians. In this case the Taliban did not take credit for the 
assassination, though it was clear why Hassan Jan was singled out. The fatwa under 
consideration here however, brings this covert war more formally out into the open. 
The draft of the fatwa was preceded a few days earlier by a major conference held 
at the number two Deoband institution in Karachi, the Jami‘a Faruqiyya in Shah Faisal 
Colony, and presided over by Faruqiyya’s now close to retiring principal (mohtamim), 
Shaikh-ul Hadith Maulana Salimullah Khan. As President of the Deoband Wafaq al-
Madaris (the Central Curriculum Committee of all Deoband Madaris), Salimullah had 
also recently completed his vast sixteen volume commentary on Bukhari, and was even 
before this feat known as Shaikh-ul Hadith. More notoriously he is also Mullah Omar’s 
father in law. In addition to the faculty of Faruqiyya, the meeting was attended by 
                                                
660 Jang has a circulation of over 1 million. 
661 Hassan Jan (1938 – 2007) was Vice President of Deoband Wafaqul Madaris and was elected as a 
member national assembly in 1988. The News, Sept 15, 2007. 
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prominent representatives of the Deoband from all over Pakistan, including Muftis from 
Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya and Banuri Town.662 Such large gatherings are not unusual, 
Deoband conferences are held year round, however what is distinctive in the list itself is 
the absence of representatives from the formerly No. 1 and No. 2 Deoband Schools, the 
Dar al-‘Ulum Karachi and Jami‘a Ashrafiyya in Lahore. The joint fatwa that was issued 
after this gathering was nothing short of a declaration of civil war; a struggle for 
hegemony between moderate and pro-government factions of the Deoband, and its more 
militant underlings.  
During my pre-911 visits to Pakistan, one of my major contacts into the world of 
the Deoband, the editor of the journal al-Farooq Ibn Naqshibandi, would ferry me from 
Faruqiyya to Dar al-‘Ulum Korangi. Both schools were closely affiliated and would 
cooperate on a number of levels. In 2007, when I asked Ibn Naqshibandi to take me to 
Dar al-‘Ulum Korangi, he refused: “we are having some issues and I can no longer go 
there” he told me. It was not until I read the fatwa that I quite understood what he meant. 
The fatwa reads: 
For the past few years, the question of Islamic banking was being 
examined in light of the principles of the Qur’an and Sunnah. The 
documents, forms, and papers of the banking principles under 
consideration have also been examined in light of the history of the 
fuqahas researches on this matter. Eventually in this regard in order to 
facilitate a verdict, senior ‘ulama gathered from all four provinces at a 
major conference on 28th August 2008, held under the auspices of Hazrat 
Shaikh-ul Hadith Salimullah Khan and at the Jami‘a Faruqiyya. At this 
meeting, all the senior Muftis of shari‘a law unanimously agreed on a 
fatwa that declares all forms of “Islamic” banking are in fact most 
definitively in violation of the shari‘a and are un-Islamic banking. 
Therefore those banks which provide interest based banking under the 
                                                
662 The participants of the meeting included Maulana Wali Khan and Dr Manzoor Ahmad Mengal (Jami‘a 
Faruqiyya), Mufti Abdul Hameed Deenpuri (Jami‘a al-‘Ulum Islamia, Banuri Town), Mufti Rafiq Ahmad 
and Mufti Saif Alam (Banuri Town), and a dozen other prominent muftis. 
 
 320 
cover of Islamic banking are no different from regular interest based 
banks.  
At this conference the participants also came to a consensus the law of the 
ban on photography/pictures cannot be suspended under the cover of 
keeping in step with the sprit of modernization/progress. Similarly the 
legitimacy of all other mediums of representation (TV, Newspapers etc) in 
terms of the verdict of the shari‘a is similar to that of pictures and 
changing times do not nullify the law. Therefore because of the law that 
bans pictures, all mediums should come under this law. Therefore any 
‘ulama who appear on TV, even under the guise of Islamic tabligh, is in 
violation of the shari‘a. Therefore in the same way that it is mandatory and 
necessary (wajib awr lazim) that one should avoid haram (banned) things, 
similarly ‘ulama should not appear on TV channels even in the name of 
spreading Islam, for this is also haram and should be avoided because it is 
against Islam. 
 
The proclamation effectively declares the following: All forms of banking, 
including and in particular those that describe themselves as Islamic banks, are heretofore 
declared haram, against the shari‘a and forbidden. Banks working in the name of Islamic 
banking are not different from other banks and dealing with them is illegitimate. A great 
deal of deliberation has gone into this decision, the fatwa declares, but this is the final 
consensus of the Fiqh Majalis (gathering of legal scholars). In addition all forms of 
human and animal representation on television or in print are also repugnant to Islamic 
shari‘a, including TV channels that claim to be set up solely for purposes of Islamic 
preaching.663 
What is significant is that both Islamic banking and the acceptance of human 
representation in the media were specifically sanctioned or at least allowed (jaiz) by the 
top two schools. The fatwa is almost explicitly aimed at governing the behavior of other 
‘ulama. So not only do we have here a major fiqh revolt, but also more amusingly a Teli 
(TV) ban by the Taliban; a declaration of what is Deo-banned. By going after both the 
                                                
663 Interestingly they left out the question of photography and ID cards. 
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institutions of finance and the entire framework of the media, the fatwa is also a direct 
ban on secular economic life. Of course on September 14th and 19th, the Grand Mufti of 
Pakistan, Taqi ‘Usmani, the head of the premier Deoband school the Dar al-‘Ulum in 
Korangi, issued a counter-fatwa, which clarifies the legality of Islamic TV and more 
importantly Islamic banking. It needs reminding here that a series of counter-fatwa’s that 
were offered against Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani in the 1940’s, fatwa’s sanctioned 
by Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, preceded the violent split between India and Pakistan. 
What Agamben designates as biopolitical caesura, the law of people formation, the 
ceaseless separation of bios and zoē, seems busy at work yet again. 
As the various Taliban offshoots and groups have gradually divided and turned 
their guns on each other, Baudrillard’s statement, “terrorism would rise against Islam” 664 
once again takes on the tone of an ominous prophecy. The Deoband has from its 
inception never formed a political unified entity, and since the 80’s has split into 
numerous factions as we pointed out in an earlier chapter. However a split of this 
magnitude among senior clerics rather than militant offshoots is unprecedented, and 
today as we speak, senior figures of the Deoband like Maulana Fazlur Rahman (JUI-F) 
and Rafi ‘Usmani, face the potential wrath if not bullet of the very Taliban movement 
that they assiduously supported throughout the 90’s and early years of 2000.  
The Teli-ban, the ban on representation as such, and the banking ban, a ban on the 
engine driving the political economy of globalization, suggest then a discursive legal 
compliment to the now pervasive threat of physical violence posed by the Taliban. That 
is to say that the fatwa is no longer targeting the individual body and its conduct directly, 
but that of the body politic. The transition from tactics to strategy is as Foucault describes 
                                                
664 Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism, p. 12. 
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in ‘Docile Bodies’ a key moment in the transition towards biopolitical strategies of 
power: ‘relations of power, they are played; it is these games of power (jeux de pouvoir) 
that one must study in terms of tactics and strategy’.665 While the chapter on docile 
bodies is concerned with elaborating the tactics of disciplinary power and its abilities to 
arrange, control, and dispose of the life of the individual body, in Society Must Be 
Defended and The History of Sexuality Foucault shifts focus from the relations between 
power and the individual to those of power and the population; from “tactics” to 
“strategy” thus represents a shift in the scale and object target; body to bios. It may be 
worth re-reading his most oft quoted and famous passage from the Will to Knowledge.666 
 
In light of this transition from tactics to strategy, it may be argued that the 
traditional 18th and 19th century disciplinary domain of the fatwa, its principal target, was 
the natural body. The Deoband’s ‘ulama power was perhaps itself constituted through 
techniques of discipline deriving from the changing forms of law, warfare and the spatial 
regulation of the private domain under colonialism. There is then a certain discontinuity 
in the scope and target of the fatwa which exemplifies the overall biopoliticization of 
Islamic practice and discourse that I am seeking to highlight. The Teli-ban fatwa seeks to 
create a counter space of sovereign power targeting the pious ummah (not just kufaar), 
and hence this non-state juridical fatwa undermines the intimacy of official state 
sovereignty (premised on respect for Islam) and law. It thereby creates a space for the 
exercise of a counter-decision, and in this way the sovereignty of its own law. It is a form 
of potential law-positing, or mythic, violence. The irregular and unpredictable 
                                                
665 Foucault in Michel Foucault, Power, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. et al. Robert Hurley, vol. Vol. III, 
Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984 (New York: The New Press, 2000). 
666 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, p 136. Quoted in this dissetation on p. 94. 
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mechanisms of its potential enforcement bring ‘ulama sovereignty and violence into the 
field of play. The aim of this fatwa is thus not primarily tactical (anatomo-political) but 
strategic (biopolitical). It is no longer focused on the relation between the individual soul 
and his salvation that is the concern of the fatwa but rather the soul of the population. It 
ambition is not local, but global, as the media ban most directly challenges all forms of 
the endless proliferation of self-styled Islamic authority.667 The Teli-fatwa here does not 
target the individual Muslim body nor does it seek to shape its conduct (its comportment, 
style of dress, diet, ablution, prayer, fasting etc.) but targets society understood as a mass, 
a Muslim population. It is a strategic move in a larger ensemble of power maneuvers. As 
Foucault highlights in Discipline and Punish, disciplinary power is aimed at individual 
bodies, employing surveillance, normalizing techniques and a “panoptic” grid of 
institutions, whereas biopolitical power has as its target a ‘species body’, it suffuses the 
general processes of life and death for a whole population.  
Unlike the older forms of sovereign and disciplinary power which police and 
govern the life of individual subjects, biopolitics, is a new configuration of power, one 
which supersedes individual life and death and transforms itself into a depersonalized, 
almost bureaucratic matter concerning the security and well being of the population. It is 
not personal, just business. The tone of the Teli-fatwa is similarly dry, business like, 
matter of fact, not to be taken personally; it simply proclaims the law of operations for 
the ummah at large. It is an exercise of ‘ulama juris-diction that is no longer confined by 
coloniality (colonial sovereignty) to the sphere of the private. In this way the fatwa can be 
read as a perverse response to the surreptitious war cry of secularity itself. Foucault’s 
                                                
667 The Baraelivis, Mawdudi’s, Hamza Yusufs, Nyaz Naiks, and Amr Khalids of the world, who 
increasingly deploy media technologies to counteract the traditional site and genealogy of ‘ulama authority. 
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insight that “the role of political power is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to 
reinscribe … relationship of force, and to reinscribe it in institutions, economic 
inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals”668 can thus be seen to hold true 
of fundamentalists and secularists alike. 
The disciplinary tactical aspect of the fatwa has by no means disappeared, it is 
simply subsumed and or complimented within a more biopolitical modality. In this way 
the historical transition of the shari‘a from enjoining to enforcement, from fana to 
fanaticism, is perhaps a marker of Islam’s irretrievable crossing into a modern 
biopolitical threshold. This fatwa is an exemplary instance of this crossing. We may thus 
paraphrase a section of Foucault’s 1978 article on governmentality as follows:669 Maybe 
what is really important for our modernity – our present — is not so much the drive 
towards an Islamic state as such, but rather the governmentalization (biopoliticization) of 
Islam. Given that the kings head has not yet been removed, given that the juridico-
sovereign model of power persists, the emphasis and fear of those forms of political 
Islam that target the state has occluded our understanding of a vaster more subtle 
mechanism of power operating immanently within the domain of the ummah more 
broadly. “Accordingly we need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society 
of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of disciplinary 
society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle sovereignty-discipline-
                                                
668 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 16. 
669 Originally: “Maybe what is really important for our modernity – our present – is not so much the 
étatisation of society, as the ‘governmentalization’ of the state.” (Governmentality in Gordon, Burchell, and 
Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. 
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government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism 
the apparatus of security.”670  
The important task then is to configure the ways in which the ‘ulama combines 
these power towards tactical/strategic, and sovereign ends. What we have here then is a 
specifically Deo671-monic (daemonic) combination of sovereignty, discipline and 
biopolitics. The fatwa is strategic-biopolitical in that it proffers specific counter-
techniques of social management (i.e. banking, media) aimed at both prevailing state 
(Pakistani) and global (U.S.) power and other local forms of entrenched ‘ulama authority. 
There is no concession to an ummah here, only a battle cry — the logic of sovereign 
biopolitical jihad.  
A parallel Foucaultian concern, one which leads us to the question of homo sacer 
and bare life, must also be addressed: “How can one both make a biopower function and 
exercise the rights of war, the rights of murder and the function of death, without 
becoming racist?”672 Like their ‘secular’ neoconservative counterparts in the War of 
Terror, the death dealing that unfolds in the process of enforcing sovereign will 
(whenever such juridico-military mechanisms of violence are in place), is prevented from 
being regarded as either an arbitrary or malicious exercise of power, or as racist, because 
it is enacted as the defense of a ‘way of life’ under threat. In the case of the fatwa, the 
implicit directive is clear; the violation of the ban on banks, and the ban on media, is a 
violation of shari‘a and thus in the language of Taliban justice, this simply means that an 
                                                
670 Contrary to many teleological interpretations of the way in which power is said to ‘evolve’ rather than 
mutate, Foucault made clear in his Governmentality essay that sovereign power was not simply ‘replaced’ 
by disciplinary power, nor that disciplinary power was in turn replaced by governmentality. ‘In reality’, he 
argues, ‘one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government.’ 
671 Deo: Djinn, or Genie (possibly related also to Devi) 
672 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 263. 
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unrepentant violator of the ban has become murtid, apostate, and hence can be killed 
without being sacrificed. The fatwa, as an instance of the technology of ‘ulama 
sovereignty, thus opens up a space for the production of an exclusive inclusion of the 
murtid as homo sacer (the ban of the Taliban): “The sovereign sphere is the sphere in 
which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a 
sacrifice, and sacred life—that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed—is the life 
that has been captured in this sphere.”673 In a parallel way, the War on Terror creates 
another sovereign sphere, a Taliban space (whether in Afghanistan or Waziristan) that 
can be bombed at will, because it harbors a form of life that is not worth living; a non-
political alien form of human being (the abode of the transcendent evil of radical 
Islamism, the cancer of Islamic fundamentalism, the dangerous other). The Islamo-fascist 
and the kafir alike mirror the logic of sovereignty at play in these overlapping spaces of 
exception. The everyday Afghan Muslim then, perhaps even more so than the Jew under 
Nazism, living under regimes whose dominant political paradigm is the War on Terror, is 
doubly “the privileged negative referent of the new biopolitical sovereignty and is, as 
such, a flagrant case of a homo sacer in the sense of a life that may be killed but not 
sacrificed. His killing therefore constitutes … neither capital punishment nor a sacrifice, 
but simply the actualization of a mere ‘capacity to be killed’ inherent in the condition”674 
of the terrorist/jihadist/Muslim/apostate. As Jewñ (lice) the figure of abject Muslim life, 
the Taliban/kafir, is rendered as bare life. The framework in which the killing of the 
Taliban/kafir/apostate takes place is “neither religion nor law, but biopolitics.”675 In this 
                                                
673 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, p. 83. 
674 Ibid., p. 114. 
675 See section 6, “The Ban and the Wolf” in Agamben, Homo Sacer. He goes on to state “If today there is 
no longer anyone clear figure of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually hominess sacri.” 
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way the execution of Daniel Pearl, “shock and awe,” and the torture of 
‘terrorist/detainees’ at Abu Ghraib, would seem to be the handiwork of the same 
biopolitical-technological specter haunting our time. 
 
Citizens of the Islamapolis 
In a most general sense the term ‘ummah’ is of course as vacuous as the term 
‘humanity’ or the ‘west’, and functions more like a political metanarrative or polemical 
quilting point. But it is important to keep in mind that the invocation of the idea of the 
ummah, is almost always a way to designate a mass, a population, and hence an object of 
knowledge regulation, and policing. In this sense ummah discourses are doubly 
biopolitical, in that they are not merely a feature of a range of Muslim political 
imaginaries, but rather constitute a modality that is useful to the logic of security that 
drives the proliferating indistinctions of the wars of/on terror. Transnational discourse on 
the ummah are perhaps, in this sense, more vital to the political economy of liberal 
regimes, whose pervasive logic of security and martial capacities for war thrive on the 
affective deployment of Islam as a vital threat. The American project for the imposition 
of liberal peace across the “Muslim World” is defunct without expert discourses on 
(political/radical) Islam as the engine of a counter-modernity, a unified homogenous plot, 
whose profuse resentments threaten “Western civilization” and its “way of life”. The idea 
of a unified ummah is thus central to the metaphysics of both Islam hating (e.g. 
neoconservatives) and Islam loving (jihadists). In our rapidly globalizing era then, the 
third biopolitical triad between ‘Security’, and ‘Population’ is ‘Terror’ rather than 
‘Territory’. The ummah, as Islamapolis, may then be seen as an extension of the carceral 
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polis, replete with an imaginary geopolitics, that seeks to exercise yet again the power of 
normalization (Islamization). What presides over these sovereign mechanisms “is not the 
unitary functioning of an apparatus or an institution, but the necessity of combat and the 
rules of strategy. … In this central and centralized humanity [read ummah], the effect and 
instrument of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple 
mechanisms of ‘incarceration’, objects for discourses that are in themselves elements for 
this strategy, we must hear the distant roar of battle.”676  
For Foucault war was the central problem of modernity.677 Foucault’s idea of war 
can certainly be related to Schmidt’s friend/enemy distinction and agonistic theories of 
the political (ala Chantal Mouffe). Its more significant origins lie however in my opinion 
in Heidegger’s conception of polemos.678 As Julian Ried notes with regard to the 
emergence of the disciplines, “Foucault insisted that the tactical models of military 
organization were of utmost importance to understand how war invests the order of 
power.”679 In Discipline and Punish war and the military sciences, and not the prison, are 
designated as the originary impetus behind the disciplining of individual bodies and the 
eventual transitions to carceral societies. As he extended his analysis of power from 
disciplinary to biopolitical regimes and modern governmentality, the problematic of war 
and power only intensified. The History of Sexuality elaborates further on the 
                                                
676 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, p. 308. 
677 “What I would like to study would be the problem of war and the institution of war in what one could 
call the military dimension of [modern] society. … How, when and why was it noticed or imagined that 
what is going on beneath and in power relations is a war? … Until now, or for roughly the last five years, it 
has been disciplines; for the next five years, it will be war, struggle, the army.’ (———, Society Must Be 
Defended.). In parallel, our concern here is with War (War on Terror, jihad), Struggle (jihad, ethos), and 
the army (Pakistani Military). 
678 Auseinandersetzung, meaning war, confrontation, logos or Kampf, struggle. In later Heidegger polemos 
emerges as an ontological concept that describes the chiasmatic relationality of Being and Dasein, the 
crossing of the ontological difference. 
679 Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity and the Defence of 
Logistical Societies, p. 31. 
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fundamental imbrication of liberal regimes, predicated on the production of ‘peace’, with 
war and biopower. In conjunction with Agamben then we can say that under modernity 
the camp and the polis merge. The Taliban are in an essential way a merger — a 
daemonic combination to use Foucault’s terms —of the camp and the polis. 
If the political space of Pakistan has indeed crossed the threshold of multifold 
indistinctions — between martial law and democracy, between fact and life, between law 
and violence, between Islam as peace and Islam as war — it would mean that a new set 
of vocabularies will need to be developed to discern the complex folds of this state of 
emergency, which on Heidegger’s reading is symptomatic of the ‘emergency of being’. It 
is my contention then that Pakistan’s fate, and by extension that of the Deoband, cannot 
be understood or interrupted unless we take into account the topos of the metacolonial 
space which envelops its onto-historical destiny. The predominant shade of this matrix in 
Pakistan is military-colonial; a space where politics, in Foucault’s famous reversal of 
Carl von Clausewitz, is always war by other means.  
The martial undercurrent of biopower, and in particular its thanatopolitical 
tendencies, have thus continued to suffuse all aspects of social relations including 
revolutionary anarchic and ‘constituting’ discourses. Doubtless Foucault would have 
approved of Benjamin’s take on the Klee painting “Angelus Novus”. The ruse of power, 
its ‘race war’ discourses, hidden and disguised as historico-political counter discourses, is 
perhaps most effectively alive in the thought and practice of resistance. Even his own 
genealogy comes under the scrutiny of the underlying polemos dynamic of life. Perhaps 
this is why Foucault remained weary of attaching himself within the intellectual tide of 
post-modernity and perhaps why he may have remained suspicious even of postcolonial 
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critique written partially under his name. Imperium is not therefore a devious errancy of 
an originally pacific project of modernity but rather its necessary correlate. If Empire and 
liberty — Pax Americana — as we now know so well, are two sides of the same coin, 
cannot the same be said of any instantiation of Pax Islamica?  
 
Power of Death 
Under the colonial regime the domain of juridico-Islamic power was confined to 
the sphere of the domestic. Additionally because of the decapitation of formal Muslim 
political sovereignty, the entire zone of remaining autonomous and legal power that was 
open to Muslims was redirected towards the zone of the private and the domestic. This is 
why in postcolonial India and Pakistan, matters pertaining to the reform of family law 
and the regulation of the female body, meet with stiff and violent resistance; as the 
Chicago trained scholar Fazlur Rahman was to quickly discover following his 
appointment by General Ayub to the Council of Islamic Ideology. Domesticity, which 
historically has been the space where patriarchal power was rarely trumped by the 
state,680 was thus the primary cite for the expression and exercise of ‘ulama power. The 
space of ‘ulama power thus underwent a mutation and indirect enlargement under the 
colonial apparatus. With the onset of independence political sovereignty would be 
transferred to the former subjects of colonial rule, but of course these subjects had 
already undergone profound transmutations under coloniality. Colonialism had indeed 
transformed political space and the very form of the subject who would in habit it. If 
before the Lahore resolution the bulk of the ‘ulama opposed the idea of a separate 
                                                
680 Ruby Lal, Domesticity and Power in the Early Mughal World, Cambridge Studies in Islamic 
Civilization (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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Muslim state, with the emergence of the name “Pakistan” the possibilities for ‘ulama 
power in an Islamic State began to garner a small but growing section of the ‘ulama who 
began flirting with the Muslim League.  
The modern state has of course increasingly penetrated zones of the private while 
maintaining is formal regard for individual rights through the coup of the biopolitical 
subject. Traditional powers of the private subject, the male prerogative over his wife and 
children for instance, have also been increasingly usurped by the state, which alone takes 
charge of the rights of each individual in its flock. In his chapter “Vitae Necisque 
Potestas” — a chapter which provides historical depth to Foucault’s characterization of 
sovereign power as “the right to decide life and death” —Agamben shows how the 
expression “right over life and death” in the history of law first appears in the Roman 
formula vitae necisque potestas, “which designates not sovereign power but rather the 
unconditional authority (potesta) of the pater over his sons.” Agamben then links the 
appearance of vita (life) in Roman law with the collapse of the classical Greek distinction 
between both zoē and bios.  
“vita is nothing but a corollary of nex, the power to kill … Life thus 
originally appears in Roman law merely as the counterpart of a power 
threatening death. … the vitae necisque Potestas attaches itself to every 
free male citizen from birth and thus seems to define the very model of 
political power in general. Not simple natural life, but life exposed to 
death (bare life or sacred life) is the originary political element.”681 
 
We can then apply this genealogy not only to the “father” of the nation, the Duce, 
but also to other expression of community leadership. Thus we can see this formulation 
of an absolute right to kill, in the modern Islamist understanding of the Caliph, an 
individual who holds both temporal and spiritual authority over the ummah. If in the 
                                                
681 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
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broad strokes of Muslim history these powers were judiciously separated, today in the 
post Iran revolution world, they have become united. But this conduction was already 
presaged in the very idea of Pakistan. Thus in the configuration of modern sovereignty 
we must keep in mind the “genealogical myth of sovereign power” which has its source 
in the Roman imperium, which “is nothing but the father’s vitae necisque potestas 
extended to all citizens. There is no clearer way to say that the first foundation of 
political life is a life that may be killed, which is politicized through its very capacity to 
be killed.”682 
If the battle within Pakistan is seen in terms of the metacolonial, as waged on the 
topological terrain of sovereignty, then the institution or individual who most effectively 
exercises the power of death, captures the space of sovereign power. Today it is this 
space over which the Army, America, and the Mullah alike, are in a bloody contest. 
These are not three distinct formations, as the long history of Pakistan demonstrates the 
filial relations between all three components. Their maximum alliance, of course 
occurred during the years following 1979. The intensity of politics today can bee seen as 
the aftershocks of this destinal sovereign alignment. 
If under the formal theories of modern sovereignty (Bodin, Hobbes, Schmidt) 
only the state has the monopoly on death, under biopower the affective power of 
sovereignty is redirected into the socius; the modern state tricks the individual into 
thinking that it, though the notion of we the people, is the true bearer of sovereignty, 
whereas in effect the actual power to kill is redirected towards the “executive” (the 
executors) or its titular head. However if the state redirects the affective component of it 
sovereign power through the general modality of biopower and the specific techniques of 




biopolitics, while maintaining control over the apparatus of death, today increasingly we 
see an indistinction in this liberal arrangement. Abu Ghraib could be seen as marking 
precisely an indistinction of this sort. If Lyndi England and her accomplices are being 
punished, it is not because of their acts of brutality and torture, but rather because of their 





By articulating the boundaries of Muslimness, both the modernists and the ‘ulama 
then are able to constitute, territorialize (and therefore terrorize) the ummah; Muslim 
People are produced through the deployments of specific biopolitical relationships and a 
distinctive logic of exclusion. The ‘ulama’s juridification of the shari‘a simply facilitates 
their role in the marking of social boundaries and limits (haddud), and the corresponding 
exercise of the exception through banning and exclusion. Let us recall then Agamben 
preliminary distinction between two forms of life: zoē, the simple fact of biological 
existence, and bios, a qualified form or way of life. A political ontology of the ummah 
(People), whether that of Iqbal or the ‘ulama, rooted in tawhid, produces the need for a 
single, qualified bios that is imposed as the essential definition of zoē, as din or way of 
life. In all Islamists then (Iqbal, Mawdudi, Thanawi, etc)there is a fundamental 
presupposition that the ummah (people) has a way of life, and furthermore, that this way 
of life, Islam, rests upon a positive, “natural” foundation. The imposition of Muslim unity 
(bios) which claims to derive its legitimacy as a representation of the natural (defined 
either biologically or culturally) Islamic way of life itself (zoē), leads however to violence 
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and caesura, simply because the very foundations of their way of life rest on a series of 
unexamined biopolitical foundations. 
Muslim modernity then represents a certain crossing, a certain threshold by which 
time the capture of Islam in the apparatus of the shari‘a is complete. We may reverse this 
and talk of a capture of the shari‘a by a biopoliticized Islam. In either case, what we 
intend by this formulation is the almost complete withdrawal of any ontological 
possibilities of the tradition and their wholesale reformulation in terms of history, the 
political and in particular the becoming of nations (people, ummah). As the Ibn Arabi 
scholar Chodkiewicz notes, ummah is derived from ummi, which is usually translated as 
‘illiterate’. “It appears a number of times in the Qur’an, in the singular, to refer to the 
Prophet himself (7:157-58) and, in the plural, to refer to the members of the community 
toward which it has been sent (62:2).” However ummi comes from the root ‘mm, from 
which the word umm (mother) is derived, “which leads the author of the Lisan al-‘arab to 
define ummi as “he who is as when his mother gave birth to him.””683 That is to say 
ummah and ummi originally refer to a state of innocence, or infancy. Agamben’s analysis 
of infancy (the relationship between language and experience) is highly suggestive here. 
Infancy refers to a new experience of the taking place of language “an experimentum 
linguae.”684 In-fancy does not simply refer to a stage of human development, but instead 
denotes “a mute experience of language” that precedes speech, and that is also 
                                                
683 Michel Chodkiewicz, An Ocean without Shore: Ibn 'Arabi, the Book, and the Law (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1993), p. 31. 
684 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz Heron, Radical 
Thinkers (London & New York: Verso, 1993), p. 6. 
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appropriated in speech. Infancy is the experience of language as communicability 
itself.685 
In-fancy … is not a simple given whose chronological site might be 
isolated, nor is it like an age or a psychosomatic state which a psychology 
or a palaeoanthropology could construct as a human fact independent of 
language.  
If every thought can be classified according to the way in which it 
articulates the question of the limits of language, the concept of infancy is 
then an attempt to think through these limits in a direction other than that 
of the vulgarly ineffable. … The concept of infancy … is accessible only 
to a thought which has been purified, in the words of Benjamin writing to 
Buber, ‘by eliminating the unsayable from language’. The singularity 
which language must signify is not something ineffable but something 
superlatively sayable: the thing of language.686 
 
Today any possibilities for an understanding of the ummah in terms of infancy —
this experience or experiment with language — is decisively broken with the advent of 
history and its biopolitical turn. Today language is a marker of subjectivity, the nation, 
and the ummah is government of the One.687 If unlike the Western tradition the resonance 
of the originary ummah were preserved in the myriad forms of antinomian Sufic 
practices, the place of Sufism today has itself been definitively displaced by the 
Islamapolis. Islam is now conceived of in terms of a ‘secure’ dwelling in the abode of 
ontic homelessness, the space of the polis. Political Islam is the desire for this political 
space, for the biopolitical security and securing of Muslim identity. 
 “Maybe”, as Foucault writes, “the target nowadays is not to discover what we are 
but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get 
rid of this kind of political’ double bind’, which is the simultaneous individualization and 
                                                
685 This insight paves a radically new way for understanding the significance of the Prophet being labeled 
‘ummi, which is usually understood as unlettered or illiterate. 
686 Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience, p. 4. 




totalization of modem power structures.” If the metacolonial signifies the ways in which 
life is increasingly colonized by operations and networks of biopolitical sovereignty, then 
Foucault’s admonition for movement in thinking apply equally well to “East and West”. 
Must we not therefore refuse the ummah, that is to say any idea of a collectivity based on 
identity, Muslim or otherwise. This refusal is not premised in favor of the valorization of 
something like secularity or West, but rather precisely because the ummah is itself merely 
a biopolitical variation of the same: the metaphysics of the West. To “save the ummah 
from itself”, will require therefore not more modernity, and certainly not more tradition, 
but the suspension of the global logics of biopolitical sovereignty, most paradigmatically 
assembled in the imperial will of the United States, and its arch inverted mimicry al-
Qaeda. It is perhaps only in the space of relative equanimity that the task of thinking an 
originary solution to the question of life may unfold: “only if, in other words, there is 
thought—only then a form of life can become, in its own factness and thingness, form-of-
life, in which it is never possible to isolate something like naked life.”688 
 
So if religion, or more precisely fundamentalism, has come back to haunt the telos 
of the Enlightenment, it comes to us as no surprise that the ‘ulama would at some point 
reclaim their historically authoritative place in the formation of public Islamic discourses, 
and in the moral leadership of the community, a place that the secular Muslim League 
was threatening to supersede. Perhaps it was this old safe zone of domestic juridical 
space that attracted the ‘ulama of the Madani factions. But the key term here is 
“authoritative”. In light of the Deoband ‘ulama’s overall opposition to the project of 
Pakistan, the renegade Thanawi-’Usmani faction notwithstanding, the ‘ulama found 
                                                
688 Agamben, “Form-of-Life”, in Negri, eds. Radical Political Thought. 
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themselves on the defensive in the new “Islamic” republic. By adroitly manipulating the 
otherwise tenuous link between Islam and territorial nationalism, and by showing how 
the survival of the former depended on the creation of the later, the Pakistan movement, 
which was ostensibly a movement for the protection of minority rights more akin to the 
Dalit movement,689 gave birth to itself from out of the womb of a split and dubious 
imaginary. Its correspondingly precarious existence owes in part to the casuistic 
conflation of Islam and Nationalism. The resultant ideology, the two nation theory, which 
in retrospect should be more aptly labeled the “X nation theory”690, became of course the 
cornerstone of the All India Muslim League (Pakistan movement), and ironically its post-
partition undoing! 
 
                                                
689 Naqvi, Nauman, “Pakistan, Islam, Bar-e-Sagheer ke Musalman awr Aqaliyat ka Sawal”, Aaj, Karachi, 
March, 2003. 
690 In fact I would argue that the two nation theory is less theory and more hypothesis, and not a very good 





Conclusion: The Space of Thinking 
 
 
Becoming Bio-Political: From Fana to Fanaticism and the Rise of the Lashkar 
 
The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving 
power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the 
piety of thought. – Heidegger691 
 
The ‘political’ is the way in which history is accomplished. – Heidegger 
 
As is well known, the driving ethos of the phenomenological and post-
structuralist traditions was to counter the predominance of a series of Cartesian logics 
embedded within modern epistemology and social thought, particularly the liberal 
“Western” model of the sovereign autonomous subject. What the Cartesian 
representational traditions seemed to miss was an understanding, or sense, of the silent 
pre-given and taken-for-granted contextual backgrounds that shape the very conditions of 
possibility of knowledge and meaning. Like the phenomenologists more generally 
Foucault was also concerned with articulating this “background” of human 
understanding. Adopting the Heideggerian concept of umwelt (environment) Foucault 
reformulates it in terms of milieu, or the historical a priori. This savoir (knowledge), or 
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space of power relationships, always already shows up as a particular “order of things”. 
Thus the imperative of political Islam, like its liberal and neoliberal counterparts, lies in 
its will-to-order. For the entire spectrum of players on the horizon of political Islam, 
Islam is said to offer a ‘code’, more than a ‘way’, of placing and ordering life and things. 
In the meantime the very ways in which life is now understood, the ways in which it has 
come to be placed at the center of politics, is a transformation that has gone unremarked 
by Islamist theorists. The significance of “life”, and hence the meaning of Islam as a way 
of life or din, has remained unthought, as if it were a transhistorical constant. This is why 
in this work I have been interested in articulating the episteme of political Islam. Through 
an archae-genealogy I hope to have shown the ways in which past and present imperial 
forms of knowledge (savoir) now constitute the “forms of subjectivity and 
worldliness”692 of the Muslim life world. The project has been aimed at articulating this 
savoir. And yet because we stand within this savoir we can only hint at it. 
In have suggested that the emergence of the Taliban phenomenon (the destinal 
mutation of the Deoband) — and by extension, much of the global radical jihadist 
movement — cannot be adequately understood through reference to Islamist ideology as 
such, but instead might be more usefully situated on a metacolonial horizon; a horizon 
which is itself a complex of intersecting spaces of power. Part of the labor of thinking 
that this work sought to undertake, was to explicate the metacolonial as a way of 
supplementing the predominantly representational and temporal modality of postcolonial 
critique, with a spatial and affective biopolitical analysis. In the Islamapolis, understood 
as a metacolonial space, there is an intensification of what Agamben calls the 
‘politicization of life’: the growing inclusion of man’s natural life in the mechanisms and 
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calculations of power. Contrary then to the Deoband and Taliban’s own self-regard as 
agents for the enactment and enforcement of divine commandment (the juridification of 
the shari‘a) and the left/liberal consensus of the Taliban as figures outside of time and 
reason — as strange reincarnations of medieval Islamic sentiment — the 
Taliban/Deoband should be seen as an exemplary site of modernity; exemplary not 
merely in the sense of the modern as the material and temporal conditions of its 
possibility, but in the sense of modernity’s primary politico-theological characterization. 
In both Foucault and Agamben the threshold of the modern era occurs when politics turns 
into biopolitics; the point when natural life begins to be included in the mechanisms and 
calculations of power.693 For Agamben “the entry of zoē into the sphere of the polis – the 
politicization of bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of modernity and signals 
a radical transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classical thought.” 
Deoband praxis is I have argued, completely biopolitical, and can be further characterized 
as driven by the will to sovereign power. And if it is indeed biopolitical, then it is already 
Western in the most essential of senses. 
Hence another key strand of my argument has been to suggest that ‘ulama 
practices should be understood in relationship to a history of power and the series of 
political technologies of the body through which they produce bare life. I have attempted 
to show how we can situate the ‘ulama in relationship to the three broad forms of power 
which are exercised spatially; sovereignty, discipline and biopolitics — “sovereignty is 
exercised within the borders of a territory, discipline is exercised on the bodies of the 
individual, and security [biopolitics] is exercised over a whole population.”694 The 
                                                
693 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, p. 3.  
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territorial practices of the ‘ulama, as we have seen with reference to the technology of 
blasphemy, are exercised in the production of the boundaries of ummah 
inclusion/exclusion (the ummagination); discipline is exercised in the space of the 
madrasa, in the regulations, dressage and habit formations of the individual body; and the 
security practices of the Deoband/Army/Lashkar/Taliban are exercised through jihad, 
which is in part concerned with the security and defense of the ummah at large. Together 
a combination and mixing of these powers produces a daemonic apparatus. Together they 
constitute the statification and biopoliticization of the ‘ulama. 
 According to Schmitt politics is, by definition concerned with the “state.” 
However as Agamben reminds us Schmitt’s political was also a political theology, and 
hence the state is not confined to the polis; it also designated status, space and rank 
within the socius (bios). Nor did Schmitt confine “state” politics to the acts of a sovereign 
head of state, dictator or government institution. Rather Schmitt’s point is less about state 
sovereignty and more about understanding how that which is sovereign is “state-like”. 
The parallel here is with Foucault’s notion of governmentality and statification. When 
governmentality, rather than a reified hypostatized state, becomes our grid of 
intelligibility, then the horizons/spaces of the political enlarge without implying the 
disappearance of the State. Rather the State is now reconfigured as a multiplicity (an 
assemblege), as the shifting node of a series of complex filiations of power. In The Birth 
of Biopolitics Foucault emphatically claims that “the state does not have an essence,” that 
it is not “an autonomous source of power.”695 Once we no longer confine our 
understanding of the state to the traditional sovereign or political domain, when we 
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situate the state within a broader network of power, when we have “cut of the Kings 
head” so to speak, we can see how ‘ulama sovereign practices enable them to take on the 
mythic and magical powers of the state. 
Here again we may be tempted to read the transition of the ‘ulama in Benjaminian 
terms; from the uncertainties of divine violence to the certainties of mythic violence. Thus 
the ‘ulama behave like a “state” precisely when they engage in sovereign practices. 
Sovereignty in turn, is rendered through the right to declare the enemy and to 
subsequently command power over the body of the enemy to the point of death. 
Spectacular displays of violence against the body of the condemned, as Foucault reminds 
us in Discipline and Punish, are the classical hallmarks of sovereign political power, 
which the Taliban and the ‘ulama in Pakistan have amply demonstrated. Jihad therefore 
should be seen as a technology of war, a technology of war which encompasses an 
economy of violence and power in much the same way as liberal geopolitics does696. 
Appeals to the supernatural (providence, Allah), the ritualized performances of power 
(Allah-ho-Akbar and off with his head) and the glorified media representations of 
violence, are all key aspects of the jihadist/liberal logic which binds together the body, 
power and violence. Jihad is thus the cipher for the appropriation of the “magical 
technologies of war.”697 Therefore the right to declare jihad, and the right to declare the 
heretic/apostate/enemy, are together biopolitical technologies: “It can even be said that 
the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.”698 The 
‘ulama’s love for and valorization of jihad, so amply demonstrated in Rafi ‘Usmani’s 
                                                
696 For an excellent account of how geopolitics is now also biopolitics see {{Vaughan-Williams, 2009 
#12826}} For the now classic Foucaultian reading of geopolitics see {{Tuathail, 1996 #7577}} 
697 Taussig, The Magic of the State. This phrase is taken from Zainab Bahrani, Rituals of War: The Body 
and Violence in Mesopotamia (Zone Books, 2008). 
698 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
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memoirs,699 and the broad vitalist allure of jihadist masculinity and heroism (the culture 
of shahadat for the party or the state), is ultimately drawn, like the sexiness of the 
military uniform, from the reservoir of this capacity for sovereign mythical violence: 
“sovereign violence is in truth founded not on a pact but on the exclusive inclusion of 
bare life.”700 It is this capacity for ultra violence over bare life that marks sovereign 
power. Additionally the ability to control the mechanisms of violence over bare life 
outside of the formal juridical boundaries of the state, is precisely that which renders 
‘ulama power as a species of the exception.  
As I have shown in the preceding chapters, practices of exclusion and violence 
against the excluded seem to be the hallmark of the Deoband in Pakistan today. The right 
to define and kill the enemy establishes the sovereign, and is according to Agamben, the 
essential right of modern politics. Agamben claims that it is this relationship of exception 
which undergirds the structure of the modern juridical relation — the relation of the 
sovereign structure of law to its subjects: “In this sense, the sovereign decision on the 
exception is the originary juridico-political structure on the basis of which what is 
included in the juridical order and what is excluded from it acquire their meaning.” This 
unlocalizable topology of the exception is vital in understanding the transformation of the 
‘ulama, who must first enter into a relationship (or produce) a state of exception in order 
to open up a space in which the determination of a certain Islami-nizam becomes 
possible. In this way the sovereign exception can be seen as vital to the often violent 
‘ulama technologies of rule, for whom “the sovereign exception is not so much the 
control or neutralization of an excess as the creation and definition of the very space in 
                                                




which the juridico-political order can have validity.”701 The topology of exception is 
itself a void, an empty space that is nonetheless constitutive of the modern legal system. 
The consequence of the biopoliticization of Islam is a simultaneous juridification of 
shari‘a, whose hidden but fundamental relationship between law and lawlessness, is yet 
another regional manifestation of the state of exception. 
The task of this genealogy has been to expose this structure of the ban which 
constitutes this link between bare life and politics, “a link that secretly governs the 
modern ideologies seemingly most distant from one another”; namely Islamism and 
liberalism. This is how I understand Agamben’s exhortation “to bring the political out of 
its concealment.”702 In Agamben’s formulation the “entry of zoē into the sphere of the 
polis – the politicization of bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of 
modernity.”703 Contrary then to the way in which Islamic rage and violence is often 
depicted as a ‘reaction’ to modernization, to rationalization, or even to colonization, I 
have argued that the specific violences of the Taliban and the Deoband are manifestations 
of the modern itself, and not the outcome of a struggle between tradition and modernity. 
This is precisely what the (late) birth pangs of modernity look like, a future-present 
which can be glimpsed in Europe’s paroxysmal decent into violence a mere few decades 
ago, and what America continues to witness in its Imperial ventures from Vietnam to Iraq 
and Afghanistan today. There is little doubt then that we indeed live after the “failure of 
peoples”.704 The Deo’s, the djinns, genies and demons that haunt the political space of 
globalization today are of ancient provenance, and predate both capitalism and 
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colonialism and anything else we might be tempted to meaningfully designate as “the 
West.”705  
 
In becoming historical and political, Islam today is in perhaps the final stages of a 
process of hollowing out. As Islam replaces Allah, Islam itself becomes sacer (sacred, 
hallowed) and the Muslim becomes Musalmann (homo sacer). Manifest most clearly in 
the passions of jihad, Islam has become primarily a biopolitical affect. The violence, 
fanaticism and terrorism that seem to be the hallmark of the more notorious forms of 
Islamic political expression (to be distinguished certainly from the mass of everyday 
“Muslim” politics) are not then signs of a revolt against modernity. It is merely 
modernity — the political — playing itself out and coming to presence in the constitution 
of Islam as a properly bio-political phenomenon. From this perspective then, it is not 
Islam as such but the (bio)political which is decisive. Part of the claim that has unfold 
here is that political Islam has crossed a threshold of biopolitical modernity; Islam is now 
fully incorporated in the space of the political. The violence of Islamic law, epitomized 
for instance by the destruction of the Buddha statues or the deployment of blasphemy as 
rational for murder, is the play of this space, the performance of its self-referential 
sovereign power. Given their intimate symbiosis with bare life, both these phenomenon 
exemplify the biopoliticization of Islam. In such spaces the violation and execution of 
shari‘a become indistinguishable. Under the Taliban, or at least wherever they hold sway, 
we see how a maximum of anomy and disorder can perfectly coexist with a maximum of 
legislation. Put in more succinct and provocative terms, today Islam is indistinct from the 
                                                




West. In this sense I have aimed to disclose the Deoband/Taliban phenomenon as in fact 
a marker of the effective indistinction between Islam and the West rather than its 
antithesis.706 
More specifically “Islam” and the “West” — their dominant discourses, practices 
and desires — now share, produce, mutually reinforce and co-inhabit the state of 
exception. Afghanistan is already the exemplary site of this production, and its anomie 
threatens to fully engulf both neighboring Pakistan (a process well underway if we take 
into account the war in the Waziristan region) and Iran. The tragedy of a relentless 
Imperial will is that it proliferates vacuous, ob-scene spaces, which in turn demand and 
require intervention; for the Imperial will also sees itself as an exemplary practitioner of 
order, it is an exemplary mentality of governance and sovereignty. The more it orders the 
greater the empty gap in which it must dwell, and so the global cycle of exception draws 
both parties within the ambit of its inescapable violence and non-sense. Even though 
political Islam, especially in its more intense variety, may appears as the shadowy 
obverse of imperial sovereignty,707 it is in fact its technological partner. Once the 
problem is viewed from across the polemos of critical ontology, the critical question is 
not the emergence of political Islam, or any other process of Islamization, but the 
emergence (and emergency) of the political.  
In short then, today Islam and the West have entered a zone of indistinction. It has 
been the task of this work to problematize and articulate this zone of indistinction as a 
                                                
706 To turn the neoconservative definition of itself against itself, political Islam — if not Islam in the totality 
of its current configuration — is an Islam that has been mugged by the (biopolitical) reality of modernity.  
707 As the otherwise erudite post-911 intervention of Enseng Ho suggests. See his deservedly acclaimed 
article, Empire Through Diasporic Eyes, CSSH. 
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metacolonial horizon.708 My goal here was not to write a social history of the ‘ulama, but 
rather to write/think a genealogy of political Islam within which the Deoband narrative is 
embedded. To think then in the shadow of genealogy and the state of exception is to 
make manifest the increasing opacity of life under the shadow of power; the 
intensification of power over life, the intensification of biopolitics. The metacolonial 
ironically gives voice and visibility to this space. In showing how Pakistan is itself the 
voice of a biopolitical command, an exemplary metacolonial state, I am suggesting the 
fundamental homelessness of Muslim life today. This homelessness found its first major 
expression in the Pakistan movement, Harkat-ul Pakistan, the desire for a Muslim 
homeland, for Muslim territoriality. This desire paved the way for the domination of the 
Lashkar-i Pakistan, the Army (lashkar) of Pakistan. The Lashkar-i Pakistan, in turn gave 
birth to other lashkars, including the Taliban. Today, in the ungovernable will of the 
Taliban, is expressed the desire for a homeland for Islam itself. This ultimate biopolitical 
fantasy, represents the final threshold of the biopoliticization of Islam. It is perhaps not 
co-incidental that the word Lashkar — battalion, army or corps — also shares 
etymological roots with the word Laash which means dead-body or corpse. The Taliban 
are thus the pure expression of action, the Lashkar-i Islam. In this way it can be said the 
Pakistan is the graveyard of Islam. Sovereignty in Agamben, is also dead-body making in 
the name of life. Along the metacolonial horizon the Lashkar-i Freedom and the Lashkar-
i Islam, can be seen to converge in a deathly embrace. 
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the wake of what Heidegger called the oblivion or emergency of being. Richard Polt, The Emergency of 
Being: On Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy (Cornell University Press, 2006). 
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This genealogy has sought to trace and expose sovereign power which always 
appears in the form of a necessity or an absolute (as peace, as freedom, as Islam). The 
state of exception, “which is what the sovereign each and every time decides”, takes 
place precisely “when naked life—which normally appears rejoined to the multifarious 
forms of social life—is explicitly put into question and revoked as the ultimate 
foundation of political power.”709 In the metacolonial space of the Islamapolis710 the 
‘ulama seek to form an apparatus of power, a military space, in order to police bodies, 
constantly producing naked life in the guise of the heretic (kafir). In the Islamapolis, 
which is today an exemplary space of shirk, the sacralization of Muslim life and identity, 
a Muslim humanism if you will, has replaced that which is most essential, and assumes 
biopolitics as its primary task.711 This is why the celebrated political gesture of Islam 
today is jihad; action in the defense of Islam. That is to say Islam is in force—enforced—
without Allah. This is a metacolonial rather than merely a postcolonial phenomenon, 
where colonialism’s original sin was simply to accelerate and intensify the birth to a 
hermaphroditic bio-polis. Colonialism is simply an apparatus of conduction. The power 
that political Islam seeks is therefore a biopolitical sovereign power (potere) which no 
longer has any form of legitimation other than emergency, and because of this, this 
                                                
709 Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics. 
710 The meaning of the Islamapolis, as a space which is characterized by its lack of questioning and care for 
being, its erasure of being, should be more clear now. In the Islamapolis, which is today an exemplary 
space of shirk, the sacralization of Muslim life and identity, a Muslim humanism if you will, has replaced 
that which is most essential, and assumes biopolitics as its primary task. This is why the celebrated political 
gesture of Islam today is jihad, action in the defense of Islam. Islam is in force (enforced) without Allah. 
711 The meaning of the Islamapolis, as a space which is characterized by its lack of questioning of and care 
for being, its erasure of being, should be more clear now. 
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sovereign power must everywhere and continuously refer and appeal to emergency “as 
well as labor secretly to produce it.”712 
With the emergence then of Pakistan, which is itself a species of a rights claim, 
and the deployment of shari‘a as a jurisprudential biopolitical technology, we have 
witnessed the acceleration, and spread, of the production of bare life as homo sacer. 
Today citizens in Afghanistan and the Frontier borders of Pakistan are all homo sacer. 
The Taliban phenomenon marks a new boundary of indistinction between homo sacer 
and sovereign; a beheading followed by a drone bombing. The tortured, torture. The new 
formulation of the Taliban’s power over life and death is reproduced through the 
circulation of new visual images of sovereignty. The execution or death video’s 
(beheadings, drone/suicide bombings, hangings), demonstrate the limits of control over 
the body of the ‘other’ and of life itself, and in this way “brings to light the secret tie 
uniting sovereign power and bare life.” This coupled with the constant anxiety of being 
the homines sacri for the other – the West or now even the Pakistani Army – demonstrate 
the reversibility and ultimate inseparability of these two characteristics. However it is not 
merely at these extremes that the stamp of biopolitics parades itself; it is in the very 
general rendering of Islam as ‘a way of life’, which marks, most ironically, the threshold 
of a subjection of a life (of potential) that is now constituted as Muslim life, as a fact.  
The costs of misdiagnosing this violence-power are high. For jihadists power in 
located in the West; for Marxists in the means of production, for Liberals in the aberrant 
individual, and for most postcolonial theorists in the colonial effects playing out in the 
state apparatus and communal identity. If however our metacolonial thesis is correct, 
                                                
712 Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics. (slight modification). The production of the heretic as 
homo sacer.  
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what cost has been paid for the misrecognition of biopowers hold over the South Asian 
socius, which all along saw its pyrrhic victory in the form of a nationalist displacement of 
a formal, ontic, colonial sovereign power. It is not merely the idea of the state that needs 
to be overcome, but the very idea of a people, for biopower is wholly immanent to the 
socius; it does not merely organizing it from above, or from some hidden central location 
behind everyday social structures.713  
If the “originary political element” is a “life exposed to death (bare life or sacred 
life) then “the originary juridico-political relation is the ban”, for it is in the threshold of 
the ban that bare life and sovereign power are held together. The ban is a force that “ties 
together the two poles of the sovereign exception: bare life and power, homo sacer and 
the sovereign”. The Taliban exemplify the ban in tying, crossing, the two poles, where 
one passes into the other. It is this relation of the ban that Agamben regards as the 
“essential structure of sovereign power from the beginning” and he charges our ethical 
sensibility to expose this form in the political structures and public spaces we currently 
inhabit. 
The banishment of sacred life is the sovereign nomos that conditions every 
rule, the originary spatialization that governs and makes possible every 
localization and every territorialization. And if in modernity life is more 
and more clearly placed at the center of State politics (which now 
becomes, in Foucault’s terms, biopolitics), if in our age all citizens can be 
said, in a specific but extremely real sense, to appear virtually as hominess 
sacri, this is possible only because the relation of ban has constituted the 
essential structure of sovereign power from the beginning.714 
 
 
                                                
713 See Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and Its Intensifications since 1984. 
714 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
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The Homeland of the Metacolonial 
 
The metacolonial, in its simplest formulation then, refers to the colonization of 
life by power.715 It is a cartography of the shadows cast by power over life.716 It is an 
exposure and critique of power as it plays out in what Foucault called, in opposition to 
demonstrative truth, the truth-event. Along this path, truth and untruth,717 are not simply 
opposed but in a state of play, struggle and strife (polis), a state of fundamental 
imbrication. Foucault’s history of the present can be seen as a history of this originary 
strife between truth and untruth as it plays out in history, where history is itself an echo of 
the struggle of truth and untruth, the originary polemos and event of being (Ereignis).718 
It is not therefore Europe or the West then that is technological, but history itself.719 
Gestell is an essentially an onto-historical, rather than western phenomenon. This point 
lies at the heart of the metacolonial’s departure from the postcolonial. The metacolonial 
thus signifies the colonization of man, not by Europe, but by history itself. The history of 
Islam is today, like the history of the West, simply coincident with the structure of 
exception and the sovereign ban. This state of exception, now invests virtually all 
structures of power, and is thus the originary source of the imperial, metacolonial, 
condition. The topology of exception, and its technologization, is the presence that haunts 
                                                
715 A power which must be understood ontologically; as is itself a variant of ontotheology. 
716 According to Heidegger this shadow is paradoxically the destining of being itself. 
717 Much like the difference between being and beings. 
718 Ereignis is “the event of an erasure and a withdrawing, constitutive of presence and history as such, the 
unfolding of truth as that which turns away from presence within presence.”: Miguel de Beistegui, The New 
Heidegger (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005). 
719 Importantly for Heidegger, as the German world for history, Geschichte suggest, history is essentially 
destiny. Destiny, not to be confused with fate, is for Heidegger a sending (Schickung) of being. It is 
therefore being and not man that has historical agency: “The history of man is played out in the manner and 
nature of his response to this exposure to the truth of being, which distinguishes him as human” (Ibid.) 
Hence the time of the event, kairòs, should be distinguished from the domain of ordinary history 




Islamic as much as Western modernity. Through the term metacolonial then, Islamic 
modernity is brought face to face with the ghosts of metaphysics haunting its 
technological, biopolitical present.720 
The task of the metacolonial is thus to expose and fully understand, as prepatory 
to the development of ethical practices of resistance721 (askēsis), the ways in which our 
lives are governed — managed, ordered and disposed— within the various disciplinary, 
normative, neoliberal and biopolitical regimes of power. The task of the metacolonial is 
to bring to light the onto-theological content that is implicit in the course of our everyday, 
global, political life. As an “effective”722 history, or genealogy, the metacolonial is not 
interested in truth, but the politics of truth (powers of truth) and knowledge-power.  
In his 1946 essay Letter on Humanism, Heidegger outlines a poetics of 
subjectivity, a language and way of thinking being that shelters the immense density of 
existence, its facticity, its singularity.723 Dedicated in part to overcoming the 
technological will to power of modern subjectivity—which Heidegger associated with the 
last great metaphysician of the West, Nietzsche—Heidegger turns towards be-longing 
through a reading of Hölderlin, “the poet who has leapt ahead of his time into the time of 
homecoming.”  
                                                
720 In this way metaphysics is not simply what Derrida called a “white mythology.” Derrida: “Metaphysics 
– the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes his own 
mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal 
form of that he must still wish to call Reason.” It is the abandonment of being that is the structural 
phenomenon and event which gives rise to the forgetfulness of being, an event which coincides with the 
history of our present and has its roots in the essence of truth itself. 
721 According to Negri’s thesis in the Porcelain Workshop, the ontological problem is rooted in the relation 
“between difference and creativity. … resistance is what allows for the existence of a relation between both 
terms. But if difference and creativity are ontological, then resistance will be so as well.” Negri, The 
Porcelain Workshop: For a New Grammar of Politics. 
722 In this originally Nietszchean term, we should hear the overtones of “affective” also. 
723 The Letter will undoubtedly form the étude for Agamben’s form-of-life. 
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The word [“homeland”] is thought here in an essential sense, not 
patriotically or nationalistically, but in terms of the history of being. The 
essence of the homeland, however, is also mentioned with the intention of 
thinking the homelessness of contemporary man from the essence of 
Being’s history. …724  
 
Contrary to the many volkish readings of Heidegger’s appropriation of Hölderlin, 
Heidegger’s homeland was ontological and not merely national or territorial. “The 
homeland of this historical dwelling is nearness to being” 725 Heidegger’s later thought is 
incompatible with any form of national or biological (racial) egoism, as he consistently 
sought to expose the onto-theological ground within the concept of the political. Against 
the idea of a homeland situated in terms of birth (nativity), territoriality, external borders, 
natural landscape, place, soil, Heidegger sought to give voice to the concept of Ereignis, 
the place (ethos) of ethics, a spatial rather than political ontology, a site where man’s 
essential relation to the truth (space) of being is at stake.  
In this way it is important to contrast the poetic sensibility of Heidegger, with 
another Nietzsche inspired thinker, Muhammad Iqbal. Iqbal is widely acclaimed as the 
poet and spiritus animus behind the idea of a ‘pure’ (pak) Muslim homeland. In Iqbal 
however the Nietzschean will to power dominates in the struggle between power 
(Nietzsche) and ethics (Rumi). Relentlessly beholden to the power of the West, and 
roused to the poetic ‘defense of Islam’ against an objectifying Orientalist and colonial 
imaginary, Iqbal was ultimately the poet of abandonment, the poet of surrender to the will 
to power. As technology grips Islam, it results in alienation, and the anxiety of this 
alienation propels the Muslim community to find a place, a homeland, a place of safety. 
                                                
724 Heidegger, Letter on Humanism in Heidegger, Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to the Task 
of Thinking (1964). 
725 Heidegger, Letter on Humanism. 
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For the Pakistani Deoband this will to power is reflected in its utter and complete 
devotion to jihad, which is often elevated to an obligation greater than salat.726 Hence we 
may say that in gaining a homeland for Muslims, Islam has become truly homeless 
(apolis); in creating a state space for the sovereignty of God/Islam, a Muslim state, an 
Islamapolis, Pakistanis have truly become refuges, homeless. Today as we speak, as the 
Pakistan Army battles its prodigal sons in the once pristine Swat Valley, the number of 
actual IDP’s in Pakistan has become one of the highest in the world. The possibilities of 
an originary dwelling as Muslim, now seem to be proleptically closed off. Yet in this 
closing also lies an opening. And so perhaps only in this sense (of proximity to the abyss) 
are Pakistani’s the most fortunate of all peoples, in that through them both the tragedy 
and the utter fiction of the people is most clearly disclosed. By placing the narrative of 
Islamic sovereignty within this history of power, by gaping into the danger that it has 
become for itself and to itself, we may open the possibility of a form of thinking which 
orients itself to ethics (thinking-being ) rather than enacting power. 
The transition then, from classical sovereignty to modern democratic politics, 
from colonialism to the postcolonial, from minority status within a potentially united 
India to a separate Muslim majority state, is not so much the story of the liberation of 
former subjects but rather their more profound entrapment in the very biopolitical 
(colonial-national) structure they sought to escape. The Islamapolis signals this 
entrapment of its own citizen-bodies within the space of the modern political. In 
becoming national, and in desiring the State, Islamist politics whether of the liberal 
variety of the Muslim League or the literalist variety of the Taliban, articulate a path of 
liberation almost entirely oblivious to the nature of modern biopolitics whose effusive 
                                                
726 Maulana Imran Ashraf ‘Usmani, Jihad ka Mutlab Qya, (Dar-ul Ishat, Urdu Bazar, Karachi, n.d.) 
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champions they have themselves become. In the metacolonial space of Pakistan, 
disciplinary, sovereign and biopolitical powers co-exists and intertwine. This is why for 
‘ulama like Rafi and Imran ‘Usmani—the sons of the founder of the Karachi Dar ul-
‘Ulum, Grand Mufti of Pakistan Muhammad Shafi—jihad is touted as an instrument of 
unity, even as jihadists are now knocking at their own gates. If the disciplinary element of 
‘ulama power results in multiple separations (caesura), the call itself is issued in the name 
of the One and the unity and brotherhood of the Ummah. The men of Jihad, to rephrase 
Baudrillard, will wage jihad against the jihadists.727 
 
 
Coda on Empire 
 
 
The American Sovereign Exception and the “Enframing” of the Muslim Enemy 
 
Mainstream public-political discourses increasingly tend to show up “Islam,” the 
constitutive other of the West, as the major obstacle/challenge to a final dénouement of a 
global and enlightened secular/neoliberal order. However with the casting of the locus of 
this “opposition” as emerging from within the ranks of radical and jihadist organizations, 
a simultaneous act of dual concealment and a form of “enframing” Islam occurs. What is 
concealed is the degree to which (arguably) mainstream forms of political Islam are 
variants of modern political ideologies that do not fundamentally challenge the key 
frameworks of contemporary political theory (popular sovereignty, the nation state form 
                                                
727 In his notes on Jihad, Imran ‘Usmani, under the ominous sub-heading “Jihad will last till the End 
Times” cites a hadith from Muslim; “Sayyidna Jabir ibn Samurah (razi ilah ‘ana’) reported that the 
Messenger of Allah said: This religion will never cease to exist. A party of the Muslims shall always fight 
[Jihad] for it till the Hour comes to pass”. 
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itself, capitalism, profit accumulation, the capacity for autonomous governance over 
bounded constituents, etc.). Secondly the deep historical entanglement of the United 
States in the forging, co-production and promoting of radical Islamist militancy 
(principally as a bulwark against socialism and independent third world nationalism) is 
also concealed. And finally, the locating of the apparent tensions between asymmetric 
powers (Western civilization/freedom vs. fundamentalist Islam/theocratic tyranny) as 
rooted within the ambit of the terrorist/the criminal/the insane, makes the emergence of 
any ethico-political alternative, one that may take its metaphysical grounds for the 
intelligibility of being as rooted within an alternative history (of Islam), all the more 
impossible to emerge.  
The American exercise of power over life, its unfurling of a form of global 
sovereignty, is encapsulated not only by its ability to invade and interdict both individuals 
and entire governments at will, but also by the ability to name juridical categories (illegal 
enemy combatants, terrorists) that place “Muslims” individually and collectively outside 
the bounds of international law and hence at the arbitrary disposition of the American 
Executive. Recall Schmidt; the capacity to mark the exception confirms not only the rule, 
but also the Ruler. It is of course power, and the force of power alone, and not the force 
of communicative reason or justice, that enables America’s self-configuration as the 
exception to the new global order/rules it seeks to safeguard. The Muslim, who need not 
be given any theological definition and need only to confirm to the fact of his 
Muslimness, can thus be seen as standing in a relation of exception to the West, 
enhancing the logic and rationality of an Imperial American State, whose current 
interventions and extension of power are further buoyed by a special historical sense of 
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mission, a calling that has typically been subsumed under the term “Manifest Destiny”. 
As Agamben astutely notes: “What is at issue in the sovereign exception is not so much 
the control or neutralization of excess” —that is to say terror, radical Islam— “as the 
creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-political order can have 
validity.” Does Radical Islam then, effectively act as a guarantee for the rationality and 
condition of possibility for the enhancement, both domestic and international, of the 
power of the American State (and other states to a lesser degree)? Ironically then, has not 
Islam, and the associated excess of terror that it produces by virtue of its own ‘essence,’ 
come to be even more critical for outlining and propelling a sense of American identity 
and mission in a post-colonial, post-cold war era? 
Hence, we should also ask what work the “blasphemous subject”, the suicide 
bomber, the militant jihadist, the Ahmadi, in short what work such figures of the enemy 
as heretic, are doing on behalf of imperial discipline and pedagogy. Public discussions 
about politics and violence, wherever Muslim bodies are present, however, tend to be 
wrought under the unifying signs of militant jihadism, al-Qaeda, suicide bombers, 
resident evil, or as Bush recently called it, “Islamo-fascism”. By restaging at the level of 
state power the journalistic formulations728 of liberals like Christopher Hitchens and his 
neocon brethren (all of whom remain under the thrall of that Orientalist grand inquisitor, 
Bernard Lewis), forms of essentialist/racist discourses are elevated into official state-
superpower concerns on national security; they become part of the discourse of war. The 
imperial and governmental utility of the construction of Islamo-fascism as a discursive 
                                                
728 And we can think of numerous works to this effect from the everyday speeches of Bush and Divid Frum 
to Dick Pearl’s master work of demonology, An End of Evil: How to Win the War on Terror. Tony 
Blankley’s recent last gasp attempt to resuscitate the merits of a bin Laden inflected Huntingtonian 
sentiment The West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations? is reminiscent of the Muslim 
League cry, ‘Islam in Danger’. 
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signifier of global evil, at once everywhere and yet nowhere specific, as a kind of 
totalizing power arrayed against civilization itself, allows for the mobilization of 
imperialisms impressive vast and expensive machinery. Such con-structions play on the 
slippage of signs overdetermined by sentiment, and only serve to mask the techniques of 
global governance and the materialized specificities of modern neoliberal rule, by 
claiming to speak for humanity itself. 
The moment is sufficiently dire to note the ways in which the “Muslim” is now 
effectively positioned as a uniquely globalized subject, a subject of theoretical as well as 
political and military labor. This widespread trope of the Muslims as the quintessentially 
violent and troubled Other of modernity and civilization, as a spectral figure outside of 
time, opens her up to the specific modes of discursive and institutional subjection and 
correction. Whether as policed subject-citizens in western democracies or tortured bodies 
in Abu Ghraib, the Muslim is both the prime and primal cite for violent interventionist 
strategies and inquisitions, by jihadists and imperialists alike. 
Thus while it is easy to vilify acts of ‘ulama taqwa politics, there is a certain 
recognition that the modern, and in particular the American liberal imagination must 
perform. This is the recognition of specter haunting the very conceptions of identity and 
sovereignty. The way in which the ‘ulama draw sharp borders between “true believers” 
and “heretics” as a prelude for legitimizing violence against their bodies, is simply a 
theologically inflected form of the secular biopolitical “US vs. Them” characterization 
which has routinely accompanied the history of American exceptionalism and violence 
against the other. By violently dominating the articulation of boundaries the ‘ulama lay 
claim to speak for Islam itself, thereby attempting to localize within their own 
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particularity, an element that is unlocalizable.729 By centering Islam within themselves, 
the ‘ulama disavow internal differences through the concretization of an external threat 
(to Islam/Pakistan). The neoliberal guardians of the West perform a similar function in 
their characterization of Muslims as in need of yet another civilizing mission. In the 
western imagination, does not Islam, as a heresy against Christianity in the first instance 
and as a heresy against time itself in the second, function in imperial discourses to 
similarly produce anomic zones and spaces of emergency? The attacks of 911 were 
mobilized in the US not in terms of a crime, but as an act of blasphemy against the body 
of a global sovereign. It was coded as the first broadside in a wider uprising of anti-
modern barbarians. This direct attack against the global sovereign in turn unleashed its 
own vast cultural-military and disciplinary mechanisms; torture, “shock and awe”, vast 
piles of human collateral damage and other exemplary forms of punishment, paralleling 
the ways in which the sovereign of the ancien régime responded to crimes against its 
body. 
                                                
729 “When our age tried to grant the unlocalizable a permanent and visible localization, the result was the 
concentration camp. … the juridical constellation that guides the camp is … martial law and the state of 





























For this project the metacolonial was originally thought in terms of critical 
ontology; as a cartography or topology of being-power. Inspired by the traces and paths 
already illuminated by three key thinkers whose works span the 20th century —Martin 
Heidegger (1889 –1976), Michel Foucault (1926 –1984), and Giorgio Agamben (b. 1942) 
— the metacolonial aims to gather these various onto-critical vectors under a single sign. 
Thus in its fullest sense the metacolonial should be regarded as an ontological concept. In 
its shortest formulation critical ontology can be understood as a question of the relation 
of being-power. Its critical axis relates to power, and its ontological axis to being — 
critical (power/knowledge), ontology (being). If Foucault stands to the left of this 
formulation and Heidegger to the right, then Agamben exemplifies the confrontation 
between the two. Critical ontology is thus a disclosure of the crossing/tension between 
being and power; the polemos of being and power. This relay of being-power is 
constitutive of human subjectivity in its historical and political unfolding. As a creature 
of critical ontology, the metacolonial aims to disclose the situation of ‘man’ (Dasein) in 
the wake of an understanding and operation of life that is colonized by metaphysics. 
However beyond the preface and this appendix, the ontological elements of the 
project have been played down in favor of a more concerted engagement with power. 
However it should be clear that being and power are interrelated questions; hence 
Foucault’s later turn towards critical/historical ontology. It was in one of Foucault’s final 
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and widely read essay’s devoted to Kant, “What is Enlightenment?”730—an essay in 
which he attempts to distance and distinguish the practice of critique from humanism—
that we first hear the conjunction ‘critical ontology’ and ‘historical ontology’. The six 
references to “ontology” in this essay can perhaps be read as a late terminological gesture 
offered in acknowledgement of the decisive influence that Heidegger had on his entire 
corpus: “For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher. […] My entire 
philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger.”731 If nothing 
else this phrase offers us a potentially invaluable bridge between the work of ontology 
and the work of political and cultural critique. However due to limitation of length, 
intelligibility, and the discursive requirements, of the discipline of history, I have 
marginalized the ontological ramifications of the metacolonial and its key paradigms: 
biopolitics, sovereignty and the state of exception. 
Heidegger, Foucault and Agamben — the original critical figures that informed 
my development of a metacolonial reading of history — together constitute the axis of 
ontology. Their works converge across at least three thematics: 
‘technology/Machenschaft’, ‘biopolitical sovereignty’, and ‘the space of exception’. 
Heidegger’s critique of technology and his diagnosis of modernity as nihilism (Gestell), 
Foucault’s genealogical grammars of power (biopolitics and governmentality/security) 
and Agamben’s ‘sovereigntology’ (the state/space of exception), all share a broad 
characteristic which can be subsumed under the general trajectory of ‘power over the 
singularity of life.’ In Foucault’s work the ontological resonances of his grammars of 
                                                
730 Michel Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment," in The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works 
of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New York: The New Press, 2003), p. 43 - 63. 
731 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Div I, p. 9. For a brilliant 




power (biopolitics, discipline, governmentality, security) are subdued. However 
Agamben radicalizes Foucault’s conception of biopolitical sovereignty, by resituating the 
question of power within the history of being. The broader aim of a critical ontology is to 
disclose the linkage between biopolitical sovereignty and Ge-stell — Heidegger’s short 
hand term for the essence of technology and technological enframing (technē). In its 
simplest formulation then, the metacolonial, as a phenomenon, refers to the colonization 
of life by metaphysics (ontotheology); the colonization of life by power. 
If ontology is the future—as the inter-disciplinary wide turn towards post-
foundationalism would seems to indicate732—then this work seeks to stand as a 
preliminary exploration and bridge towards this coming ethico-political topology. 
 
 
                                                
732 See for instance Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, 
Badiou and Laclau, Carsten Strathausen, A Leftist Ontology: Beyond Relativism and Identity Politics (Univ 
Of Minnesota Press, 2009). See in particular the essay “Giorgio Agamben’s Franciscan Ontology” by 
Lorenzo Chiesa in Lorenzo Chiesa and Alberto Toscano, eds., The Italian Difference: Between Nihilism 




Foucault’s Concept of Power 
 
 
For Foucault, critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. 
It is not simply a matter of saying I am against this or that. Rather it is a matter of 
pointing out, of uncovering, the kinds of assumptions, the familiar unchallenged, 
unconsidered modes of thought, upon which the practices we accept, actually rest, 
including and above all scholarly practices. The task of genealogical thinking then is to 
understand the political rationalities (or reasons of power) that operate at any given place 
and time. Foucault's historical methodology thus aims to provide tools by which the 
governed can understand the rationality and structure of power that informs the way they 
are governed and thereby better resist more intolerable and unjust forms governance. In 
part this involves understanding the contradictions and effects of the systems of power 
we inhabit. At the base of his critique was a complex, evolving and nuanced 
understanding of power. Foucault can thus be seen as offering not only a novel way of 
thinking about power, but also as offering a critique of the understandings of power that 
have been foundational for much of the ‘radical’ and liberal tradition of protest against 
abusive state power and other forms of social control and injustice. Crucial aspects and 




1) It avoids thinking of power as a thing or substance which can be owned or 
possessed. Power is not a capacity (as in horsepower). 
2) It understands power as relational and spatial. 
3) Most critically power does not only reside at the level of the State and the 
apparatus of the state (police, government, etc). Both of his key terms for forms of 
modern power, ‘bio-power’ and governmentality, challenges the idea of the bordered 
state as the sole container of sovereign power and authority. Instead power is capillary 
like and flows through the social body.733 
4) Power is never a stable, coherent and unitary entity, but rather a collection of 
“power relations” that imply complex historical conditions and multiple effects. Power is 
as always field of powers, an assemblege. Consequently, whenever Foucault speaks of 
power he is never describing a primary or fundamental principle, but rather a collection 
of correlations wherein practices, knowledge and institutions intersect. 
5) Foucault avoids essentialist understandings of the subject. For Foucault the 
subject is not a pre-given, essential identity outside power, but rather an identity already 
complicit in power relationships. The ‘soul’ or ‘self’ is in part, an ‘effect’ of power. If the 
subject is always already fully implicated in power relations, the effects of power 
constitute the very core of its being. Thus we must look beyond the liberal humanist 
subject for a more effective critique of power and the political. 
 
                                                
733 “Power circulates throughout the cells and the extremities of the social body; it is an aspect of every 
social practice, social relation, and social institution....... Truth isn’t outside power... [or] the reward of free 
spirits.... Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it 
induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth.” 
Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77, 131. 
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6) There is no place of truth beyond power to which criticism aspires. Power is 
itself about “placing.” Power puts things in order (ordering), it establishes rules of 
hierarchy and distribution. Power produces knowledge of ones place (knowing ones place 
in society).We may say that space is power, that power operates as a system of spatial 
arrangements (e.g. the panopticon) 
7) Power is not a one-sided, monolithic and repressive force, but rather is a fluid 
and dynamic relationship; one that emerges from a multitude of points and is coextensive 
with the social body. 
8) Since power is not a simple hierarchy of domination and subordination, since 
power flows from the bottom up and circulates within the social body, power cannot 
merely be totalized in a sovereign state. In this way Foucault shifts the attention of the 
critique of power away from an over emphasis on the State and the ‘ideological state 
apparatuses’ (police, courts, military, etc.) and redirects them to other spheres(e.g. 
towards global markets, private corporations, other civic, social and political institutions: 
church, school, prison, hospital, factory, film industry, psychiatric wards, etc.) 
9) For Foucault, power no longer functions only to distort, conceal or repress 
truth, but also operates through ‘regimes of truth’ (knowledge experts). Power is not 
merely deductive (a power that takes) it is also productive. Power is not only prohibitive. 
Power does not only say No! 
 
Foucault kept modifying or ‘redefining’ his account of power734. In one of his last 
interviews he distinguished three different levels in his analyses of power: relationships 
                                                













295-B  Defiling, etc, of copy of Holy Qur’an. Whoever willfully defiles, damages or 
desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an extract there from or uses it in any 
derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable for 
imprisonment for life. 
 
295-C  Use of derogatory remarks, etc; in respect of the Holy Prophet. Whoever by 
words, either spoken or written or by visible representation, or by any imputation, 
innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the 
Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment 
for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 
 
298-A  Use of derogatory remarks, etc..., in respect of holy personages. Whoever by 
words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, 
innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly defiles a sacred name of any wife 
(Ummul Momineen), or members of the family (Ahl-i-bait), of the Holy Prophet 
(PBUH), or any of the righteous caliphs (Khulafa-e-Rashideen) or companions 
(Sahaba) of the Holy Prophet description for a term which may extend to three 
years, or with fine, or with both. 
 
298-B  Misuse of epithet, descriptions and titles, etc. Reserved for certain holy 
personages or places. 
 
1 Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 
Ahmadis or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written or by 
visible representation: 
 
 refers to or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion of the 
Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as "Amir-ul Momineen", "Khilafat-ul 
Momineen", "Khilafat-ul Muslimin", "Sahaba" or "Razi Allah Anho"; 
 
 refers to or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the Holy Prophet 




 refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family 
(Ahl-i-Bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as Ahl-i-Bait; or 
 
 refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family 
(Ahl-i-Bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as Ahl-i-Bait; or 
 
 refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as Masjid; shall be 
punished with imprisonment or either description for a term which may 
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
 
2 Any person of the Qadiani group or Lahore group, (who call themselves 
Ahmadis or by any other names), who by words, either spoken or written, 
or by visible representations, refers to the mode or from of call to prayers 
followed by his faith as "Azan" or recites Azan as used by the Muslims, 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which 
may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 
 
298-C  Persons of Qadiani group, etc, calling himself a Muslim or preaching or 
propagating his faith. Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who 
call themselves Ahmadis or any other name), who directly or indirectly, posses 
himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or 
propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken 
or written, or by visible representation or in any manner whatsoever outrages the 
religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 










The text of the “Objectives Resolution” as passed by the Constituent Assembly 
March 1949:  
 
‘In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful’ 
 
Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and 
the authority which He has delegated to the state of Pakistan through its people for being 
exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;  
This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame 
a constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan;  
Wherein the state shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen 
representatives of the people;  
Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social 
justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed;  
Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order I their lives in the individual and 
collective sphere in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in 
the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah;  
Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and 
practice their religions and develop their cultures;  
Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such 
other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a 
federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on 
their powers and authority as may be prescribed;  
Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of 
opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of 
thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, and association, subject to law and public 
morality;  
Wherein adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of 
minorities and backward and depressed classes;  
Wherein the independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured;  
Wherein the integrity of the territories of the federation, its independence and all 
its rights including its sovereign rights on land, sea, and air shall be safeguarded;  
 
 371 
So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honored 
place amongst the nations of the world and make their full contribution towards 








Table 1: Results of National Assembly Elections of November 1988 
        
 Punjab Sind Frontier Baluchistan Others  Total 
PPP 52 31 7 1 1 92 
IJI 44 - 8 2 - 54 
MQM - 13 - - - 14 
Other Parties 5 - 7 6 8 18 
Independent 12 2 3 2 8 26 
 
Total Seats 113 46 25 11 9 204 




Table 2: Results of National Assembly Elections of October 1990 
        
 Punjab Sind Frontier Baluchistan Others  Total 
IJI 59 3 8 2 1 105 
PDA 14 24 5 2 - 45 
MQM - 15 - - - 15 
ANP - - 6 - - 6 
JUI (Fazlur) - - 4 2 - 6 
Minor Parties 3 - - 5 - 8 
Independent 6 4 3 - 8 21 
 
Total Seats 114 46 26 11 9 206 















































Al-Balagh (Dar al-‘Ulum, Karachi) 
Al-Farooq (Jami‘a Faruqiyya, Karachi) 
al-Haq (Haqqania, Peshawar),  
al-Hasan (Jami‘a Ashrafiya, Lahore) 
al-Bayyanat (Karachi) 
Al-Khayr (Multan) 
Tarjuman-i Islam (Lahore) 
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